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PREFACE 
Empirical research on youth has been conducted continually by the Institute 
for social research in Zagreb since its very foundation that is, since the mid 
1960s. During this period numerous projects aimed at gaining scientific insight 
into equally numerous issues relevant for studying youth have been realized. The 
last of a series of such scientific-research projects – Youth and European 
Integration Processes – whose implementation began at the end of 2002, has 
been conducted by: Vlasta Ilišin (project manager), Josip Županov, Furio Radin, 
Dejana Bouillet, Helena Štimac Radin, Ivona Mendeš and Dunja Potočnik. This 
scientific-empirical project is different from most others focused on the youth 
population, most of all because this investigation included a control sample of 
adult examinees. This form of coverage of examinees enables the analysis of 
possible inter-generational differences, where there are a great many assump-
tions, but not enough is known for sure. 
This book is the first in a series of two scientific monographs that together 
represent an integral interpretation of the results gained from this project. The 
subject of analysis in this study is the relationship of youth toward the European 
integration process and their, in a wider sense, political readiness for inclusion in 
that process. The analysis includes, apart from inter-generational comparisons, 
comparisons with the results of previous research on youth in Croatia, along 
with results of European research conducted on youth or the general population. 
This book is conceived as a research study, and it is structured into eight 
chapters. 
Youth, Croatia and Europe: An Introduction to the Research written by 
Vlasta Ilišin is the first, introductory chapter. It outlines the conceptual 
framework of the research and specifies the social context in which it was 
conducted, that is, the contemporary Croatian society, the process of European 
integration and risks accompanying the process of transition and globalization. It 
thus starts with the general hypothesis that tendencies and changes in Croatian, 
European and global settings leave a significant mark on the young generation in 
Croatia, that is, that all this influences the forming of attitudes of youth toward 
the phenomena researched. The introductory chapter also explains the research 
methodology, research goals, the instruments applied and the construction of the 
sample. An integral part of this explanation is the comparison of the structure of 
the basic sample of youth and the control sample of adults, and the analysis of 
youth as a foundation for understanding the later differentiations within this 
population. 
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The European Union has for several years been present in the Croatian 
public as an often exploited subject, but that is, for the most part, not accompa-
nied by adequate analytical insights nor by argumented and rational discussions 
about the meaning of the European integration process, as well as the European 
ambitions of Croatia in that context. Serious discussion have been suppressed 
into the background by the onrush of emotions, prejudice and stereotypes – and 
if they are conducted, they are mostly concentrated on the legal and economic 
aspects of European unification. This is why Damir Grubiša analyzes the genesis 
and development stages of the European Union in the second chapter, Political 
Axiology of the European Union: The Goals and Values of European 
Integration, accenting the political dimension of the integration process. Here, 
special attention is dedicated to the values this process of integration is founded 
on, which lead to the creation of a new Europe of values. 
The following three chapters consider the subjective political precondi-
tions, that is, the socio-political readiness of youth for Croatian integration into 
the European Union. Thus, in the third chapter, Political Values, Attitudes and 
Participation of Youth: Continuity and Change, Vlasta Ilišin analyzes the 
political values of youth, the changes in perceptions of social and political 
problems and forms of participation of youth in social and political processes 
and institutions. In this context, special emphasis was given to insights into the 
democratic potential and social capital of youth and an analysis of the perception 
of Croatian integration into the EU as a political goal, which is in an indicative 
discrepancy with the officially proclaimed priorities. 
Human rights: The ticket towards a Democratic Europe is the title of the 
fourth chapter written by Dunja Potočnik. Starting with the hypothesis that 
human rights and freedoms are important for the democratic legitimating of 
Croatia on its road to a united Europe, she analyzes the evaluation of particular 
human rights and freedoms, and the perception of youth on the protection of 
those rights in Croatia, as well as the contribution of different social protagonists 
to their realization, along with changes that have taken place during the last 
several years in the dimensions investigated. 
In the fifth chapter National Identity and Attitudes toward Europe Furio 
Radin analyzes the phenomena of national cohesion and social distances, 
changes taking place in that regard and their relation to the attitude toward 
Europe and Croatian integration into the European Union. In his analysis, along 
with intra-generational, special attention is dedicated to inter-generational 
variations in the level of national cohesion, all resulting in some interesting 
findings. 
The sixth and seventh chapters consider the relationship of youth and the 
process of European integration, especially the perception of existing and 
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potential problems in the process of Croatian accession to the European Union. 
Vlasta Ilišin and Ivona Mendeš analyze the existing positive and negative 
expectations, as well as the perception of potential winners and losers, when 
Croatia is integrated into the European Union some day, in the chapter named 
Youth and the European Union: Perception of Consequences of Integration. 
Equal attention is dedicated to the perception of trends of development and 
potential difficulties in the European Union itself, in order to determine the 
image young people have about this desired association, because they are the 
ones that the future of the European Croatia will significantly depend on. 
Ivona Mendeš analyzes the existing and desired level of information about 
European integration and institutions, as well as knowledge about certain aspects 
of the process of Croatian accession to the European Union, and the institutional 
configuration of the Union, in the chapter Knowledge and Information about the 
European Union. The disparity between the self-assessed good level of 
information and the weak knowledge about the investigated dimensions is a 
significant trend confirming that Croatian citizens are in dire need of education 
about the main political goal of the actual political option and the prevailing part 
of the Croatian political elite. 
Finally, the Summary is also an integral part of this book. 
Along with the researchers and the technical services at the Institute, almost 
one hundred surveyors, having to invest significant effort to reach and animate 
the examinees to cooperate, are to thank for the realization of the scientific-
research project Youth and European Integration Processes. The effort to ensure 
the quality of work of the surveyors and their motivation to successfully finalize 
the task and within the deadlines was mostly made by the young members of the 
project, Dunja Potočnik and Ivona Mendeš. Their engagement in the preparation 
and implementation of the field part of the research by far surpassed the 
demands usually put before young assistants, and the fact should be emphasized 
with special pleasure that they proved to be up to all the challenges that faced 
them. 
The project was financed by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Sport 
of the Republic of Croatia. However, special gratitude is owed to the 
Department for the Family of the Ministry of the Family, Veterans' Affairs and 
Intergenerational Solidarity, which, as a co-financer of the project, enabled the 
field research to be conducted in the planned scale. 
Unfortunately, in the last stages of the realization of this project, in 
November 2004, a member of our research group and a long-standing honorable 
associate, the academician Josip Županov died. His parting from the social and 
scientific scene is a great loss for Croatian social sciences, particularly 
sociology. Regretting the fact that he could not finalize his engagement on our 
Croatian Youth and European Integration 
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common project in the form of a written contribution, we remain permanently 
grateful for all the intriguing and productive ideas he shared with us, as well as 
his selfless pedagogic advise, in the best sense of those words, that we could 
always count on when we encountered any research doubts. 
 
In Zagreb, September 2007 
Vlasta Ilišin 
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Vlasta Ilišin 
YOUTH, CROATIA AND EUROPE: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
The beginning of the 21st century in Croatia has been marked by significant 
changes, as well as the continuing of social trends formed in the first decade of the 
transition period. This is also a time when Croatian efforts to join the European 
Union are becoming more intense. The process of European integration and the 
European Union as an institutional expression of a united Europe have become the 
most important topics to the political and wider public. Citizens, who are burdened 
with a number of problems, especially those of the socio-economic character, are 
for the most part only passive observers of political moves undertaken by those in 
power, but that is sufficient for their attitudes to form towards European integra-
tion and Croatia’s place in the united Europe. Specific issues are touched upon, 
including the questions about the readiness of Croatia and its citizens to join the 
EU, as well as the potential advantages and disadvantages, that is, winners and 
losers in the process of accession to the European Union. In this context, the 
young appear as the one segment of the population that is relevant in many ways 
as a research subject. To be more specific, an insight into the readiness and the 
relationship of citizens toward the inclusion of Croatia into the European integra-
tion process, requires that special attention be given to the young, for they should 
be the ones who will spend most of their lives in a new and different social and 
political surrounding. Thus, their attitudes to the European integration of Croatia 
and their readiness for adequate participation in that process become, if not 
decisive, then certainly important for the success of that process, both from the 
viewpoint of Croatia and its citizens and from the viewpoint of the EU. Besides, 
the young are that portion of the population which is most sensitive to different 
influences, which is why changes taking place in the modern society may be 
detected in them first. 
In this introduction, we will specify the conceptual framework and the 
social context within which the social attributes of youth are being subjected to 
empirical research, as an indicator of their readiness for integration into a 
European environment, as well as their relationship toward European integration 
and Croatia’s inclusion in the EU. We will also extend an explanation of the 
methodology used and the structure of the sample, while theoretical approaches 
Vlasta Ilišin 
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to the chosen research problems will be elaborated specifically in each portion of 
the research. 
1. Croatia and the process of European integration 
The first decade of transition in Croatia was more turbulent than in most 
post-socialist countries. Along with all the difficulties every country in transition 
faced more or less successfully, Croatia also experienced several years of armed 
conflict. War, fought on Croatian soil, left long-lasting economic and social 
consequences that the social sciences will explore for a long time to come. 
However, the changes brought about by the establishment of the new socio-
political order are equally important for social sciences. These changes were all-
encompassing, and they were especially deep in the political and economic 
systems. The new political order was normatively based on liberal-democratic 
values, and the economic system on the postulates of capitalism. This, in princi-
ple, signified the acceptance of the fact that the democratic social order means 
political pluralism, the rule of law, tolerance, the respect for human and minority 
rights, freedom of the press and so on, while the new economic system demands 
the inviolability of private ownership, and the development of entrepreneurship 
and a market-oriented economy. In the early 1990s there was a sense of euphoria 
among the Croatian citizens, instigated by state independence, national affirma-
tion and the abolition of the totalitarian political system, which undermined the 
problems occurring from the very start of transition. 
Namely, in spite of the given normative and institutional-political 
frameworks, the real processes in Croatia did not always occur in accordance 
with the proclaimed principles. Thus, an ethnically homogenous state with the 
domination of the concepts of national integration and renewal of traditional 
values was installed; the political monopoly of a single party, whose style of 
government included some elements of authoritarianism and clientelism, lasted 
for ten years; the public media were more in the service of the ruling nomencla-
ture than the citizens; human rights and national minorities' rights were often 
violated without respective sanctions (Katunarić, 1995; Lalović, 2000; 
Kasapović, 2001; Zakošek, 2002). 
The deficient democratization of the Croatian society, along with the 
Croatian involvement in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also contributed to 
the significant foreign policy isolation of Croatia. At the same time, the nation-
alization of social ownership was conducted, followed by privatization using a 
model that had enabled numerous malpractices. 
Ownership conversion and the restructuring of the economy have resulted 
in the mass deterioration of economic subjects and in the loss of work places, in 
Youth, Croatia and Europe: An Introduction to the Research 
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the fall of living standards of the widest strata of the population as well as in a 
pronounced deepening of social differences. The new situation was reflected in 
the loss of the type of social security known to the generations that had lived 
under socialism, in the reduction of social rights and protection, on the deepen-
ing of inequalities in education opportunities and the general worsening of the 
quality of life. The end of the war and the experience of living in new circum-
stances have enabled dissatisfaction with the manner and dynamics of social 
transformation to surface, brought about even more because the citizens had 
great expectations regarding fast progress on individual and social plains at the 
beginning of the transitional period. Instead, Croatia lost its comparative 
advantages from the beginning of the period of transition relatively soon and 
found itself at the lower part of the success scale of transitional countries. The 
second decade of transition began with a change in power, and at the end of 
2003 a third, peaceful political alternation, which undoubtedly signifies 
Croatia’s entrance into a period of democratic consolidation. However, other 
political changes took place, such as the democratization of society, the liberali-
zation of media space (along with the increase of criticism in the media), greater 
protection for human and minority rights. These trends started when the six-
member coalition took over power in the beginning of 2000, and in a number of 
aspects they were accelerated and clearly articulated after the CDU and its 
coalition partners came into power at the end of 2003. Indeed, the coalition in 
power made several very important symbolic moves that sent a strong message – 
before all, to European partners – about the persistence of Croatia in building 
democratic norms and standards. However, the trends that seem to persevere are 
those in the economic sphere. Economic development of Croatia has not been 
initiated, propulsive entrepreneurship activity not achieved, the competitive 
abilities of the country have not been improved, the consequences of poorly run 
privatization have not been rectified, and falling into debt as well as the sale of 
valuable resources to foreign capital have continued. Most citizens are dissatis-
fied again, because their standard of living has not improved, the unemployment 
rate is still high, and with almost every new law and state budget, the already 
reduced social rights keep decreasing. 
Within the stated continuity and changes relations between Croatia and the 
EU hold a specific position. After the 2000 elections Croatian isolation loosened 
and the relationship with the EU seemed to be constantly improving, which 
resulted in the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2001, 
and in receiving the avis in 2004, granting Croatia candidate status for accession 
to the European Union. However, in March 2005 Croatia did not manage to 
arrange the beginning of the desired negotiations about accession due to the 
assessment by the European partners of its unsatisfactory cooperation with the 
Hague Court. These negotiations started in October 2005. Croatian accession to 
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the EU is the greatest priority of this Government, and the agreement of almost 
all the relevant political parties has been achieved on this issue. The delay in 
starting the negotiations with the EU was reflected on political processes and 
relationships in the country, but furthermore on the attitudes of citizens toward 
European integration and the EU. The relationship of the EU towards Croatia 
and the potential advantages and disadvantages that Croatia’s accession to the 
Union might cause are especially questioned. All this seems to lead to a greater 
disregard of the question of what the potential perspective of Croatia might be if 
it did not join the EU. 
Even though the basic information about the EU is mostly familiar, it is not 
needless to recall the main stages of development of that association (Obradović, 
2004). The process of European integration started in 1951 by the association of 
six European countries headed by France and Germany. The first enlargement 
took place in 1973 with the accession of three other countries, the second in 
1981 with the joining of Greece, the third in 1986 with two other Southern 
European countries entering (Portugal and Spain), the fourth in 1995 when three 
countries joined the Union and finally, the fifth and the largest enlargement with 
ten countries, after which the EU consists of a total of 25 member countries. 
Among the newest members, eight used to belong to the group of socialist 
countries, and their accession has also symbolically signified the erasure of the 
ideological-political border between the former European West and East. 
Parallel to the geographic enlargement of the EU, there has been a process of 
deepening of the European integration. The initial motive for unification was 
economic in nature, and those reasons remain permanently important, which is 
easily recognizable in the set-up and functioning of the common market, the 
customs union, the economic-monetary union... However, at the same time, the 
need for the integrated European countries to establish deeper mutual coopera-
tion on the political level and to build common political bodies, as well as 
regulate a way of making decisions that could overcome the “democratic deficit” 
present in the EU, was obvious (Mintas-Hodak, 2004:17). This dimension of the 
integration process culminated in the formulation of the European Constitution 
in 2004, but considering its grave problems with ratification it is questionable if 
it will ever come into power. The Constitution regulates the institutional 
structure and the composition of common bodies of authority and the manner of 
their functioning and decision-making, but it also promotes the values the united 
Europe is founded on. Independent from the destiny of the Constitution of 
Europe and the modifications it is bound to endure, those values cannot be 
doubted, and in this research project they are the aspect of European integration 
that interests us the most. Here it should be mentioned that these values originate 
from the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Basic 
Freedoms from 1950, which has been amended and elaborated over time in 
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accordance with the social changes taking place in democratic societies, only to 
be included at last in the European Constitution as the basic document of an 
integrated Europe. Thus, is should be noted that the European Union is, at the 
declaratory level, based on the values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, rule of law and respect for human rights, all linked to pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and 
men. 
The EU guarantees the freedom of movement of people, goods, services 
and capital, and forbids discrimination based on nationality. The goals of the EU 
spring from the stated values, such as the preservation of peace and wellbeing of 
citizens, sustainable development, the promotion of scientific and technologic 
progress, the promotion of justice and social protection, gender equality, inter-
generational solidarity and protection of the rights of children, along with the 
reduction of social exclusion and discrimination , and stimulating economic, 
social and territorial cohesion and solidarity among the EU members (A 
Constitution for Europe, 2004: 8). These values and goals of European integra-
tion represent, at the same time, a catalogue of general political demands that 
should be complied with by the countries wishing to join this association. 
The criteria that the EU sets for future members emphasize the question of 
the influence of this association on the aspiring countries and the existing 
member countries. In other words, the initial dominant focus on research into the 
impact of the member states on the EU has, in analytic insights, been redirected 
to the process of Europeisation , that is, to the realization of the influence of EU 
on the continent and changes in particular countries. As S. Hix and K. H. Goetz 
(2000) notice, political science studies of European integration are developing 
along with the progress of the process of integration itself. To be more specific, 
these studies have for years been in a gap between two political science 
disciplines: comparative politics (focused mostly on the comparison of institu-
tions and processes in different countries) and international relations (oriented 
toward studying the international and regional institutions and relations). Since 
the long-term empirical influence of European integration on national political 
institutions and processes is still not transparent and seems minor, this might be 
the reason that it has been disregarded. However, with the development of the 
EU the potential influence of this association, and its institutions and decisions, 
on the economic development and political order of certain countries is increas-
ing, so that the mutual influences become the object of analysis. Thus, we may 
say today that “European integration encompasses two mutually related 
processes: the transfer of political competences onto the supranational level for 
the purpose of achieving particular political goals, and the establishment of a 
new set of political institutions with executive, legislative and legal powers” 
(Hix, Goetz, 2000:3). At the same time, European integration is observed within 
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the context of the globalization process. The EU is then understood as a 
protagonist that contributes to creating a globalized economy, as well as an 
association that represents one of the leading powers in global political 
transformations with its institutional-political solutions (Hix, Goetz, 2000; 
Youniss and others, 2002). 
The influence of the EU on member countries is realized mostly on the 
economic plain through market regulation (which includes the harmonization of 
existing national standards), macroeconomic stabilization and redistribution of 
common resources (Duch, Taylor, 1997; Gabel, 1998). This influence is direct 
because it demands the adjustment of national standards to the common 
European norms. However, the EU has an indirect influence as well that 
strengthens along with the enlargement and the deepening of the process of 
European integration (Hix, Goetz, 2000; Davies, 2003). That indirect influence 
may be recognized at the institutional level and in the patterns of political 
functioning and behavior, where certain changes can be stimulated or existing 
processes strengthened if they are in accordance with EU demands. However, 
the process of European integration can indirectly influence national electoral 
processes and political parties as well, including the choice of options in public 
policies, and the representation and mediation of the structure of interests (Hix, 
Goetz, 2000:11). At the same time, the enlargement and development of the EU 
and its institutions enables national political protagonists to enter a wider politi-
cal arena where they will gain important informational leverage that can be used 
in their political activities on the domestic plain. The later statement suggests 
that the “political elites are equipped to better use the EU level to realize 
personal advantages, than regular party members or a mass electoral body” (Hix, 
Goetz, 2000:14). The main reason behind this is not that the project of European 
unification was thought of by the political elite, but because the political leaders 
are in charge of it and directly participate in the discussions and the decision-
making. This is why their level of information is significantly better, and why 
their accountability is higher, if the citizens of their countries do not have 
sufficient information about the relevant events on the EU level. 
How the EU is seen by the citizens of member countries and candidate 
countries is an important question, because citizens are the ones on whom the 
tempo and quality of development of European integration finally depend , and 
they have to endure the consequences of the decisions made by the political 
elite. Thus, public opinion surveys are being systematically conducted, and they 
have already demonstrated that the information citizens have on the EU, its 
institutions and decisions, as well as the perception of the potential advantages 
and disadvantages that membership in the EU brings to their country and them 
personally, vary in time and from one country to another. The findings of these 
researches are also one of the main contributions to a better insight into the 
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political dimensions of European integration, as well as into the indirect 
influences the EU realizes on the level of particular states. 
When considering Croatia, the influence of the EU already acting on 
domestic economic, and especially political processes, is undoubtedly more 
important than the Croatian influence on the EU (especially because Croatia has 
yet to fulfill the conditions for accession). The Croatian political elite has 
decided that joining the EU is a primary strategic goal, but different social and 
political events put the citizens' support to constant strain and test. The ups and 
downs in the relations with the EU directly influence the oscillations in the 
support for Croatian accession to that community of states, as well as changes to 
the perception of potential losses and gains at the national, group and individual 
level after Croatia becomes a member of the EU. Also, the EU presented Croatia 
with demands that had to be met in order to begin the accession negotiations, 
and among the standard criteria appeared those that are actually based on the 
less than satisfactory recovery from the social and political consequences of the 
war. That is how Croatia found itself in a small circle of European countries that 
had to fulfill very concrete political conditions along with the usual adjustments, 
and it is not irrelevant that there was no consensus in the country about its 
fulfillment. This, of course, is the cooperation with the Court in The Hague, 
which most members of the political elite achieved a relatively satisfactory 
consensus about, while a large share of the citizens were verbally opposed to its 
fulfillment. Croatia found itself in a very paradoxical situation. Specifically, 
even though it is politically prepared to join the EU better than economically, the 
start of the accession negotiations with the EU was inhibited by a political 
condition. Also, the public is of the prevailing opinion that Croatia is both 
economically and politically better prepared for European integration than 
countries that had at the time already begun negotiating for the next round of 
enlargement (specifically, Bulgaria and Romania), as well as some countries that 
had already become full members in the last round of EU enlargement. All this 
affected to a great degree the perception about the EU and the support of 
Croatian public opinion for the process of European integration, and previous 
studies have shown that changes almost always start with the young. 
2. Youth in a risk society 
The young represent one of those segments of the European population that 
is said to be the potential winners of the European integration process, and 
whose attitudes, due to their (future) role in the development and stability of the 
united Europe, are followed especially avidly. However, the increased social and 
scientific interest in youth occurred in mid 20th century, about the same time the 
European integration process started. In the early 1950s, youth became an 
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important segment of the population because of the role it had in the renewal of 
the war devastated social resources and in the modernization processes induced 
by speedy socioeconomic development. With time, different theories about 
youth have appeared and have been empirically tested, and each of them has 
enriched the knowledge about this specific population group. A systematic 
overview of existing theoretic and empirical findings can, hence, be summarized 
in an extensive definition that the “young are a social group sprung from the 
industrial society, including the population aged 15 to 30, to which society, 
independent of its psychophysical maturity and socio-cultural stratification, 
attributes common specific social characteristics, based on which it determines 
its special social role and subjugates it to special social treatment, the 
consequence of which is the marginal social status of youth compared to the 
older population” (Ilišin, 1999:69). 
In their approach to youth, two mutually complementary traditions are 
recognizable (Griffin, 1993; Roche, Tucker, 1997; Ule, 2000; Schizzerotto, 
Gasperoni, 2001). One sees youth as a resource, which means that the young are 
seen as representatives of a desirable future, the carriers of dominant social 
values transferred from one generation to another, as well as a potential source 
of innovation and a vital social asset and a segment of the population that needs 
to be provided with the optimal social conditions for development. In this 
context, the young are observed both as a future social strength and as an 
important social resource in the present. In other words, the social importance of 
youth comes from its potential that should be activated immediately, without 
delay for the future. Aside from than, the constant reduction of the demographic 
share of the young in the populations of developed countries suggests that they 
should be, or soon will need to be, treated as a relatively rare resource. The 
second tradition sees youth as a problem (that is, a source of problems and/or a 
group that experiences problems), meaning that it is looked upon as a population 
in a sensitive stage of development, thus prone to different forms of deviant 
behavior, that is still not satisfyingly integrated into the given society and that 
the same society should protect. This viewpoint is often linked to a negative 
public image about youth and the mistrust of the society toward the young 
generation. The consequences are reflected in the marginalized social status of 
youth and the paternalistic relationship of the society toward it. Both approaches 
exist today, and the prevailing approach in a given moment depends not so much 
on the youth, but on the dynamics of social events and changes. It is indicative 
that the approach to youth as a resource is emphasized more in periods of social 
stability and economic progress, while the opinion about youth as a problem is 
more pronounced in socially unstable conditions accompanied by economic 
stagnation or decay. Still, independent of the prevailing approach, the common 
goal of all modern societies is the adequate social integration of youth, for whom 
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adequate social conditions should be provided (Furlong, Guidikova, 2001). To 
put it differently, the development of existing capacities of youth should be 
stimulated in unstable times marked by fast change as well, because “as always, 
it is the task of youth to create history, present and future, and it is a social 
obligation to give to youth sufficient resources and ensure an adequate basis for 
the fulfillment of that task” (Youniss an others, 2002: 121). 
Young people are a very vulnerable segment of the population for a number 
of reasons, and changes taking place in the modern world, almost always and 
everywhere, before and more than others, seem to affect youth. The basic reason 
for this is that most young people are at a crossroads between the protected 
world of childhood and the competitive world of adulthood that expects from 
them adequate integration by taking over permanent social roles. However, this 
integration – today, and in the second half of the 20th century – is a complex 
process, in which the young often distance themselves from the society which, 
due to their vulnerability and specific living experience, they see as not friendly 
enough (Furlong, Cartmel, 1997). The ever longer duration of institutionalized 
education, the uncertain opportunities for employment (especially in safe and 
well paid jobs), the difficult socioeconomic emancipation and the delay in 
founding their own families are the characteristics of the phenomena known as 
prolonged youth (Ule, 1987; Griffin, 1993; Cavalli, Galland, 1995; Roche, 
Tucker, 1997; Brown, Larson, Saraswathi, 2002). Prolonged youth logically 
results in slow social integration and keeps the young in a dependant position 
toward society, and adults. 
At the same time, modern society is rapidly changing, making it a risky 
place to grow up in and an environment where patterns of the view of youth as a 
stage in life that serves as a transition into adulthood are changing (Beck, 1992; 
Furlong, Cartmel, 1997; Ingelhart, 1997; Roche, Tucker, 1997; Wyn, White, 
1997; Kipke, 1999; Miles, 2000; Mortimer, Larson, 2002). Globalization 
particularly contributes to these far-reaching changes, followed by the rapid 
development of the information-communication technology, economic changes, 
increased population migrations, which include increased risk and pressure for 
modernization, and reduces and transforms the existing forms of social 
reproduction (Larson, 2002; Youniss and others 2002; Ruddick, 2003). The 
global sources of risk – not just for youth – are the pollution of the environment, 
the instability caused by political crises and military conflicts, the crumbling of 
the bipolar world (the socialist vs. the capitalist bloc) with the constant deepen-
ing of the gap between the rich and poor parts of the world. (Ule, 2000; Ruddick, 
2003). The modernization processes in the contemporary world contribute to the 
weakening of traditional ties and manners of transferring values and behavioral 
patterns from generation to generation, where the young are forced to search for 
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identity and individual strategies of social integration in a more difficult way 
(Giddens, 1991; Ingelhart, 1997; Wyn, Dwyer, 1999; Ule, 2000). 
The risks the young are exposed to in a modern society are additionally 
expanded and deepened in transitional societies – both in comparison to youth 
from developed countries and to the earlier generations of youth in the socialist 
society. Growing up in this unique socio-historic period is marked by a double 
transition: first, the young pass through a universal transitional period from 
youth into adulthood and second, this process is taking place in a society that is 
itself in a process of social transformation. The socialization of youth is 
happening in conditions when institutions, processes and social norms that 
directed the transfer into the world of adults are gone, or are being fundamen-
tally changed themselves. Even though it is thought that the young are “the 
natural winners of transition” (Young People…, 2000: 12), because they are 
more susceptible and better equipped for accepting changes brought about by 
social transformation – the existing analytic insights have shown that the young 
are still more prone to new and greater risks than to new and better perspectives. 
Thus it has been demonstrated that poverty is expanding and social differences 
are deepening, and the state and social support for social reproduction and 
promotion is decreasing; competition on the labor market is being reduced, 
unlike the permanently high rates of unemployment of the young; social insecu-
rity is growing, including the increase of the crime rate and of different forms of 
deviant behavior; health protection is becoming less available even though the 
exposure to different forms of risky behavior is increasing; competition and 
pressure for achieving high levels of education are also increasing with the 
simultaneous reduction in the educational chances of youth from socially 
deprived classes; the previous social values depreciated, which is why the inter-
generational transfer is losing its importance; the new values are being 
established and internalized too slowly, so the young are left to search individu-
ally for identity and integrity and to manage in choosing their goals in life 
(Wallace, Kovatcheva, 1998; Tomusk, 2000; Ule, 2000; Young People…, 2000; 
Kovatcheva, 2001; Roberts, 2003). 
It is exactly the experiences and research into the social status and 
problems of youth in transitional countries that, according to K. Roberts (2003: 
484) demand a reaffirmation of the traditional (conventional) paradigm of youth 
in sociology that investigates the link between social origin, orientations and 
goals of youth. The transitional societies have shown that the life opportunities 
of youth are not created primarily individually. In other words, individual life 
choices occur within an existing social structure and are limited by the accessi-
bility of the necessary resources (Cote, 2002). An insight into the given 
structures, above all into the socioeconomic and socio-class dimensions, is a 
necessary foundation for the analysis of the cultural dimension of the lives of 
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youth, such as values, leisure, consumer behavior, sub-cultural patterns and 
lifestyles (Wyn, White, 1997; Miles, 1998; Wyn, Dwyer, 1999; Roberts, 2003). 
To put it shortly, great social changes in all post-socialist societies have clearly 
demonstrated that the achievements of youth and its future social status are 
predominantly caused by the starting positions that are, in turn, a consequence of 
existing socioeconomic and socio-structural reality. 
The changes occurring in the process of globalization and, recently, transi-
tion, do not, however, impact only the young. This is a global and epochal 
experience the young share with adults that to a certain degree contributes to the 
erasure of inter-generational differences. After the rapturous social turmoil of 
the 1960s it was noticed that the gap between the young and the adults/older has 
started to narrow (Keniston, 1971), while modernization strengthened to a 
degree the social position of youth, thus alleviating the differences in the 
generational distribution of power (Eisenstadt, 1992; Ule, 2000; Ruddick, 2003). 
In the preceding decades the young profited from the lengthening of education, 
because it helps them prepare for adequate social integration and increases their 
chances for a higher social status later on; the specific knowledge that youth has 
more of, especially in the field of new technologies, increases their competitive 
abilities on the labor market; due to the rapid changes adults have become less 
important in the transfer of knowledge and tradition onto the new generations, 
and the new lifestyles promoted by the young influence in part the transforma-
tion of adult living patterns. These changes in the relationship between the 
young and the old question the economic, political and cultural monopoly of 
adults (Ule, 2000:23), but do not abolish it, nor does it seem that such an 
ambition exists. Namely, after one generation of youth shook the existing order 
and power relations, more pragmatic generations came onto the scene. As S. 
Eisenstadt (1992) explains, even though they are critical toward the modern 
society, the young are not interested in conflicts with the centers of power and in 
radical changes. It would seem that the resistance towards adults is weakening, 
as is the generational homogenization of youth, and the author believes that 
inter-generational association and solidarity are gaining in strength. This can 
certainly be supplemented by the fact that the circumstances in transitional 
countries, including Croatia, do not stimulate intra-generational linking. It is just 
that the new competition circumstances and the socio-structural changes encour-
age choosing individual strategies for achieving better social positions. The 
existing channel of social promotions can be used less and less for this purpose, 
because social support is inadequate, and family resources, that is, the socio-
class defined opportunities and limitations, become more significant. The stated 
thoughts about youth in modern societies in general, and in transitional countries 
in particular, are the framework within which we observe today's generation of 
youth in Croatia. Here, research into the social characteristics of contemporary 
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Croatian youth aims at gaining insight into their readiness for integration into a 
developed European environment, that is, how they correspond to youth in the 
European Union in status, attitudes, values and behavioral patterns. 
3. Research methodology and sample structure 
Research goals 
The subject of this research are the social attributes, attitudes and behav-
ioral patterns of Croatian youth and their relationship toward European values, 
institutions and the process of integration. Within the research subject defined in 
this way, comparative analysis is conducted on two levels: a comparison of two 
generations of youth, and of youth and adults. 
In line with that, five general research goals have been set: 
1. to determine, describe and analyze the social attributes, problems, values and 
forms of behavior of the contemporary Croatian youth, 
2. to determine, describe and analyze the relationship of youth toward European 
values, institutions and integration process, 
3. to determine, describe and interpret the connection of the researched 
dimensions with the social attributes of youth, 
4. to determine, describe and interpret the changes that have taken place in the 
researched dimensions in the population of youth from 1999 to 2004, 
5. to determine, describe and interpret the similarities and differences between 
the young and adults in all the researched dimensions. 
 
The stated general research goals have been elaborated into a larger number 
of specific goals and hypotheses in each particular portion of this research 
project. 
Questionnaire 
The instrument for gathering empirical data was construed as a structured 
survey with questions of the closed type, in the form of nominal and interval 
scales. The questionnaire covers a relatively large number of indicators that were 
operationalized into sets of variables that detect: 
− the socio-demographic, socio-structural and socio-cultural characteristics of 
participants, 
− the perception of certain social phenomena and problems and the means for 
their solving, 
− the perception of problems and potential of youth, 
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− the reasons for satisfaction and dissatisfaction with different areas of life 
and the perception of future, 
− forms of behavior in certain areas of everyday life (use of new technologies, 
leisure time, interpersonal communication, use of psycho-active 
substances), 
− the value orientations, personality traits and social distance, 
− the perception of importance and protection of human rights and freedoms, 
− national cohesion and distance, 
− democratic values and political attitudes and participation, 
− the perception of different dimensions of European integration and expecta-
tions from Croatian accession into the European Union, 
− knowledge and information about European integration and institutions. 
 
This study uses the part of the applied questionnaire dealing with the social 
characteristics of youth, the perception of certain social phenomena and 
problems and ways of solving them, democratic values and political attitudes 
and participation, human rights and freedoms, national cohesion, the different 
dimensions of European integration, expectations from Croatian accession to the 
EU, and knowledge and information about European integration and institutions. 
The questionnaire has been doubly adjusted to the demands of comparative 
analysis. First of all, over half the variables are in content and formally identical 
to the variables applied in the research of youth in 1999, and most other 
variables were conceived in such a manner to enable a comparison with other, 
mostly European, research. Second of all, an identical instrument was used for 
researching the young and the adults, that is, only three questions have different 
contents, due to the adaptation to the specifics of the population being surveyed. 
The gathering of field data lasted from the beginning of February to the end 
of March 2004. The surveying was done in the participants' homes, and the 
questionnaire application was individual. After receiving instructions from the 
surveyor, each participant autonomously filled out the questionnaire, which 
lasted about an hour on average. Good cooperation by the participants was 
ensured, so that the proportion of those not answering certain questions does not 
exceed 5%. However, we must note here that the youth in 2004 demonstrated a 
lower level of readiness to participate in the survey than was the case five years 
earlier. According to the surveyors’ estimate, it is becoming more difficult to 
persuade citizens – the young and the adults – to spare some of their time to fill 
out a questionnaire. Some of those refusing to cooperate, especially in larger 
cities, stated that they were saturated by constant questioning of their opinion on 
different issues, which sounds convincing considering the boom of different 
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research agencies, whether they be public opinion agencies, or those in the field 
of marketing. Another group of citizens is resigned and does not wish to partici-
pate in anything; unless concrete personal gain can be recognized, that is, calling 
upon a higher social interest causes cynical remarks that there is no use from 
research insights, because those in power do not care what citizens think 
anyway. 
If these trends continue, it will become increasingly hard to conduct 
empirical research in Croatia, regardless if it is scientific or of some other 
nature. This is not encouraging for the researchers, or for the creators of social 
decisions, at the same time when changes in the public opinion of a country that 
aspires to join the integrated Europe should be followed more often and 
increasingly seriously. 
Sample 
This research used two samples: the basic sample of youth, comprising 
2000 participants, and a control sample of adults, including 1000 participants. 
The sample of youth includes the population from age 15 to age 29, and the 
sample of adults the population older than 30 years of age. Before we explain 
the construction of the sample, we must indicate that according to the 2001 
census, there were 903,000 young persons in Croatia, representing 20.6% of the 
total population. Demographic research has already demonstrated that in the 
modern society “the young population is decreasing both in absolute and in 
relative numbers” (Oliveira-Roca, 1993). This has been happening in Croatia as 
well, ever since 1953, when the proportion of youth was 27.7%, and each 
successive census has noted a decrease in the share of the young population. 
Both samples were constructed as a three-phased probabilistic sample of 
persons fitting the given age segments of the population, and they were chosen 
by the same method and realized at the same surveying locations. 
In the first stage the choice of 250 locations for surveying was made, with 
each location having 12 young and 6 adult participants (planned). The choice of 
location was made through systematic choice from a list of settlements in the 
Republic of Croatia, listed by counties and settlement size. The probability of 
choosing a particular settlement as the possible location for field work was 
proportional to the number of its inhabitants, with the possibility that the same 
location may be picked out again. This achieved a satisfying spatial arrangement 
and an adequate relation between the urban and rural populations. In the second 
stage, housing units where the surveys would be conducted, were picked in each 
of the locations. The choice was made from a list of telephone subscriptions by 
random choice without return. The third stage consisted of choosing a single 
participant within a chosen household. From the persons living in the household 
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in the given age category, one person was picked through a random choice 
method by Troldahl and Carter (1964), thus achieving a balance by age and 
gender. The balancing of the sample of youth and the sample of adults was 
achieved by surveying a young person in the first two households, and then an 
adult in the following household. This sequence was repeated until the quota 
was filled for the given sampling location. 
Through additional weighting, a correction of the covered sample of youth 
was made due to disproportions occurring, regarding the age segment and 
gender, which was a consequence of the unequal availability of all groups of 
participants to the surveyors. 
As is visible from the description of the sample construction1, the surveying 
was conducted in all the counties and the City of Zagreb. To be more precise, 
the research was conducted in a total of 175 settlements: 56 towns (four macro-
regional centers and 52 other towns) and 119 rural habitats. 
More detailed information on the structure of the realized samples is given 
in Table 1. It portrays those socio-demographic, socio-structural and socio-
cultural attributes of the participant that will be used in further analysis as the so-
called independent variables. 
Before analyzing the most indicative tendencies that stand out from the 
inter-generational and intra-generational comparisons, it is necessary to explain 
several points in the sample structure portrayed. First, the nationality of the 
participants was not shown, because that attribute is not used in further analysis. 
The reason lies in the extreme national homogenization: among the young 
94.9% (Croatian), and among the adults 93.1%. Among the other 10 registered 
nationalities, the most numerous is Serbian (1.8% in the sample of youth and 
2.8% in the sample of adults), but that is not sufficient a number to make a valid 
calculation of the statistically significant differences. Second, the attribute of the 
participants' mothers' education was omitted – since there is a large relation to 
the father's level of education, we consider that it is sufficient to use the father's 
education level as one of the indicators of social origin. Third, some of the 
attributes have been presented in summarized form (adjusted to further analysis). 
So, the grouping of the counties into six regions is explained here. Thus, the city 
of Zagreb was kept as a separate region (area), and the remaining five wider 
regions were composed in the following way: Northern Croatia (Zagreb, 
Krapina-Zagorje, Varaždin, Meñimurje, Koprivnica-Križevci and Bjelovar-
Bilogorje counties), Central Croatia (Sisak-Moslavina, Karlovac and Lika-Senj 
                                                     
1 The sample was constructed and described by dr. sc. Ivan Rimac, a senior scientific 
associate at the Institute for social sciences Ivo Pilar from Zagreb. 
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counties), Istria and Primorje (Istria and Primorje-Gorje counties), Eastern 
Croatia (Virovitica-Podravina, Požega-Slavonija, Brod-Posavina, Osijek-
Baranja and Vukovar-Srijem counties) and Dalmatia (Zadar, Šibenik-Knin, 
Split-Dalmatia and Dubrovnik-Neretva counties). 
The summarization was done for the party preference variable as well. The 
participants settled on 18 political parties in total, but for further analysis only 
the 5 parties preferred by at least 5% of the participants are used. The final list of 
parties in the variable of party preference/party identification is as follows: HDZ 
(Croatian Democratic Union), HNS (Croatian People’s Party), HSP (Croatian 
Rights Party), HSS (Croatian Peasant Party), SDP (Socio-Democratic Party) and 
undecided. 
The comparison of the structure of samples of youth and adults points to 
some significant tendencies. Before we touch upon these, we should mention that, 
of course, there are no differences regarding gender, place of residence and 
regional affiliation, because those were the attributes used to stratify the samples. 
There are no inter-generational differences when it comes to religious self-
identification either, which is an indicator of the process of de-secularization and 
retraditionalization, that has revoked the previously existing differences between 
the young (as less religious) and adults. 
On the other hand, the differences regarding age, marital and socio-
professional status of the youth and the adults are logical. A calculation indicates 
that the average age of the basic sample is 23.02, and of the control sample – 
50.05 years of age. Thus, it seems that the average age of the participants in the 
control sample is probably a little higher than would be the average age of the 
parents of the young participants, but the difference is not such that they could 
not be considered as representatives of the generation of parents. Aside from 
that, it should be mentioned that farmers (there are 0.9% of them among the 
young, and 3.5% of them among the adults) have been added to the contingent 
of employed, and that in the sample of adults the housewives (4.4%) were put 
into the category of unemployed persons. But, it is indicative that the share of 
unemployment is identical among the young and the adults, as well as that there 
are more retired persons in the adult sample than there is population that is older 
than 60. This data confirms the well known consequences of the relatively 
numerous bankruptcies that resulted in the lay-off of workers, and the mass 
premature retirement of the surplus of workers. In this, two fifths of those who 
are single among the adults are not married, or have never been married, and one 
fifth are divorced. 
 
Youth, Croatia and Europe: An Introduction to the Research 
 27 
Table 1: The structure of the basic (youth) and the control sample (adults) – (%) 
Attributes of participants Youth Adults 
Gender   
Female 49.1 51.5 
Male 50.9 48.5 
Age   
15 – 19 years 33.2 – 
20 – 24 years 34.0 – 
25 – 29 years 32.8 – 
30 – 39 years – 27.6 
40 – 49 years – 28.7 
50 – 59 years – 21.0 
60 and more years – 22.7 
Socio-professional status   
Employed 35.5 50.1 
Unemployed 20.8 20.6 
Pupils 22.8 – 
Students 20.9 – 
Retired  – 29.3 
Father's level of education (qualifications)   
(Un)finished elementary school 19.0 54.9 
Vocational school 29.1 19.8 
High school 30.6 16.2 
Junior college, university and higher 21.3 9.1 
Participant’s level of education (qualifications)   
(Un)finished elementary school 27.0 18.8 
Vocational school 17.7 20.4 
High school 43.8 36.0 
Junior college, university and higher 11.5 24.7 
Place of birth   
Village 43.3 58.0 
Small town 30.4 22.4 
Major city 11.3 9.1 
Zagreb 15.0 10.4 
Place of habitat (residential status, type of habitat, domicile)   
Village 43.3 42.9 
Small town 29.3 29.8 
Major city 10.1 10.3 
Zagreb 17.4 17.0 
Regional status   
Northern Croatia 22.8 22.8 
Central Croatia 8.6 8.4 
Istria and Primorje 12.2 12.0 
Eastern Croatia 19.2 19.6 
Dalmatia 19.7 19.6 
Zagreb 17.6 17.6 
Marital status   
Not married 80.8 24.6 
Married 19.2 75.4 
Religiosity (religious self-identification)   
Religious 73.6 75.8 
Undecided 16.2 12.3 
Not religious 10.2 11.9 
Party affiliation   
HDZ 27.1 35.1 
HNS 7.6 8.3 
HSP 7.3 4.6 
HSS 5.1 6.4 
SDP 14.2 12.0 
Undecided 38.8 33.6 
N (number of participants) 2000 1000 
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The differences between the young and adults that testify to important trends 
have to do with the educational status of the participants and their fathers and the 
place of birth. It is visible that the fathers of young participants are on average 
more educated than their children, which is primarily a consequence of the age 
difference: there are over one fifth of those still in high school and two thirds of 
those that could not have graduated from the university among the young, 
meaning that the educational differences between the young and their fathers will 
be clearly defined only once they approach the age of 30. However, the compari-
son of the level of education of the fathers of the young and the adult participants 
is an indication of the real situation in Croatia (Ilišin, Mendeš, Potočnik, 2003:63), 
that is, that each new generation is on average more educated than the previous 
one. Based on that, we can assume that today's generation of youth will at the end 
of its education become averagely more educated than the generation of their 
fathers, and especially grandfathers. However, it should be pointed that the 
educational structure of the adult participant varies from the official statistical 
information (Ilišin, Mendeš, Potočnik, 2003:62), in the sense of overrepresentation 
of participants with university degrees, and under representation of participants 
with no qualifications. This warping of the sample is very common in empirical 
research in Croatia, as a consequence of the well-known fact that the less educated 
citizens are less prepared to cooperate in surveys. It is certain that such a selected 
sample of adults affected the research results obtained (to the degree where 
education affects the attitudes and behavioral patterns), most probably in the 
direction of convergence with the attitudes of youth. This way the possible inter-
generational differences are probably mitigated, but the tendencies pointing to 
inter-generational similarities and differences are not changed significantly. The 
adults are noticeably more often of a rural provenience, a testimony to past 
processes of urbanization and modernization. Considering the relatively large 
share of rural population in the total population of Croatia, and compared to 
developed European countries, where that population makes up 5-10% of the total 
population, we can assume that these processes will continue – whether by the 
migration of the rural population into urban environment, or by the more intense 
urbanization and modernization of rural areas. 
The mutual comparison of the observed attributes on the basic sample (the 
young) has also resulted in insights into interesting tendencies, and it is at the 
same time useful for explaining the differences that appear under the influence 
of particular attributes. Here we will only mention the most important trends. 
When it comes to the young, there is a great interdependence of age, level of 
education and socio-professional status. Thus a comparison of the age and level 
of education of the examinees (χ2=1036.09) indicates that out of all the young 
that only have primary education, 16.0% of them are older than 19 (probably 
indicating that a good number of those will never achieve any qualification), 
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while 76% of those having some university education are also older than 25. Or, 
to put it differently, in the youngest age cohort, two thirds have only finished 
primary education, and the same number in the 20-24 age cohort have completed 
high school qualifications. The most interesting here are certainly those older 
than 25, 8.8% of whom have no qualifications, 22.4% have vocational 
education, and 42.2% have a four year high school education, while 26.5% have 
graduated from college or university. This oldest group of youth is the most 
reliable indicator of educational tendencies among the young, and it is obvious 
that the number of those that remain unqualified is decreasing while the number 
of highly educated ones is increasing (there would probably be more of them if 
the efficiency of studying was better). When age is compared to the socio-
professional status of youth, completely expected results are again yielded 
(χ2=1395.10): among pupils 98.5% are younger than 19; 63.9% are aged 20 to 
24 (14.1% of them are in the oldest age cohort); two fifths of those unemployed 
are either in high school or in the oldest age cohort of youth; while two thirds of 
employed youth are older than 25, and one third is in the middle age cohort. 
Seen from the other side, among the participants younger than 19, pupils are 
dominant (67.7%); among those older than 25, the employed are dominant 
(64.2%); and the middle age cohort consists of students (39.2%), employed 
(36.4%) and unemployed (23.5%). The greatest relation is registered in the 
comparison of the level of education with the socio-professional status of the 
young (χ2=1930.10). Certainly, a large majority (80.8%) of those without 
qualification are among the pupils, just as a similar number of those with a 
university education (75.7%) are in the employed category, and among the 
employed there are also 53.8% of those with vocational degrees. Since the 
employed and the unemployed youth have already finished their education, it is 
useful to compare them in particular. Thus the educational structure of the 
employed indicates that there are 6.1% of those without qualifications, 26.8% 
have vocational education and 42.7% have secondary school degrees, while 
24.5% are highly educated. At the same time, among the unemployed, there are 
14.4% of those without qualifications, 37.5% of those with vocational degrees, 
39.2% high school graduates and 8.9% with university degrees. This data 
indicates that the educational structure of the employed is better than that of the 
unemployed, as well as that the most difficulties in getting employment are 
experienced by the young without qualifications and those with vocational 
qualifications. The trend of more difficult employment of the unqualified 
workforce has been going on for several decades, to be more specific since more 
powerful industrial development hit Croatia, demanding a qualified work force. 
At the same time, with the development of the tertiary sector the demand for 
industrial and crafts qualifications has decreased, but the demise of industrial 
production in Croatia must contribute to the more difficult employment of youth 
with such qualifications today. All these findings unambiguously indicate that 
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with the increase in age of the young participants, there is a linear increase in the 
level of their education and employment. Observed integrally, this data also 
suggest that the youngest participants who are predominantly pupils and have no 
qualifications, are on one pole, and the other belongs to the older age cohort of 
youth who are mostly employed and have a secondary or higher education 
(where over four fifths of those with university degrees are also employed and 
the oldest group of youth). This group – especially when it is accompanied by 
the urban population of youth with better social background – can be labeled 
with the syntagm of a socio-culturally more competent youth, which is to a 
considerable degree linked to the attitudes of youth. In any case, the specified 
correlations are permanent in the population of youth and should be considered 
when the results are being interpreted. 
Certainly, there are correlations among other attributes of the young, and 
we will look at only some of them. First, education is still less accessible to 
youth from rural environments (χ2=140.23): for example, among the young 
living in villages 35.8% have finished high school, and 6.4% university, while 
there are 59.1% of young people with high school diplomas in Zagreb and 
18.6% with a university level of education. Second, there is a tendency for 
reproduction of social status observed through a comparison of the education of 
participants and their fathers (χ2=265.53), and the socio-professional status of 
youth and the education of their fathers (χ2=185.48). Thus, 37.4% of youth with 
higher education have fathers with the same degree of education (and another 
33.0% come from families where the father has secondary education), while 
42.9% of youth finishing vocational schools has fathers with the identical level 
of qualification, and 38.0% have fathers without qualifications. At the same 
time, 35.2% students come from fathers with university education and 36.9% 
have fathers with high school qualifications, whilst the unemployed youth is of a 
predominantly lower social background (35.4% have fathers without qualifica-
tions and 29.8% have fathers with vocational degrees). Future research will 
show if, parallel with the social stratification of the Croatian society, the 
accessibility of educational resources and adequate employment will decrease 
for young persons from lower classes. Thirdly, the correlation of marital status 
with the age and gender of the participants indicates at the same time that there 
are both changes and the survival of tradition. 
To put it shortly, the analysis of the structure of the sample of youth has 
confirmed that among them there are tendencies already confirmed in previous 
researches in the field of sociology of youth, that is, that they are slow in taking 
over the permanent social roles and that their present and future social status 
depends primarily on their social background and the structural characteristics of 
the society they live in. 
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Data analysis 
The data analysis was conducted on the basic sample of youth (N=2000) 
and the control sample of adult participants (N=1000). 
The following analysis and procedures have been used on variables 
prepared for statistical processing: 
 
1. univariate analysis − determining the distribution of answers, 
2. bivariate analysis − computing the significance of differences 
by using the χ2 test, 
− computing the significance of differences 
by applying variance analysis, 
3. multivariate procedures − hierarchic factor analysis under the 
component model, to the number 
determined by the Kaiser-Guttman 
criterion and by applying the varimax 
rotation, 
− multidimensional scaling. 
 
The comparative analyses on data gathered in researches conducted in 
Croatia were conducted on two levels: between the young and adults in 2004, 
and between the generations of youth in 1999 and 2004. Data from 1999 was 
gathered as part of the research The Value System of Youth and Social Changes 
in Croatia2 on an identically constructed sample of 1700 young people from the 
entire Croatian territory. 
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Damir Grubiša 
POLITICAL AXIOLOGY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE 
GOALS AND VALUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
1. The process of European integration 
The process of European integration has been going on for more than half a 
century, specifically, since 1951, when the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community was signed in Paris, or 1952, when this Treaty was 
ratified by the six founding-states and when the first common institutions of that 
community, headed by the High Authority – a predecessor of today's European 
Commission, were set up. The European Union today has 27 countries with 
more than 450 million inhabitants with territory that covers more than half of 
Europe, while its economic strength makes it the second economic power in the 
world, following the USA. Still, regardless of the fact that the European Union, 
along with its predecessors – the European Coal and Steel Community, the 
European Atomic Energy Community, the European Economic Community and 
the European Community – is a unique phenomenon of economic, political and 
social integration, its citizens, that is, the citizens of its member-states, still do 
not completely understand or know the goals of this process, nor the values it is 
based upon. 
Everyone agrees – the theorists of integration and the politicians taking part 
in these processes, as well as the public observing it – that this phenomenon is 
unique in known history, and that this process has brought about the creation of 
a new political community sui generis and a new understanding of politics. 
Namely, so far politics has always been related to the state, so it has been syn-
onymous with running a state. With the appearance of the European Union, new 
experiences and new forms of politics were born, not exclusively linked to the 
existence of a state, but appearing as forms of human activity at supranational and 
international levels. Politics is no longer government, but becomes a much more 
fluid process of political administration at several levels (multi-level governance) 
and is articulated through a system of public policies, whose initiation, formula-
tion, decision-making and implementation procedures are a result of cooperation, 
not only of state protagonists, but also of numerous protagonists of non-state 
provenience and with hybrid compositions. 
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In this way, the European Union really is a political construct, a political 
community sui generis with many attributes of a state, but is not a state itself; 
expressing many attributes of an international organization, but is not an 
international organization sensu stricto. It is not a federation either, even though 
it has many of the characteristics of classic federations; nor is it a confederation, 
even though, again, it shares some attributes with the classic confederative 
states. Finally, we can say that the European Union is a peculiar hybrid that may 
be defined as a politeia sui generis, which is approximately reflective of the 
consensus among the political theorists of European integration. As such, it is 
not simply a political system without a state, but is at the same time a grand 
laboratory and experiment in action, with new forms of political administration – 
governance, with new processes and, finally, with new institutions. All these 
elements of the political system (again, by analogy – sui generis), these being 
institutions, processes and protagonists, function in a value system that, at the 
same time, preceded the very beginning of the integration process, and also 
appears and is modified during this process. Hence, we are dealing with a 
dynamic construct, a product of political engineering in constant emergence and 
change, that generates a new political experience, new ideas and new goals, and 
constantly questions the values it is based on, developing new ideas and values, 
adjusting them to practice, as the practice itself is adjusted and realized in 
accordance with these values and political ideas. This is why the European 
Union is fertile soil for political theory and its research. At the same time, it is 
the subject of research by economic theory, legal theory and sociological theory. 
And within the framework of political theory, the process of European integra-
tion has passed through several phases, where this process, as a research subject, 
has moved from one discipline into another: it began its existence as irenology – 
the science of peace, in order to find its haven in the discipline of comparative 
politics via the theory of international relations. 
However, with the evolution of European integration, its political axiology, 
that is, its political goals and values, evolved as well. Developing from a form of 
international cooperation into an economic, and then political community, the 
protagonists of the European integration process adopted and developed the 
values and goals of this common endeavor they had embarked on. These values 
were with time modified and took the shape of political ideas and political 
principles with normative and prescriptive meaning for those participating in the 
process, articulated into accepted political standards for the participants of the 
process and their creations. The common determination of goals – what is aimed 
at – resulted, thus, in the establishment of primarily economic, and finally, 
political standards, that have had a backlash effect on these goals, in order for 
the new goals to evoke the elaboration of new standards (Boniface, 2004). 
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2. The “educational deficit” in the process of European integration 
As we have already mentioned, the process of European integration has 
been going on for more than half a century now, and it encompasses today most 
European states and societies, including almost half a billion people. Still, 
regardless how hard the protagonists of this process try to make it more real to 
the inhabitants of this political hybrid, and regardless of how much effort they 
put into making it more understandable and transparent to the citizens involved 
in the current processes, whether directly or through the institutions and 
processes in the member states, the fact remains that one of the greatest, critical 
problems of this politeia is that the average citizen still knows much too little 
about the goals and values of the European Union. Just as little is known about 
the processes, protagonists and institutions of this political system that is 
constantly being built, rebuilt and remodeled and that engages a significant 
amount of energy from the decision and policy-makers, the public, scientific 
world, the protagonists of legal and political engineering and the creation of 
ideas and other forms of human creativity. This became clear at the end of the 
second and the beginning of the third millennium, when, in line with the 
dominant fin-de-siècle optimism (that is, actually, a characteristic of all previous 
eras, but at the end of the 20th century it had particular strength due to the fact 
that Europe, it is believed, is free of the remains of both totalitarian ideologies – 
fascism and communism – which had tragic results and were the causes of 
World War II and then the Cold War) comes a somber assessment of the 
opportunities of the new century, and in this case, an entirely new millennium. It 
would seem that after the “dark twentieth century”, a period of wars, totalitari-
anism, destruction, the holocaust and destruction that history has never seen 
before, the historic Minerva’s owl lived to feel satisfaction in the victory of the 
ideas of peace, the overcoming of divisions, cooperation and solidarity among 
peoples and nations, all symbolized by the European Union, after the end of the 
old and the beginning of the new millennium. But the insufficient knowledge 
about this integration process, its institutions, protagonists and values gives us 
enough elements to claim that one of the acute problems and shortcomings of 
the European Union is not just the widely mentioned “democratic deficit”, but 
also a form of educational deficit. This educational deficit consists of a deficit of 
knowledge, as much as mere information about what is happening, which is why 
the European public reacts to many events within the European Union with 
prejudice and stereotypes. 
Thus, at the end of 2000, in the regular survey by Eurobarometer, a biennial 
activity of Eurostat – the Statistical Office of the European Commission, 
European citizens were asked how much they believe they know and are familiar 
with the existing European Union, its policies, goals, values and institutions. 
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Eurobarometer is usually used by the European Commission in its planning 
activities, and the survey includes a test of knowledge of European citizens 
about how EU institutions work, as well as questions related to the accessibility 
of information and the familiarity of EU public policies. On this occasion the 
participants were asked to assess their own knowledge and level of information 
about the EU on a scale from 1 to 10, grade 10 meaning that they know 
something best or most, while 1 means that they know the least about a topic. 
And while 8% of citizens admit they know nothing about all these things, no less 
than 68% of participants graded themselves with a 5 or less, which resulted in an 
average grade of only 4.51. Only 7% of citizens graded themselves with an eight 
or more. This brings us to the point that three out of four citizens of the EU 
admit they are poorly acquainted with and inadequately understand the European 
Union and its policies, institutions, processes and values (Eurobarometer, 2001; 
comp. McCormick, 2002). 
When we analyze the categories of the population with most knowledge 
about the European Union, we see that they are mostly those with a university 
education, especially managers, higher officials in state administration, journal-
ists, lawyers, student and university teachers in three departments: political 
science, law and economy, while those that know the least are manual workers, 
the retired and persons with a lower level of education in general. The most 
educated, when it comes to the European Union, is the group of European 
citizens aged 25 to 54. But where the distribution of knowledge and familiarity 
with the European Union among the member states is concerned, the citizens of 
countries with a longer democratic tradition and culture seem to fare better, such 
as the Scandinavians, the Dutch, citizens of Luxemburg, Germany and Austria, 
while the citizens of Greece, Spain and Portugal have the lowest level of 
information, along with – completely atypical – the citizens of Great Britain, a 
country that in political theory is a prototype of a consolidated democracy. It is 
also a country with a strong tradition of island isolationism that, after the United 
Kingdom joined the European Community in 1973 became sporadic, and then 
systematic euroskepticism. At the beginning of the third millennium, that is to 
say, just before the greatest enlargement that brought eight transitional and two 
Mediterranean countries into the EU, according to the findings of Eurobarome-
ter, one third of the citizens had never heard anything about the Council of 
Ministers or the European Court of Justice, and a fifth had never heard of the 
European Commission, the most important policy-making body of the EU, or 
the European Central Bank, the consequences of whose actions citizens see 
every day in their personal or household budgets. But there is worse yet: along 
with the immense ignorance about the political community that directly or 
indirectly forms 75% of its member states' public policies, the citizens of the EU 
firmly believe in stereotypes that have no real basis, even though it is somewhat 
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understandable why these stereotypes are present in the consciousness of 
European citizens. One third of Europeans think that the greatest item in the EU 
budget is the cost of its administration in Brussels, Luxemburg and Strasbourg, 
while facts tell us that the costs of this EU administration, that is the “Brussels 
bureaucracy” and its functioning take up only 5% of the budget, and that the main 
item of the European budget is actually its agricultural policy, accounting for 45% 
of the total budget. The lack of information and knowledge about the EU are, thus, 
intertwined with misconceptions and disinformation, resulting in a negative 
feeling toward the EU, its institutions and functions, thus feeding the citizens' 
repulsion toward this political construction seen as a sort of political labyrinth and 
bottomless pit, into which the contributions of European taxpayers and member 
states disappear. This is a significant aspect feeding euro-skepticism and euro-
pessimism, so the strength of the rejection of integrative, political and economic 
engagement increases, and the European Union is distorted into an image of a 
Moloch that gobbles down the funds of the European citizens and, from its nimbus 
of nontransparent institutions and processes, imposes decisions with far-reaching 
negative consequences, criticized in the public through scandals, disclosed once in 
a while – from the corruption of the members of the European Commission to the 
squandering of enormous amounts of budget money. 
This is, by no means, encouraging information, for it testifies to the real 
basis for the formation of animosity toward the European Union and, condition-
ally, for criticism and possible rejection of such a model that in the opinion of 
the population is wrongly portrayed as an abomination. This does not mean that 
the European Union has no institutional or functional weaknesses and that it is 
immune to the bureau-pathological syndrome, that is the ailment of all political 
systems, nor that it is resistant to the phenomenon of corruption, maladministra-
tion and malversations of all types. However, the simultaneous lack of 
democratic legitimacy of most institutions of the European Union and the 
limited sovereignty of the European Parliament, along with the misconceptions 
about the European Union, all increase the democratic deficit, which usually 
works in such a way that decisions are made within the narrow circle of the 
European elite – the Eurocrats and the tight environment of the national elite and 
political leaders that have access to the European decision-making chambers and 
mechanisms. Thus, the lack of information and education about the European 
Union, in spite of all the efforts undertaken by the European institutions to make 
their work more public and transparent, may detonate a long-term chain reaction 
and a domino-effect, in the form of rejection or deceleration of the further 
process of European integration, due to the fear of eurocratism as a new form of 
non-democratic government, lacking the necessary democratic legitimacy. At 
the same time, such superficial reactions have a negative influence on the 
European and national elite that keep closing up for the fear of this uninformed 
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public, which constructs a vicious circle, circulus vitiosus, whose utmost effect 
is the increased democratic deficit of the European Union. 
This is why, based on the data about the lack of information and education 
of European citizens, which have been confirmed every other year since the 
millennium public opinion research by Eurobarometer, it is necessary to 
reconstruct the stages of the development of the European Union and determine 
the evolution of its goals and values, for a better understanding of the course and 
substance of the European integration process, without mystifications and 
beyond the stereotypes and mistaken perceptions that cloud the processes and 
institutions of European integration. In order to do this, it is necessary to start 
with a retrospective, from the first ideas and goals that determined the beginning 
and the first steps of the process of European integration. 
3. The evolution of European integration and different 
formulations of goals and values of the process 
The destruction during the First and especially the Second World War 
caused the political leaders of European nations not only to consider seriously, 
but actually to work on the elimination of the causes that led to the two world 
wars. Even after World War I, it was determined that one of the main causes for 
the breakout of this world-wide conflict was the nationalism of the European 
peoples, caused by the conception of the national state. The atrocities of the 
Second World War only confirmed this assessment of the national state being an 
intrinsic cause of conflicts between national, ethnic groups internally, which 
became open wars in the system of international relations. However, unlike 
World War I and the analysis of its causes, that in the circle of democratic politi-
cians and thinkers produced the conclusion that the national state and the 
national state system inevitably lead to wars, during and after World War II this 
thought was supplemented by the atrocities of the Nazi-fascist regimes and their 
ideology. Thus, the first document that is a precedent of the European integra-
tion idea, the Manifesto of Ventoten, appearing in 1941 within the Italian 
resistance movement, authored by Altiero Spinelli (a charismatic Europeanist, a 
member of the European Commission from 1970 to 1976 and the father of the 
Treaty on European Union) and Giorgio Rosselli, who along with nationalism as 
a main cause of the world wars, stated that the causes are also fascism, racism 
and xenophobia. The Manifesto of Ventoten, which was the basis for the 
Declaration on Europe of the representatives of European resistance movements 
gathering in Geneva in 1944, thus determines a need for a new Europe which 
states the four historic “no-s”:no to fascism, no to nationalism, no to racism and 
no to xenophobia. The Manifesto of Ventoten is a document in which a negative 
definition is predominant, thus producing the need to create an entire system of 
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permanent peace in Europe, which would not come into existence while there 
are national states. The ultimate goal of the Manifesto of Ventoten is the creation 
of a European federation as a political entity that will overcome the existence of 
national states, the causes of each future war in Europe. The idea of a European 
federation was taken on by other politicians and theorists, such as Winston 
Churchill, who, in his speech of 1946 at the University of Zurich, promoted the 
idea of the need to create a United States of Europe as a counterpart to the 
United States of America. The ideas found in the Manifesto of Ventoten and, 
later on, at the congress of representatives of resistance movements from 
occupied Europe, were inevitably infused with the idea of not only a European 
federation, but socialistic thought about the creation of a just society, based, not 
on capital, but on labor (thus, as a recipient of these ideas, the first article of the 
Italian Constitution defines Italy as a “republic based on labor”), which were 
hence, unacceptable to the representatives of the European democratic 
establishment. The alternative to the antifascist and socialist idea about a 
European federation was the idea of a democratic federation of Europe with 
democratic institutions and a market economy. Churchill's idea of a European 
federation was also limited to continental Europe, that indeed, in his opinion, 
should have been brought into such a condition that new wars would not be 
caused again. This is why it was necessary for the European states to enter a 
democratic federation and to join each other in controlling the nations and 
territories wars are fought over, in order to realize some national interests. The 
federalist movement flourished after the war, and it was led by the author of the 
Manifesto of Ventoten, Altiero Spinelli. This brought about the first Congress of 
European Federalists, that in 1949 grew into the first European organization that 
emphasized peace-making in Europe as its main priority – the Council of 
Europe. The proliferation of the Cold War made European politicians elaborate 
the idea of a functional community as a framework for cooperation and safety in 
Europe, as opposed to the idea of a federation with socialist attributes and 
utopian elements, which would somberly and pragmatically direct the European 
nations and their leaders toward the need for cooperation, instead of conflict. 
Instead of the pompous projects and excitement over the federalist formula, the 
pragmatic politicians turned to satisfying certain concrete interests. Instead of 
uniting Europe from above, the European politicians chose a road for building a 
cooperation system from the bottom, starting with the basic need for 
reconstructing a devastated Europe. The plan, elaborated by Jean Monnet, a 
former vice-secretary of the League of Nations and the director of the French 
Planning Office, along with Robert Schumann, a French foreign relations 
minister, foresaw the construction of a new Europe through a mechanism of 
small steps, the first being the common disposition of the resources that nation-
alist wars are fought over, the control of strategic raw materials – coal and steel. 
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The seemingly more modest, low-profile approach of the French 
technocrats joined by the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, and the Italian 
Prime Minister, Alcide de Gasperi, was focused on the realization of peace – by 
other means. Peace in Europe should be achieved, first, through the process of 
peaceful reconstruction and joint control of strategic resources; second, the 
French and German nationalisms should thus lose their raison d’etre, because 
France and Germany would be permanently pointed towards cooperation and 
joint exploitation of the sources of these strategic resources, which bring about 
control of one country over another; and, finally, thirdly, other European 
countries were invited to join this bilateral agreement, creating in such a way a 
bloc of democratic countries against the safety threat represented by Eastern 
Europe and the communist bloc. This was the creation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community, as a loose system of cooperation that, in order to function, set 
up common institutions, which the founding countries empowered to decide for 
them, creating the embryos of the first supranational European institutions. This 
limited integration model was only the first step in the process that spilled over 
the limits set by its founders. This is why the first process, entering political 
theory, enriching it with new findings, was the spillover process (Dinan, 1999). 
The goal of this first step of integration was peace, and the manner of 
achieving this peace was cooperation in a limited area, gradually progressing 
through the spillover process into other areas as well. Cooperation in the joint 
exploitation of natural resources gradually demanded agreements in other plans 
– the plan of limiting or elimination of customs, simplifying transportation 
conditions, harmonizing the decision-making process in national contexts, 
widening negotiations about problems arising on an everyday basis, along with 
the pressure of other protagonists to join the process. 
The primary goal, thus, was the establishment of peace and elimination of 
the causes of war, so in terms of political science, the first to take up the topic of 
European integration was the discipline of irenology. The values expressed by 
the Manifesto of Ventoten (defined negatively), as antifascism, antinationalism, 
antiracism and anti-xenophobia, turned into democratic political values in the 
Schumann Declaration: peace, cooperation, solidarity. Aside from that, the 
founding fathers of the European institutions were linked by a common 
ideological demo-Christian millieu. Schumann and Monnet, as well as De 
Gasperi and Adenauer, embraced the ideas of Christian democracy and 
promoted them in their political worldview and practice. As Robert Schumann 
stated, the democratic idea he started from was closely linked to Christianity. 
Christian values, such as the equality of human beings, freedom, dignity of 
work, tolerance and standing up to totalitarianism, lie in the roots of the 
Christian conception of democracy. But democracy cannot be introduced from 
above, it must go through a ripening process in people's minds in order to come 
Political Axiology of the European Union: The Goals and Values… 
 43 
alive in political practice. This is why this future European federation cannot be 
built according to a preconceived plan, it will, if it ever comes to life, be the 
result of small steps and attempts that will be verified as right in practice, and 
not in the minds and ideas of great men: “Europe will not be created all at once, 
or according to a unique, general plan. It will be constructed through real 
achievements that will first create a de facto solidarity” (Schumann, 2000). 
This is how the process of European integration began, from its starting 
position of a mid-range theory and practice, as a limited experiment that might 
transform later, through its confirmation in reality, as it has done, into a more 
permanent and irreversible process. 
The basic goals of this integration were expressed in the preamble of the 
Paris Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. The main 
goal was to achieve peace in Europe and the world, and this peace could be 
preserved only by “creative efforts that are comparable to the dangers that 
endanger it (that is, peace)”. Thus, the founding countries decided to replace old, 
long-lasting and centuries old rivalries by conciliating and linking their important 
interests. This will be accomplished, in the wording of a resolution, by construct-
ing an economic community that will set the basis of a wider and deeper 
community among people, long divided by bloody conflicts. Along with that, the 
signing countries are decisive to set the base for institutions that will determine the 
direction of a common destiny, to be “shared by all from now on”. The achieve-
ment of peace was, hence, set as the main goal. But the means for its realization 
and preservation come from satisfying the basic needs of the population: 
economic expansion, development, employment and the growth of the standard of 
living in the member states. The goal of the community is peace. But this peace 
cannot be realized without the development and satisfaction of the citizens' 
interests for a higher standard, as stated in the founding Treaty establishing the 
ECSC. The instrumentalization of this goal is not through the abrupt abolition of 
national states, but through a process of creation of supranational institutions as a 
counterbalance to the national state, a sort of check-and-balance system that 
ought to guarantee that European countries will not slip back into nationalism, a 
lawful product of the existence of the national state. At the same time, this 
amalgam of a utopian-pragmatic approach, aptly illustrated by Jean Monnet 
when stating that Europe (this new Europe, unlike the old Europe, torn apart by 
national antagonisms) will not be created now and in an instant, according to a 
previously conceived, rational general plan, but will be constructed through a 
number of real accomplishments, followed by the process of maturing of 
awareness of the new values this process needs to be supported by. These words, 
built into the Schumann Declaration, quite accurately predict the way the future 
European Community was to develop, and become the European Union we 
know today (Schumann, 2000). 
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Besides, this process is consistent with the political ideas about the open 
society which were formulated at the same time by Karl Popper, criticizing the 
utopian, abstract engineering characteristic of rational dogmatism, preferring a 
pragmatic, step-by-step engineering. “Plans for step-by-step engineering are 
relatively simple. These are plans for individual institutions... If they do not 
work, the damage is not that great, nor is their reconstruction that difficult. They 
are less risky, and thus less controversial. But if it is easier to achieve a reason-
able consensus about the existing evil and the means of fighting it than about the 
ideal good and means for realizing it, then there is more hope that, using the 
step-by-step method, we can overcome the practical difficulties of all reasonable 
political reforms, that is, using reason, instead of passion and violence, in 
achieving goals. There will be a possibility of achieving a reasonable compro-
mise and, hence, the realizing of improvement by democratic methods. 
'Compromise' is an ugly word, but it is important to learn its correct use. Institu-
tions are inevitably the result of compromise with circumstances, interests, etc.” 
(Popper, 1993). 
This is exactly how the institutions of European integration were developed, 
step by step, following the feeling of trust achieved by success of the steps 
previously taken. Parallel to this process is the process of adoption and codifica-
tion of the basic political values of the West European democracy. An important 
part of these values is embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights 
adopted by the Council of Europe in 1949. Even though these process are 
parallel in the first phase of integration – initiated within an international organi-
zation, such as the Council of Europe, and then in the European Coal and Steel 
Community as not an international organization, but an embryo of a future 
European Community – and there is no apparent contact and interaction between 
them, these processes will later, with the transformation of the European 
Community into the European Union, be poured into the single process of 
building a “Europe of values” (l’ Europe de valeurs), that is, Europe based on 
human, economic and social values (Boniface, 2004). 
The basic document of the ECSC outlines the strategy of widening and 
deepening this process. This strategy will become the main attribute of the 
process, synthesizing the aim of deepening integration, as well as enlarging to 
other protagonists – the national states in Europe not among the narrow circle of 
founding states. Thus, for example, Great Britain was invited to the discussions 
of the six initiators (France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries), but 
refused to join the circle due to its colonial interests and trans-Atlantic axis, with 
the most powerful ally in the world and its close partner, the USA. 
But the process of European integration set on such a pragmatic base was 
not linear. The attempts to create a European Defense Community in 1952 
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failed, as well as the creation of the European Political Community in 1953, due 
to resistance by the member states. These experiments were seen as premature 
and met the resistance of the rigid advocates of national interests – in the first 
case, the resistance of France, scared of the possibility of Germany rearming, 
and in the second case, the resistance caused by the fear of national states losing 
political autonomy. The integrationists, those wanting to rush further steps, had 
to sober up and realize that Europe cannot be build by applying pressure, but 
that the process must be gradual and must not create a feeling of national 
endangerment in the member states. This is why Jean Monnet was disappointed 
enough to resign from the position of President of the ECSC High Authority, 
and retreat from politics. But the fly-wheel of integration was already in motion 
and could not be stopped. The member states became aware of the advantages of 
gradual integration and this form of regional cooperation, recognizing their own 
interests in this process. This is why Monnet's resignation enticed European 
politicians from second-line countries (namely, the France-Germany axis was 
key in starting the integration, because, finally, it was all about the common 
management of resources that were up to then under the exclusive sovereign 
authority of France and Germany) to take the torch in the phase of blockage 
caused by France, leading to a conference of foreign affairs' ministers of the 
ECSC countries in Messina, in 1955. This conference was where the agreement 
of re-launching the European idea was achieved, that is, basically, the plan of 
European integration devised by Monnet and Schumann, which might better be 
named an anti-plan, because in its character it was the opposite of visionary 
(Popper might say – utopian) plans of a united Europe. On the contrary, opposite 
the declaratory vision, the “pragmatic vision” of Monnet, Schumann and others 
sharing their opinions, was much more efficient. 
However, this attempt to “re-launch Europe” had to be even more 
pragmatic and limited by its scope and planned achievements, in order not to 
repulse the European national states and their politicians that might become 
afraid of losing part of their power and control over the political processes in 
their own countries. In order for this not to happen and to avoid other possible 
obstructions, it was decided that leverage be put on the real area of economic 
life, the creation of a common market and the emphasis on the economic 
advantages from this process of European integration. This orientation led to the 
takeover of the initiative by Italy and Belgium – Italy as the host of the Messina 
conference and Belgium in the form of its foreign affairs minister, Paul-Henri 
Spaak, who was authorized by the Messina conference to propose an action plan 
for the renewal of the idea of a “European plan”. After one year of working on 
it, Spaak came out with a concrete proposal that led to the signing of the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957. One of these treaties founded the European Atomic Energy 
Community that was to be a modernized version of the ECSC, because it was 
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based on the principles of the common exploitation of atomic energy modeled 
by the ECSC, that was limited to classical strategic resources, dominant in the 
first phase of the post-war economic development. The second treaty founded 
the European Economic Community, whose goal, over a twelve year period, was 
to contribute to the building of a European common market through gradual 
elimination of all restrictions to internal trade and the setup of common external 
customs on all goods coming into the area of the EEC's member states. This was 
to eliminate the barriers to the free movement of people, goods, capital and 
services, and action – a synonym for integration – was to be taken only in areas 
where there was consensus among the member states. This was seemingly the 
end of the conflict of ideas between the federalists and the functionalists. The 
federalists have retreated before the functionalists, who prevailed, but this 
prevalence was possible due to the introduction of another set of values – the 
economic values of the free market. This synthesis of the supranational institu-
tional engineering and the simultaneous retention of the national state system, 
that constructs the supranational level with a constant compromise with the 
national level of politics, through the national states, thus introducing a new 
system of multi-level governance, was best characterized by Andrew Moravcsik 
(1998), creating the term “liberal intergovernmentalism”. 
For a while European integration moved from the field of irenology and 
international relations into the field of economy. In the first phase of discussions 
and initiatives, the goal of irenology suited the philosophical approach to peace, 
expressed best by Kant in his concept of eternal peace through the creation of a 
world federation. This pax philosophica, since it was not real, was replaced by a 
more pragmatic approach that may be labeled as the concept of pax oeconomica. 
This period will finally transform, after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, 
into the age of pax juridicae, that should be definitely consolidated by the 
adoption, that is, ratification of the European Constitution. 
But then, when the first cracks in the system dominated by the pax 
oeconomica occurred, an exit from the crisis needed to be found to strengthen it. 
The prevalence went to the new approach born in Messina and later labeled, 
according to Moravcsik, liberal intergovernmentalism. Along with the recognition 
and affirmation of the ideas of the liberal market with its four freedoms – the 
freedom of movement of people, goods, capital and services – the basic method of 
intergovernmental, intergovernmental decision-making is affirmed, thus counter-
balancing the supranational institutions and mechanisms, because, without the 
counter-weights, they might sidetrack European integration into a federalist 
integration. And since the European states, or rather their national political elite, 
were determined to retain their prerogatives of government and power, a compro-
mise was devised – a liberal European market and intergovernmental negotiations 
all the way to the point where the supranational way of decision-making starts to 
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endanger the reduced sovereign prerogatives of the national political class. Thus, 
liberal intergovernmentalism is still today considered the leading and valid politi-
cal theory of European integration. 
The Treaty establishing the Founding of the European Economic Community 
of 1957 put in the background the main goal of European integration, the 
achievement of peace. Peace slid into the seventh paragraph in the preamble of 
this document. Before peace as the goal of the European integration other, much 
more specific goals of this integration are numbered, suitable to the pragmatic turn 
toward the satisfaction of economic interests. The first goal of the European 
Economic Community is now to realize common actions that will, through the 
elimination of the barriers dividing Europe, ensure the economic and social 
progress of the member states. The second goal – or the essential goal, as the 
preamble of the document states – “the constant improvement of the living and 
employment conditions of the peoples of the member states”. As we can see, the 
population of the member states is still treated as “people”. The transformation of 
people into citizens will only take place in the Treaty on European Union (more 
popularly known as the Maastricht Treaty) of 1992. The third goal of this 
community is the realization of stability in economic expansion, a balance of 
exchange and loyalty of competition. The fourth goal is the harmonious develop-
ment of the member states' economies that will take into account the decrease of 
disparity between different regions, reducing the falling behind of those at the low 
end. The fifth goal is the gradual reduction of restrictions in international trade, 
and the sixth is the realization of solidarity that links Europe to overseas countries 
and the declarative help in their development and prosperity. Peace is only in 
seventh position, which is completely in line with the “economic approach” 
promoted by Spaak's working material about the elimination of the lag in 
European integration (Verilli, 2004). 
The Treaty on European Economic Community introduces the four market 
freedoms as political “values” in the fourth part: those are the freedom of 
movement of goods, the freedom of movement of people, services and capital, 
that become normative values, whose implementation is operationalized in the 
remainder of the Roman EEC Treaty. 
A brief digression is called for here: as we can see, the sources from which 
the political axiology of the European Union, that is, European integration in the 
wider sense, is extrapolated, are mostly the preambles of the treaties on the 
founding of European Communities, or the European Union. An analysis of the 
preambles enables us, as in the case of an analysis of the preambles of classic 
constitutions, to determine those goals and values that infuse the entire constitu-
tional act and which are operationalized in it through a system of institutions, 
procedures and through determining institutional protagonists. The preambles 
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represent, in the legal-political experience, an integral part of the constitutional 
act as its introduction, as a sort of incipit of the document explaining the bases 
and the deeper reasons and motivation for the act that they precede (Catannaro 
and Magnani, 2003; compare w. Pinelli, 2004). This is why both ideological 
options and philosophic-political ideas meet in the preambles with perceptive 
principles and hermeneutic criteria, together creating that bloc de constitutionalité 
without which the text of the individual articles is simply a technical norm. Thus, 
as Haberle puts it, in the preambles we recognize the formulation of values, 
historic-political goals, high ideas and motivational situations, as well as the 
institutional instruments that will be operationalized on the level of technical 
norms in the constitutional text itself (Haberle, 2002). 
The implementation of the Treaties of Rome lasted for an entire thirty year 
period, long enough for the European citizens to invert the goals and values in 
their consciousness, thus giving prevalence to the perception that the basic 
purpose and goal of the European integration is the creation of a common 
market and that political action on the supra-state and interstate levels only 
follows the economy. Thanks to the successes in the gradual introduction of the 
common market, the European integration process managed to gain momentum, 
a new momentum and drive that overcame all the political reasons for the 
standstill. The project of eliminating barriers to trade, capital, services and labor 
turned out to be attractive to countries that had not joined the six founders of the 
ECSC in the first round. Insisting on the separation of the processes of enlarge-
ment and deepening, the EEC accommodated new members, the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark in 1973. This group would have been joined by 
Norway if only its citizens had not refused to join the EEC. Associated member-
ship in the EEC was requested by Sweden, Austria and Switzerland, and then 
Portugal, Spain and Malta. The EEC had, through the inversion of its priorities 
and goals, become a success story of international politics – even if it was slow 
and burdensome, it had a positive outcome. After the demise of the military 
dictatorship, the EEC was joined by Greece in 1981, and the post-fascist Span 
and Portugal in 1986, thus increasing the European Community from the initial 
six countries to twelve member states. The enlargements in the 1980s resulted in 
political and economic consequences for the economic plan, the EEC became 
the largest economic bloc in the world. However, the joining of three undevel-
oped countries, compared to the existing member states, transformed the internal 
economic balance. The rerun of the Irish case was no longer possible, when the 
entire EEC supported the speedy development and reconstruction of the Irish 
economy, turning it into a country with the most dynamic development index in 
Europe. The regional and cohesion funds of the EEC were now divided between 
three users, meaning that these countries could not count on such a spectacular 
growth rate as Ireland, whose gross domestic product contained 5% financial 
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resources donated and invested by the EEC. Something similar now became 
practically impossible, but these three new members did still receive significant 
advantages in other areas; their recovery took longer, but it was still ensured by 
the EEC and its funds (Dinan, 1999). 
Along with enlargement, a process of deepening was occurring, especially 
in the area of harmonizing the financial policies of the member states. A new 
initiative for creating a European Monetary System was launched, with the goal 
of introducing a common European currency. The creation of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism created a zone of monetary stability and strengthened the European 
economy in comparison with the world markets. However, the attacks of inflation 
and unemployment, the actualization of the oil crisis, the transfer from the gold 
exchange rate to a fluid exchange and other economic de-balances, led European 
politicians to revive one of the main ideas of the Roman treaties, the realization of 
a unique market as a step further from a common market. However, the system of 
institutions serving the new EEC proved to be insufficient, demanding changes 
and adaptation to the new situation – an enlarged EEC. This signified the need for 
consideration of the reality of the spillover process and the creation of flexible 
institutions that have political, as well as economic prerogatives. In other words, 
the epilogue was the strengthening of supranational institutions with the parallel 
strengthening of the democratic decision-making structure. This is the reason why 
the EEC had to outgrow its initial framework imposed by economic pragmatism 
and embark into the field of political prerogatives and competences. This means 
that there was a need to return to the area of political ideas and values, which 
brought about the revival of old concepts about the “closer alliance of European 
countries”. 
4. Political teleology in the process of European integration 
The Single European Act of 1986 signified the transition back to politics. 
The European Economic Community grew in name into the European 
Community, recognition that European unity is no longer reduced to the 
economic sphere alone, but that it is spreading, slowly and gradually, into the 
political sphere. The Single European Act, which was ratified and came into 
power in 1987, confirmed the creation of the largest united market in the world. 
The business capability of the economic subjects was expanded to the territory 
of the entire Community, protectionism became punishable by law, while state 
and other monopolies were destroyed by the support for comprehensive market 
competition, by adopting harsh sanctions against violation of the rules of 
competitiveness. The institutions of the EC gained in strength in comparison 
with the institutions of the EEC: the Commission obtained new, wider jurisdic-
tion in the field of environmental protection, scientific research, development 
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and regional policy. The judicial institutions of the EC strengthened, that is the 
European Court of Justice, and a First instance court was founded, that lifted the 
burden of the already overbooked European Court in Luxembourg, enabling it to 
put more energy into battling issues of violations of competitiveness and the 
unobstructed functioning of the market. The Single European Act gave more 
strength to the prerogatives of other European, supranational institutions: the 
European Council, known as the European Summit, was legalized as the highest 
decision-making body within the EC system. The Council of Ministers of the EC 
gained new responsibility concerning European Political Coordination, that is, 
the coordination of the foreign policies of the member states; finally, the 
European Parliament also obtained greater jurisdiction and moved from the level 
of consultation to a higher level of cooperation when it comes to decision-
making forms. It still lacked a decisive role, but it had a strengthened status 
regarding other European institutions. Economic and monetary unity became a 
key formula that replaced the formula of “economic and monetary collec-
tiveness” (Verilli, 2004). 
This new situation reflected the political optimism among the EC members. 
This again had an influence regarding the reformulation of the main goals and 
values of European integration. In the preamble of the Single European Act, the 
member states expressed their decisiveness to work together on promoting 
democracy, the basis of fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions and 
rights of the member states, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, namely, based on 
the principles of freedom, equality and social justice. The original goal of 
European countries from the late forties and early 1950s – international peace and 
security – came back with a grand entrance. 
The EC member states are aware, the preamble says, of the responsibility 
Europe has to promote the principles of democracy and the respect for law and 
human rights they are attached to, so that together they might themselves 
contribute to the preservation of international peace and security. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe signified a new phase of eurooptimism and euroenthusiasm. It 
seemed that the original goals of the European Union were nearing their realiza-
tion, that peace in the continent was a done deal and that democracy and the rule 
of law and human rights had won, spreading a territory of freedom to the Eastern 
part of the continent. This euphoric optimism from the late 1980s is best 
reflected in the title of the book, written by Francis Fukuyama, The End of 
History. Only then, fifteen years or so after this epitome of the period was 
created, would a counter thesis appear in the form of the title by Joschka Fischer, 
one of the greatest advocates of the neo-federalist idea of Europe – The Return 
of History. 
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Out of this optimism arose the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, which turned 
European integration from an economic into a definitely political integration, a 
complex political system of multi-level governance with a conspicuous political 
ambition of uniting Europe in a political sense. The Treaty on European Union, 
as it was named, sets up a new architecture of Europe based on three pillars, and 
the entire construction of Europe is graphically portrayed as an ancient temple. 
The imagery of ancient democracy was conjured up intentionally, and the three 
pillars holding the roof of the temple are three areas sharing different types of 
competences between them. The first pillar consists of the three preceding 
communities – the Coal and Steel Community, the Atomic Energy Community 
and the European Community, that was a derivation of the European Economic 
Community. The first pillar is expressly supranational and decisions within it are 
made in supranational institutions, through a complex procedure of agreement, 
compromise and voting by a qualified majority. The second pillar consists of the 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the principles of intergovern-
mental cooperation and decision-making apply to it just as they do to the third 
pillar, which comprises internal policy and the judiciary. The ultimate responsi-
bility for decisions made under the jurisdiction of the second and third pillars 
lies with the member states. The Maastricht Treaty also defined the schedule for 
introducing a common European currency, and expanded the areas of public 
policies to consumer protection, public health, transportation, education and 
training and social policy (with the exception of the United Kingdom). Under 
the guise of the third pillar, intergovernmental cooperation in issues of immigra-
tion and asylum was increased, and a common policing agency was created, 
Europol, in order to fight organized crime and the drugs trade. A new Board of 
Regions was created, and the regional funds for support for the poorer countries 
in the EU were increased. Maastricht launched a new concept of European 
citizenship: citizens of member states automatically become citizens of the 
European Union and have civil rights in all parts of the EU, as well as the right 
to participate in elections in their country of residence. The jurisdiction of the 
European Parliament expanded and the codecision procedure was deepened, 
increasing the role of the Parliament and giving it the possibility for a third 
reading of legal propositions before they are adopted by the Council of Ministers 
(Verilli, 2004). 
The Treaty on European Union confirms the orientation and commitment 
of the Union to the principles of freedom, democracy and respect for human 
rights and basic freedoms, as well as the legal state. The orientation toward legal 
state principles was introduced for the first time, which is understandable due to 
the pressure from the new democracies in Eastern Europe to become EU 
member states. The emphasis on the legal state was to have its epilogue in the 
criteria for membership of new applicants, adopted at the EU Summit in 
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Copenhagen in 1993. They are the political, economic, legal and, administrative 
criteria adopted later on, at the Madrid Summit. 
Along with these general principles in its constitutive treaty, the new entity, 
the European Union, is oriented toward the further development of democracy 
and the democratic functioning of political institutions in the member states, as 
well as the Union as a whole. The economic goals were reduced to the conver-
gence of the member states' economies, whose best expression is the common 
currency, as well as to the emphasis on sustainable development, social and 
economic cohesion. Regarding social cohesion, this time the preamble mentions 
the European Social Charter, and the EC Charter of fundamental social rights of 
workers from 1989. This way the social elements corrected the perception of a 
liberal economy, which is why the EEC and EC were under the attack of 
criticism expressed by social constructivists over the years. The express 
mentioning of social rights and the related charters directed the new EU toward 
a model of a social politeia (since we cannot in this case discuss a social/welfare 
state, because there is no state). 
Peace and security in this document were relegated to the boundaries of the 
common foreign and security policy, not because this is a less significant goal, 
but because the threats to peace have decreased in a Europe where the barriers 
between the East and West have disappeared. The political agenda changes with 
the times, and this is most visible in the hierarchy of goals of European integra-
tion and the changes it went through. In the Treaty on European Union, creating 
a political, not just an economic community, these goals already start from the 
general principles of human rights, democracy, basic freedoms and the legal 
state, only to enumerate the economic goals regarding welfare, development and 
progress. This Treaty, as the first article announces, signifies a new stage of an 
ever closer Union between the people of Europe, where decisions are made as 
transparently as possible, and as close to the citizens as possible, meaning at 
lower levels of power, in line with the newly established principle of subsidiar-
ity. Thus Article 6 of the Maastricht Treaty repeats that the bases of the Union 
are the principles of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and basic 
freedoms and the principles of the legal state, common to all the member states. 
With the Amsterdam Treaty from 1997 (ratified in 1999), also known as 
Maastricht II, the European Union undertook the first revision of the preceding 
Treaty on European Union, in order to adjust the European Union to the ever 
more skeptical and apathy-ridden citizens that saw Maastricht I as a step toward 
political union, but this document and its complexity and technical lingo already 
caused a first reaction in the form of an education and information deficit. The 
Treaty on EU was already a more complex constitutional document ante litteram 
than all the other treaties about the economic community, so it may be claimed 
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that its constitutional complexity contributed to the increase of the education 
deficit. Aside from that, the manner in which the entire work was nomotechni-
cally executed was perplexing and nontransparent, because all the previous 
treaties remained in power, and their texts have been changed or amended, so in 
order to decipher them one needed the help of specialized conversion tables – 
which certainly did not contribute to the greater legibility and transparency of 
the texts, nor the transparency of the institutions Maastricht I was in favor of. In 
the preamble of the Amsterdam Treaty the first line accents the “important goal” 
in the form of the continual improvement of the living and working conditions 
of the population, confirms the solidarity that links Europe and the overseas 
territories and, as a goal, determines their development and prosperity. Article 2 
determines in more detail the task of promoting the harmonious, balanced and 
sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and 
social protection, equality between men and women, a high degree of competi-
tiveness and the convergence of economic performances, a high level of 
protection and improvement in the quality of the environment, the increase in 
standards and quality of life, and the economic and social cohesion among the 
member states. 
Here, for the first time and on a number of occasions, the obligation of 
protecting the environment as a priority was highlighted, as it must be integrated 
into the public policies and activities of the European Union as an integral part 
of the concept of sustainable development. This is where and when the stage is 
once again taken by the set of values from the box of initial ideas of European 
integration: the Treaty expressly mentioned, again in the form of priorities, the 
fight against discrimination based on gender, racial or ethnic background, 
religion or opinion, age or sexual orientation. From this process a more sophisti-
cated Europe seems to be emerging, based on a pluralism of values and turned 
toward the realization of multiple goals, in line with the increasing and changing 
needs and priorities, that is, preferences of its citizens (Moeller, 2004). 
The 2001 Nice Treaty was mainly meant, as its preamble states, to prepare 
the European Union for the major enlargement that was to occur in 2004. In 
order for the European Union to adjust to the entrance of the new members – 12 
candidates – the change and adjustment of its institutions was necessary: the 
European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European 
Parliament, the Board of Regions and the Economic and Social Board. The 
institutional reforms also included the European Court of Justice and decision-
making mechanisms at all levels. The system of voting with a qualified majority 
was altered to absorb the new division of votes, but it was at the same time done 
so that the precarious balance in favor of the smaller countries was corrected to a 
new balance, that returns part of the lost importance and weight to the large 
countries, as was outlined and realized by the Maastricht Treaty. The Nice 
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Treaty additionally complicated the constitutional configuration of the EU, so it 
is not surprising that the voters in Ireland refused to ratify this treaty at the 
referendum, and only accepted it at the re-sit of the repeated referendum. As for 
the goals and values of the EU, they were not an issue in this treaty, but what 
happened parallel to the events surrounding the adoption of the Treaty is 
important. 
Also in Nice, but a year earlier, 2000, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union was signed, a unique document that, one might say, 
accepted the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms from 1949, put this time into the context of the creation of European 
unity. The EU thus has no need to mention any document that was created in 
another forum (the Council of Europe), but articulates its own value system in 
the field of human and basic rights. 
This Charter's preamble mentions for the first time the resolution of the 
people of the European Union, in creating an ever closer, that is, firmer alliance, to 
share a peaceful future based on common values. This formulation will later serve 
for the launch of the idea of the “Europe of values”. This orientation toward 
“common values” is specified in a complex expression stating that the Union, 
aware of its spiritual and moral heritage, is based on indivisible, universal values 
of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of 
democracy and the rule of law, that is, the legal state. Thus, the European Union 
puts the individual at the heart of its activities, establishing the citizenship of the 
Union and creating a territory of freedom, security and justice. This message about 
the “individual at the heart of the Union's activity” was not received with 
sufficient attention by the public. In contrast to this clear orientation toward the 
value of the individual, the general impression is, on the one hand, clouded by the 
bureaucratization of the EU, and on the other, by the numerous affairs of 
corruption and misuse of the EU resources, which is why this message was lost, in 
order to come to attention later on, in the Treaty on the Constitution, which 
establishes the European Union. 
5. The goals and values of European integration in the European 
Constitution 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed by the heads of 
state and prime ministers of the member states on October 28th 2004 in Rome, 
consolidates the goals and value system of the European Union. More clearly 
than ever before, the European Union defined its goals and values in this 
document, not leaving any room for the ambivalent interpretations of the past. 
The document signed in Rome is the third version in circulation: the first version 
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was finalized by the European Convention, made up of 108 representatives of 
EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of member states and dis-
tinguished individuals headed by the former French president, Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing. This version passed through two corrections, and the final version 
was defined by the Intergovernmental Conference in June 2004. Between the 
first and the final, third, version the text of the preamble was changed, an entire 
new passage was added so that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union was incorporated into the text of the Constitution; a chapter 
about EU public policies was added, and the provisions regarding the function-
ing of EU institutions and the decision-making procedure in the Council of the 
EU were altered, which had been the cause of the disagreements between the 
member states (Grevi, 2004). 
The grand discussion preceding the final adoption of the third version of 
the European Constitution revolved around the issue of whether to mention 
Christianity as a source of inspiration of the values that the European Union is 
based on, in the preamble, or not. In the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU, dignity is apostrophized as the first and basic right, operationalized through 
the right to live, the right to personal integrity, the prohibition of torture and 
inhumane or degrading behavior or punishment and, finally through the prohibi-
tion of slavery and forced labor. The theme of human dignity infuses the entire 
history of Christian philosophy, ever since Pico Della Mirandola raised the issue 
and portrayed it as a fundamental question of the Christian worldview in his work 
De dignitate homini (On human dignity). Human dignity was also referred to by 
the founding fathers of the European Union: Schumann, Monnet, Adenauer and 
De Gasperi. But through the passage of time and the changes in different attempts 
to experiment with the construction of European unity, this issue was lost from 
sight and it was thought that it was sufficient to refer to the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This issue returned, if only to the 
surface, in the Charter of Basic Human Rights, in order to enter the text of the 
Constitution in full glory through that Charter. However, the controversy about the 
Christian ideological bases of the European Union raised a great amount of noise: 
in the original version of the preamble, as the main ideas of the European Union 
the Greek and Roman heritage, Renaissance humanism and Enlightenment, as 
well as the entire spiritual heritage of Europe lying in the foundations of the 
European identity were mentioned (Brennan and Hamlin, 2004). 
In spite of the strong pressure exerted by the Catholic Church, that insisted 
on mentioning Christianity among the ideological foundations of European 
identity, in the end, because of the inability to achieve a consensus about it, an 
attitude of compromise and pragmatism prevailed, erasing from the preamble the 
mention of the Renaissance humanism and Enlightenment as a counterbalance to 
the refusal to introduce Christianity expressis verbis in the text of the Constitu-
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tion. The new formula of the “European style of compromise” was worded so 
that the founders of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe state that 
they find their inspiration in the cultural, religious and humanistic heritage of 
Europe, which developed universal and inalienable values of humanity, freedom, 
democracy, equality and rule of law (Grevi, 2004; Ziller, 2004). 
This was the way in which the motto under which Europe was to adopt the 
Constitution, a quote from Tukidid's History of the Peloponnesian Wars, was 
omitted: “Democracy is our constitution, because it is the rule of the majority.” 
The allusion to the ancient polis was, thus, erased from the European Constitu-
tion, and with it the link to the Greek and Roman heritage. In the discussions 
held during the Convention, the mention of the tradition of the Athens 
democracy were common, while the Roman tradition was received through the 
institution of citizenship open to all inhabitants of the Roman empire, including 
barbarians – if they accepted Roman laws. While the Greek tradition was 
unquestionably accepted as a source of modern European values, battles were 
fought over the Roman tradition. To be more specific, the “Roman tradition”, 
along with the institution of citizenship, includes two other components of 
Roman history: early republicanism that, even in Machiavelli's interpretation, 
was the ideal of the Renaissance political ideas of citizenship, while the latter 
component of Roman history, the Roman Empire, remained a synonym of non-
democratic government and imperialism – the politics of force and conquering. 
In the end, the attitude prevailed that both the Greek and the Roman traditions 
should be rejected, which, on the other hand, according to the criticism from the 
lines of the Catholic Church, were the bearers of pagan values, along with the 
specific “Renaissance humanism” and Enlightenment. The term “the cultural, 
religious and humanistic heritage of Europe” was deemed wide enough to cover 
any possible controversy. This is how the votes of the representatives from 
Ireland, Italy and Poland, who took into consideration the plea of Pope John 
Paul II, expressed in the Papal letter Exhortatio Apostolica Ecclesia in Europa 
(Johannes Paulus II, 2003), at the intergovernmental conference, that the future 
European Constitution be amended by the Christian-Jewish values, remained a 
minority. 
The second article of the preamble emphasizes the faith that Europe, 
reunited after “bitter experiences” aims to continue in the path of civilization, 
progress and prosperity for the good of all its people, including the weakest and 
least capable, hence, remaining a continent open to culture, learning and social 
progress. This is why it wishes to deepen the democratic and transparent nature 
of its public life and fight for peace, justice and solidarity around the world. It is 
interesting that peace here is understood as a finished, done deal for the people 
of Europe and that the achievement of peace, justice and solidarity is to expand 
to the entire world. This would signify that Europe is assigning itself a “mission” 
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in the world – to spread peace, justice and solidarity while, unlike the USA, it 
does not raise the issue of expanding democracy in the world as the main goal of 
its policy. Democracy is, completely accurately, intended for “public life”, 
meaning politics, whose democratic and transparent nature must be deepened 
around the Union, as well as in the member states. This is why the founders 
express their conviction that the peoples of Europe are deliberate in overcoming 
of their former divisions and are, united more firmly then ever, building their 
common destiny. Here, we arrive at the new motto of the European Union, 
which is offered in the fourth article of the preamble: Europe is “united in 
diversity”. Unlike the North American politeia, that as its motto uses the expres-
sion e pluribus unus – from different into single, the 21st century Europe is 
constructed with awareness of the richness of diversity and does not aim for 
unification through a melting pot of cultures and ethnic communities. Respect-
ing the rights of every individual and aware of their responsibility toward the 
future generations of the world, Europe offers, as the Constitution proclaims, the 
best opportunity for realizing this great endeavor, that makes it a “special area of 
human hope”. This is an explanation of the missionary drive from the second 
article: the ambitions of this Europe are not reduced to mid-range goals or only 
to the realization of a common market and the welfare of the Union and its 
inhabitants, but is an ambition plan realizing “human hopes” (Pinelli, 2004). 
The very text of the Constitution, that is Title I., determines the definition 
and goals of the Union. However, even if it was to be expected that the goals 
would hold first position, Article I.-1. tells of the establishment of the Union, 
about how the Constitution, reflecting the will of the citizens and countries of 
Europe to build a common future together, establishes the European Union to 
which the member states transfer their jurisdiction, in order to realize the goals 
they have in common. Thus, the Union will coordinate the public policies that 
the member states use to achieve those goals, and the entrusted jurisdiction will 
be used based on the “Community foundation”. This Community foundation 
signifies the “Community method”, that through common law became a manner 
of harmonizing policies in the European Union and assumes a procedure of 
policy formulation through the EU institutions, with the aid of what is known as 
committology – a system of deliberative decision-making though a pluralism of 
committees, advisory and regulatory, as well as permanent compromises 
achieved though negotiation and mediation. 
The goals of the European Union are not state until Article I.-3., which 
might drive one to believe that they are subordinate to the “common goals” and 
that they spring from them, that is the goals summarized from the national 
political level. However, they do have autonomous value: the reason they are not 
mentioned until the third article is, again, a result of a compromise achieved at 
the Convention devising the first version of the Constitution. In the first version, 
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the goals of the EU stood before the provision about the establishment of the 
Union, because it was believed that the Union itself – its establishment and 
purpose, is a derivation of the main goals of all its citizens and member states. 
Thus, the first and main goal of the Union is to promote peace, its values and the 
welfare of its people. Peace is conceived not as a situation where there is no war 
or threat of war, but is necessarily supplemented by the corollary of welfare and 
human progress, without which it cannot survive permanently (Bonde, 2004). 
However, that the final text of the Constitution is a compromise is proven 
by the second paragraph of Article I.-3., which states that the Union will offer its 
citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal borders, as well 
as an internal market where market competition is free and undistorted. Only the 
third paragraph states that the Union will work on behalf of the sustainable 
development of Europe, based on balanced economic growth and the stability of 
prices, on a highly competitive social market economy, aiming for full employ-
ment and social progress and a high level of protection and improvement of the 
quality of the environment. It will also, in this declarative direction, promote 
scientific and technologic progress, fight social exclusion and discrimination and 
promote social justice and protection, the equality of men and women, solidarity 
among generations and the protection of children's rights. It will also promote 
economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity between the member 
states. Here, the values reflecting the previous concepts of the Europe of peace, 
the Europe of the market and the new, only recently established Europe of 
values, are all intertwined, in a not very logical order. However, economic goals 
were not portrayed as instrumental, procedural activities in the service of the 
main goal, peace, but as values per se, in the context of, naturally, achieving the 
welfare of European citizens (Brenan and Hamlin, 2004). 
It is interesting that in the very first articles of the Constitution, one may 
detect the compromising nature of this document. This is why the concepts of 
the Europe of peace, the Europe of the market and the Europe of values inter-
twine with each other in what is not the most fortunate of orders. The same goes 
for the inserted provisions, such as the second section of the third paragraph of 
Article I-3 , where one may simultaneously read the obligation of the Union to 
respect the rich cultural and linguistic diversity and ensure that the European 
cultural heritage is preserved and enhanced. This section should, obviously, 
logically and by content belong to Title II, where fundamental rights in the 
European Union are discussed, since this subject matter is part of the collective 
human rights. However, the authors of the Constitution obviously decided to 
amplify the effect of the Union's insistence on this diversity, even if it was an 
inconsistent addition to the enumeration of the goals of the Union. 
In its relationship toward the “wider world”, the Union will emphasize and 
promote its values and interests, meaning it will contribute to the peace, security, 
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sustainable development of the world, solidarity and mutual respect between 
nations, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human 
rights, especially children's rights, as well as strict adherence to and develop-
ment of international law, including the respect for the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations. The Union will, according to the fifth paragraph, realize 
these goals with appropriate means in line with the authority invested in it by the 
Constitution (Cremona, 2004). 
This is how the Constitution of the EU inverts the relationship of goals and 
values: values are expressed first, and goals are enumerated later. The European 
Constitution introduces values labeled as the common values that the Union 
undertakes to respect. These values, enumerated in order, are: 
− human dignity 
− freedom 
− democracy 
− equality 
− the rule of law 
− human rights 
− minority rights. 
 
However, the second paragraph of Article I-2 states that these values are 
common to member states in a society where pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between men and women prevail. What 
are these, really, other than values closely linked to the enumerated values? It 
could be concluded according to the expression used in the Constitution, that 
these are “added” values, as Jens-Peter Bonde believes. But is it possible to 
imagine human dignity as a value that needs to be nourished, if at the same time 
it does not include equality between men and women. Certainly, in the times 
when Pico Della Mirandola wrote his tractate on human dignity, the issue of 
equality between men and women was not on the agenda. As democracy today is 
unimaginable without pluralism and tolerance, so are the rule of law and respect 
for human rights unthinkable without justice and freedom from discrimination, 
as well as equality between men and women. Thus, the core of the seven basic 
common values must be supplemented by these five additional values in order to 
create a complete whole (Bonde, 2004). 
Truth be told, the discussion at the Convention was went on within the 
framework of this dilemma: are these, actually, equally important values or may 
a hierarchical ranking scale be established between them, according to which, 
the first seven values form the common values, and the additional five are values 
of individual societies, that is “society” in the singular, as the European Consti-
tution provides. 
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The original approach to the values of the European Union was developed 
by Michael Emerson, who summarized the catalogue of values stated in the 
European Constitution in the form of a Decalogue, that is, the Ten Command-
ments. He claims that Article I-2, labeled as “The Values of the Union”, is a 
disappointing text, confusing and inconsistent. At the conference of the Brussels 
Center for European Political Studies, held in February 2005, Emerson offered 
his analysis of the values of the EU, under the title “Which Values for Europe?”, 
based on the critical reading of the European Constitution, and not just the initial 
explicit part, Title I, that covers values. Title II should also be considered, for it 
discusses the fundamental rights and citizenship of Europe, especially Article I-
10, mentioning the institution of citizenship of the European Union as comple-
mentary to national citizenship, as well as Title III, “Union Competences”, 
especially Article I-11, speaking about the institute of subsidiarity (Emerson, 
2005). 
And still, one of the basic values of the Union, as Emerson sees it, is 
inclusiveness and openness to others, which is the subject of Title VIII and Title 
IX, as formulated in Articles I-57 and I-58 How is it possible, though, to 
mention the values of the European Union and fail to mention the basic values of 
a liberal society, that were for a long time the basic values of the “Europe of 
markets”, such as the four freedoms of movement of goods, people, capital and 
services? This is why Emerson believes it is not enough to be limited to a self-
declaration of values as the European Constitution does, but a single 
“Decalogue” – the Ten Commandments (of the Lord), according to Moses’ Ten 
Commandments from Mt. Sinai – should be derived, based on the entire text. 
These ten commandments (addressed to the European Union!) should look like 
this, according to Emerson: 
1. be truly democratic and respect human rights and the rule of law; 
2. guarantee the four freedoms of movement – goods, labor, capital and 
services; 
3. enable and care for social cohesion between people, regions and states; 
4. ensure sustainable economic development to the benefit of future 
generations; 
5. reject nationalism and stimulate the citizens' multiple identities; 
6. ensure a federative, multi-governance administration; 
7. ensure a secular rule and stimulate the multi-cultural pluralism of the society; 
8. promote a multilateral order in international relations; 
9. sustain from threatening or using force on others without just cause; 
10. be open, inclusive and integrative toward neighbors that accept the above 
mentioned commandments. 
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The form of this Decalogue should, of course, be taken with a sense of 
humor. However, since all this was presented at a serious event of a serious 
institution, a leading think-tank (brain trust) of European policy, one should 
critically reflect on some of these values, formulated in this way and in this 
context. In the first line, “federative” multi-level governance, that is, political 
administration, is a questionable value. European Union is not yet a federation, 
and by all accounts it will not be in the near future. Multilevel governance is a 
specific of the European Union that needs to operate more adequately than it has 
functioned so far, but a decent incentive to that would come from the ratification 
of the Constitution and its coming into force. In the second place is the “threat or 
use of force” on others which requires a “just cause”. This cause is prone to 
differing interpretations, which was obvious between the European Union member 
states during the American intervention in Iraq, who interpreted differently the 
justification for their participation in the attack on Iraq. This is the reason the 
representatives of the peace movements, during the discussion about the draft of 
the Constitution, asked the European Union to explicitly distance itself from war, 
and declaratively reject it as a political means, even as a means of necessary 
defense. In some European constitutions, for example of Italy, there is a formula-
tion about the rejection of war as a political means, so an analogous formulation 
was suggested for the European Constitution as well. However, the example of the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia, indicates how dangerous wars are, so their 
general rejection is unrealistic. On the contrary, the threat of using force might 
play a significant role in the prevention of the outbreak of conflicts, but it requires 
a common defense policy and a mechanism for the articulation of such a policy, 
which will only be enabled by the implementation of the European Constitution 
after it comes into power. 
Returning to the goals of the European Union and how they were formu-
lated in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and enumerated in 
Article I-3, one may say that they follow the formulations fixed by the Amster-
dam Treaty. The main novelty consists of a summarizing formulation that the 
purpose of the Union is to “promote peace, its values and the welfare of the 
peoples”. Peace is a universal goal and not an exclusive goal of the European 
Union, while social welfare was elaborated as an instrumental key, as a means of 
achieving peace, where a more extensive paragraph about international relations 
was thus inserted. In this context it should be mentioned that the Union has the 
obligation to contribute to the “rigorous respect for and development of interna-
tional law, especially regarding the principles of the United Nations Charter ”. 
Article I-3 divides the European Union goals into two groups of goals: those that 
relate to the EU itself, its own goals, we might say, and goals it has in relation to 
the affirmation of its own values in the global context (Article III-292). We will 
portray these goals in a comparative outline. 
Damir Grubiša 
62 
EU goals regarding “itself” (internal) EU goals regarding the “outside 
world” (external) 
- promoting peace, its values and the 
welfare of its peoples  
- contribute to peace and security 
- achieve an area of freedom, security 
and justice without internal borders 
- contribute to the sustainable 
development of the world 
- achieve a common market where 
competition is free and undistorted 
- contribute to solidarity and mutual 
respect between nations 
- achieve the sustainable development 
of Europe, based on balanced 
economic growth 
- contribute to free and fair trade 
- achieve a highly competitive social 
market economy 
- contribute to eradication of poverty 
- achieve the stability of prices - contribute to the protection of human 
rights, especially children's rights 
- achieve full employment and social 
progress 
- contribute to strict adherence to and 
development of international law, 
including the respect for the 
principles of UN's Charter 
- achieve a high level of protection 
and improvement of the quality of 
the environment 
- contribute to equality between men 
and women 
- promote scientific and technologic 
progress 
- contribute to solidarity between 
generations 
- achieve social justice and protection - contribute to economic, social and 
territorial cohesion 
 - contribute to cultural and linguistic 
diversity 
 
As we can see, this is for now the most developed code of goals and values 
of the European Union. One may debate about the relevance of the goals and 
whether these values really create the coherent system of an “open society” 
Popper advocates; in a word, is it truly a finalized code, or will in time the need 
arise to add a few new values to the exiting ones? These values, prima facie, 
really do form the corpus of the constitution, which is synonymous to 
democracy, as Pericles says. However, we can immediately note that the 
imperative of democracy is somewhat limited by clauses that invite respect for 
the existing orders in the member states. Namely, Article I-5 is dedicated to the 
relations between the European Union and the member states. Through this 
article the European Union is obliged to respect the national identity of the 
member states, and the object of this respect is, aside from the “basic structure, 
political and constitutional” of the member states, the autonomous system 
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(meaning, the form of government and form of state), the “important functions” 
of preservation of territorial integrity, public order and national security. These 
specifications are not irrelevant, if the long-lasting discussions and polemics 
between the advocates of intergovernmentalism and supporters of supranation-
alism are taken into consideration. This formulation is preclusive regarding the 
development of democracy within the European Union. One may assume, for 
example, that the level of democracy achieved in transitional countries still lags 
behind the quality of democracy in the consolidated democratic systems of 
Western Europe. It is one thing to respect national identities and oblige the 
European Union to stimulate the affirmation of identities of the member states, 
including national, cultural and linguistic identities, and quite another to bring to 
life the principles of democracy, as well as respect for human rights, which are 
of a more universal character. So satisfaction with, for example, the level of 
democratic rights in one member state might mean the cementing of the internal 
development of the member states and the reduction of the effects of policy, 
legal and economic convergence towards higher, common standards. Also, it 
might happen that these constitutional directions reduce the effect of Europeisa-
tion, as a process of mutual infusion and transfer of the positive experience of 
constructing the political system of the European Union to the political systems 
of the member states. This would mean that the positive effect of “Europeisa-
tion”, as the terminus technicus signifying this process, is reduced only to the 
original impulse of adjustment to democratic principles at the moment of 
accession to the EU and adoption of the Copenhagen criteria that precede that 
accession. On the contrary, the process of Europeisation must continue in the 
case of the transitional countries that, in spite of their initial successes, differ by 
the degree of stability of their democratic institutions and procedures, which is 
why the possibility of a step back is not excluded, that is, the post festum 
destabilization of political systems, after EU accession. This might take place for 
different reasons, among which one should not exclude the negative effects of 
possible global recessions and crises, a decrease in the development of the 
European Union itself (for example, caused by a ratification crisis related to the 
Constitution), crises of institutions of the Union or blockage of the Union's 
bodies by one or more states, as was the case in the crisis of the “empty chair” of 
1965 or a contingent set of circumstances that we cannot predict at the moment 
(Fraile Canton, 2004; Poettering, 2005). 
The European Constitution is the codification of all the basic EU regula-
tions, and not a radically new constitutional act. It satisfies the demands set by 
the Laeken Declaration of 2001, asking for a better definition and share of power 
in the European Union, a simplification of the founding treaties and legislative 
procedures, as well as the complicated voting system. The key slogan of the 
Laeken impulse for reform of the Union was transparency, openness, clarity. At 
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the same time, the Laeken Declaration demanded the introduction of more 
democracy to the functioning of the European Union, greater transparency of the 
work and efficiency of its institutions and procedures. All this is to be achieved 
through a single treaty that will replace all the previous ones and finish the 
initiated process of constitutionalization of the European Union. The result was 
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, that indeed simplified the 
decision-making procedures in the EU, expanded the jurisdiction of the 
European Parliament, the only body of the EU with elective legitimacy, 
abolished the three pillars the European Union was founded on, according to the 
Maastricht Treaty, so that the competences that used to belong to the first pillar, 
the pillar of the European Communities, were extended. The forest of legislative 
procedures was replaced by a simpler nomenclature of regulations (the previous 
regulations and directives were replaced by the general “acts”), and participation 
in discussions about regulations that need to be passed was expanded to the 
national parliaments of the member states. The European Union, among others, 
became a legal entity, that is it gained the capability to be a subject of interna-
tional relations, which gives the EU an autonomous appearance, and subsidiarity 
– the principle that decisions are made as close as possible to the citizens, was 
confirmed as a counterbalance to the elaborate system of transferring 
sovereignty to the supranational bodies of the Union in the form of the 
exclusive, divided and common authority of the EU. New institutions were 
introduced, that are supposed to symbolize the greater togetherness of the Union 
and its common foreign and security policy: the president of the European Union 
and the minister of foreign affairs of the EU. Finally, there are provisions about 
the greater transparency and accountability of the Union to the member states 
and the citizens, as well as provisions about the internal democracy in the EU, 
that now for the first time introduce participative democracy, even if in a very 
narrow form (Ziller, 2004). 
The provisions about democracy represent another novum in the constitu-
tional acts of the European Union. The “democratic life of the Union” received 
an entire separate part in the Constitution, Title VI (Articles I-45 and I-52). 
Starting from the principle of democratic equality of the citizens, that will with 
“equal attention” be respected by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of 
the European Union, special articles elaborate the principles of representative 
and participative democracy. The European Union is thus, expressly, based on 
representative democracy, manifested in the direct representation of citizens at 
the level of the Union in the European Parliament, while the member states are 
represented in the Council of the European Union, through their governments, 
who are democratically accountable either to the national parliaments or their 
citizens. In spite of the direct and indirect representation of the citizens of the 
European Union in the bodies and institutions of the Union, each citizen has the 
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right to participate in the democratic life of the Union as well, and decisions 
must be made in the most open manner and as close as possible to the citizens 
themselves. This is the first time that the European Union has spoken so openly 
about the object of fear (and critique) of the political public, the democratic 
deficit of the Union. The chapter about the democratic life of the EU tries to 
compensate for this deficit by expanding the catalogue of values of the Union, 
not only to democracy in the abstract sense, but pointing out how it is practiced 
as well. Representative democracy is, incidentally, the first and rudimentary 
form of democracy. This is why the Constitution takes a step further and also 
presents the principle of participative democracy. The institutions and bodies of 
the European Union are obliged, with adequate means, to offer the citizens and 
their representative organizations the opportunity to learn about and publicly 
exchange views about all the areas of activities the Union undertakes. The Union 
will uphold an open, transparent and regular dialogue with the representative 
associations and the civil society, as it will undertake wide consultations with 
the stakeholders, precisely in order to ensure the coherence and transparency of 
the political activities of the Union. The citizens may appear both as direct 
action initiators, as protagonists of an “agenda-setting” process and invite the 
Commission to undertake an action or issue a legal act, pertinent to the 
implementation of the Constitution. Of course, regarding the size of the Union, 
the minimal number of citizens necessary for such an initiative to be valid is 
“not less then one million”. The provisions about the social partners and 
autonomous social dialogue also belong among the provisions about democracy. 
In order for this democracy to function in the Union, the new institution of the 
ombudsman, appointed by the European Parliament, whose duty is to accept, 
investigate and report about “maladministration” in the activities of institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies of the EU, and the Constitutions, guarantees 
complete independence to this institution (Grubiša, 2005). 
However, democracy cannot be realized without the transparency of the 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of such a huge machinery as the 
European Union, dominated by bureaucratic and technocratic procedures at the 
highest level, but which inevitably aspire to, exactly because of the high level of 
expertise they require, a sort of secrecy or at least surreptitiousness in the eyes of 
the public. Thus, the Constitution obliges the Union to promote “good 
governance” and the cooperation of the civil society, and this may be done only 
if all the EU bodies lead their business as open as possible. This way, the 
sessions of the European Parliament will be open, as will the sessions of the 
European Council when it discusses and votes on a legal act. And, in order for 
the publicity of the work to be complete, the Union must guarantee the 
accessibility and openness of access to the documents of the European Union, in 
the first instance, to the citizens themselves, and each institution, body, office or 
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agency must adopt their own procedural rules to regulate access to the 
documents. There was no need, nor has anyone ever felt the need for such 
provisions before now: the EU was addressed by critics for its non-democratic 
nature, and now it has turned into the initiator and stimulator of “good 
governance”, thus becoming a standard for member states and an integral part of 
the Europeisation of democracy. 
Finally, we may conclude that with this Constitution, the European Union 
becomes a new Europe of values in the true meaning of the words: the European 
identity is not determined by geographical status or borders, the borders of the 
EU are now the borders of an area accepting a catalogue of values, enumerated 
in the EU Constitution, as well as the democratic standards of the political order. 
However, the adoption and signing of the Constitution opens another problem, 
returning us to the education deficit mentioned at the beginning: according to the 
newest Eurobarometer data, 15% citizens of the EU have not even heard about 
the EU Constitution, and over 60% do not know what exactly is written in it. 
This is why the process of ratification is going to be difficult and burdened by 
barriers, and the proclaimed transparency and clarity are not going to be that 
quick nor reach easily what we call the “average European citizen”.Educational 
and informative action, as well as the dissemination of values and goals of the 
European Union, and its democratic standards, will be the task of each member 
state. However, regardless of the problems this process will open and the 
numerous paradox-effects that will be manifested, the goals and values of the 
EU will remain noted forever, regardless of whether the process of European 
integration falters temporarily or falls into a crisis, they will remain a roadmap 
for the development of the human values of the political life in a new Europe. 
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Vlasta Ilišin 
POLITICAL VALUES, ATTITUDES AND 
PARTICIPATION OF YOUTH: CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE 
1. Introductory remarks 
Integration into the European Union is a political issue and decision. In other 
words, the integration into this association, along with the economic, social and 
cultural, has its political dimension as well. This is not simply an issue of political 
conditions set before the aspiring countries by the EU, nor of decisions about 
accession made by the authorities and the citizens, but is also an issue of political 
consciousness and behavior of these political officials and citizens. These 
components are the elements that the political elite and the citizens bring with 
them into the community of countries based on a certain system of democratic 
values and rules of political conduct. 
The demise of socialist systems on European soil and EU enlargement with 
countries whose experience comes from a totalitarian political order, raise the 
question of the democratic and integration potential of European citizens. This is 
especially true when youth is concerned, who are often regarded as potentially the 
greatest winners of the integration process and are expected to contribute to the 
future of a united Europe. The goals and dynamics of the integration process 
equally demand a research of the youth's relationship towards the democratic 
values and institutional politics in the old and the new EU members, as well as 
those that are in the different phases of preparation for accession to the Union 
(Ichilov, 1997; Furlong, Guidikova, 2001; Youniss and others, 2002; Adnanes, 
2004). One can, therefore, state that the scientific interest in the political 
orientation and participation of youth in European societies, based on the 
necessity to explain the occurring changes and foresee the future of modern 
democracy. 
The relationship of youth and politics is in this analysis observed and 
interpreted in the context of political culture that is understood as a relationship 
of individuals and political values, institution and participation, with emphasis 
on the civil (democratic) political culture as the type of political relationship 
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most appropriate to a democratic system (Almond, Verba, 2000). The democratic 
political culture is linked with the concept of citizenship, which implies a 
relationship of the citizen towards the society – and in this context, politics as well 
– and incorporates affiliation, membership, autonomy, equality, accountability and 
participation (Van Steenbergen, 1994; Hall, Coffey, Williamson, 1999). The 
democratic political culture and the concept of citizenship are also linked to 
social capital, understood as a network of social relationships based on trust, 
reciprocity, cooperation and solidarity (Matić, 2000; Putnam, 2000), all of which 
contributes to the total development of the society, including the 
democratization of social relationships. An analytical matrix for researching the 
nature and dynamics of the relationship between youth and politics also includes 
the classical models of territorial and functional structural cleavages (Lipset, 
Rokkan, 1967), as well as newer patterns of ideological, cultural and socio-
economic polarization (Kasapović, 1996; Zakošek, 1998, 2001). Considering the 
Croatian society as a “new democracy” the modified interpretative model 
includes three structural cleavages: territorial-cultural, ideological-cultural and 
socio-economic (Zakošek, 1998, 2001, 2002)1. Also, age as an element of a 
social cleavage with political consequences can be included in the context of 
structural cleavages (Andersen, Heath, 2003). The assumption is that the 
existing structural cleavages are reflected in the group of youth as well, but, at 
the same time, age generates the profiling and polarization of political attitudes 
and behavioral patterns. However, in the analysis of age effects one should 
differentiate the temporary from the permanent, in order to detect the existence 
                                                     
1 N. Zakošek (2001: 109) describes these three cleavages in a very concise manner: “In 
Croatia, the territorial-cultural cleavage (or the center-periphery cleavage) appeared as a 
consequence of a long-term historic conflict regarding the creation of the Croatian state, 
where the options directed toward the establishment of an autonomous Croatian state 
came into conflict with the options of Croatia's integration into wider political entities. 
The ideological-cultural cleavage crystallized in a long-term process of secularization 
and modernization around the opposition between the religious and secular ideological 
and moral worldviews. Finally, the socio-economic cleavage is newer in origin and 
linked to the consequences of the market-capitalist transformation of Croatia economy; 
in this cleavage the conflict of interests between the winners and losers of the socio-
economic transformation is manifested.” It should be added that the territorial-cultural 
cleavage appears in the form of rivalry of the bearers of the state-creation project (the 
center) and the minority and regionalist demands (representing the periphery). Along 
with the state-creationist, the center-periphery cleavage also has a cultural component, 
where the center advocates the conception of an “exclusive Croatian nationalism, hostile 
towards minority cultures, multi-culturalism and all forms of international integrations 
and outside cultural influences”, while the periphery is represented by cultural (ethnic 
and regional) minorities, which “negate the hegemony of the exclusive Croatian national 
culture” as well as protagonists that “today advocate the definition of a national identity 
and national culture open for interaction with other cultures and for Croatia's 
international integration” (Zakošek, 2002: 89). 
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of potential new generational units and obtain elements for predicting whether 
the young generations will be the bearers of these same values and behavioral 
patterns in their mature age as well (Neimi, Hepburn, 1995). 
Within this theoretical framework one can investigate the political 
awareness and behavior of individuals as well as groups, and in this case, this 
concerns youth as a social group. Several specific factors are at work, along with 
the influence of the social and political context, where the attitudes and behavior 
of youth are concerned. This is a combination of influences of the life cycle, the 
specific generational experience and the events of an era, where youth is only 
occasionally a recognizable and significant political protagonist of (Braungart, 
Braungart, 1989). The existing analytic insights have indicated that youth in 
almost every society and period of time different from the adult citizens by a 
number of politically relevant elements, however, these differences are usually 
not of the type or scope to allow for a diagnosis of a permanent conflict of 
generations (Braungart, Braungart, 1989; Ilišin, 1999, 2002; Henn, Weinstein, 
Wring, 2002). 
As for certain generational differences, numerous researches conducted 
around the world are unanimous in their findings when youth and adults are 
compared according to the political dimension. Firstly, the young are more 
liberal (that is, less conservative) and more open for changes in their political 
viewpoints than the adults (Alwin, Korsnick, 1991; Watts, 1999; Andersen, 
Heath, 2003). Secondly, the young express a lower level of interest in politics, 
vote in elections somewhat less often, have a weaker affiliation to parties, and 
are extremely rarely members of political parties and authorities at all levels 
(Grifin, 1993; Bynner, Ashford, 1994; Hackett, 1997; Roche, Tucker, 1997; 
Ichilov, 1998; Jowell, Park, 1998; Matthews, Limb, Taylor, 1998; Schizzerotto, 
Gasperoni, 2001; Henn, Weinstein, Wring, 2002). Thirdly, it was demonstrated 
that the young are more likely to engage in social or extra-institutional politics, 
where the inclusion into civil associations and volunteer work is considered as 
one of the most efficient forms of political socialization of the young for their 
full and responsible civil (democratic) political participation, for it is assumed 
that it leads to a long-term political activism (Neimi, Hepburn, 1995; Youniss, 
Yates, 1997; Kluegel, Mason, 1999; Yates, Youniss, 1997; Kluegel, Mason, 
1999; Yates, Youniss, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Youniss and others, 2002; Frisco, 
Muller, Dodson, 2004). Finally, the distance of youth from institutional politics 
is most often interpreted through the discourse of the life cycle theory, 
presuming that the young will be more active in their mature years and that their 
total social conditions and attributes will change. However, the explanations 
starting from the changes occurring in the post-materialistic society, where civil 
participation is in transit from the traditional political forms and institutions to 
the field of civil society, are common, as are the explanations regarding the 
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dissolution of youth with political elites as well as their preoccupation with the 
satisfying of elementary existential needs, along with the statement that lower 
participation is, as a rule, concentrated in the more marginalized groups, one of 
which is youth (Alwin and Korsnick, 1991; Helve, 1997; Inglehart, 1997; 
Wuthrow, 1997; Watts, 1999; Henn, Weinstein, Wring, 2002). We must keep in 
mind here that the political participation of youth becomes even more 
problematic after noting the decrease of participation of all the citizens in the 
electoral processes and political parties along with the decreasing trust into 
political protagonists in the developed democracies (Čular, 2003). It should also 
be taken into consideration that the social capital in modern society is weakening 
parallel to the strengthening of the trend of individualization and the increasing 
mistrust into the institutions of the system (Matić, 2000; Putnam, 2000). 
However, the existing solutions of organizing youth in democratic societies 
point youth towards institutions void of adults, which results in a sort of “youth 
ghetto-isation” distancing them from the world of institutional politics where 
decisions regarding youth are made (Matthews, Limb, Taylor, 1998; 
Schizzerotto, Gasperoni, 2001). The majority of the mentioned processes affect 
the relationship of youth towards politics directly but not stimulatingly. 
Research has also registered the collapse of youth engagement in the 
former socialist countries, the reason for which is found in the disengagement of 
youth in developed democracies, as well as in the opinions that the interests of 
youth are not adequately represented in the political sphere in a formal manner 
(that is, the young do not play an institutionalized political role); that political 
socialization is aggravated because the adults cannot transfer the values and 
experience from the former political order; that youth is overly burdened with 
the race for accomplishment in the new capitalist environment, and simply have 
no time to engage in politics; that the poor organization of youth in the 
promotion of their interests is a reaction to the over-organization in the socialist 
era; that the young accept the new political system, which could be interpreted 
as a latent readiness for political activity, but only when they estimate it is 
necessary; and even that the lack of political engagement of youth is really a 
healthy consequence of normal politics (Tymowski, 1994; Ule, 1996; Wallace, 
Kovatcheva, 1998; Yates, Youniss, 1999; Mitev, 2001; Adnanes, 2004). Even 
though many of the previously mentioned hypotheses about the political 
(self)marginalization of youth in transitional countries, are debatable, the latter 
explanation must certainly be the most problematic. Namely, if it is observed from 
the viewpoint of repeated warnings that the extremely weak participation of youth 
in political events and activities, especially when it is lengthy, represents danger 
for the representative democracy even in the countries with a long democratic 
tradition (Jowell, Park, 1998; New incentives… 2001; Schizzerotto, Gasperoni, 
2001; Henn, Weinstein, Wring, 2002; Andersen, Heath, 2003), then the 
“normalcy” of political passivity is very questionable. Therefore, we must again 
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emphasize that in the developed European countries, especially in the dynamic 
period of economic and political changes on the continent that had begun with 
the demise of socialism and continued with the process of EU enlargement, the 
young citizens are paid particular attention, because they are the ones the 
success/failure of the European integration project depends on greatly. Thus, the 
political disengagement of youth is not simply putting in question the future of 
representative democracy, but also the future of a united Europe. This is not to 
say that a passive youth is the greatest threat to European democracy and 
integration, but we must insist that ignoring the problem of insufficient political 
involvement of youth may in the near future turn up as a problem bigger than it 
would seem at this moment, burdened with grand and far-reaching changes with 
epochal meaning. 
Croatia fits in completely into the image of a collapsed political 
engagement of youth in the post-socialist countries. This is without debate 
corroborated by the results of empirical research in the past fifteen years (Ilišin, 
1999, 2002, 2003). Thus, the Croatian youth, in spite of the relatively 
satisfactory democratic potential identified through their attitudes and values, 
demonstrate a lack of readiness to vote, a lower level of party affiliation and 
inclusion into the work of political parties, while it is present in institutions of 
power in a negligible number. The situation is not much better in the 
organizational sense either: the numerous youth associations are rounding up a 
small number of the members of this generation and are having difficulties 
gathering around a common cause. The activity of the political party youth – 
where it exists – is mostly limited to party settings, and cooperation is weak. In a 
word, and based on the existing insights, the young in Croatia today are not a 
relevant political subject. This means that the interests of youth are not clearly 
articulated nor mediated into the public sphere, and the existing institutions of 
youth are atomized and fragmented, which greatly limits the possibility of 
generational political affirmation. 
We should mention that the police marginalization of youth in Croatia, in 
spite of the fact that it had its own organization, was present in the socialist 
period, and became more pronounced as the years after World War II passed by, 
because the young then capitalized their contribution to the war by taking 
positions in the institutions of power. At the same time, youth was the social 
group that questioned the socialist order in its later stages the most (Santrić, 
1989) and the first to embrace the liberal values (Ilišin, 1999). Regardless of the 
fact that the young were least burdened by socialist heritage, the new political 
protagonists on the party scene at the time of the epochal upheaval in 1990, never 
looked for “new breed” politicians for a new time in this social group. Thus, the 
young entered the transitional period as losers, and they remained in the same 
position in all the electoral cycles and changes in power, in spite of the 
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saturation of the public with the same faces in the Croatian political elite. The 
absence of youth from institutions of power is linked also with the fact that its 
interests are very rarely in the focus of interest of political protagonists and 
institutions of power, which additionally confirms their marginalization. Still, 
such a marginalized political status of youth is not a reason for not researching 
their relationship towards politics – on the contrary. 
There are three equally important reasons for researching the relationship 
of youth and politics now and here. The first is that Croatia is in a period of 
democratic consolidation, so it is assumed that the dynamics and quality of the 
democratization process greatly depend on the political awareness and activist 
potential of youth. The second reason is the fact that Croatia is (should be) 
intensively preparing itself for equal accession into the European Union. Starting 
from the point that young people will be spending a larger part of their lives in a 
new economic, social, political and cultural environment – which is why the 
development of Croatia in the new community will depend on them – it is 
necessary to gain insight into their political values and convergence with the 
dominant and proclaimed values in the EU countries. The third reason is the 
result of the fact that one of Croatia's obligations regarding EU accession is to 
ensure the institutional framework and mechanisms for implementing youth 
policy congruent to the principles accepted by the Council of Europe, the 
stimulating of active participation of youth in society is one of. In order to 
manage this in an optimal way, it is certainly necessary to enrich the scientific 
insights about the political awareness, participation and potential of Croatian 
youth. 
The accent in this segment of the research is on the analysis of political 
values, attitudes and participation of Croatian youth as indicators of its readiness 
for European integration. These political components are tracked in their dynamics 
(changes) and specifics (comparisons with adults in Croatia, and partially youth in 
Europe). The goal of the analysis is, hence, to determine the distribution, structure, 
specifics and changes of political values, attitudes and participation of youth. 
Here, we start from three basic hypotheses: 1) youth in Croatia is different than 
adults or its European counterpart regarding its political values, attitudes and 
participation; 2) changes taking place on the social and political plain in the past 
five years affected the dynamics and direction of changes of political values, 
attitudes and participation of youth in Croatia; 3) political values, attitudes and 
participation of youth is significantly determined by its socio-demographic, socio-
structural and socio-cultural attributes. The influence of the social and other 
attributes of youth on the examined phenomena will be detected by using the 
attributes of gender, age, socio-professional and residential status, provenience, 
regional status, education of participants and their fathers, as well as religious self-
identification and party affiliation. We will only interpret the differences and 
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correlations (obtained through the χ2 test and variance analysis) significant on a 
level of .0001 or less. The comparative analysis is conducted on three levels: 
between the young and adults, the youth from Croatia and Europe, and youth 
from Croatia in 1999 and 2004, and only the first order factors will be 
mentioned and interpreted as the results of factor analysis. For the purpose of 
saving space for the outline of the obtained results, the summary tables are 
mostly used, while a portion of the relevant findings is not even portrayed in the 
tables, but rather referred to synthetically in the text. 
2. Party affiliation 
Numerous scientific researches about the electoral behavior of citizens 
have been conducted in Croatia since 1990, as well as media surveys of public 
opinion that measure the rating of political parties on a monthly basis. The 
number of party supporters is susceptible to changes and in this regard, the data 
collected a year or two ago are obsolete. However, in this type of scientific 
research we are not interested into how many supporters a party has at the 
moment, for our attention is predominantly focused on the investigation of the 
structuring of political party sympathizers, that is, the social profile of the 
potential voters of all the relevant parties. 
In order to illustrate, we will portray data about the support for political 
parties among youth in 1999 and 2004, as well as adults in 2004 (Graph 1). For a 
better understanding of the registered changes we must note that the first 
research was conducted at the beginning of 1999 (which was the last of almost 
10 years of ceaseless monopolization of power by HDZ, that is, one year before 
the fourth parliamentary elections were held), and the second at the beginning of 
2004, several months after HDZ won in the fifth parliamentary elections held at 
the end of November in 2003. These facts certainly eliminate the possibility of 
surprise regarding the registered changes in the political affiliation of youth. We 
should mention that in 2004 the young chose a total of 18 parties offered in the 
survey, as well as several others grouped in the category “some other party”, 
along with a significant number of those who do not explicitly support any party, 
or they cannot decide (categorized into the common group “undecided”). Five 
parties with at least a 5% support by youth, as well as the group of undecided 
participants, were chosen for further analysis. 
It is visible at first site from data in Graph 1 that there were shifts in the 
function of time, as well as differences seen from the inter-generational 
viewpoint. Within that, it is evident that there is a greater convergence in the 
party affiliations of youth and adults than between the young today and five 
years ago. Hence, we can conclude that the social circumstances had a similar 
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influence on youth and adults, which can be linked with the thesis that the young 
are more likely to vote like their parents, especially fathers (Converse, 1976; 
Turner, 1989). however, as could have been expected, the young demonstrate a 
somewhat smaller degree of party affiliation, which could be explained from the 
point of view of the life cycle theory. In other words, with the process of 
maturing and gaining experience, a part of today's youth will to a greater or a 
lesser extent identify themselves with a certain party, or parties. 
 
Graph 1: Party affiliation of youth and adults (%)2 
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The changes in the party affiliation of youth indicate a recent inclination 
toward the right-wing political pole (and the election results testify that the same 
is true of the adults), which must be a reaction to the failed expectations that the 
six-member coalition, coming into power in 2000, will implement the desired 
                                                     
2 The choice of data for the needs of this comparison on the party affiliation of youth was 
based on the results obtained in 2004. This is the reason why the supporters of two 
liberal parties are excluded from comparative analysis, because their support fell under 
the threshold of 5% in the meantime. They are: HSLS, whose support plummeted from 
12.5% to 1.7%, and LS, whose support decreased from 5.4% into 0.4%. On the other 
hand, HNS was included in the relevant parties, while five years ago it only had the 
support of 2.2% of youth (Ilišin, Radin, 2002: 344). 
Political Values, Attitudes and Participation of Youth: Continuity and Change 
 77 
changes on the economic and social level. It would, therefore, seem that after the 
strengthening of the socio-economic cleavage, reflected in the “polarization of 
the electorate into the winners and losers of economic transformation” (Zakošek, 
2001: 121), the influence of the territorial-cultural and ideological-cultural 
cleavages is revitalized, returning to Croatian political life issues that for a while 
might have seen overcome. 
It is also interesting that the number of those politically undecided 
increased among the young in the observed period of time, which can be 
interpreted as an indicator of the disappointment with political parties (and it can 
only be assumed that the same took place with the adults, a relatively high 
number of which offers support to no political party). However, party 
preferences are a dynamic category and the repeated turn to the left-wing center 
political options in the near future is not something we should exclude, although 
we should count on the fact that most relevant political parties have a stable core 
electorate, salvaging them from a complete debacle in elections. 
It was already mentioned that the primary investigative interest is to 
establish the subgroups of youth from which the supporters of the observed 
political parties is recruited, that is, what is the profile of young party 
sympathizers, shown by the summarized data in Table 1. 
Based on the obtained results, and before discussing their meaning, it is 
possible to sketch out the social profile of young supporters of the observed 
political parties. 
HDZ's supporters are mostly pupils and the unemployed, the young with a 
finished primary school whose father has the same level of education, those that 
were raised and living in rural areas, especially in Dalmatia and Eastern Croatia, 
and religious youth. At the same time, there are a lot less potential voters of HDZ 
among students and the employed, the young – who as their fathers – have a high 
school or academic education, inhabitants of major cities, Istria and Primorje, and 
non-religious participants. 
HNS enjoys the greatest level of support among students and the highly 
educated, with academically educated fathers, those that grew up and live in 
major cities and in Zagreb, and among the non-religious participants. The 
potential voters of HNS are least likely to be recruited among pupils and 
unemployed youth, as well as those with no qualifications or three years of high 
school (the same goes for their father's education), who were raised and live in 
rural areas, especially in Eastern Slavonia, Istria and Primorje, as well as 
amongst those who are reportedly religious. 
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Table 1: Party affiliation regarding the attributes of youth (%) 
Attributes of youth HDZ HNS HSP HSS SDP Undec. TOTAL 
Socio-professional status χ2=60.50  
Employed 30.5 39.9 26.9 42.6 41.8 36.6 35.5 
Unemployed 24.1 16.7 18.7 20.2 13.0 24.3 20.8 
Pupils 28.7 17.4 25.4 17.0 18.4 22.4 22.8 
Students 16.7 26.1 29.1 20.2 26.8 16.7 20.9 
Father’s education  χ2=74.92  
Primary school or less 24.6 13.1 15.7 31.2 8.6 20.3 19.0 
Vocational school 31.9 21.9 36.6 28.0 26.8 29.4 29.2 
High school 25.9 29.2 29.1 23.7 37.7 32.1 30.5 
College, univers. or more 17.6 35.8 18.7 17.2 26.8 18.2 21.3 
Education  χ2=55.30  
Primary school or less 35.4 19.3 25.4 27.7 20.7 26.9 27.7 
Vocational school 19.1 10.7 20.9 19.1 12.3 20.2 18.0 
High school 37.0 52.9 44.0 44.7 53.3 41.9 43.3 
College, univers. or more 8.5 17.1 9.7 8.5 13.8 11.1 11.0 
Place of birth χ2=108.60  
Village 48.8 27.0 45.5 57.4 32.4 46.1 44.0 
Small town 29.9 28.5 26.1 20.2 30.1 32.0 29.9 
Major city 7.4 16.8 14.9 4.3 10.4 13.4 11.2 
Zagreb 13.9 27.7 13.4 18.1 27.0 8.6 14.9 
Place of habitat  χ2=132.01  
Village 51.1 25.2 40.3 55.8 34.1 45.9 43.0 
Small town 28.7 27.3 27.6 20.0 23.4 32.0 29.4 
Major city 5.2 14.4 16.4 4.2 11.5 11.9 10.1 
Zagreb 15.0 33.1 15.7 20.0 31.0 10.2 17.5 
Regional status χ2=188.98  
Northern Croatia 24.4 22.3 15.8 40.0 25.7 23.1 23.4 
Central Croatia 9.2 6.5 12.0 4.2 6.9 9.4 8.7 
Istria and Primorje 4.8 7.2 7.5 2.1 11.9 17.6 11.0 
Eastern Croatia 22.6 10.8 24.8 23.2 13.4 20.4 19.8 
Dalmatia 23.6 19.4 23.3 10.5 10.7 21.0 19.8 
Zagreb 15.2 33.8 16.5 20.0 31.4 10.2 17.3 
Religious self-identification χ2=106.78  
Religious 85.9 60.9 79.5 87.1 59.8 71.2 74.2 
Undecided 10.5 18.1 17.4 8.6 24.1 17.3 16.1 
Not religious 3.6 21.0 3.0 4.3 16.1 11.5 9.8 
TOTAL 27.2 7.6 7.2 5.1 14.3 38.6 100.0 
 
HSP is a party whose voters are above averagely recruited from the lines of 
student, the inhabitants of major cities, as well as Central and Eastern Croatia. 
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On the other hand, on average, the smallest number of supporters are from the 
lines of employed youth living in Northern Croatia, Istria and Primorje and the 
non-religious participants. 
HSS can mostly count on the support of the employed youth, those whose 
father is without qualifications, who are born and living in the country, in 
Zagreb and Northern Croatia, as well as religious participants. There is a small 
number of this party's supporters among the pupils and inhabitants of major 
cities, Istria and Primorje, Central Croatia and Dalmatia and among the non-
religious participants. 
SDP has more potential voters in the lines of students, youth with a high 
school or academic education (whose fathers share the same qualifications), 
living in Zagreb, and the young who are not religious or are undecided when it 
comes to religiousness. This party has a considerably smaller number of 
supporters among the unemployed, young with a blue-collar education or 
without qualifications, among those whose fathers are unqualified, the 
inhabitants of villages in Eastern Croatia and Dalmatia and the religious 
participants. 
The undecided participants when it comes to party affiliation come from the 
lines of the unemployed youth, those with a vocational education qualification, as 
well as those raised and living in major cities and Istria and Primorje. The young 
expressing their party affiliation are on the opposite pole, such as students, whose 
fathers have a college or university education, and those raised and living in 
Zagreb. 
The data about the social profile of the supporters of the five observed 
political parties do not significantly vary from the previously established data, as 
on the sample of all citizens of age and on the sample of youth (Zakošek, 1994, 
1998, 2001; Ilišin, 2002). Based on this, we can state that the social structure of 
political parties is recognizable and relatively stable in its basic outline. 
However, as is demonstrated by the direct comparison with the findings about 
the young party sympathizers from 1999 (Ilišin, 2002: 161), the social 
structuring is not definitely over – at least when youth is concerned. To be more 
specific, with the changes of the social context come the changes in party 
affiliation, which is why this process is never really over (Andersen, Heath, 
2003). 
In our comparison of the recent results with those five years ago, we will 
limit ourselves to several most important findings. Firstly, it would seem that 
there is a minimal degree of homogenization regarding party affiliations: in the 
existing situation, the gender and age differences within the young population 
have no more influence on the choice of political parties. Therefore, it follows 
that the potentially different (specific) experiences, dependent on the degree of 
maturity or on gender, are not reflected at this political level. 
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However, this might mean that the young simply do not recognize the 
elements of the party programs and activities which directly address, for 
example, women or specific age cohorts. This homogenization is also pointed to 
by the findings about the mild weakening of the differentiation of youth 
regarding its socio-professional and educational status and its narrow social 
background (observed through the father's level of education). However, since 
there was a deepening of differences regarding residential and regional status as 
well as religiousness, this brings us to the second important tendency. Namely, 
the strengthening of the aforementioned polarizations within the young 
population points also to the strengthening of the elements of the territorial and 
ideological cleavages with the simultaneous survival of the already strong socio-
economic cleavage. The third important finding is that, in spite of the fact that 
the young electorate of most parties has most of the characteristics as five years 
ago, certain and significant shifts were registered. Before all, this regards the 
supporters of HSP, who are recruited more and more from the lines of students 
and urban youth, while the unemployed youth of a rural and lower social 
background were most inclined toward this party before, and in the territorial 
sense, there has been a widening of the electoral basis of HSP, because Eastern 
Croatia is joined by the Center (and this most probably is no accident, for these 
areas were under the control of the Serbian rebels in the early 1990s). It is 
impossible not to notice that the mentioned changes of the social structure of 
HSP's supporters are congruent with the efforts of this party to create a public 
image that no longer belongs to the extreme right-wing pole, where it was placed 
from its very founding, by changing its rhetoric. If we link this with the fact that 
HSP did not participate in power at the national level in the past 15 years, we 
can state that the increased support for this party is partially a result of the fact 
that is, simply, could not have disappointed its voters the way HDZ and SDP, 
along with their former coalition partners, did. Fourthly, the attributes of the 
young supporters of the observed political parties point to the significant 
convergence of the sympathizers of HDZ and SDP on the one hand, and to a 
somewhat weaker resemblance of the potential voters of HDZ, HSS and HSP. If 
HNS (as LS in the previous research) and SDP are seen as left-wing center 
parties, and HDZ, HSP and HSS (which was already closer to the right-wing 
than the left-wing center), as right-wing parties, we have an impression that 
there has been a certain bipolarization of the Croatian party space in the past five 
years. The total marginalization of HSLS, relevant in the first decade of 
transition, and also a member of the party center, also lead to this hypothesis. 
According to the recent data, the political party center was significantly emptied 
and the voters, to put it roughly, are aligned into one of two wide political 
blocks. Whether the tendency of further development of the Croatian political 
and party system will lead to a bipolarization or to greater pluralism is an open 
question, depending on the changes in the social and political context, both in 
the country and on a wider level. The fifth interesting trend comes from the 
changes registered in the group of undecided young participants. In this context, 
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the most intriguing thing is the absence of the influence of age and gender, 
considering that five years ago the young up to age 19 (most of them pupils) and 
women tended to above averagely declare their indecision regarding political 
parties. Previous data was completely in congruence with the results of earlier 
studies, which consistently indicated a certain political inferiority of the 
youngest members of youth and women, but the existing situation raises an issue 
regarding the usual interpretations offered by the life cycle theory and the 
feminist approaches. As for the influence of gender, it would seem that in 
Croatia, at least where the party affiliation is concerned, there has been a certain 
leveling of political interest and knowledge of young women and men. The 
absence of differences between age subgroups of youth may indicate an earlier 
maturing of the youngest, as well as the influence of a deepening dissatisfaction, 
which includes youth that has gained its first experiences in elections to a greater 
degree. Here, the results of the young from Istria and Primorje are also 
intriguing, because they now decided not to declare their party preference, so 
one might speculate that it is an indicator of their disappointment with IDS as a 
party that for years had no worthy opponent in this region – to simplify, they no 
longer wish to vote for IDS, but no other party seems to be an acceptable 
replacement. However, the fact that the young, summarily, decide on a political 
party somewhat less often than the adults, warns that age is still a dimension that 
affects the affiliation toward political parties (hence, probably the participation 
in elections) in the whole electorate. 
In further analysis, party identification of youth is also used as a so-called 
independent variable. It is logical to expect that the comparisons of the political 
values of the supporters of the observed parties, their attitudes and participation, 
will also point to other dimensions of the political polarization of youth. 
3. Democratic values 
Mentioning youth as at least a potentially relevant subject in the processes of 
democratic consolidation and Croatia's accession to the EU demands an insight 
into their political values and attitudes – of course, with special emphasis on those 
with a democratic orientation. The acceptance of constitutional and democratic 
principles, trust in institutions, tolerance for certain social phenomena and groups, 
and the perception of the priorities of Croatian politics are used as indicators of the 
democratic potential of youth in Croatia. 
Before the results about the acceptance of constitutional values among 
Croatian youth are shown, we must mention that it indirectly indicates the level 
of acceptance of the principles the united Europe and its Constitution are based 
on. As was portrayed in the introductory chapter, this document expressly states 
the values (A Constitution for Europe, 2004: 8) that are compatible with the 
declared principles of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (2001) to a 
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great degree. The later constitutional values were transcribed from the catalogue 
of the basic liberal-democratic values, and in this sense, at least at the 
constitutional level, they bring Croatia closer to Europe. Table 2 portrays the 
comparative data about the acceptance of 11 constitutional principles3 only for 
the answer “very important” (a four degree scale consists of answers from “very 
important” to “completely unimportant”). 
 
Table 2: A comparative outline of the acceptance of constitutional values (%) 
Youth Adults 
Constitutional values 
1999 2004 2004 
Freedom 91.2 93.8 94.9 
Respect for human rights 87.8 91.9 93.6 
Equality 74.2 85.9 87.4 
Social justice 75.7 81.9 89.3 
Gender equality – 79.2 79.5 
Protection of nature and human environment 72.8 77.9 82.6 
Pacifism 67.4 75.9 80.2 
Inviolability of ownership 64.9 73.9 85.8 
Ethnic equality 58.1 70.5 74.5 
The rule of law 55.2 64.1 78.6 
Democratic and multiparty system 60.8 58.5 71.9 
 
Observing the obtained results as a whole, it is without question that all the 
constitutional principles are highly accepted, especially if we add that, for 
example, there are approximately 0.5% (freedom) to 12% (democratic and 
multi-party system) of young participants who consider these principles to be 
“mostly” or “completely” irrelevant. The high level of acceptance of the 
normatively proclaimed principles undoubtedly points to a high consensus 
among the citizens and the creators of the Constitution regarding the basic 
liberal-democratic values. This is certainly a necessary, although not a sufficient 
basis for the democratic development of a society that does not have a tradition 
of liberal-democratic values and standards in its heritage. 
The generational differences are very intriguing, for they clearly show that 
the adults accept all the principles – especially the rule of law, the democratic 
                                                     
3 The participants, of course, were not told that these principles can be found in Article 3 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, for it might have affected their answers. 
We should also add that the principle “gender equality” was not mentioned in the 1990 
Constitution, which is why the level of acceptance of this value was only measured in 
2004. 
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and multiparty system, the inviolability of ownership and social justice – more 
than the young. These, most obvious, differences are symptomatic to the 
interpretation that the attitudes of adults are greatly affected by their experience 
of life in socialism (when social ownership was protected at the expense of 
private ownership and when there was no political pluralism, but there were less 
social differences and insecurity). However, these findings raise an issue 
regarding the earlier research conducted in this country and around the world, 
which pointed to a more present liberal and democratic awareness of youth 
compared to adults. We do not have enough data for now, but we might assume 
that this is a consequence of a political socialization in a turbulent transitional 
period, which is why the young find it harder to deal with the discrepancy 
between the proclaimed principles and the often conflicting social and political 
practice. 
However, we at the same time registered an increase in the acceptance of 
all constitutional values among the young (aside from the democratic and 
multiparty system). Thus, the acceptance of ethnic equality, as well as pacifism, 
the inviolability of ownership and the rule of law increased the most during 
these past five years. The higher validation of these principles must have been 
affected by a number of circumstances, including democratization and the 
change in the political priorities and rhetoric from 2000 until today. On the other 
hand, a mild decrease of the importance of a democratic and multiparty system 
might be a reflection of the saturation and disappointment with political 
protagonists and the (lack of) functioning of political institutions, and it might be 
that today's youth find political pluralism to be so “self-understandable”, that 
they miss the importance of its development and strengthening. 
Since we are interested in the structuring of constitutional values, the 
observed values were submitted to factor analysis and variance analysis. Table 3 
portrays the two obtained factors (with the total variance of 52.4%), which are in 
their configuration almost identical to the ones obtained in 1999 (Ilišin, 2002: 
184). 
The basic liberal-democratic values is the label of the first factor for it is 
primarily constituted by the classical values of equality and respect for 
individual rights and freedoms. As is evident, these are joined by values pointing 
to specific equalities (ethnic and gender equality as well as social justice) and 
the insurance of the basic conditions for the survival of a community and 
mankind in general (pacifism and environmental protection). The variance 
analysis indicated that the young are not differentiated by any of their attributes 
when it comes to accepting these values. If we look at the generally high 
acceptance of the constitutional principles and the absence of differentiation of 
youth, we can conclude that there is a high level of consensus among the young 
in accepting most of the basic constitutional values. 
Vlasta Ilišin 
84 
Table 3: The factor structure of constitutional values 
Constitutional values Factor 1 Factor 2 
Equality  .772  
Respect for human rights .704  
Freedom .678  
Social justice .599 .402 
Ethnic equality .590  
Pacifism .534 .444 
Gender equality .512 .385 
Protection of nature and human 
environment .495 .390 
The rule of law  .842 
Democratic and multiparty 
system  .840 
Inviolability of ownership .371 .614 
% of common variance 29.2 23.2 
 
The second factor was labeled values of a democratic order due to the fact 
that the bases of its configuration are the principles of the rule of law, democratic 
and multiparty system and the inviolability of ownership. To be more specific, 
without these principles and respect for them, there is no democratic order. 
Regarding the acceptance of this value matrix, the young are somewhat less 
unanimous – the variance analysis yielded four significant differences, but with 
relatively low F-ratios (from 32.4 to 4.94). To be more exact, it turned out that 
the increasing age and education of youth increases the acceptance of these 
values, as well as that greater importance is ascribed to them by the employed 
(opposite the pupils) and youth from Central Croatia and Dalmatia (unlike the 
participants from Northern and Eastern Croatia). Based on the obtained results, 
we might suggest that the greater loyalty to the values of a democratic order is 
primarily linked with the social competence of youth, and only partially with the 
particular regional specifics. 
The understanding of the principle of a democratic and multiparty system 
can be operationalized and investigated through different attitudes. We again use 
a scale for investigating democratic attitudes in this analysis, which was used in 
the previous research of youth (Ilišin, 2002: 178). The question was dichotomous, 
and Table 4 holds the distributions of affirmative answers (that is, agreement with 
the statements offered). 
As before, the ranking scale of acceptance of contradictory claims causes 
confusion and difficulties for interpretation. On the one hand, all the participants 
accept the right to a democratic expression of different opinions with a high 
percentage – which must imply the existence of different interests, and hence the 
disagreements between some social groups and their political representatives – but 
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they also believe that individual and group demands should be subjugated to the 
collective and general interests. The young differ from the adults exactly by their 
lower level of acceptance of the domination of collective and general over special 
interests, and also by their lower glorification of the Croatian constitution and 
ascription of a lower significance to the necessity of an existing opposition. The 
later generational difference might reflect a critical attitude of youth toward the 
activity of political parties when they are the opposition, which are criticized by 
analysis for either their clemency and calculations or their radicalism, all for the 
exclusive purpose of attracting voters. 
 
Table 4: A comparative outline of the acceptance of democratic attitudes (%) 
Youth Adults 
Democratic attitudes 
1999 2004 2004 
Everyone has the right to express their opinion, even if the 
majority thinks opposite 98.0 98.2 97.4 
Every citizen has the right, if the need arises, to express 
his or her beliefs in the streets 79.0 74.4 70.2 
True democracy cannot be imagined without opposition 80.7 71.1 82.4 
Conflicts of different interest groups in our society are 
harmful to the general interest of the state 57.8 70.0 77.3 
The interests of the whole nation must be above all 
specific interests 68.3 69.5 74.8 
Every political party must have a chance of gaining power 74.8 65.1 68.3 
The President, Parliament and the Government shared the 
power in our Republic according to the law 33.9 55.8 57.6 
In his previous work, the President controlled what the 
Government did to a legally allowed extent 44.4 54.8 56.4 
In his previous work, the Parliament controlled what the 
Government did to a legally allowed extent 38.6 45.6 46.1 
The opposition's duty is not to criticize the government, 
but to support its work 35.2 44.8 46.0 
Citizens have no right to strike if that endangers the public 
order 32.0 43.4 48.0 
There are conflicts in every society, which must be 
resolved by force 24.7 24.6 22.9 
The Croatian constitution has its weaknesses, but it is the 
best compared to all the others 22.1 23.3 38.2 
 
The changes in the attitudes of youth are not grand, but are significant, 
because the agreement with the attitudes that conflicts of interests are bad for the 
general interest and that the right of citizens to strike should be limited increased 
considerably, as well as their institutional trust, parallel to the reduction of 
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support for the right of all political options to come into power and the necessity 
for an opposition to exist in a democratic system. These changes point to a slight 
shift toward the acceptance of an authoritarian model of political activity and 
behavior, that is, the acceptance of a narrowing of the democratic maneuvering 
space. Here, it is possible to speculate that the increase in the perception that the 
institutions of power function in accordance with the law partially leads toward 
the attitude that the manifesting of the citizens' dissatisfaction is not only aimed 
against certain actions of those in power, but against the very foundations the 
order is based on. On the other side, it is possible that some newer events, which 
might be seen as a risk to the determined or realized goals, stimulate a renewed 
gathering of the national ranks. Both finally lead to a narrower democratic 
potential of youth. 
More elements for the explanation of the determined changes and 
differences will be yielded by the results of the multi-variate analysis (Table 5). 
In this case, the factor analysis yielded five first order factors (with a total 
variance of 53.2%). 
The first factor obtained was labeled institutional trust because it consists 
of attitudes that might be seen as indicators of trust toward the highest 
institutions of power, and we have already noted that approximately one half of 
the young participants believe that the protagonists of state authorities are 
behaving in accordance with the law. We cannot tell from these answers whether 
those that believe the President of the Republic, the Croatian Parliament and 
Government do not control each other according to the legal system, believe that 
there is too little or too much of this control, that is, if there is any abuse of 
power. The variance analysis indicated that the young are very homogenous in 
their partial trust, for none of the observed attributes of youth could be correlated 
with this latent dimension. 
The second factor – harmonious unity – clearly points to the preference of 
harmony in political relations, which implies a yearning toward a conflict-free 
society. The demands for subjugating of particular interests to the collective 
ones, testifies about the misunderstanding of political competition, as well as the 
lack of readiness to see politics as an art of finding compromises. Since the 
attitudes contained in this factor are very common (with a tendency of 
increasing), it is obvious that the young (as much as the adults) have difficulties 
with understanding of democracy and the way it works. This model of belief is 
above averagely represented by men (F-ratio=13.65) as well as youth from 
Central Croatia opposite those from Istria and Primorje (F-ratio=5.94). 
Democratic participation, which is the name of the third factor, consists of 
three attitudes which undoubtedly speak in favor of acceptance of political 
pluralism and the right to the freedom of political thought and action. These 
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attitudes are best accepted in the researched population of youth, who are also 
completely unified in this, regardless of the different social attributes that might 
hypothetically influence the variations in the acceptance of this model of thought. 
 
Table 5: The factor structure of democratic attitudes 
Democratic attitudes 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Factor 
5 
In his previous work, the President 
controlled what the Government did to a 
legally allowed extent 
.806     
In his previous work, the Parliament 
controlled what the Government did to a 
legally allowed extent 
.795     
The President, Parliament and the 
Government shared the power in our 
Republic according to the law 
.780     
Conflicts of different interest groups in 
our society are harmful to the general 
interest of the state 
 .776    
The interests of the whole nation must 
be above all specific interests  .578    
Every citizen has the right, if the need 
arises, to express his or her beliefs in the 
streets 
  .737   
Everyone has the right to express their 
opinion, even if the majority thinks 
opposite 
  .711   
Every political party must have a chance 
of gaining power  .312 .348   
There are conflicts in every society, 
which must be resolved by force    .814  
Citizens have no right to strike if that 
endangers the public order    .488  
The Croatian constitution has its 
weaknesses, but it is the best compared 
to all the others 
.372   .408  
True democracy cannot be imagined 
without opposition     .765 
The opposition's duty is not to criticize 
the government, but to support its work  .315   -.656 
% of common variance 16.0 9.8 9.5 9.4 8.5 
 
The fourth factor was arbitrarily labeled understanding of conflicts because 
the most saturated attitude is the one about the existence of conflicts that must be 
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resolved by force, followed by the acceptance of a possible abolition of strikes in 
the interest of protecting the public order. The third attitude testifying to a lack of 
criticism toward the Constitution, seems to have wandered into this model of 
thought, but it is in some way linking the (mis)understanding of conflicts with 
institutional trust. However, the first two attitudes in this latent dimension are 
actually the most consistent with the attitudes constituting the model of 
harmonious unity. This is corroborated by the fact that regional status is again an 
influential attribute, but also the only one to produce any statistically significant 
correlation in the variance analysis procedure (F-ratio=7.5). To be more exact, 
youth from Central Croatia and Dalmatia accept the attitudes we interpret as an 
indicator of misunderstanding when it comes to conflicts above the average, while 
youth from Istria, Primorje and Zagreb are on the opposing pole because they 
accept this model of thought the least. 
Finally, the fifth factor – democratic rules – consists of variables regarding 
the vision of the democratic role of an opposition, that is, the high acceptance of 
the attitude about the necessity of an opposition in a democracy and an equally 
high rejection of the attitude that the opposition should play a “constructive” role 
in the support of those in power. Again, we can notice that this factor is similar 
to another model – this time, democratic participation – but they are still 
separated, which suggests that significant changes in the conception of the 
opposition's function have occurred. However, the findings of the variance 
analysis are most intriguing here for they indicate a more significant 
differentiation of youth. Specifically, this model of democratic thought is 
influenced by the educational status of the participants and their fathers, as well 
as age, socio-professional status, gender and regional status of youth (with F-
ratios ranging from 29.85 to 5.80). It seems that the acceptance of democratic 
rules (seen trough the role of the opposition) actually increases in a linear 
manner with the educational degree of the participants and their fathers, as well 
as with age, and the highly educated, oldest subgroup of youth is joined by men, 
students (compared to pupils), and the population of Istria, Primorje and Zagreb 
(unlike the participants living in Northern and Eastern Croatia). the attributes of 
those who accept democratic rules more without a doubt indicate their higher 
social competence, which apparently seems to overcome the possible destructive 
influence of disappointment caused by the actual behavior of opposition parties. 
The model of democratic thought which was marked as an indicator of 
institutional trust is supplemented by the following data, explicitly addressing 
the level of trust in social and political institutions. The participants answered on 
a five-degree scale, and Graph 2 portrays the answers for the degrees “complete 
trust” and “trust” (the other answers were the following categories: “undecided” 
and “mistrust” and “complete mistrust”). 
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Graph 2: The ranking scale of trust in institutions – youth and adults (%) 
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It is immediately evident that the Church is the only institution enjoying the 
trust of most citizens, in line with the fact that over two thirds of the participants 
declared they were religious. On the other hand, this information provokes the 
comment that the trust in the Church ought to be even higher, that is, congruent to 
the percentage of religious citizens. The relatively good position of television is 
interesting, because it is usually quite criticized for its lack of objectivity, 
manipulation of public opinion, advancing the ruling establishment, etc. When we 
focus on the political institutions, it is obvious that the institution of the President 
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of the Republic enjoys almost twice as much trust than the Parliament or the 
Government. This better placement must reflect the popularity and reputation of 
president S. Mesić, while the lower rating of the other two highest institutions of 
power is probably an indicator of the citizens' dissatisfaction with their work. 
The low level of trust in the judiciary must be a consequence of the 
dissatisfaction with the functioning of the judicial bodies, burdened with a number 
of problems – from their slowness and inefficiency, to their lack of expertise and 
objectivity. The faults and mistakes of the judiciary cause a lot of attention as well 
as numerous objections by the national and international public, often ending in 
judgments about the poor construction of the legal state and the dubiousness of 
realizing the constitutional principle of the rule of law. The convincing last place 
of the political parties is not endemic to Croatia, because trust in political parties is 
the lowest in the democratically more developed countries (Čular, 2003: 4). If we 
observe the citizens' trust as a whole, we can state that the trust in the observed 
institutions is at a low level4, a witness to the deficit in this component of the 
social capital. 
The differences between youth and adults are not enormous, but are 
symptomatic. The most pronounced one is that the adults express more trust in 
political institutions, while the young trust the mass media, especially television 
somewhat more.5 The reason could partially lye in the fact that today's youth is 
growing up with the media and use them quite a lot. It is also possible that most 
media's efforts to be a public corrective of the government in the past few years, 
who are least trusted by the young, contribute to their level of trust. 
How the attitudes of youth are structured is demonstrated by the results of 
factor analysis (Table 6). Three factors were yielded (with a total variance of 
60.0%), while the variance analysis indicated most differences in the case of the 
second factor. 
The first factor was labeled trust in the institutions of power and authority 
because it deals with the political institutions and those, which, due to their 
monopoly (public services) or economic strength (large companies), have 
                                                     
4 This is pointed to the comparison with the finding that in Great Britain, for example, 
three fifths of the citizens trust the Church, the labor unions and television (Miller, 
Timpson, Lessnoff, 1996: 202). 
5 The young in Croatia are much like their counterparts in the Mediterranean countries 
when it comes to mistrusting the political institutions, where, for example, the national 
parliaments enjoy the trust of 30-40% of youth, but they are also very different from 
their Scandinavian peers, whose trust ranges 50 to 60% (Schizerotto, Gasperoni, 2001: 
48). On the other hand, trust in the political institutions was especially low in the former 
socialist years during the first years of transition (Mitev, Riordan, 1996: 87). 
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significant power. The nongovernmental organizations do not really fit into this 
context, but we can presume that the young see their activity as politically 
influential (which is the ambition of these associations). The young are 
differentiated according to their residential and educational status, provenience 
and party affiliation (the relatively low F-ratios range from 8.89 do 5.93). In 
short, a greater trust in the institutions of power and authority is demonstrated by 
youth living and raised in Zagreb (opposite those living in rural areas), the 
highly educated (unlike youth without qualifications) and the sympathizers of 
HNS and SDP (compared to the supporters of HSS and HSP). The mentioned 
findings primarily point to the influence of social competence, while the greater 
trust of the supporters of the left-center parties could be linked with the 
participants' attributes, as well as reflect the fact that these parties were in power 
not long before the survey was conducted. Aside from this, a certain influence is 
exerted by the fact that the voters of these parties are mostly concentrated in 
Zagreb, since young people from Zagreb express a greater level of trust in the 
institutions of power and authority in general. 
 
Table 6: The factor structure of trust in institutions 
Institutions Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Croatian Parliament .825   
Croatian Government .815 .300  
Non-governmental 
organizations .687   
President of the Republic .670   
Political parties .656 .303  
Public services .603 .380  
Large companies .575   
Church  .760  
Army  .741  
Police .323 .709  
Judiciary  .548  
Labor unions .372 .425  
Radio .407  .901 
The press   .843 
Television   .832 
% of common variance 26.1 17.8 16.1 
 
Trust in the institutions of protection, as the second factor, is in its content 
somewhat linked with the first factor. However, different kinds of institutions 
are grouped together in this case, most of which represent segments of the 
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institutions of power – where their competence has to do with the protection of 
citizens – as well as the Church and the labor unions. More light on the meaning 
of this latent dimension is shed by the results of the variance analysis. The 
young are extremely differentiated according to their trust in the institutions of 
protection – all the observed attributes, aside from gender, are linked with 
advocating this factor (the F-ratio values range from 117.18 to 10.05). The 
greatest difference is the one between the religious and non-religious 
participants – the religious youth expresses a significantly higher level of trust in 
the institutions of protection, which must be dictated by the Church's position in 
the observed factor. They are joined by the participants with a lower level of 
education with a background in families where the father has no qualifications or 
a vocational education (opposite the young who, as their fathers, have a high 
school or university education), the young socialized and living in rural 
settlements (compared to the participants from Zagreb and major cities) and in 
Dalmatia, Central and Eastern Croatia (unlike the inhabitants of Istria, Primorje 
and Zagreb), as well as subgroups of pupils and the unemployed (as opposed to 
students), followed by the youngest participants and those supporting HDZ, HSP 
and HSS (versus the voters of HNS and SDP). The mentioned findings suggest 
that this is a certain form of authoritarian awareness, linked with a lower social 
competence of youth. This youth is more oriented toward the institutions of 
unquestionable authority (at least in its eyes), most of which have the exclusive 
right to use force and sanctions. 
The third factor – trust in the media – is consistent in content, and 
therefore, easy to interpret. It would seem that the young perceive the media as 
an instrument of public control, where all the other institutions are suspects in 
advance. Considering the fact that the media, aside from the Church, enjoy the 
highest level of trust of youth, it was to be expected that it would be very 
homogenous in its advocating of this factor. The only weak, but statistically 
significant difference (F-ratio=5.29) was established regarding the regional 
status: more trust in the media is expressed by the young from Central Croatia as 
well as Istria and Primorje, while the participants from Eastern Croatia and 
Dalmatia are below the average (they also, as we noted earlier, trust the 
institutions of protection above averagely) 
The values of youth with political implications were measured with the aid 
of their perception of the (un)acceptable phenomena in contemporary society. 
Table 7 shows the first two answers (“completely” and “mostly acceptable”) 
from a four-degree scale and, as an illustration, the data about the perception of 
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young Europeans about how much their peers (do not) accept some of the 
investigated phenomena (Young Europeans in 2001: 13).6 
 
Table 7: A comparative outline of the acceptance of certain social phenomena (%) 
Youth Adults 
Social phenomena Europe 
2001 
Croatia 
2004 
Croatia 
2004 
Sex before marriage 88 92.6 81.8 
Sexual education in schools – 88.9 84.5 
Donating organs – 85.4 83.2 
Compulsory AIDS testing 61 78.4 76.4 
Living in an extra-marital relationship – 70.4 63.5 
Having children out of wedlock – 64.9 59.0 
Divorce – 60.7 51.5 
Euthanasia 54 48.6 40.2 
Decriminalizing prostitution – 35.7 29.7 
Forced surgical operation of 
pedophiles(castration) 
60 34.2 30.6 
Right of homosexuals to marry 59 33.2 19.6 
Decriminalizing soft drugs – 32.3 16.9 
The poor should not have many children 30 31.3 32.2 
Death penalty 27 30.0 31.3 
Right of homosexuals to adopt children 41 17.1 9.7 
Homosexual experiences – 16.6 7.5 
Genetically modified food 13 13.6 7.7 
Cloning 12 9.7 5.6 
Bribery and corruption – 6.9 3.6 
 
At the top of the scale are phenomena whose acceptance is witness to the 
liberalization of sexual behavior and the institution of marriage, that is, the 
significant shift from the traditional and patriarchal model of upbringing. 
The donation of organs and the compulsory AIDS test are accepted by the 
majority, while all the other phenomena are not accepted by the majority of 
participants. They especially reject the right of homosexuals to adopt children, 
as they reject the homosexual experiences, genetically modified food, cloning, 
                                                     
6 The research was conducted in 18 West European countries, on a sample of 9.760 
young people aged 15 to 24. This sample differs from the one used here because it did 
not include the cohort of youth 25 to 29. This influenced the obtained results, which 
should be taken into consideration in the comparison and interpretation of results. 
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and bribery and corruption. These phenomena can be characterized as the issues 
long-term public debates will be held about, when sooner or later, some of them 
will be more accepted than is the case today. 
The generational comparison indicates that the young are consistently more 
tolerant and liberal than the adults, which is especially evident in the example of 
acceptance of premarital sexual experiences, extra-marital relationships, and 
parenthood outside of marriage, divorce, euthanasia, the decriminalization of 
soft drugs, genetically modified food, and rights of homosexuals, including the 
right to marry and adopt children. Therefore, it is obvious that in this aspect of 
the research, the values of the determined inter-generational difference confirm 
the findings of the existing research in the world. 
However, the comparison of the Croatian youth with their European 
counterparts indicates that the young Croats are still notably under the influence 
of traditional values, and it is interesting that they are more permissive than their 
European peers only regarding premarital sexual experience (perhaps due to the 
age difference between the two samples of youth used) and pedophilia. The 
traditionalism of the Croatian youth is especially apparent in the attitudes about 
the rights of homosexuals to found a complete family – their acceptance is twice 
as small as that of the youth in Europe that mostly supports these rights. The 
Croatian young are also somewhat more prepared to violate the human rights by 
compulsory AIDS testing, and since this is a majority attitude with the European 
youth as well, it is obvious that the “moral panic” surrounding this disease is not 
ebbing fast or easily. Among the European youth the fear regarding pedophilia is 
very pronounced, for two thirds of it supports the forced surgical operation of 
pedophiles, which is almost twice as much as in Croatia. Lately, a number of 
scandals linked to this phenomena has made the European public much more 
sensitive than in Croatia, where it is only beginning to be publicly discussed, 
which is why we can assume that this is the reason for such a big difference 
between the attitudes of youth in Croatia and Europe. Let's also emphasize that 
approximately one third of the participants from each of the investigated 
samples, supports the death penalty, even though it has been abolished from the 
European and Croatian penal systems. 
Since these are very different phenomena, it is not surprising that the factor 
analysis extracted five factors (with a total variance of 52.3%) and that some of 
them have structures which are very difficult to explain (Table 8). 
The liberalization of family and sexual relationships is a possible label for 
the first factor, which is relatively consistently structured, and the majority of 
this latent dimension consists of phenomena linked with marriage and sexuality. 
They are joined by the more permissive relationship towards euthanasia and 
decriminalization of prostitution and soft drugs, problems actual in most modern 
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nations. It is especially indicative that the young are maximally different when it 
comes to this factor, that is, they differ among each other according to each 
analyzed attribute (the F-ratios range from 52.71 to 11.72). Thus, on the one 
side, are the ones with an above average acceptance of the offered phenomena: 
the non-religious participants, those with more education on average, much as 
their fathers, the urban youth (according to domicile and provenience), the oldest 
youth, men, students, inhabitants of Zagreb, Istria and Primorje, as well as the 
supporters of HNS and SDP. On the opposing pole are the ones who support the 
liberalization of family and sexual relationships below the average: the religious 
participants, without qualifications or with vocational education (the same goes 
for their fathers), of rural background and domicile, young women, pupils, the 
youngest age cohort, the population of Northern and Eastern Croatia, as well as 
the voters of HDZ and HSS. The mentioned trends plausibly illustrate the 
polarization of youth into the traditionalist and modernist orientations, so this 
requires no additional comment. 
The situation is similar in the second factor, that is, the rights of 
homosexuals. The content of variables constituting this latent dimension is 
unambiguously testifying about the attitude towards homosexuality. Since this is 
an extremely disputable issue in Croatia, it is not surprising that the young are 
divided according to all the attributes used, aside from age (the F-ratios range 
from 50.38 to 7.60). The group more tolerant toward the phenomenon of 
homosexuality is very similar in its characteristics to the group of youth with a 
more liberal relationship toward family and sexuality. To be more exact, the 
rights of homosexuals are especially supported by women and non-religious 
participants, students and the highly educated, those raised and living in Zagreb, 
and supporters of HNS and SDP. Homosexual rights are especially refuted by 
men, the religious participants, the employed, those with vocational degrees, 
youth of rural provenience and domicile, the inhabitants of Central Croatia and 
Dalmatia, as well as voters of HDZ, HSP and HSS. Therefore, this is again a 
polarization on the conservative-liberal, that is, traditional-modern scale. In this 
case, the most interesting are the differences between genders, because it is 
already known that men express less understanding towards homosexuality than 
women, perhaps because the gay sexual orientation is more often attributed with 
men than women. However, regarding the findings linked with the first factor, 
we can state that the socially more competent youth – including a higher social 
background, educational and socio-professional status – is notably more tolerant 
toward the individual's free choice regarding sexual orientation and behavior as 
well as family and sexual life patterns. 
The three remaining factors are of a partially residual character and are 
structured in such a way that makes finding the internal correlation of the 
grouped phenomena difficult, except perhaps for the phenomena where the 
Vlasta Ilišin 
96 
abuse of power is a strong possibility. Thus, the third factor was arbitrarily 
determined as medical and educational intervention, for it consists of 
compulsory AIDS testing and institutionalized learning about sexuality. Why is 
it that organ donation is linked with the previous two phenomena, it is difficult 
to discern. Only women are more likely to advocate this set of variables (F-
ratio=72.90), which might point to their greater inclination for a safer and 
quality sex life and a more pronounced sense of solidarity (suggesting the 
greater acceptance of organ donation). 
 
Table 8: The factor structure of (un)acceptable social phenomena 
Social phenomena 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Factor 
5 
Living in an extra-marital relationship .718     
Having children out of wedlock .714     
Divorce .707     
Sex before marriage .658     
Decriminalizing prostitution .533  -.328   
Euthanasia .517     
Decriminalizing soft drugs .487  -.375   
Right of homosexuals to marry  .803    
Right of homosexuals to adopt 
children  .790    
Homosexual experiences  .696    
Compulsory AIDS testing   .613  .360 
Sexual education in schools .381  .605   
Donating organs .444  .484   
Genetically modified food    .752  
Cloning  .301  .619  
Bribery and corruption    .485  
The poor should not have many 
children     .638 
Forced surgical operation of 
pedophiles (castration)     .632 
Death penalty    .384 .451 
% of common variance 17.3 11.9 8.0 7.6 7.5 
 
Socio-biologic experimentation (the fourth factor) is by content, primarily 
determined through attitudes regarding genetic manipulation with (un)foreseen 
social consequences. However, bribery and corruption turn up as the third 
element, which leads to the conclusion that this is simply a mathematical 
correlation between the least accepted phenomena. It is also difficult to explain 
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why these phenomena are somewhat more accepted by youth from Eastern 
Croatia, and less by those from Dalmatia (F-ratio=5.19). We could only partially 
assume that the young from rural areas were led by the thoughts about the greater 
crops from genetically modified plants and the experiences of the farmers who 
grew them, so their attitudes are somewhat milder. 
Social repression is the label of the fifth factor because it includes the 
acceptance of attitudes that, without a doubt, point to repressive measures 
regarding certain social groups, primarily those who have committed crimes. The 
problem is that the attitude regarding the limiting of the right of the poor to 
procreate is linked with this (meaning, the violation of their human rights), which 
also implies the attitude that they are to blame for their own poverty. This is a way 
for the social community to significantly abolish the responsibility for the 
conditions which perpetuate poverty. Even though these phenomena are accepted 
by one third of the young – giving enough space for possible differentiation – the 
variance analysis indicated that they are completely homogenous in this regard. 
The (in)tolerance of Croatian citizens is also demonstrated by the data about 
the personal (un)acceptance of particular social groups. Graph 3 portrays the 
summarized data from two (“completely” and “mostly acceptable”) out of the four 
degrees used. 
As could have been expected, the mostly acceptable groups are those fighting 
to save the environment, fighting for animal rights and against racism. It is 
indicative, though, that the anti-racists do not enjoy more support, which could be 
an indicator of a certain degree of racial intolerance, as well as the result of 
situation related circumstances, that is, the fact Croatia is not a multi-racial 
society, and therefore, more sensitive to the problem of inter-racial relationships. 
Most citizens find the remaining groups to be unacceptable. For example, less than 
one fifth of the participants believe that feminists are acceptable. This, compared 
to the already analyzed high support for the constitutional principle of gender 
equality, and the success achieved by organizations founded on feminist principles 
in promoting women's rights, is very intriguing. Perhaps the term “feminism” 
itself causes resistance with the participants, associating it with a radical critique 
of male domination and the aggressive promotion of the female principle, while 
not being aware that an otherwise high level of acceptance of feminist ideas and 
practice is demonstrated by their other attitudes. As for the groups at the back of 
the scale of acceptance, the results are also quite expected, and it is obvious that 
Croatian citizens manifest certain repulsion toward the social groups with 
inherently violent methods and considered unacceptable on the global level. 
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Graph 3: The ranking scale of personal acceptance of certain social groups – 
youth and adults (%) 
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In the case of the relationship towards different social groups, as well as in 
the case of social phenomena, the young are more tolerant than the adults, 
especially evident in their acceptance of sports fan groups and homosexuals and 
lesbians. The later tolerant relationship is in line with the previously established 
higher support for the rights of homosexuals, suggesting a generally higher 
tolerance of youth for different sexual orientation. The groups of sports fans are, 
on the other hand, a generationally tinted phenomenon, because most of them 
consist of young people. They are also the members of the extreme cores of these 
groups who often manifest forms of violent behavior. It would simply seem that 
the young are more tolerant toward their peers, who express their need for 
identification and social visibility by fan rituals. 
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The factor analysis of the 12 observed social groups yielded four factors 
(with total variance of 59.8%), portrayed in Table 9, while the variance analysis 
indicated some significant differentiation among the youth (Table 10). 
 
Table 9: The factor structure of (un)acceptable social groups 
Social groups Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Skinheads .723    
Extreme groups (neo-fascist/neo-Nazi) .710    
Terrorists .668    
Islamic fundamentalists .640 .450   
Sports fan groups .499 -.366  .371 
Communists  .761   
Feminists  .686   
Homosexuals and lesbians  .654   
Animal rights activists   .863  
Environmental protection activists   .806  
Anti-globalists    .768 
Fighters against racism    .735 
% of common variance 18.4 16.6 13.0 11.8 
 
Violent groups is the label of the first factor because it consists of extreme 
political and sub-cultural groups who are infused – at least the majority of them 
– with violent forms of political rebellion and expression of disgruntles. 
Although, most of these groups are at the bottom of the tolerance scaly, it seems 
that there is a significant disagreement among the young in this regard. As 
shown by the data in Table 10, a somewhat higher level of acceptance of violent 
groups is expressed by the youngest participants, pupils with primary school 
education, men and participants from Northern Croatia, as well as voters of HDZ 
and HSP. Seen from the opposite standpoint, a higher level of rejection than the 
average is demonstrated by participants with an academic education, socialized 
and permanently residing in the most urban areas, women, students, inhabitants 
of Istria, Primorje and Zagreb, as well as supporters of HNS and SDP. These 
findings indicate a tolerance for political radicalism and violence by the less 
socially competent, which includes the social conditions for socialization and the 
effects of the life cycle. Namely, the research has shown that adolescence is a 
stage of life when aggressive political participation and readiness for political 
violence is most pronounced, and weakens along with the maturing process and 
with the gradual inclusion into the community (Watts, 1999: 488). 
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Table 10: Differences among the youth in accepting the factors of 
(un)acceptable social groups 
Attributes of youth Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Gender F-ratio=19.79 F-ratio=29.15 F-ratio=12.92 F-ratio=16.47 
Female – + + – 
Male + – – + 
Age F-ratio=25.31 F-ratio=15.85   
15 – 19 years + –   
20 – 24 years 0 0   
25 – 29 years 0 +   
Socio-professional status F-ratio=15.23 F-ratio=15.49  F-ratio=14.02 
Employed 0 0  0 
Unemployed 0 0  – 
Pupils + –  0 
Students – +  + 
Father’s education   F-ratio=19.03  F-ratio=17.31 
Primary school or less  –  – 
Vocational school  –  0 
High school  0  0 
College, univers. or more  +  + 
Education  F-ratio=19.76 F-ratio=23.38  F-ratio=8.50 
Primary school or less + –  0 
Vocational school 0 –  – 
High school 0 0  0 
College, univers. or more – +  + 
Place of birth F-ratio=6.84 F-ratio=17.25  F-ratio=5.97 
Village 0 –  – 
Small town 0 +  0 
Major city – 0  0 
Zagreb – +  0 
Place of habitat  F-ratio=8.32 F-ratio=16.00  F-ratio=7.37 
Village 0 –  – 
Small town 0 0  0 
Major city – 0  + 
Zagreb – +  + 
Regional status F-ratio=7.58 F-ratio=17.17  F-ratio=6.30 
Northern Croatia + 0  – 
Central Croatia 0 0  0 
Istria and Primorje – +  + 
Eastern Croatia 0 0  0 
Dalmatia 0 –  0 
Zagreb – +  + 
Religiousness  F-ratio=64.39   
Religious  –   
Undecided  +   
Not religious  +   
Party affiliation F-ratio=5.72 F-ratio=32.90  F-ratio=5.18 
HDZ + –  0 
HNS – +  + 
HSP + –  0 
HSS 0 –  – 
SDP – +  0 
Undecided 0 0  0 
Legend: – below common average; 0 within common average; + above common average 
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The second factor was labeled ideologically characterized groups because 
it primarily consists of groups with a clearly articulated ideology, who are also 
perceived as ideological, where even that very perception has an ideological 
predisposition. The placement of homosexuals and lesbians in the observed set is 
more difficult to explain, but the linking pin might be the fact that these are 
groups which radically change the established order of things. As for tolerance 
regarding the ideologically characterized groups, the young are again extremely 
differentiated (Table 10): a higher level of tolerance is verbally expressed by the 
non-religious participants, women, students, those (as their fathers) with an 
academic education, born and living in Zagreb, residents of Istria and Primorje, 
the eldest youth as well as the supporters of HNS and SDP. A significant level of 
intolerance is manifested by the religious youth, men, the youngest age group, 
pupils, the participants with a rural provenience and domicile, those who (much 
like their fathers) have a vocational education or are without qualifications, and 
voters of HDZ and HSS. The polarization of youth in this case is identical to the 
one established when the (in)acceptance of the rights of homosexuals were 
investigated, testifying to a consistent (in)tolerance toward different sexual 
identities. It is obvious that these attitudes are deeply influenced by the 
traditional values, which are at the same time, most widely spread in the socially 
deprived social classes and groups. Here, a significant role is played by religious 
convictions – since Croatia is predominantly Catholic, the convergence of the 
believers' attitudes with the attitudes of the Catholic Church (although, they are 
close to other religious as well) – which expressly condemns homosexuality, and 
does not really find communists or feminists to be very acceptable – is not 
unexpected. 
Ecologically aware groups, the third factor obtained, is simple in content 
and certainly the most common among the young. There is only one significant 
difference in its acceptance – women accept it more. 
The final, fourth, factor, was labeled anti-globalists and anti-racists 
because it is very difficult to try and look for a specific link between these two 
groups. One might say that they are connected by the activist potential, but the 
same goes for, for example, ecologically aware groups. The difference might be 
found in the fact that environmentally friendly groups put their effort into 
protecting nature, while the anti-globalists and anti-racists are trying to protect 
the society, human beings. However, even though the fourth factor is somewhat 
confusing, the young are not homogenous in accepting the included groups. On 
the one side are those who accept them more – youth with a higher level of 
education, with fathers who are similarly educated, inhabitants of Zagreb, Istria 
and Primorje, women, students and HNS's voters. On the other side are the 
young with a lower education (just like their fathers), of rural background and 
residential status, men, the unemployed, youth living in Northern Croatia and 
sympathizers of HSS. This polarization is largely similar to the one established 
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regarding the (in)tolerance of ideologically characterized groups, but this time, 
without the religious component. 
The final group of variables in this segment about the political values of 
youth concerns the perception of the priorities of Croatian politics. However, the 
political goals or priorities might also be seen as an indicator of the perception of 
existing problems in the Croatian society, something we will discuss in the 
following segment. The participants could chose an answer from a four-degree 
scale regarding the measure in which the Croatian government should focus on 
the realization of the goals offered. Table 11 shows data regarding the highest 
level (“a lot”) for youth and adults.7 
 
Table 11: The ranking scale of political priorities – youth and adults (%) 
Political goals Youth Adults 
Reducing unemployment 90.6 95.1 
Fighting crime and corruption 86.1 94.5 
Economic growth and development 81.4 89.2 
Ensuring social justice and security for all 77.5 84.6 
Ensuring human rights and freedoms 76.2 79.7 
Improving the position of youth 76.2 76.3 
Environmental protection 67.6 72.5 
Improving the position of women 53.2 57.7 
Improving the relationship with neighboring countries 52.8 55.9 
Developing private enterprise 47.0 58.7 
Stimulating population growth 44.2 52.3 
Harmony between Croats and ethnic minorities 42.4 49.7 
Protecting the dignity of the Homeland War 42.3 55.0 
Croatia's accession to the European Union 41.8 45.3 
Development of regions and decentralization of Croatia 40.2 47.1 
Punishing war crimes and cooperating with Hague 29.4 33.0 
Strengthening military power and security of the state 21.3 21.1 
Supporting Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina 18.7 17.8 
Spiritual renewal 18.0 29.7 
 
                                                     
7 In the 1999 research a question about political goals was also asked, however, 
methodological reasons do not allow for a direct comparison. In that research the 
question was not constructed as an interval scale, but as a multiple-answer question (out 
of the 12 answers offered, the participants were able to chose only 3). Still, the previous 
data might be used for an illustration of changes or continuity. 
Political Values, Attitudes and Participation of Youth: Continuity and Change 
 103
As is visible, almost a half of the goals offered are considered by most of 
the participants to be priorities. Among them the reduction of unemployment, 
the fight against crime and corruption as well as economic growth and 
development are especially emphasized. It is obvious that the Croatian citizens 
are burdened by existential problems, which is why the improvement of the 
socio-economic situation is their number one priority. The importance of these 
goals is supported by the high ranking of ensuring social justice and security, as 
well as improvement of the position of youth and women. The later data again 
provokes us to ask why the feminists are so poorly ranked on the scale of 
tolerance toward social groups when their basic goal is exactly to improve the 
social position of women, something the participants care about without a doubt. 
The bottom of the scale is interesting because it mostly consists of answers 
which cause great turmoil in the political public, while they are obviously less 
important to the citizens compared to other priorities. However, in the context of 
this research, the most interesting position is the one regarding Croatia's 
accession to the EU as a political goal. About the same time Croatia began to 
near its realization, and when it was declared as an unquestionable priority by 
those in power, less than a half of the participants emphasized this goal as the 
most important one. It would seem that there is a disagreement between the 
citizens and those in power concerning the determination of political priorities, 
so the difficulties which occur in the realization of EU accession might easily 
affect the citizens' support for this goal.8 
The intergenerational comparison again demonstrated that the young 
express almost all of the political goals somewhat less than the adults. This is 
especially evident regarding the protection of the dignity of the Homeland War 
and spiritual renewal, the development of private enterprise, economic 
development, fighting corruption, ensuring social justice and stimulating the 
population growth. We might say that the consistently higher emphasis of almost 
all the suggested goals by the adult participants is witness to their greater interest 
in political events and a better understanding – based on experience – of the 
problems burdening the Croatian society. It is intriguing that the young express 
the need for population growth notably less, even though the society, completely 
naturally, expects the most in this regard from the young. The same goes for 
                                                     
8 This is testified to by the data on the changes in the importance of this goal, which was 
researched in the pre-election surveys since 1990, conducted within the project 
Elections, Parties and the Parliament in Croatia 1990-2000 at the Faculty of Political 
Science of the University of Zagreb (research team: I. Grdešić, M. Kasapović, I. Šiber i 
N. Zakošek). Along with all the limitations regarding the methodological barriers, a 
rough comparison would indicate that in 1990 this was the most accepted goal, and its 
importance decreased systematically until 1999, when it somewhat increased (Ilišin, 
2002: 175), only to fall again now. 
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spiritual renewal as a less accepted priority, which is deemed important because 
of the socialization of youth. 
Otherwise there have been no significant changes in the priorities of the 
young in the past five years, regarding their rating – back then the upper portion, 
as well as a considerable part of the lower portion of the scale, was similar. The 
reduction of unemployment, ensuring social justice and individual rights remain 
constant among the political priorities, and it is indicative that the acceptance of 
these values increased permanently from the beginning of 1990 (Ilišin, 2002: 
175). The reason for youth's sensitivity to these problems must lie in the 
constant increase of unemployment and social insecurity, as well as in the 
blatant examples of the violation of individual rights. 
The factor analysis demonstrated that the political goals are structured into 
four factors (with a total variance of 47.2%), shown in Table 12, and the 
variance analysis indicated how and how much the young are different in their 
acceptance of certain priorities. 
The first factor – the value of equality and justice – consists of goals that 
are primarily focused on the insurance of individual rights and social justice, 
along with the acceptance of the position of marginal groups, such as women 
and youth. These are already high priority among the young, so the high 
consensus among them is not surprising. To be more exact, only young women 
accept this set of values more than the men (F-ratio=55.02), most probably 
contributed by the goal regarding the improvement of the position of women 
The national and traditional values is the label of the second factor 
consisting of political goals which reflect national affiliation, pride and concern 
for national survival, along with the demand for a spiritual renewal, based on 
traditional values (if judged by the public appeals about the necessity of a moral 
renewal of the nation). The included goals are among those least or averagely 
accepted, and since they constitute a specific model of political thought, it is not 
surprising that the young are different in the acceptance of these values 
according to their observed attributes (with F-ratios ranging from 95.75 to 9.25), 
aside from gender. These goals are above averagely accepted by the religious 
participants (opposite the non-religious), supporters of HDZ and HSP (unlike the 
voters of HNS and SDP), youth with a rural provenience and domicile 
(compared to the urban youth), living in Eastern Croatia and Dalmatia (versus 
the inhabitants of Istria, Primorje and Zagreb), participants who, as their fathers, 
are unqualified or have a vocational education (as opposed to the highly 
educated), pupils, the unemployed and those up to 19 years of age. These trends 
clearly indicate that these are the groups of youth where the traditional values 
have deep roots, and who are only partially influenced by the modernization 
processes. 
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Table 12: The factor structure of political priorities 
Political goals 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Ensuring human rights and freedoms .727    
Ensuring social justice and security for all .681    
Improving the position of women .639    
Environmental protection .620    
Improving the position of youth .590    
Supporting Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina  .749   
Protecting the dignity of the Homeland War  .725   
Spiritual renewal  .613   
Strengthening military power and security of 
the state  .591   
Stimulating population growth  .588   
Croatia's accession to the European Union   .689  
Harmony between Croats and ethnic minorities   .667  
Punishing war crimes and cooperating with 
Hague   .651  
Improving the relationship with neighboring 
countries   561  
Development of regions and decentralization of 
Croatia   .495  
Economic growth and development    .670 
Reducing unemployment .317   .638 
Fighting crime and corruption    .530 
Developing private enterprise   .332 .507 
% of common variance 13.3 12.7 11.5 9.7 
 
The third factor may be labeled values of integration and cooperation 
because it almost completely incorporates the goals aimed at Croatia's 
integration in the wider European environment and its coexistence within and 
outside of national borders. These values mostly have an average acceptance of 
youth, but there is a high level of consensus in among them. The only difference 
occurs regarding the party affiliation (F-ratio=11.26): integration and 
cooperation is something that the sympathizers of HNS and SDP care about the 
most, and HSP's voters the least. In this case, a convergence of party rhetoric 
and opinions of party supporters is evident, and we may assume that the anti-
European attitudes of HSP attract new supporters to this party, who according to 
some other attributes do not belong to its “typical” electorate. 
The fourth factor, that is values of socio-economic development, is very 
consistent in content and very common among the youth. However, in spite of 
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this, the young are not homogenous in accepting this value set, because they 
differ according to age, socio-professional, educational and regional status (the 
F-ratios range from 30.04 to 5.97). To be more specific, the acceptance of the 
values of the socio-economic development increases linearly with age and 
education of youth, and it is more expressed by the employed and students 
(compared to pupils) and inhabitants of Central Croatia, Istria and Primorje 
(opposite those living in Eastern Croatia). The mentioned characteristics 
indicated that the values of socio-economic development are to a certain degree 
an opposing pole to the national and traditional values, because similar groups of 
youth accept one above averagely, and the other below average. Behind it, we 
suspect a latent conflict of the modernist and traditionally oriented youth, 
reflected on their ranking of political goals. 
4. The perception of social and political problems 
In this segment we will analyze the perception of the problems of Croatian 
society, the perception of corruption, the vision of social inequalities and the 
estimate of the causes of the existing difficulties in Croatian society and the 
choice of protagonists that can contribute to overcoming of these problems the 
most. 
The insight into the priorities of Croatian politics, as seen by the young, 
already sketched out the problems that might be perceived as most important. A 
comparison with the results of the 1999 research will indicate whether there 
were any changes in the perception of the most important problems of Croatian 
society today (Table 13). Here, we must mention that the participants were able 
to choose a maximum of three problems out of the 17 offered. 
At the top of the ranking scale of social problems are those of the socio-
economic nature, which is in line with the previously established ranking of 
priorities of Croatian politics. It is, therefore, obvious that Croatian citizens are 
burdened by existential problems so much that all others are less important, just 
as all other priorities lost the race against the ones regarding economic and 
development policies. The newly added problem of bribery and corruption has a 
high rating, in accordance with the emphasis on the fight against this 
phenomenon as a political goal, as well as the assessments of national and 
international organizations, putting Croatia high up on the scale of presence of 
bribery and corruption. 
It is interesting that the young express most of the observed problems 
somewhat more than the adults, and this is especially true when it comes to the 
problems of bribery and corruption, unemployment, alcoholism and drug abuse. 
The particularity of these problems is undoubtedly a generational issue, because 
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it is common knowledge – which is corroborated by official statistics – that the 
percentage of unemployment is highest among the young, as well as that they 
are the most numerous victims of addictions. Why the young are more sensitive 
to bribery and corruption is an open issue, but one might speculate that the lack 
of life experience, in the sense of facing the “efficiency” and “usefulness” of 
corruptive behavior for those that need or want something, contributes to a 
harsher disapproval of this phenomenon. Some problems are, on the other hand, 
perceived by the young as less important, but this can also be explained with 
generational differences in mind. Thus, the adults express economic problems, 
privatization crime, social differences and the appearance of organized crime 
more often – most problems newer in date. It is not irrelevant that almost all the 
adults were socialized in a socialist society, and most spent a part or their entire 
working lives in that system. This must contribute to an increased sensitivity to 
the ruining of economic resources, which they created themselves, the 
consequence of which is the mass loss of employment, the decrease of the living 
standard and the enormous deepening of social differences. In other words, their 
immediate experiences make them more critical toward the phenomena 
occurring in the problematic transformation of a planned into a market economy. 
 
Table 13: A comparative outline of the perception of the greatest problems in 
Croatian society (%) 
Youth Adults 
Social problems 
1999 2004 2004 
Unemployment 59.7 58.7 51.4 
Economic problems 51.4 48.8 54.0 
Bribery and corruption – 28.2 23.1 
Crime in ownership transformation and privatization 31.6 25.5 32.8 
Social inequalities 24.4 19.7 24.1 
Lack of work, discipline and responsibility 10.8 19.1 19.9 
Low evaluation of work and knowledge 15.5 17.0 15.4 
Morality crisis 16.5 15.1 20.0 
Organized crime 11.8 12.8 16.6 
Alcoholism, drug addiction, etc. 21.5 11.3 7.0 
School and educational system 6.2 6.4 4.3 
Disrespect for human rights and freedoms 14.1 6.2 3.4 
Insufficient democratization of society – 4.5 3.6 
Housing problems 7.4 3.9 2.7 
Pollution of the human environment 6.3 3.3 1.3 
Inter-ethnical relations 3.7 2.9 1.3 
Religious problems 0.7 0.6 0.5 
 
Vlasta Ilišin 
108 
As for the changes in the perception of social reality, it is symptomatic that 
there was a decrease in pronouncing of all the analyzed problems by the young, 
especially the violation of human rights and freedoms, crime in transformation 
and privatization (suggesting that the future generations will have forgotten how 
a part of the social elite got their wealth), social differences and addictions. 
Therefore, it follows that the young seem to notice certain improvements in 
these areas or that the conditions of “wild capitalism” (Županov, 2002) – during 
which they were socialized becoming the only ones they have immediate insight 
into – have blunted their critical blade. However, there is one problem that the 
young do express almost twice as often than before: lack of work, discipline and 
responsibility. This might actually be a rare indicator of a positive adjustment to 
the European environment, where the work ethics and discipline are stricter. 
An analysis regarding the observed attributes of youth demonstrated that 
they are quite homogenous in the perception of social problems, because only 
six of those problems arise some statistically significant differences, most of 
them sporadically. The exception is the problem of unemployment, raising the 
most disaccord. The emphasis on this problem as the most important decreases 
linearly with age (χ2=38.38), participants' level of education (χ2=21.39), their 
fathers' education (χ2=25.56), and the urbanization of their place of habitat 
(χ2=12.25). Aside from the groups of youth with a poorer social status, 
unemployment is seen as a greater problem by the unemployed and pupils, 
opposite the employed and students (χ2=35.29), women (χ2=12.25) and the 
religious participants (χ2=16.06). Most of the mentioned attributes point to the 
fact that the situational circumstances dictate a great deal how unemployment as 
a social problem is seen – it is more felt by youth whose starting positions 
(social background, development of their place of residence) and competitive 
power on the labor market (education, gender) are lower. Paying attention to 
crime in transformation and privatization increases linearly with age (χ2=22.71), 
where it is more emphasized by the employed than the pupils (χ2=17.74). The 
poor validation of work and knowledge is expressed more with the increase of 
the youth's level of education (χ2=30.55), as well as the fathers' education level 
(χ2=17.84). The situation is different with alcoholism and drug abuse: the 
expression of this problem decreases with the increase in the level of education 
of the young (χ2=37.25), and it is most emphasized by the pupils, opposite the 
employed and students (χ2=45.18). Finally, the lack of work, discipline and 
responsibility is a somewhat greater problem in the eyes of men (χ2=12.16), and 
the moral crisis is more pronounced by the young from Istria and Primorje, 
unlike their peers from Northern Croatia (χ2=22.37). In most of these 
differentiations a decisive role is played by situational circumstances, which 
obviously contribute to the greater sensitivity of the young who are more 
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directly involved in one of these social problems or suffer the consequences of 
not solving them. 
We assumed in this research that bribery and corruption will be at the top 
of the existing social problems, which is why we additionally examined the 
areas of social life in which the participants notice the existence of this 
phenomenon. The perception of the existence of corruption was investigated in 
seven areas, and the answers consisted of four degrees (from “a lot” to “none”). 
The answers for the degree “none” ranged from 3 to 8%, indicating that the 
participants noticed the existence of a certain degree of corruption, in all the 
analyzed areas. In this regard, the results of this research are completely in line 
with other surveys regarding the perception of the presence of corruption in 
Croatia, determining that the perception of corruption affects the negative 
dynamics of social capital (Štulhofer, 2004: 166). 
Graph 4 only portrays the answers for the degree “a lot”, in order to gain an 
insight into where corruption has the deepest roots, according to the participant's 
judgment. 
The data shown indicate that most Croatian citizens perceive judiciary to be 
the area laden with corruption, while the education system holds the opposite 
pole, with a quarter of the participants thinking it is corrupted. When these data 
are looked at generally, they look slashing and they partially explain the earlier 
established low trust in the Croatian judiciary, Government and public services. 
In this context, the most problematic is the judiciary, especially because we can 
assume, with great confidence, that the impression (or knowledge) about the 
spread of corruption among those dealing with justice, leads directly to the 
mistrust in the institutions of the system, the legal state and the rule of law. 
The fight against bribery and corruption was more often stated as a political 
priority by the young than the adults, but regarding the concrete perception of the 
spread of corruption in the observed areas, it was shown that the existence of 
corruption is less perceived by youth than the adults, especially regarding the 
judiciary and health systems. However, they do notice it more in two cases: in the 
school system and police. These generational differences accurately reflect the 
differences in living experience, that is, they are linked with the greater immediate 
relationship with certain institutions. The young are forced to address certain 
services and institutions less than the adults, so they probably cannot estimate the 
scope of corruption as easily. 
This tendency is confirmed by the differences within the youth sample. The 
statistically significant differences are generated by age, socio-professional status 
and level of education. The perception of a lot of corruption in the judiciary and 
health systems, local authorities and public administration increases consistently 
with age (χ2 ranges from 31.54 do 17.61) and level of education of youth (χ2 
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ranges from 28.03 to 17.91), and the oldest and most educated youth is joined by 
the employed and students, while pupils notice corruption in these four areas 
under the average (χ2 ranges from 30.36 do 21.29). The perception of corruption, 
therefore, predominantly depends on the existing social status, and the level of 
maturity of youth is linked to this, while a significant role is played by 
competence mediated through more education. In other words, the concrete 
attitudes regarding corruption are not caused by differences in ideological 
orientations but, primarily, by the living situation and experience. 
 
Graph 4: The ranking scale of the perception of a significant existence of 
corruption in certain social areas – youth and adults (%) 
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It was already demonstrated that the participants highly validate equality 
and social justice (both as constitutional principles and as political priorities) and 
that the social differences are considered to be one of the most important social 
problems. Even though social inequalities exist in all modern societies, this issue 
is raised with renewed strength in societies in transition, whose citizens still 
have memories of socialism, which was officially defined as a society with 
social equality. The participants were offered nine pairs of social groups in order 
to evaluate which of the compared social groups are in a worse, same or better 
position. Table 14 portrays which of the social groups in question are in a worse 
position compared to their counterpart groups. 
 
Table 14: A comparative outline of the perception of a poorer position of some 
social groups (%) 
Youth Adults 
Social groups in worse position 
1999 2004 2004 
The poor vs. the rich 93.1 91.2 91.7 
The unemployed vs. the employed 90.5 87.4 90.2 
The uneducated vs. the educated 64.8 81.4 82.2 
Living in villages vs. living in cities 54.2 62.4 59.5 
Women vs. men 28.9 41.2 43.3 
Youth vs. adults 34.2 39.5 43.8 
Opposition members vs. ruling party members 65.4 38.4 38.8 
Ethnic minorities' members vs. Croats 35.9 33.3 26.6 
Atheists vs. religious believers 27.3 21.2 20.4 
 
The obtained results demonstrate that the participants, without much 
dilemma, believe that the social groups of the poor, unemployed, uneducated and 
living in rural areas are more deprived. These social handicaps are difficult in their 
own right, and it is even worse that there is often a tight interdependence of 
poverty, lack of qualifications and employment. Exiting this circle of misery is 
difficult and uncertain, and the participants obviously recognize the set of 
circumstances which keep certain groups of citizens at the social bottom. In their 
perception of social inequalities, the young and adults are mostly unanimous, seen 
by the identical ranking of the social groups they think are in a worse position. 
Even though the young are inclined to perceive a little less inequality than the 
adults in most cases, the opposite is true in two cases: the young emphasize a 
worse position of national minorities and the rural population more. 
The changes among the young are much more indicative. They tell us that 
the emphasis in their perceptions regarding social inequalities is changing, 
which might mean that in some areas they are deepened and in some they are 
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alleviated. In other words, the social inequalities exist and transform in line with 
the changes in the given time and space. Compared to the data from five years 
earlier, among the less perceived inequalities are the worse positions of the 
members of opposition compared to the ruling parties' members, and somewhat 
less of atheists compared to the religious population. the perceived reduction of 
political inequalities is most probably caused by the dynamic in the change of 
power during the observed period of time, which demonstrated that no party can 
monopolize power the way it was done in the first transitional decade. Since the 
five-party coalition was in power for four out of the five observed years, a 
portion of the perceived decrease of political inequality might probably be 
ascribed to the manner of the previous HDZ's government and the government 
of the coalition, headed by SDP, and it is possible that the very common 
assessment that “all politicians are the same” had its effect here. As for the 
reduction in the perception of a worse position of atheists, it is probably a 
consequence of the increase in the number of participants declaring their 
religiousness, which is why the inequalities of this type are out of their sight. 
However, the data shows that the young perceive certain inequalities to a 
greater degree than before, which is especially true of the educational and 
gender inequalities. One might assume that the harsher competition on the labor 
market and demands for a more qualified labor force in the stumbling Croatian 
economy – and after the turbulent 1990s, where social status and wealth were 
(too) often acquired based on spoils and suitability, and not knowledge and merit 
– affected the youth's ability to see more clearly the inequalities between the 
educated and those without an education. Let's mention that this perception of 
educational inequalities raises the issue of inequalities of opportunities for 
education, which may also be expected to deepen in line with the changes of the 
social structure and stratification of the society. a greater perception of the worse 
position of women, on the other hand, suggests that the activities of women's 
associations and of state authorities in charge of promoting women's rights are 
achieving some results. Specifically, the position of women has not changed 
considerably in the past five years, certainly not for the worse (after it had 
deteriorated at the beginning of the transitional period), but this data indicates 
that the awareness of the public about the existence of gender-based inequalities 
has changed. 
The factor analysis (Table 15) obtained three factors (total variance of 
47.4%), logically configured and basically identical to the ones obtained in the 
research five years ago (Ilišin, 2002:164). 
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Table 15: The factor structure of social inequalities 
Social groups in worse position Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
The poor vs. the rich .718   
The unemployed vs. the employed .619   
The uneducated vs. the educated .598   
Ethnic minorities' members vs. Croats  .670  
Atheists vs. religious believers  .698  
Opposition members vs. ruling party members .328 .464  
Youth vs. adults   .809 
Women vs. men  .377 .537 
Living in villages vs. living in cities .340  .497 
% of common variance 18.1 14.7 14.6 
 
The first factor can be labeled social inequalities because it consists of the 
commonly known inequalities in all modern societies. Judging by the 
distribution of answers, this is the most common and very consistent type of 
inequality, and the young are quite unanimous about it. The variance analysis 
demonstrated that only those with a vocational education (F-ratio=8.34) and 
those from Istria and Primorje – opposite the participants from Eastern Slavonia 
(F- ratio=5.80) – perceive social inequalities less. The regional differences are 
easily explained by differences in development, but the question remains why 
the young with three years of high school education perceive social inequalities 
less. Perhaps the fact that most of them are already employed contributes to the 
greater sense of social security and numbs their sensitivity to equalities existing 
outside of the scope of personal experience. 
Political inequalities (the second factor) are constituted by the perceived 
inequalities at the national, religious and narrow political levels. In a democratic 
society, inequalities based on ethnicity and religiousness should not have 
political connotations, but the Croatian experience and research (e.g. Vrcan and 
others, 1995; Zakošek, 1994, 1998, 2001; Šiber, 1998, 2001) indicated a 
significant correlation between political beliefs and the religious and national 
component. The distribution of answers already indicated that the perception of 
this type of inequality is already decreasing and that the young think it is 
emphasized the least, while the variance analysis shows that the young are quite 
different among each other in this regard (the F-ratios range from 29.03 to 4.54). 
Political inequalities are mostly perceived by women, youth from Zagreb (born 
and living in it), the highly educated (unlike those without qualifications) and 
supporters of HNS and SDP (versus the voters of HSP). This differentiation of 
the participants suggests that the sensitivity to political inequalities increases 
along with the level of education and development of the environment, as well 
as according to the identification with the left-wing political parties. 
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The third factor, socio-cultural inequalities, is constituted by the 
antagonisms youth-adults, women-men and rural-urban, with elements of 
traditionalism and patriarchalism with accompanying stereo-types in their roots. 
As was indicated by the distribution of answers, this type of inequality is on the 
rise, i.e. these inequalities are, as a rule, more perceived after the calming of 
great social and political turmoil. In other words, the age related stratification 
and gender equality usually come to the agenda when a society, including 
Croatia, enters a more stable phase. Regarding the inequality between the 
populations of rural and urban areas, it is a direct consequence of the continuing 
underdevelopment and depopulation of rural areas, opposite the higher quality of 
life in urban centers with a concentration of economic resources, educational 
institutions and a number of other benefits. 
It is not questionable that the transition in Croatia was marked by numerous 
difficulties, and it was already shown how the young rate the existing problems. 
But, we were interested in who or what the responsibility for the existing 
economic and social problems is addressed to. Graph 5 portrays the distribution 
of the obtained results, noting that the participants could choose a maximum of 
two out of the eight answers offered. 
Most of the participants believe that the war and its consequences are the 
main cause of the existing difficulties in Croatia. It is not surprising, because the 
war is often apostrophized in the public as the cause of Croatia's socio-economic 
regression. This is at least partially true, just as the fact that the war affected the 
dynamic of consolidation of the social and political system and the political 
awareness and behavior of Croatian citizens. 
Aside from the war, the participants emphasize two other “culprits” – the 
immorality of new entrepreneurs and crime, and the bad politics of HDZ from 
1990 to 2000. This is also not unexpected, because the Croatian privatization 
model was the object of numerous critics and the cause of unwanted consequences 
for the wider population. The new entrepreneurs appeared within this model, 
created by HDZ and used to restructure the economy for an entire decade. It is 
interesting that half as many participants address the responsibility for the existing 
difficulties to the coalition government, who was nonetheless defeated in the 
November 2003 elections, and HDZ got another chance to try and mobilize the 
social development. It would seem, therefore, that the overly high expectations 
regarding the correction of privatization and other irregularities and injustices, 
apparent at the beginning of 2000, transformed into an equally high level of 
disappointment four years later. 
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Graph 5: The ranking scale of the causes of economic and social problems in 
Croatia – youth and adults (%) 
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It is equally intriguing that only one out of eight participants sees the 
socialist heritage as the cause of today's problems, since at the beginning of 
transition, the Croatian citizens were the most critical toward the socialist 
regime, and its economic and political system, out of the citizens of all the post-
socialists countries (Županov, 1996; Sekulić, Šporer, 1997). It is probable that 
the experience of living in new conditions during the last 15 years – 
characterized by poverty, social insecurity, unemployment, increasing crime, 
etc. – removed the etiquette of the “attending culprit” for all Croatian 
misfortunes, and the very passage of time brings new causes in the place of the 
old. 
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As is visible in Graph 5, the young state war and its consequences as the 
cause of difficulties more than the adults, which is understandable since they 
were raised during and after the war. Since the period of maturity is a time of 
increased vulnerability, it is expected that the war had a deeper impact on the 
young. On the other side, the young emphasize the immorality of new 
entrepreneurs and crime somewhat less, also explainable with the fact that they 
were not the ones whose right to manage the nationalized social ownership was 
stripped from, and the ones losing jobs, but the adults. 
The young differ among each other regarding the emphasis on the first five 
causes of the problems, and the summarized results can be found in Table 16. 
The obtained results are quite expected. It is logical that HDZ's 
responsibility for the problems is most emphasized by the supporters of SDP and 
HNS unlike HDZ's voters. They are joined by the non-religious participants 
opposite the religious, living in major cities, especially Zagreb, Istria and 
Primorje, contrary to the inhabitants of Dalmatia and Central Croatia, as well as 
students versus the unemployed. Along with that, criticism towards HDZ 
increases linearly with the father's level of education. The attributes of these 
participants are very similar to those established in the supporters of the 
opposition today (primarily HNS and SDP), which is the best explanation of the 
established ambiguous attitude of the young about HDZ's responsibility for 
existing problems in Croatia, which is also a cause of difficulties they are the 
least unanimous about. They are almost equally divided regarding the guilt of 
the former coalition government. In this case the signs are different – greater 
responsibility is ascribed by the sympathizers of HSP and HDZ (unlike the 
potential voters of DP and HNS, youth of rural origin and domicile, those with 
vocational qualification, opposed to the academically educated participants. 
Also, the support for the observed attitude decreases linearly with the increase of 
the father's level of education. Here, we can also see the convergence of the 
attributes of participants addressing the blame to the coalition government with 
those who are usually HDZ's supporters. All that was mentioned points to the 
fact that the political polarization among the young is consistent and 
significantly present. War and its consequences are above averagely emphasized 
by HDZ's supporters (versus the voters of HNS and SDP), pupils and the 
unemployed, and the support for this attitude decreases with age, and it is under 
averagely represented by the non-religious participants. Stating the immorality 
of new entrepreneurs and crime as the causes of the economic and social 
problems, increases with age and education, and peaks among the students and 
the employed (versus the unemployed and pupils). Therefore, it is obvious that 
the increasing social competence breeds more criticism toward the privatization 
model, and puts less emphasis on the negative effects of the war, as a sort of “vis 
maior”. 
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Table 16: The perception of the causes of economic and social problems 
regarding the attributes of youth (%) 
Attributes of youth 
War and its 
consequences 
Immorality of 
new 
entrepreneurs 
and crime 
Bad politics of 
HDZ 1990-
2000 
Bad politics of 
coalition 
government 
2000-2003 
Condition 
inherited from 
socialism 
Age χ2=24.48 χ2=32.19    
15 – 19 years 68.2 33.6    
20 – 24 years 60.4 45.1    
25 – 29 years 55.0 48.2    
Socio-professional status χ2=30.27 χ2=25.46 χ2=21.60   
Employed 56.3 46.3 44.1   
Unemployed 67.1 40.6 34.3   
Pupils 68.9 33.0 37.1   
Students 55.5 47.1 48.0   
Father’s education    χ2=20.96 χ2=23.61  
Primary school or less   34.2 18.8  
Vocational school   38.1 18.5  
High school   43.4 12.1  
College, univer. or more   48.7 9.7  
Education   χ2=22.03  χ2=20.12  
Primary school or less  35.1  15.4  
Vocational school  41.0  21.5  
High school  45.0  12.9  
College, univer. or more  51.3  9.6  
Place of birth    χ2=23.07  
Village    19.1  
Small town    11.7  
Major city    12.0  
Zagreb    10.4  
Place of habitat    χ2=23.29 χ2=19.68  
Village   40.2 18.4  
Small town   35.3 11.3  
Major city   48.0 11.9  
Zagreb   49.9 10.1  
Regional status   χ2=35.71   
Northern Croatia   44.1   
Central Croatia   32.9   
Istria and Primorje   48.1   
Eastern Croatia   34.1   
Dalmatia   36.1   
Zagreb   50.4   
Religiousness χ2=20.65  χ2=54.62   
Religious 63.6  36.8   
Undecided 60.2  50.2   
Not religious 47.0  60.9   
Party affiliation χ2=32.88  χ2=244.22 χ2=63.38 χ2=43.27 
HDZ 70.9  18.3 22.5 17.9 
HNS 52.5  63.3 6.5 9.4 
HSP 59.4  32.8 24.6 21.6 
HSS 55.3  55.3 17.0 11.7 
SDP 53.1  70.9 4.6 5.4 
Undecided 61.9  39.7 13.3 9.6 
TOTAL 61.3 42.6 41.6 14.7 12.2 
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Finally, socialism is considered more responsible by the sympathizers of 
HSP and HDZ, while this attitude is less present among the supporters of SDP 
and HNS, and the undecided participants. This polarization of the supporters of 
the mentioned parties is actually expected, because it quite accurately reflects 
the party rhetoric, as well as the positioning of the parties on the left-right 
continuum. 
The final investigated attitudes in this segment are related with the social 
protagonists the participants believe might do the most for Croatia's exit from 
the existing difficult situation. The participants were again able to choose a 
maximum of two out of the eight answers offered, and their choices are 
portrayed in Graph 6. 
 
Graph 6: The ranking scale of social protagonists that can contribute to 
overcoming of existing difficulties in Croatia – youth and adults (%) 
1.8
5.6
7.2
15.0
27.3
38.0
28.5
56.7
1.5
3.7
8.8
14.6
33.3
37.2
40.1
51.0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Church clergy
Public servants in
administration
Farmers
Workers
Private entrepreneurs
and managers
Politicians and political
parties
Youth
Experts and
intellectuals
Youth
Adults
 
 
Political Values, Attitudes and Participation of Youth: Continuity and Change 
 119
Out of all the social protagonists offered, experts and intellectuals are the only 
ones most participants believe might contribute to the overcoming of existing 
difficulties, while youth, politicians, political parties and private entrepreneurs and 
managers have a solid rating. It seems that in the estimate of a potential 
contribution two approaches of the participants are used: what would be the ideal 
situation and what is given by the existing relations of power. namely, it is often 
debatable how much the knowledge of experts and intellectuals is taken into 
consideration when making developmental decisions, and it is evident that the 
inclusion of youth is minimal. On the other hand, although the politicians, and 
especially parties, do not enjoy the greatest trust of the participants, they still 
believe that political protagonists have the most power in Croatia, where the 
elements of “political capitalism” are still quite alive (Županov, 2002). However, 
there is also a budding entrepreneurial capitalism, objectively increasing the power 
of private entrepreneurs and managers, also expected to strengthen their own role 
in developmental projects. The participants have no high hopes for the workers, 
farmers and civil servants, and nothing is expected from the clergy. The later 
result probably reflects the people's conception that the Church is in charge of 
spiritual and moral issues, and not ensuring the material conditions for a life of 
dignity. 
The differences among the young and the adults are small, but more than 
indicative – as much as the young trust the abilities of their own generation, the 
adults are more convinced of the possible contribution of experts and private 
entrepreneurs to. The discrepancy in the vision of a potential social contribution of 
youth is without a doubt an indication of a social mistrust in the young, which is 
proven by the adults' answers here. 
The young themselves are symptomatically different in their emphasis of the 
potential contribution of the observed protagonists in overcoming of 
developmental problems. To start, we should mention that the young are 
completely homogenous regarding the estimated potential contribution of their 
generation. On the other hand, most disagreements were registered regarding the 
estimated contribution of private entrepreneurs and managers. The faith in this 
group increases linearly with the level of education (χ2=18.61), the level of 
urbanization of the place the participants were born in (χ2=25.15) and live 
(χ2=25.15), and the educated, urban youth is joined by the employed unlike the 
pupils and the unemployed (χ2=25.58), who in their lack of trust are joined by the 
young from Northern and Eastern Croatia (χ2=38.69). The characteristics of those 
that emphasize the potential contribution of experts and intellectuals are somewhat 
similar: this emphasis increases linearly with the participants' (χ2=73.95) and their 
fathers' level of education (χ2=36.55), they are joined by students – unlike the 
pupils and the unemployed (χ2=43.62) – as well as HNS's voters opposite the 
supporters of HDZ (χ2=27.09). As for the other analyzed protagonists, the 
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differences are sporadic. Thus, the faith in the contribution of civil servants 
decreases linearly with the increase of the participants' (χ2=21.10) and their fathers' 
(χ2=19.39) education; the young with a vocational education, versus the highly 
educated participants (χ2=18.13) trust the workers more; and the sympathizers of 
HSS and HSP put the least hope in the farmers, as opposed to the supporters of 
HNS and SDP (χ2=22.77). If we look at the established differences in general, the 
current social status and the conditions of socialization have an evidently 
significant influence. These factors are correlated with the party affiliation, which 
actually depend significantly on the mentioned attributes of the participants. 
5. The political participation and potential of youth 
For an improved understanding of youth and their relationship toward 
politics, an insight into their political participation is necessary. It is already well 
known that this participation is low, in general and in comparison with the adults. 
this phenomenon deserves our attention for at least three reasons: the optimal 
functioning of the democratic order and institutions depends on the adequate 
political participation of the citizens; in the process of democratic consolidation 
the engagement of all segments of the society is necessary (especially those which 
demonstrate an innovative potential); the participation of youth in political 
processes motivates and enables them to make decisions now and in the future. 
This segment shall analyze the interest of youth in politics, its perception of the 
representation of marginal groups in Croatian politics, the participation in different 
organizations, the readiness for personal engagement, the perception of the 
optimal forms for the political engagement of youth and the protagonists which 
might stimulate it to actively participate in the society. 
We have already mentioned that the young express lest interest in politics, 
and we should add that it is believed they do not lack interest per se but, rather, 
react to politics, which is mostly not interested in the young, that is, their 
problems and opinions (Bynner, Ashford, 1994). In this research we measured 
the interest in politics in two ways: through the self-estimate of the participants 
regarding their interest in politics and political events (Graph 7), and the 
frequency of communicating with friends and parents (in the case of youth) or 
with friends (in the case of adults) about politics and society (Graph 8). 
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Graph 7: A comparative outline of the declared interest in politics (%) 
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Graph 8: The frequency of communication about political issues – youth and 
adults (%) 
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The declared interest in politics is, as was expected, smaller among the 
young. Still, in the observed five year period, there has been an increase of those 
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that are somewhat interested at the expense of those who are completely 
uninterested. This is still under the level of political interest of youth in the 
socialist period, which was within the range of today's interest of the adults (Ilišin, 
2003: 49). Even when considering the communication about politics and society, 
it turns out the young are less inclined to this subject than the adults, where they 
communicate more with their friends than their parents. The communication about 
political issues is also higher than their declared interest in politics, probably 
because social events are included into these conversations. The widening of this 
subject outside of the narrow definition of politics obviously increases the level of 
interest in exchanging information and comments.9 
The young are significantly different regarding their interest in politics, 
which is most evident in their conversations with friends. However, since all 
three examined indicators of interest in politics are linked with the similar 
attributes of youth, the obtained results are all portrayed in Table 17. 
It is obvious from the summarized data that the interest in politics in all 
three of the examined forms is not only linked with religiousness and 
provenience of youth. It is also immediately evident that this combined political 
interests increases along with the age of the participants and their fathers' level 
of education, as well as that greater interest is expressed by the supporters of 
HNS and HSS, students and the employed, versus the participants without party 
affiliation, pupils and the unemployed. The declared interest in politics is also 
higher with men and those living in Zagreb. The communication about political 
issues – both with friends and parents – is also more intense the more educated 
the participants are. As for communication with friends, politics is a more 
common topic among youth from Zagreb (unlike the young from Northern and 
Eastern Croatia) and young men. Data summarized in this way confirm the well 
known tendency that maturing and achieving a higher social status (including 
education) increases the interest in politics. It is interesting in the context of 
Croatia, that the supporters of HNS and HSP are most politicized, which might 
be linked with the fact that a significant portion of these parties' voters are 
students (who are among the most interested), and it might be connected with 
the clear programmatic and rhetoric profile of these parties (also positioned on 
the opposing poles on the dimension of left-right ideological orientations). 
                                                     
9 We must mention that the declared interest in politics, along with military and defense 
matters, are at the bottom of the scale including 15 interests (of youth and adults), just as 
the conversation about politics is at the bottom of the scale regarding the frequency of 
conversations the young have with their friends and parents (along with talking about 
sex and love). This means that, in spite of certain shifts, politics is permanently at the 
margin of interest of youth (and, to a considerable degree, the adults) compared to other 
contents of everyday life. 
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Table 17: Interest in politics and political issues regarding the attributes of youth (%) 
Interest in politics Communic. with friends Communic. with parents 
Attributes of youth 
High 
Ave-
rage 
No 
interest 
Often 
Some-
times 
Never Often 
Som-
etimes 
Never 
Gender χ2=18.74 χ2=26.74  
Female 7.7 52.6 39.7 17.2 46.8 36.0    
Male 13.7 49.1 37.2 25.1 47.6 27.2    
Age χ2=27.20 χ2=101.20 χ2=71.09 
15 – 19 years 10.4 45.2 44.4 17.9 36.3 45.7 13.0 42.6 44.4 
20 – 24 years 10.9 49.3 39.9 22.0 50.1 27.9 17.9 53.1 29.0 
25 – 29 years 10.9 58.1 31.0 23.9 55.3 20.8 16.9 59.5 23.6 
Socio-profess. status χ2=27.48 χ2=100.40 χ2=64.18 
Employed 9.5 55.2 35.3 22.0 54.6 23.4 15.0 59.1 25.9 
Unemployed 7.7 51.4 40.9 19.6 46.2 34.1 14.6 50.9 34.5 
Pupils 11.2 44.4 44.4 16.5 34.8 48.7 13.2 41.8 45.1 
Students 15.3 49.6 35.0 26.9 49.1 24.0 21.9 50.8 27.2 
Father’s education  χ2=25.28 χ2=27.64 χ2=55.55 
Primary school or less 8.8 53.1 38.1 16.8 45.9 37.3 8.6 52.4 38.9 
Vocational school 9.5 50.6 39.9 18.1 48.7 33.2 14.5 52.5 33.0 
High school 9.7 47.7 42.6 22.5 46.8 30.7 15.1 51.3 33.6 
University or more 15.6 54.3 30.1 28.4 46.9 24.8 25.8 50.9 23.2 
Education   χ2=103.70 χ2=82.49 
Primary school or less    15.5 36.8 47.7 12.2 42.6 45.2 
Vocational school    18.2 49.4 32.4 11.5 52.7 35.8 
High school    24.5 51.2 24.3 18.2 55.0 26.8 
University or more    27.1 53.3 19.6 23.0 58.8 18.1 
Place of habitat  χ2=27.98 χ2=38.22  
Village 8.9 53.0 38.1 17.8 48.8 33.4    
Small town 9.3 50.4 40.3 20.4 45.2 34.2    
Major city 9.9 45.5 44.6 19.8 48.5 31.7    
Zagreb 17.9 49.3 32.9 32.3 45.7 22.0    
Regional status  χ2=47.55  
Northern Croatia    17.3 47.7 35.0    
Central Croatia    18.5 54.9 26.6    
Istria and Primorje    16.5 48.8 34.7    
Eastern Croatia    19.0 44.4 36.5    
Dalmatia    22.7 45.9 31.4    
Zagreb    32.2 46.1 21.7    
Party affiliation χ2=37.51 χ2=49.19 χ2=45.69 
HDZ 12.5 53.5 34.0 23.0 45.5 31.5 18.2 50.4 31.4 
HNS 15.3 54.0 30.7 32.1 46.7 21.2 18.1 60.1 21.7 
HSP 16.4 53.0 30.6 30.1 45.1 24.8 24.2 50.0 25.8 
HSS 4.3 56.4 39.4 21.1 43.0 35.8 10.6 46.8 42.6 
SDP 11.9 52.3 35.8 21.5 55.0 23.5 20.5 52.5 27.0 
Undecided 7.2 48.4 44.4 15.3 47.4 37.3 10.8 51.4 37.8 
TOTAL 10.7 50.8 38.5 21.3 47.2 31.5 16.0 51.7 32.4 
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It was mentioned in the introduction that the young demonstrate a marginal 
participation in politics, especially true when it comes to institutions of power. 
We were, hence, interested in how the young perceive the representation of their 
own generation and of other marginal, but politically relevant political groups 
(Table 18), and whether they believe that there should be a legislative act, which 
should ensure the adequate representation of these groups in the Croatian 
Parliament (Table 19). Tables 18 and 19 portray the answers “yes” and “no”, 
while the answer “I do not know” was omitted in order to increase the visibility 
of the results. 
 
Table 18: A comparative outline of the perception of sufficient representation of 
marginal groups in Croatian political life (%) 
Youth 1999 Youth 2004 Adults 2004 
Marginal groups 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Croatian ”Diaspora” – – 31.0 18.9 39.9 20.2 
Ethnic minorities 21.9 23.6 29.6 23.4 42.6 20.6 
Women 20.7 41.9 15.9 52.3 22.0 56.7 
Youth 8.8 60.6 5.4 73.8 6.7 74.6 
 
As could have been expected, the perception of the need to legally ensure the 
representation f a certain marginal group decreases with the increased perception 
of the adequate political representation of this group. The data indicates that the 
participants believe that the best represented groups in Croatian political life are 
the “Diaspora” and national minorities – where most participants do not have a 
clear attitude – while women and youth are perceived as politically marginalized 
groups. Also, most participants believe that the legislative intervention for the 
ensuring their adequate representation is necessary, unlike the national minorities 
and the Croatian “Diaspora” (again, most participants do not really have a defined 
attitude about this). It would seem that the political representation of national 
minorities and the “Diaspora” presents an issue for, primarily, the politicians, 
while the participants believe that the participation of women and youth is a 
problem more related to their everyday experience. 
The young and the adults are almost identical – only regarding national 
minorities there is a little more understanding for their right to political 
representation among the young. Even though the adults have demonstrated a 
significant skepticism earlier, regarding the potential of youth to contribute to 
resolving Croatia's problems, it is interesting that they now show a high 
compliance with the young, who see their generation as politically marginalized 
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and as the group which should be helped the most through legislation to achieve 
political affirmation.10 
 
Table 19: The perception of the need for legal insurance of the representation of 
marginal groups in the Croatian Parliament – youth and adults (%) 
Youth Adults 
Marginal groups 
Yes No Yes No 
Youth 68.5 10.1 68.7 13.4 
Women 58.9 15.5 56.2 22.9 
Ethnic minorities 35.6 21.0 35.9 27.8 
Croatian ”Diaspora” 27.4 27.0 29.3 33.6 
 
If we look only at the results of youth, it is evident that the political 
position of women and youth is perceived less favorable now than five years 
earlier. Since there has been positive change in this period of time – at least 
when the representation of women is concerned – we can again assume that the 
consolidation of the social and political order revitalized the dissatisfactions and 
demands that were pushed in the background by the “grand” political topics and 
goals. This, actually, is one more indicator of the “normalization” of the social 
and political life, that is, the entering into a more stable period of social 
development. 
The young are polarized regarding their perception of the existing 
representation of the “Diaspora” and the need to ensure its political 
representation in the Parliament. Namely, the attitudes that the “Diaspora” is 
present enough in the political life (the χ2 range from 78.63 to 29.32) and that its 
political representation in the Parliament should not be guaranteed by legislation 
(with χ2 ranging from 56.93 to 20.57), depend on identical attributes. We are 
talking about the young from Zagreb, Istria and Primorje, where the support for 
these attitudes increases with the urbanization of the place of provenience and 
domicile, age, level of education of the participants and their fathers. These are 
joined by the students, the non-religious participants and supporters of SDP and 
                                                     
10 These attitudes of the participants correspond completely with the reality. Specifically, 
the analysis of the age structure of the Croatian parliamentarians indicate that from the 
beginning of transition there was a maximum of 2.6% of members younger than 30 
(while there is approximately 21% of youth in the electorate), and in the first mandate of 
the Parliament not one member was younger than 30 (Ilišin, 2003: 47). Such under-
representation of youth in the parliament is one more indicator of the collapse of the 
engagement of youth after the fall of socialism (when the young were guaranteed 
political representation via the existing organization of youth, ensuring them 5-9% of 
parliamentary seats). 
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HNS as well as men. The “Diaspora” is more often perceived as insufficiently 
present in Croatian politics and as the group whose representation in the Croatian 
parliament should be legally stimulated, by the rural youth, especially in Dalmatia, 
the younger, less educated participants with a lower social background, and they 
are joined by the pupils and the unemployed, the religious participants and 
supporters of HDZ and HSS. These summarily mentioned attributes clearly 
indicate that the role of the “Diaspora” in Croatian political life is undoubtedly a 
political issue regarding which there is no consensus. However, since most young 
participants do not have a constructed attitude about this issue, a political 
campaign aimed at strengthening the political role of the “Diaspora” or at its 
exclusion from the parliament, would fall on fertile soil. There is, therefore, space 
for influencing the citizens if a serious public debate was conducted about the 
political status of the “Diaspora”. A certain indifference towards this issue might 
be linked with the earlier established weak rating of the support for Croats in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the political representatives of the Croatian 
“Diaspora” mostly come from the neighboring state. It is obvious that, with the 
passing of time and the ebbing of the demands for the homogenization of Croats 
wherever they are, the Croatian citizens are less and less interested in their 
counterparts who realize their civil and political rights and obligations in another 
country (for example, the often stated taxation). 
Regarding the issue of political “visibility” and the guaranteed political 
representation of national minorities the young are considerably less differentiated. 
There is only a partial similarity of those who estimate that the national minorities 
participate in Croatian politics sufficiently (the χ2 range from 61.13 to 21.07), and 
those who believe that they should not have a legally guaranteed entrance into 
the Parliament (the χ2 range from 45.31 to 20.34). This is more often the 
judgment of men, the averagely older youth, and HSP's sympathizers, unlike the 
supporters of HNS and SDP. Aside from these congruencies, the non-religious 
participants express the need for a legislative regulation of the representation of 
national minorities more often (χ2=22.57), while the employed more often 
believe that the national minorities are already present enough in Croatian 
politics. This is also a political issue, but it is obvious that it causes less 
polarization and that the existing solution is accepted more than in the case of 
the “Diaspora”. Anyway, the preceding analysis of political priorities 
demonstrated that the coexistence of Croats and minority nations in the country 
seems more important to the young than solving the possible problems of the 
Croats in the “Diaspora”. 
As expected, the young women more often estimate that the members of 
their sex are marginalized in Croatian politics (χ2=91.67), and that their 
participation in the parliament needs to be legally ensured (χ2=81.65). Along 
with that, the awareness about the insufficient presence of women at the political 
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scene increases linearly with education (χ2=32.68). As for the representation of 
youth, even though almost three quarters of the young participants agreed that it 
is insufficient, the legally ensured election of the young to the parliament is 
more supported by women (χ2=30.12) and participants from major cities and 
Zagreb (χ2=28.78). Based on the established trends we can state that the more 
favorable circumstances of socialization contribute to the awareness of the 
feeling of deprivation, which consequently increases the readiness to accept 
social intervention to improve the situation, without waiting for a spontaneous 
development that might alleviate or eliminate the political discrimination based 
on sex and, especially, age. 
We have seen that both the young and the adults think that youth is most 
politically marginalized, mostly on the level of political participation. Testifying 
to the accuracy of this perception are the data about the inclusion of youth in 
different organizations, that is, associations (Table 20).11 
 
Table 20: A comparative outline of participation in organizations and associations (%) 
Youth Adults 
Organization or association Europe 
2001 
Croatia 
1999 
Croatia 
2004 
Croatia 
2004 
Sports association or team 28 19.9 15.8 7.5 
Cultural or art association 13 13.4 6.5 6.3 
Political party – 6.8 5.3 8.7 
Youth association 9 7.5 4.7 0.0 
Labor union – 9.1 4.1 12.4 
Organization for environmental 
protection 5 
5.2 2.4 3.1 
Organization for protection of human 
rights 3 
3.2 0.6 0.9 
Peace organization – 2.9 0.6 0.9 
Organization for protection of 
women's rights – 
2.2 0.4 0.3 
Other association 5 4.8 2.3 5.1 
No association 50 – 66.7 67.0 
 
The indicators of participation of both youth and adults in different 
organizations and associations are surprising because two thirds of participants 
                                                     
11 The data about the participation of young Europeans can be found in the study Young 
Europeans in 2001 (p. 3). The comparison is lacking regarding the political 
participation, because the European research did not include the inclusion in the political 
parties and unions. 
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in both age groups are not included in any of the associations. It is possible to 
assume that among the participants who are formally not members of any of the 
observed organizations there are those who at least occasionally join some of 
their activities, but they are probably few. Within the obtained distribution, it is 
evident that the young manifest a greater social activism, while the adults are 
more prepared for political engagement (observed through the membership in 
political parties and unions). In a word, these tendencies may be seen as another 
indicator of the distance of youth from institutional politics. 
It is somewhat surprising that in the past five years the already poor 
participation of youth was further reduced in all the observed organizations and 
associations.12 This points to the assumption that the collapse of youth activism, 
diagnosed at the beginning of transition, is again increasing after a certain 
improvement. The question is why is this happening: it is possible that the young 
are disappointed with the activity of different associations and their role in it; it 
is possible that many associations and organizations, after the pioneering days, 
entered the established phase, when, as a rule, adults are taking over the 
dominant roles in them; and it is probable that the opportunity for active 
participation in certain activities are objectively reduced due to a reduction in the 
number of adequate organizations (suggested by the decreasing engagement in 
sports and culture and art). In any case, after the noted decrease in participation, 
the Croatian youth is even more distant from their European counterparts, even 
though they were quite similar to them five years earlier. This discrepancy in the 
expressed activism does not support the thesis which interprets the low level of 
social participation of youth by the influence of social stability – if Croatia is in 
a more stable period, it is certain that the young Europeans live in even more 
stable conditions. Indeed, social stability, in principle, works in favor of the 
engagement of youth in civil initiatives and activities for satisfying certain 
specific needs – of course, if the society as a whole and citizens as individuals 
are sensitive and wealthy enough to finance the building and maintaining of the 
necessary space, expert work and so on. 
The participation in the three most represented types of organizations – to 
be more exact, those in which at least 5% of young participate in – along with 
the answer indicating that the young are not included in any association or 
                                                     
12 It is especially indicative that the number of union members is decreasing – from a 
quarter of employed youth (Ilišin, 2002: 188) to one tenth. Such a minimal inclusion of 
youth in unions must imply the dissatisfaction with the activity of the existing unions, as 
well as the pressure of the owners and boards of companies, aimed at the de-stimulation 
of union engagement. The awareness about solidarity and the need for social action in 
order to protect the interests of the employed, is obviously at such a level that it is too 
weak a stimulus for youth to try to change the situation. 
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organization, were submitted to further analysis. The summarized data portrayed 
in Table 21, shows that the differences among certain groups of youth are not 
numerous or large, but are significant. 
 
Table 21: Membership in organizations regarding the attributes of youth (%) 
Attributes of youth 
Sports 
association 
or team 
Cultural or 
art 
association 
Political 
party 
No 
association 
Gender χ2=67.01   χ2=41.41 
Female 9.0   73.3 
Male 22.3   59.7 
Socio-professional status χ2=24.80   17.93 
Employed 13.5   64.1 
Unemployed 10.6   75.1 
Pupils 21.5   63.6 
Students 18.5   64.6 
Father’s education  χ2=24.33 χ2=31.52  χ2=35.99 
Primary school or less 9.0 3.4  74.5 
Vocational school 15.7 3.8  68.9 
High school 15.8 7.3  66.5 
University or more 21.7 11.6  55.3 
Education    χ2=27.44  
Primary school or less   3.0  
Vocational school   9.1  
High school   4.0  
University or more   9.6  
Party affiliation   χ2=52.79 χ2=35.59 
HDZ   8.2 67.6 
HNS   5.0 64.7 
HSP   15.7 54.9 
HSS   4.3 66.3 
SDP   3.8 66.5 
Undecided   2.1 75.3 
TOTAL 15.8 6.5 5.3 66.7 
 
The established differences are expected and confirm the already familiar 
tendencies. It is not surprising that men, pupils and students and participants 
with academically educated fathers are more active in sports. It is evident that 
certain traditional differences in affinities still prevail, such as the fact that sports 
facilities and props are more accessible to those in the process of obtaining an 
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education and those whose families are better situated, and who consider 
sporting activities to be important. The same is true when it comes to engaging 
in cultural and art activities, which are also stimulated more by the families 
where the father has a university education. On the other hand, membership in 
political parties depends more on whether the young have already finished their 
education, indicated by the above average inclusion of those with a vocational or 
university diploma. A higher political participation is also stated by the 
supporters of HSP, and partially HDZ, which can be used for an indirect 
conclusion that these parties have the greatest share of young members. It is 
interesting that approximately 2% of the young, who would not support any of 
the parties in elections, answered that they are members of a party (?!). This 
could be interpreted as an indicator of a self-passivity of youth caused by the 
dissatisfaction with the activity of their parties, but the question is why are they 
still members. It is possible that we are dealing with a start of a future 
instrumental and clientelistic behavior, that is, joining a political party in order 
to more easily realize certain benefits in their career or some other area of life. 
The attributes of youth who least participate in the social life are also 
expected: women, the unemployed, those who are undecided when it comes to 
party affiliation, and their passivity decreases as the level of the fathers' 
education increases. The social activism of youth is obviously under a 
significant influence of family socialization, incorporating the stimulation of 
youth to join different activities and associations. 
The mentioned data points to a low social capital of the citizens of Croatia, 
especially youth. The poor participation is caused by a number of moments, and 
one of them might be the (lack of) readiness to join different activities aimed at 
solving certain social problems. To investigate the potential readiness for civil 
engagement, we used a four-degree scale (from complete readiness to complete 
unpreparedness), and Table 22 portrays the summarized answers “completely” 
and “mostly prepared”. 
The data indicate that the young and the adults are, in principle, 
significantly more prepared to join different activities for a greater cause, than 
they really are included in the work of existing organizations and associations. 
In their verbal expression of readiness for a concrete and often informal 
engagement, the young are predominant this time. It is especially expressed 
regarding the making of flyers (which is certainly closed to them than the 
adults), signing of petitions, organizing strikes (even though it was demonstrated 
that they avoid organizing in unions – perhaps, among other things, because they 
believe the unions are too weak and conciliate toward employers), 
communication with the media (in line with the already expressed higher trust in 
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the media), and even inclusion in the work of political parties.13 At the same 
time, the adults are somewhat more prepared to join the elections and participate 
in collecting financial resources for solving an existing problem. 
 
Table 22: The ranking scale of personal readiness for participation in civil 
activities aimed at solving social problems – youth and adults (%) 
Civil activities Youth Adults 
Voting in elections 84.6 90.0 
Signing petitions 68.0 63.2 
Collecting financial resources 44.9 48.1 
Joining the work of civil associations 42.5 41.3 
Organizing civil actions 34.5 36.5 
Making flyers 34.0 17.5 
Contacting international organizations and pointing to a social 
problem 32.3 31.6 
Contacting newspapers 29.5 23.6 
Participating in TV shows 26.0 19.8 
Contacting politicians personally 26.0 26.7 
Starting new civil initiatives or nongovernmental organizations 25.4 27.6 
Joining the work of political parties 21.4 18.7 
Organizing strikes 20.7 15.1 
Writing to politicians 20.7 20.8 
Giving financial donations to political parties 6.8 7.7 
 
                                                     
13 Since the obtained statements are contrary to the real condition, it is useful to mention 
that in the research conducted five years earlier, the weak political participation of their 
generation was explained by the young with various reasons (Ilišin, 2002: 194). On the 
one hand, they can be summarized into the concept of critical distance, because the 
young equally stated the dishonesty of politics, the disregard of the problems of youth by 
political protagonists and the mistrust the adults harbor regarding the political 
engagement of youth. On the other hand, a part of the young found the reasons in the 
incompetence and lack of interest of their peers, who are preoccupied by existential 
problems and lack the time for politics, joined by the attitudes that politics is boring, that 
the young do not feel experienced or capable enough to be active in politics and thus 
believe it is only natural that only adults deal with it. We should also note that the last 
two attitudes were the least accepted by the young, and considering the previously stated 
attitudes, we can conclude that the political potential of youth is significantly higher than 
would be indicated by the manifested level of participation. Aside from that, the reasons 
for political distance are obviously complex and cannot be resolved by occasional 
campaigns. 
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As is visible from the data, most of the young are ready to participate in 
only two activities, the ones expressing their political will and demands directly. 
Between one and two fifths of the young are prepared to join different activities 
of the formal or informal type, while only one out of fourteen participants 
expressed the desire to financially support the work of political parties. This 
result logically corresponds with the already established mistrust of the young in 
political parties. 
The 15 investigated civil actions were grouped into three factors (Table 23) 
with a total variance of 59.1%, while the variance analysis indicated that the 
young are quite homogenous in their preference for certain types of actions. 
 
Table 23: The factor structure of civil activities 
Civil activities Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Organizing civil actions .806   
Starting new civil initiatives or nongovernmental 
organizations .766   
Contacting international organizations and pointing 
to a social problem .703   
Collecting financial resources .699   
Organizing strikes .694   
Making flyers .663   
Participating in TV shows .570 .405  
Joining the work of civil associations .540 .351 .303 
Contacting newspapers .477 .420  
Contacting politicians personally  .781  
Writing to politicians  .779  
Joining the work of political parties  .724  
Giving financial donations to political parties  .622  
Voting in elections   .813 
Signing petitions   .673 
% of common variance 29.4 19.6 10.1 
 
The first factor can be labeled civil initiatives because it includes actions, 
which presume taking action through civil associations, the ad hoc self-
organization of citizens and activities through the mass media. This type of 
action is averagely distributed among the young. In this case, the influence of 
socio-demographic attributes is missing – the young are very homogenous in 
their expression of readiness to join one of the relatively numerous civil 
initiatives. 
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Political initiatives is the label of the second factor. It consists of the 
informal and formal political activities, but certainly with the ambition of 
influence over political protagonists who mediate the citizens' interests into the 
institutions of power. A greater readiness for such actions is expressed by the 
men (F-ratio=13.44), supporters of HDZ opposite HNS's voters (F-ratio=9.08), 
youth from Northern and Eastern Croatia unlike the inhabitants of Istria, 
Primorje and Zagreb (F-ratio=7.83). It is somewhat expected that men and 
HDZ's supporters are more politically engaged – at least verbally – while the 
regional differences are more difficult to interpret, aside from the fact that it is 
evident the young from the more developed regions feel the lowest level of need 
to communicate with politicians or to associate themselves with political parties. 
The third factor could be arbitrarily labeled formal political actions because 
it primarily consists of the readiness to vote in elections. This is a basic form of 
the political participation of the citizens, and the expression of political will is 
linked with the signing of petitions, as another act which clearly demonstrates 
the political views of the signees. Even though the readiness to participate in this 
type of political actions is most common among the young, they are also most 
differentiated in its acceptance. The variance analysis demonstrates that the 
readiness for formal political actions increases along with the level of education 
(F-ratio=24.02) and age of the participants (F-ratio=21.75). Aside from that, a 
greater readiness is expressed by the employed and students compared to the 
pupils (F-ratio=18.97), the supporters of HSP and SDP versus the undecided 
participants (F-ratio=13.79) and youth from Zagreb and Central Croatia opposite 
those from Easter Croatia (F-ratio=4.95). The attributes of those preferring 
formal political actions indicate that they are the socially more competent youth. 
It would seem that it has more trust in the formal democratic forms of political 
influence, while those who are less prepared to participate in elections believe it 
is more efficient to act in other, usually informal ways (which can be guessed 
from the trends established in the political initiatives factor).14 
The difference between the real social and political participation of youth 
and their readiness to join different civil actions warns of reasons that prevent 
the young from realizing their potential as citizens. The question about how they 
perceive the measures which might stimulate the active participation of youth in 
                                                     
14 It is useful to mention that approximately 85% of both the young and the adults 
estimate that their influence in the social and political life of the country is slim to none, 
while around two thirds of the participants believe the same for the local level. It is 
possible to assume that this perception of one's personal influence leads to a political 
passivity. On the other hand, it could be optimistically assumed that the awareness about 
the insignificant personal influence might motivate the young to be more politically 
active in order to change that fact. 
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the society should give us elements to estimate the possible inhibiting reasons. 
Table 24 shows the comparative data for 1999 and 2004, and the participants 
chose between answers “yes” and “no” for each of the measures offered. This 
data is accompanied by the findings about the attitudes of young Europeans, 
although they are not completely comparable.15 
 
Table 24: A comparative outline of the acceptance of measures for stimulating 
the active participation of youth in society (%) 
Youth Adults 
Stimulating measures Europe 
2001 
Croatia 
1999 
Croatia 
2004 
Croatia 
2004 
Addressing the young and considering their 
opinions when making decisions 45 – 87.9 88.4 
Establishing youth clubs 28 – 81.8 80.1 
Joining different youth interest associations – 81.7 81.3 83.5 
Introducing special youth information campaign 45 – 73.2 68.9 
Stimulating volunteer work 19 – 72.9 80.6 
Introducing compulsory education programs 
about civil rights and democracy 37 – 66.2 72.5 
Individual inclusion in nongovernmental 
organizations – 56.0 61.8 70.3 
Youth organizations of political parties (party 
youth) – 65.7 60.3 63.0 
Legal introduction of obligatory representation 
of youth (so-called quota) on all levels of power – 58.7 58.6 60.8 
Autonomous political parties of youth – 71.0 57.7 56.1 
Individual activity in existing political parties – 59.5 53.6 64.5 
Lowering the age limit for voting in elections 13 – 15.0 12.7 
No form of political organization of youth 
makes sense – 18.8 19.4 17.0 
 
It is interesting that most young and adult participants believe all the 
suggesting measures to be stimulating, with the exception of reducing the age limit 
for participating in elections.16 It follows that widely distributed measures and 
                                                     
15 The participants in the European research could only chose two measures, so the 
percentages are lower than in our research. Still, the data is comparable according to the 
ranking, so they are portrayed along with the Croatian results. 
16 This attitude of the participants indicates that the recommendation in the National 
Programme of Action for Youth (2003: 63) to give active suffrage to the young at the 
local level at the age of 16, is in a certain way wrong or, at least, premature. On the other 
hand, the National Programme does not recommend introducing the so-called youth 
quota, even though it is supported by the young. However, for those realizing the youth 
policy it is important that there be an agreement between the young and the National 
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actions are necessary to improve the social integration of youth. Although almost 
all the measures are considered be purposeful, the young prefer the focused 
informative campaigns more, and volunteer work, civil education and individual 
inclusion in political parties less. The adults, on the other hand, believe that the 
young do not have the knowledge about democracy and the readiness to contribute 
to a society with difficulties with volunteer work. 
When the attitudes of young Croats are compared with the data gathered in 
the research of young Europeans, the coinciding of the primary importance of 
including youth in the decision-making processes is obvious. Judging by the 
ratings, the youth in Croatia care more for youth clubs, and young Europeans 
prefer educational programs about civil rights and democracy (which are certainly 
set up much better than in Croatia). 
It is also interesting that during the five year period there has been an 
increase in the validation of the non-governmental sector among the young, with 
the simultaneous weakening of their faith in the potential effectiveness of 
autonomous political parties of youth. It is certainly indicative that they mostly 
express the need to take their opinions into consideration, that youth clubs 
should be formed and that the young should start joining the organizations of 
youth. It is logical that the young put so much emphasis on participation in 
decision-making, because they are mostly excluded from this process – but it is 
intriguing that they do not care for the possibility to participate in elections at an 
earlier age (which is a classic and indispensible form of direct democratic 
decision-making) and it is possible to assume that they think their vote will 
change nothing. The same is true with the youth associations – the young think 
they are mobilizing, but they are also included in their work at an insignificant 
level. The insufficient number of youth clubs is a well known problem, and now 
we have a confirmation that the young feel this insufficiency is very 
pronounced. 
How the proposed stimulating measures are structured was demonstrated 
by the factor analysis (Table 25; a total variance of 42.2%). The variance 
analysis, on the other hand, indicated that the young are very homogenous in 
choosing the adequate measures. 
 
                                                                                                                                   
Programme regarding the stimulation of an active participation of youth in the society, 
especially regarding the importance of education for democracy. This is a measure 
which is more easily implemented than, for example, the change of the predominant 
climate of distrust toward the young in the society. 
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Table 25: The factor structure of measures for stimulating the active 
participation of youth in society 
Stimulating measures 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Establishing youth clubs .652   
Stimulating volunteer work .631   
Addressing the young and considering their opinions 
when making decisions .604   
Introducing special youth information campaign .561   
Joining different youth interest associations .507  -.354 
Introducing compulsory education programs about civil 
rights and democracy .474   
Individual activity in existing political parties  .730  
Youth organizations of political parties (party youth)  .672  
Autonomous political parties of youth  .613  
Individual inclusion in nongovernmental organizations  .496  
Legal introduction of obligatory representation of youth 
(so-called quota) on all levels of power  .469  
Lowering the age limit for voting in elections   .730 
No form of political organization of youth makes sense   .613 
% of common variance 16.3 16.2 9.7 
 
It is possible to label the first factor incentives for social integration 
because most of the included measures are aimed at the stimulation of the social 
engagement of youth and their training for equal participation in social affairs. 
As the distribution of answers indicates, these are also the measures with the 
highest support among the young. Their content says that the young still do not 
feel competent enough for an optimal social activity, and that they would like 
society to grant them special treatment and importance, enabling them to act as a 
generation, instead of simply young individuals. A somewhat greater support for 
this factor is demonstrated by young women (F-ratio=31.73) and participants 
who were raised in small or major cities (F-ratio=6.27). 
The second factor was named incentives for political participation. It, with 
the exception of joining non-governmental organizations, consists of different 
forms of participation in political institutions: parties and institutions of power. 
These are also generally accepted measures, but somewhat less than in the case 
of the incentives for social integration. The variance results indicate that the 
young from Zagreb – versus those from Istria, Primorje, Central Croatia and 
Dalmatia – accept this factor the least (F-ratio=6.66). 
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Formal political measures is the arbitrary label of the third factor. It 
includes the support for the reduction of the minimal age for the right to vote, as 
well as the agreement with the attitude that no political organization of youth 
makes sense. This could be a minimalist and defeatist perception of the political 
engagement of youth, exhausted in the act of voting. These attitudes are least 
present among the young, and their support decreases with the increase in the 
level of knowledge (F-ratio=20.73) and age of the participant (F-ratio=18.83). 
They are also most accepted by the pupils, compared to the students (F-
ratio=16.47). Therefore, the young who have realized the right to vote, no longer 
believe that reducing the age limit might contribute to the active participation of 
youth in the society. The question remains: is it because they believe that those 
younger than 18 cannot reach rational decisions, or do they estimate, from their 
own experience, that the right to vote is not a sufficient incentive for a greater 
social and political engagement and influence? 
The final question interpreted in the context of the relationship of youth and 
politics has to do with the estimated importance of social protagonists in 
stimulating the young to actively participate in the society. the young were able 
to chose only one answer out of the nine offered. Table 26 portrays the results, 
along with data about the attitudes of young Europeans (Young Europeans in..., 
2001: 4).17 
 
Table 26: A comparative outline of social protagonists that can motivate youth 
to actively participate in society (%) 
Youth Adults 
Social protagonists 
Europe 2001 Croatia 2004 Croatia 2004 
Family and friends 20 33.1 38.4 
Education system 26 20.1 26.7 
Television 12 15.1 9.5 
Youth associations 20 14.6 9.8 
Popular public figures 8 6.7 6.9 
Political parties 4 6.1 5.8 
Internet forums 3 2.2 1.6 
Press / newspapers 1 1.2 0.6 
Radio 1 0.9 0.5 
 
                                                     
17 The participants were also able to choose the answer “I do not know” in the European 
research. There was only a 5% acceptance of this answer, which allows for the 
comparison with the results of our research. 
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The young and the adults demonstrate most disagreements regarding the 
four most relevant protagonists: the young respect the primary (family and 
friends) and the most important agent of socialization (the education system) 
less than the adults, and believe in the effect of television and youth associations 
more. These are expected, typically generational differences. 
At the same time, the young in Croatia believe more than their European 
counterparts in the contribution of friends and family, and less in the educational 
system and the associations of youth. The first could be interpreted by more 
preserved traditional family relationships in Croatia, which, again, might 
indicate a greater acceptance of the paternalistic relationship of the adults toward 
the young. As for the difference in the perception of the importance of 
educational institutions, we can assume that they must offer more content 
regarding civil education in Europe, which is why they are the most stimulating 
factor for young Europeans. The same is true of the potential contribution of the 
young associations, because we are able to presume that such organizations 
function in a more stimulating social milieu in the more developed European 
countries, aside from having a longer tradition and being more active. 
As we can see, in spite of the fact that the young use the media, and are quite 
trusting of them, they do not see them as protagonists who can stimulate the social 
engagement of youth. It seems that their judgment is correct, because there are no 
media for youth (whose basic function should be their social promotion and 
mobilization), and the existing media are primarily commercially oriented, giving 
media space to topics and protagonists who cause more attention from their 
audiences. This is why the young only become a topic when excesses are 
involved, and this blowing out of proportion disturbs the already suspicious 
public, but does not make it more sensitive to an objective perception of the 
youth's total social status and real life problems. 
The participants are very homogenous regarding the estimate of the 
potential contribution of different protagonists to the social mobilization of 
youth: only differences regarding the level of education and gender were 
established. The emphasis on the role of the educational system increases with 
the level of education, along with a parallel decrease of the importance of family 
and friends (χ2=41.95). Young women also put more hope in the influence of the 
education system and the youth associations, while men emphasize the possible 
positive contribution of television more (χ2=26.42). 
6. Concluding discussion 
The relatively extensive analysis of political values, attitudes and political 
participation of youth enables us to better explain the existing trends in the 
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relationship of youth towards politics. Especially helpful in this regard is the 
comparison with adults, as well as the longitudinal tracking of changes within 
the young population. Here, we will reflect on the important tendencies and try 
to understand their wider and far-reaching implications. 
When we look at all the obtained results, it is evident that there are 
differences between youth and adults, but only a smaller part of them is 
significantly pronounced. Thus, the results indicate that the young express a 
higher level of trust in the media. Furthermore, they are more tolerant towards a 
number of social phenomena and groups causing debates in the Croatian and the 
European public, they are more sensitive to ethnic inequalities, they also 
perceive the war as the main cause of existing difficulties more, they have 
considerably more faith in their own generation as the social strength which can 
initiate positive trends, they express a greater readiness for joining different civil 
activities, and trust that television and youth associations might mobilize them to 
actively participate in social affairs. At the same time, the young less than the 
adults accept the values of a democratic order, but are less inclined towards the 
harmonious conception of politics, they are less socially sensitive, express less 
trust in the institutions of power, they more rarely express socio-economic goals 
and preservation of tradition among the political priorities, they choose 
immorality and crime in privatization as the causes of today's problems less, 
they perceive less corruption in all areas of social life (aside from the school 
system), they have less faith in the positive contribution of experts and 
entrepreneurs in overcoming the crisis trends, they are less interested in politics 
and participate in political parties less, and their trust in the mobilizing role of 
democratic education, volunteer work, political parties and nongovernmental 
organizations, as well as in the contribution of the family and educational system 
in the stimulation of the social engagement of youth, is much lower. 
The enumerated differences between the youth and adults can primarily be 
interpreted from the discourse of the life cycle theory. This means that the 
witnessed differences are mostly the product of a different total social status of 
youth and adults, which presumes that most of the young have yet to take over 
their permanent social roles, and that their immediate experience is limited to 
some social areas. It follows that with their maturing and their full social 
integration, most differences from the adults will be erased. The common 
experience of a time in history, that is, life in a specific socio-historic period 
with a tendency to equalize differences, contributes to the convergence of youth 
and adults. The potential generational differences – which, as a rule, occur with 
the different reception of the same events and processes – are not very visible, 
and will be unambiguously detected only when today's generation of youth is in 
its mature age and when their attitudes are then compared with the attitudes of 
new young generations. Then, it will be more clear how much the existing 
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differences between the young and the adults are a consequence of the fact that 
most adults gained their experience in a different social order, which, to a 
degree, forms their existing system of political values, which in some elements, 
especially related to the social dimensions, are different from the system of 
political values of youth. The absence of deep inter-generational divides 
indicates that, in spite of the radical changes taking place in the dissolution of 
the old and the establishment of a new social and political order, the mechanism 
of transferring political values from the adult generations to the young functions 
considerably, along with the faults that exist in the constructed political 
awareness of adults. Here, we must notice that the adults are more resistant to 
the potentially unfavorable influences from the environment, which is especially 
evident in their better understanding of the democratic rules. This statement also 
suggests that Croatia is now in a more stable period of social development, 
which is expected when the early phase of transition is replaced by the 
democratic consolidation phase. 
Therefore, it was demonstrated that the young in Croatia accept traditional 
values somewhat less than the adults, but also that in some areas they are just as 
more conservative compared to their European peers. Pointing to this is the 
greater orientation of Croatia youth towards family and the lower level of 
tolerance for some phenomena and groups in the modern society. Also, the 
social participation of Croatian youth is at a lower level, which testifies less to 
their lack of interest, and more to the inability of the Croatian society to meet the 
needs of youth for realizing its social necessities. 
The third comparative level includes the tracking of changes occurring 
within the Croatian youth between 1999 and 2004. The recapitulation of the 
obtained results indicates that in the observed period of time there has been an 
increase in the already relatively high level of acceptance of all the constitutional 
principles, as well as in the harmonious perception of politics and institutional 
trust, while the lack of work, discipline and irresponsibility are now more 
perceived as a social problem than before. The recent data also indicate that the 
young today perceive the existence of educational, gender and age related 
differences more, as well as the worsening political representation of all 
marginal groups. On the other hand, the understanding of conflicts and 
democratic rules (especially the role of the opposition) is weaker, the emphasis 
of crime in transformation of ownership and privatization as problems is smaller, 
the young now perceive the existence of social and religious differences less, 
their social activism and political participation is reduced, and the perception of 
joining political party youths and establishing autonomous youth parties as 
forms of activities that might contribute to a more active participation of youth 
in society decreased. 
Political Values, Attitudes and Participation of Youth: Continuity and Change 
 141
The mentioned changes tend to lead to a further social, especially political, 
(self)passivity and marginalization of youth, and it is especially intriguing that it 
does not sufficiently understand political competition and its importance. If this 
was understandable in the first phase of transition, considering the war, 
stimulating homogenization, and the absence of a democratic tradition and the 
monopolization of power by one political party – the obtained results are no 
longer as understandable after spending more than 15 years in a multiparty 
democratic system. Therefore, we can presume that some elements of a 
functional political system and behavior of political protagonists is such that 
they convince the young that democracy, immanently inclined toward a conflict 
between political interests, is simply a less important form without obligating 
rules and procedures. This certainly points to faults in the process of political 
socialization of youth, which especially raises the issue of the need for an 
institutionalized education for democracy. In other words, if the adult 
generations, socialized in a different social order, still cannot optimally transfer 
their values in new generations, and if the functioning of political institutions is 
still marked by numerous “child illnesses”, than education, which can develop 
civil competence, is necessary. Anyway, in the countries that do not lack a 
democratic tradition, education for civil rights and democracy is a permanent 
process which takes place through appropriate school programs. 
The data also show that there has been a certain decrease in the social 
sensitivity of youth, which must be a consequence of socialization in a society 
aiming at market competitiveness and maximizing profit. The accompanying 
consequences are – especially with the lack of developed instruments of a social 
state, and after the poorly implemented restructuring of economy – the 
deepening of social inequalities and the decrease of the living standards of a 
large portion of the population. Thus, maturing in a society that suppresses 
social sensitivity, the young also become insufficiently sensitive to the issue of 
social justice in the (re)distribution of significantly limited resources. The young 
are raised in an environment in which their immediate and indirect experience 
tells that personal success is important, and the responsibility for achieving or 
not achieving it, is also personal. The emphasized orientation on competition 
and individualization of achievements weakens the social sensitivity and 
solidarity with the losers of social transformation. 
However, during the past several years the acceptance of the 
Constitutionally outlined basic political values has increased. This is a very 
important finding because such a high, and increased validation of liberal-
democratic principles, leads us to assume that the Croatian society is 
overcoming the anomy it was in since the transitional period began. Leaving 
aside many events from the social and political practice that are witnesses to the 
recurrent violation, disregard or reduction of the interpretation of constitutional 
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principles, we are left with an extremely high convergence of the political value 
systems of youth (as well as adults) and the officially proclaimed political 
values. This, of course, is no guarantee of a harmonized and appropriate 
behavior of those in power and of citizens, but it certainly represents the 
necessary level of consensus about the principles a pluralistic society and a 
democratic political order should be built on. 
The continuity of the tendencies established in the previous research is 
confirmed by the findings that youth is not a monolithic group, regarding the 
acceptance of political values, expression of political attitudes and level of 
political participation. The systemized data indicate, however, that the young 
tend to be homogenous in their acceptance of constitutional values and 
democratic attitudes, the common perception of social and socio-cultural 
inequalities, the extreme perception of their political status as marginal, and their 
average readiness to join different civil actions. At the same time, the greatest 
level of differentiation occurs regarding the not especially present tolerance 
toward most of the observed social phenomena and groups, the perception of 
unemployment as the most important social problem and the cause of existing 
difficulties, the average perception of the existence of political inequalities, and 
the expression of a weak interest in politics as well as the perception of the role 
of the “Diaspora” in Croatian political life. 
Looking at these results generally, it turns out that the young are mostly 
different regarding the level of achieved education and socio-professional status. 
The education level usually has the position of the attribute that affects the 
participants' attitudes the most in every social research, and it is interesting here 
because this is true even in the young population, many of which are still in the 
process of obtaining an education. Certainly, the basic division occurs between 
those with the lowest and highest qualifications, where a part of youth with high 
school education tends to get the same results as the academically educated 
youth. These are primarily students, and the fact is that education is very linked 
to the socio-professional position of youth, which has the same scope of 
influence on their differentiation. The results have manifested that students are 
usually on the one side, and pupils and the unemployed youth on the other in 
most situations. While with pupils we can assume that there will be a change 
with their maturing, the issue of the unemployed participants remains, because 
they seem to be a subgroup of youth that is placed more permanently on the 
social and political margins. 
A significant influence on the differentiation of youth is played by party 
affiliation, gender, age, regional status and the father's level of education. This 
group of attributes points to the influence of different types of socialization, 
along with a degree of (im)maturity of youth. In other words, being raised in 
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families with different social statuses and in regions with different levels of 
development and cultural traditions, results in the formation of different attitudes 
of youth. It is also obvious that in the area of relationships towards politics, the 
differentiated models of socialization of women and men are still at work, 
contributing to the survival of the commonly known gender differences. As is 
logical when the political sphere is involved, party affiliation is an important 
element of polarization because it consists both of different ideological 
orientations, and of differences in the social profile of party supporters. 
The least influential attributes are the residential status, provenience and 
religiousness. These trends indicate a certain weakening of the influence of 
rural-urban differences, which is to be expected in a modern society, where the 
media override the transportation, infrastructural, cultural and other differences. 
The poor influence of religiousness indirectly testifies to the weakening of the 
correlation between the adoption of religious beliefs and the manifestation of 
religious affiliation, resulting in the loss of certain differences between the 
religious and the non-religious youth. However, the share of religious believers 
is such that their attitudes predominantly determine the main direction of youth 
orientations, which then points to a strengthening of the influence of religious on 
a general level. It is therefore questionable if the weakest influence of religion 
on political attitudes of youth may be seen as an indicator of a weakening 
correlation between politics and religion, traditionally present in this area. 
All the mentioned differentiation of youth can be summarized by sketching 
out two large, relatively polarized groups. One group consists of youth with 
higher education and social origin (an above averagely educated father, urban 
environment, and developed regions), students, averagely older, mostly non-
religious and supporters of HNS and SDP – that is, the socially more competent 
youth, inclined to the left center ideological-political options. The other group 
consists of averagely younger participants, especially pupils and the unemployed 
with a lower education and social background (a father with lower 
qualifications, rural milieu, less developed regions), declared believers and 
sympathizers of HDZ, as well as HSP and HSS. In this case, we are profiling a 
socially more inferior youth inclined toward parties positioned at the right-wing 
pole of the ideological-political spectrum. The socially more competent youth is 
more liberal, critical toward social reality and political protagonists, and it 
manifests a greater consideration for democratic procedures and institutions, 
which is an indicator of the importance of more favorable circumstances in the 
process of political socialization. Since some of these circumstances are 
impossible to change by focused actions and campaigns, education is again the 
most appropriate channel of adopting knowledge and information that can 
contribute to the making of aware citizens, who are more difficult to manipulate 
and objectify for certain dubious particular political goals. 
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The changes in the polarization of youth indicate that the territorial-cultural 
and ideological-cultural cleavages deepened in the past several years, and there 
are indications that the socio-economic cleavage will grow stronger as well. The 
unequal access to existing social resources of today's youth will generate an 
unequal status in their mature age, that is, the advantages achieved at the start 
(youth), are a guarantee of achieving better social positions in the future. 
Therefore, we can expect a widening and deepening of the process of social 
differentiation, which, if it is not corrected through mechanisms aimed at 
ensuring equal access, at least in the process of enabling youth to take over the 
permanent social roles, in the approach to social resources (primarily education), 
can be disastrous for the optimal development of a relatively undeveloped nation 
with a small population. What we mean is that human capital is what such 
countries, including Croatia, need to treat with a lot of thought and responsibility 
and invest in maximally. Among other things, by stimulating as many citizens as 
possible, especially the young, to actively participate in the social processes and 
institutions. 
Finally, the results obtained in this research may be summarized into 
tendencies and statements of a wider nature. Firstly, the political culture of youth 
testifies in a number of aspects that we are approaching democratic standards – 
especially regarding the acceptance of basic liberal-democratic values and the 
principle readiness for social engagement – but also that its social power and 
social capital are low. Secondly, the young are aware of their social and political 
marginalization, and recognize an entire spectrum of measures which might 
contribute to them achieving a certain amount of power and become active 
citizens, which is desirable in a democratic society, but they insufficiently use 
the channels of social and political promotion at their disposal. And thirdly, the 
young are not that different from the adults to enable us to mention a 
generational gap, let alone a conflict. However, the young did turn out to be 
somewhat more liberal, flexible and tolerant, which is certainly an argument in 
favor of them gaining and/or winning adequate social space for expressing their 
attitudes and desires. Their similarity to the adults might appease those social 
structures which fear that youth activation might end up in the radicalization of 
political life, which is difficult to control. This same inter-generational 
resemblance could be disappointing to those social structures that have high 
hopes regarding the innovative potential of youth and its ability to carry out the 
necessary changes. Independent of the potential fears and desires of the adults, 
one should assume that there is enough latent potential in the young population, 
which, in a more favorable social environment, might be more pronounced. The 
establishment of such an environment might be helped by the knowledge that the 
Croatian society, on its way to the European Union, needs the activity of all 
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social resources, as well as the potential of youth, as the most vital segment of 
the society, which is most open to changes. 
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Dunja Potočnik 
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE TICKET TOWARDS A 
DEMOCRATIC EUROPE 
1. Introduction: Human rights development tendencies 
The basic reason for regulating human rights is stated in a sentence by 
Isaiah Berlin (1978: 85): “It takes minimal rules to ensure the conditions of 
existence of human society.” A more systematic regulation of human rights 
began at the end of World War One, by regulating procedures concerning the 
soldiers and population of enemy states or conflicting parties. However, the 
individual as such, was still not the subject of interest of international law. It 
took the horrific consequences of World War Two to attract a new view on 
individual rights, which had become the subject of international care and were of 
the opinion, that a state that does not respect the rights of its own citizens 
represents a threat to the population of other states, and thus world peace 
(Jurišić, 1999: 75). The process that may be associated with the development 
and spreading of the human rights belief is best described as being a shift from 
basic needs toward basic rights. “The development of an international standard 
of protection of human rights, from the Second World War to today, was in most 
part characterized by efforts to limit the expertise of the state over the indi-
vidual” (Jurišić, 1999: 77). 
The concept of human rights includes the protection of citizens from the 
overly broad rights of the state. However, the problem of human rights growth, 
consequently, by definition, is occurring today. It can be said that basic human 
rights have weakened by the growth of interest compared to the situation in 1948 
when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted. 'There are 
numerous discussions on the definition of those rights. Some rights, labeled 
‘negative rights’, are described by a ‘non-action zone’ and include those rights 
that the state should rarely involve itself in (such as the right to life and right to 
privacy). Other rights, known as ‘positive rights’, ensure the rights of indi-
viduals. For example, the right of children to an education. However, even 
though there is a differentiation between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ rights, there 
are situations where it is difficult to separate the two. Both ideas of freedom 
have their place and their shortcomings in the modern thoughts of human rights. 
Dunja Potočnik 
150 
According to the definition, each tolerant society must give freedom to the 
individual, that is, ‘negative freedom’. Politicians play a significant role in 
monitoring the actions of individuals so that they do not limit other individuals 
in their own freedom. Otherwise ‘negative freedom’ would quickly turn into 
anarchy (Berlin, 1978). 
Originally limited to basic rights, the rights of individuals, through the 
parameters of their participation in the political life of the community and 
creation of a civil society, expanded to political and numerous civil rights 
(economic, social, cultural). The proliferation of rights is for the most part, along 
with the individual, related to collective rights, and the objects of legal protec-
tion are no longer only human beings, but nature and animals as well. Accord-
ingly, this moment in time is known as the ‘human rights age’, and the ‘political 
culture of human rights’ as dominant characteristics of political culture of 
modern society (Baranović, Ilišin, 2004: 341) Analysts warn that such an expan-
sion in the area of human rights, leads to their fragmentation and dispersion, 
which in turn contributes to the cheapening of those rights and weakens their 
real effectiveness (Kalanj, 1996: 58). On the other hand, the expansion of human 
rights is seen by the conservatives as a threat, because it nourishes the egotism 
of the individual, questioning his/her responsibility for their community. A. H. 
Birch even mentions “cultures obsessed by human rights”, such as, American 
society (Miller, Timpson, Lessnoff, 1996: 5). Still, the increased recognition of 
human rights through their protection on an international level is not simultane-
ously followed by progress in their opinion. 
Globalization1 is often stated as one of the factors of the human rights 
explosion. If we start with the assumption that the basic characteristics of the 
world we live in, are a change from the “normal” way of life, globalization can 
be understood as a process of a change of interests, and the care humankind 
manifests towards its territory and its traditional constitution of the system of 
societies (Jurišić, 1999: 71). The globalization processes have led to the 
development of a global civil society and their new heroes. International non-
government organizations that are active in the promotion and protection of 
human rights and that seem to occupy an increasingly important role in this 
sphere. The international level of the UN organizations, national and local 
stages, are in turn affecting the expansion of traditional human rights protection, 
                                                     
1 Globalization, in this research, is assumed to mean processes whose intensity has been 
on the increase in the last two decades: the movement of short-term foreign investments, 
long-term direct foreign investments, commerce on the global level with the policy to 
decrease its barriers, the increasing share of trans-national corporations in world produc-
tion and trade, the global interdependence of production, the movement of people 
motivated by trade or search for employment and the development of new forms of 
communication. 
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their integration into domestic legislations and the development of international, 
regional and national actions for their protection (Dokmanović, 1997). 
The new stage of globalization, based on new financial markets and global 
service markets on the rise, has been made possible by a strong development of 
new forms of communication and the development of faster and cheaper 
transportation. The removal of barriers in economy, commerce and transpor-
tation also led to an increase in the number of international agreements and 
conventions in this field, and, hence, to a development of international law 
focused on countermeasures of global linking of socially undesirable and 
adverse activities, such as international crime, international terrorism, trafficking 
of women and children, arms and the drug trade, all of which lead to the 
increased significance of internationally agreed action to protect human rights. 
“In the political sense, globalization alleviates the expansion of authority, 
politics and interest across existing, socially created, protective borders” (Jurišić, 
1999: 71). By introducing international law, states transfer their expertise to 
international institutions and lose a part of their sovereignty, even though liberal 
democratic states are still independent protagonists in the global community of 
states (Skocpol, 1988). 
However, the anticipation of the process of globalization as a trigger of 
significant positive, social, political and economic changes, has burst like a 
bubble. “The centers of power”, that had expected to contribute to the positive 
effect of globalization have in the meantime failed in their respect for human 
rights, both on their own territory and on the territories of other countries 
(Havidan, 2004). Specifically, in the “beginning of the 1970s, the key problem 
became the issue of integrating the implementation of human rights into the 
entire notion of national security” (Jurišić, 1999: 79). For example, when 
speaking about American foreign policy, we may accept the opinion that the 
human rights issue has often been subjugated to a higher goal of American 
national security: once it was the fight against communism, today it is the war 
on terror. Another example that removes the legitimacy of the positive effect of 
globalization, can be found in Latin America, that has lately been experiencing 
another period of economic recession and the pauperization of the population, 
along with an increase in the violation of human rights. 
The main pillars of globalization are linked to the communication process. 
The role of a modern communications system should, among other things, be 
focused on the spreading of information about human rights, and a systematic 
documenting of all the cases and their violation, aimed at preventing and 
sanctioning them. Due to the spread of poverty, most of the world's population 
still does not have access to the information necessary for preservation of their 
rights, which could be labeled as a kind of ‘digital divide’. The current economic 
globalization is based on neo-liberalism and widens the gap between the rich and 
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the poor. The promotion of market freedom and the free movement of capital, 
investments and goods, have created a ‘market fundamentalism’ that melts the 
sovereignty of national states and creates a suitable ground for conflict of all 
types. Economic prosperity has an instrumental role in the preservation of 
human rights, but it is a well known fact that its violation occurs in most cases, 
due to shortage in resources and the fight for dominance over those resources. 
The renowned 1945 study by Karl Popper, Open Society and It's Enemies 
(published for the first time in Croatia in 1998), advocates the widest possible 
freedoms, as well as warns, that social institutions should be created for the 
protection of the economically weak. However, institutions themselves are rarely 
adequate, if they are not rooted in tradition. Respecting traditions is necessary to 
create a link that connects institutions with the intentions and value systems of 
individuals. Among the most important traditions are those that create a ‘moral 
framework’ in society and embody its innate sense for justice and decency. The 
level of morality it has reached, must be included (Popper, 2003). Croatia is, in a 
sociopolitical as well as economic sense, on the cusp of negotiations for accession 
into the European Union. Human rights are the basis of EU's axiology; their 
definition of social values2 is in the Preamble of the EU Constitution. It states that 
member states be aware of their responsibilities for the preservation of the princi-
ples of democracy and respect for human rights, in order to contribute to the 
preservation of world peace by joint efforts (A Constitution for Europe, 2004). 
If we leave aside the fact that the protection of human rights is not at the 
stated level, even within the EU, Croatia needs to adjust its domestic legislation, 
as well as increase the awareness of its citizens regarding human rights. The 
                                                     
2 Kluckhohn gave a definition of values that, because it is so concise, is often accepted in 
sociological research: “Values are the explicit or implicit conception inherent in an 
individual and characteristic for a group of something desirable that affects the selection 
of appropriate manners, means and goals of action” (Kluckhohn: 1962: 388-433). It is 
important, as Kluckhohn remarks, to perceive the three elements of values – affective 
(values as the desirable), cognitive (values as conceptions) and connative (values as 
criteria for selection). Aside from the emotional, cognitive and voluntary aspects, 
culture, group and relationships of the individual toward culture and his/her place in the 
group, are also important for the definition of value. D. Pantić (1977: 277) offers a 
definition of values that represents a modification and expansion of the one given by 
Kluckhohn: “Values are relatively stable, general and hierarchically structured charac-
teristics of an individual (disposition) and of groups (elements of social awareness), 
formed by the mutual effects of historic, current-social and individual factors, that due to 
desirability proscribed in such a way, focus the behavior of its bearers toward specific 
goals”. “The expansion regarding Kluckhohn consists of treatment of values as relatively 
stable characteristics of individuals or groups, meaning they are more permanent and 
more difficult to change than, for example, attitudes, but they are also not fixed for good, 
but may change depending on certain influences” (Čulig, Fanuko, Jerbić, 1982: 24). 
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belief and value systems of our youth are an important indicator of the trends in 
society. In the future, they will represent its backbone. The relationship of Croa-
tian youth toward human rights is our prime interest, because of the accession 
negotiations with the EU, among other reasons, where positive validation of 
human rights is perceived as a ‘ticket’ into the Union. 
Methodological explanations 
The following results analysis is an attempt to clear up some aspects of the 
relationship of youth in Croatia towards human rights. The subject of this 
research, are their attitudes towards respecting particular human rights and the 
contribution of certain institutions, associations and significant individuals 
towards realizing human rights in Croatia. We understand that the perception of 
human rights, freedom and the respect for human rights in Croatia is part of 
political culture3. The youth are, as a social group, in the process of concept and 
attitude formation in all aspects of society, interesting for the analysis of the 
relationship toward human rights and freedoms. 4 They are, therefore, at the 
center of this research. On a descriptive level their results are compared with the 
results of the research of adults and, where data is available, with the research of 
youth in Croatia from 1999 (Ilišin, Radin, 2002) 
Human rights may be defined as basic rights and freedom, in which the 
government has a right to intervene (in some cases), such as their infraction by 
physical or legal subjects. The aims of such analysis of the relationship of youth 
toward human rights are conceived in such a way: 
1. to determine how the young justify particular human rights and freedoms 
and how they assess the respect for human rights in Croatia and the 
contribution of different social protagonists to the respect of those rights, 
2. to establish the changes taking place in the population of youth from 1999 
to 2004, their perception of respect for human rights and the contribution of 
the observed protagonists, 
3. to determine the similarities and differences between the young and the 
adult population in all the researched dimensions of the relationship toward 
human rights, 
4. to establish the attributes and manner of differentiation among the young in 
their relationship toward the researched dimensions of human rights and 
freedoms. 
                                                     
3 Political culture is defined as the relationship toward politics and the role of the indi-
vidual in the political system (Šiber, 1998: 144). 
4 The term human rights and the term human rights and freedoms are used as synonyms 
because we believe that human freedoms also represent a form of rights. 
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The analysis starts with the hypothesis that states, there are differences 
among the youth regarding their attitudes about the desirable level of protection 
of human rights, as well as the perceived level of respect for human rights, the 
contribution of certain institutions and significant individuals to their 
understanding. In other words, we assume that the variation in attitudes about 
the respect for human rights among individuals, can be explained through the 
differences in their attributes. The attributes of youth in this case include gender, 
age, socio-professional status, father’s education, education of the participant, 
regional status, permanent residence, religiousness and political party preferences. 
The instrument contains several sets of variables that may be categorized 
into four basic groups: 
1. variables for determining the attributes of youth, 
2. variables for determining the level of desirability in the protection of 
particular human rights, 
3. variables for determining the perceived level of respect for human rights, 
4. variables for determining the perceived contribution of certain institutions 
and significant individuals to the realization of human rights in Croatia. 
 
With the help of bivariate analysis, that is, through the calculation of the 
significance of differences by using the χ-test, an analysis was conducted to 
determine the correlation of the perceived level of respect for human rights and 
all the other previously mentioned attributes of youth. Only the significant 
differences on a level of .0001 or less were interpreted. In line with the aims of 
the research, the comparative analysis is conducted on two levels: on the results 
of the research conducted of the population of young and adult participants in 
2003, and of the results of the population of youth in researches conducted in 
1999 and 2004. Factor analysis has also been conducted, and first level factors 
are stated and interpreted as a result. The yielded factors were submitted to 
variance analysis, in correlation to the general life, satisfaction and social attrib-
utes of youth. The differences significant on a level of .0001 and less were 
interpreted in this case too. 
2. Acceptance of specific human rights and freedoms 
Through the normative proclamation in international conventions and 
declarations, constitutions and state acts, as well as political parties' programs 
and numerous other documents, human rights became an institutional 
mechanism for the regulation of political, economic and cultural life in society, 
with a significant influence on the public and private life of the individual 
(Baranović, Ilišin, 2004: 342). In turn, if the individual does not wish to be left 
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on the margins of society and categorized as a mere object, he/she must build a 
relationship of participation, toward different sectors of state power, as well as 
toward other citizens – entities. A democratic society demands a specific degree 
of political participation of all citizens. The youth are at the same time, those 
participating in the present, and the potential for the future, when they in turn 
will be the ones making the decisions. 
The Croatian Constitution guarantees a wide band of civil freedom, 
economic, cultural and social rights, and is the basis for gaining their respect. 
However, an equally important element for the best possible implementation for 
the respect of human rights is the awareness of citizens about their rights and 
obligations when it comes to their personal freedom, as well as the freedom of 
others. Youth, as a ling just being formed in a specific social system, are one of 
the most important elements of a positive reception and application of basic 
postulates suggestions of human rights. However, in forming that awareness to 
citizens about the achieved and optimal level of protection of human rights, the 
periodical reports of international organizations are quite significant. For 
example, the Freedom House follows the progress or the regression of the election 
process, the civil society, media independence, governance and supremacy of the 
legal system and its independence, each year. The state of the categories is graded 
from 1 to 7, where 1 represents the highest level of democratic development, and 7 
the lowest. In the most recent annual report of the Freedom House (Freedom in 
the World 2004 Country Ratings – Croatia) on countries in transition, Croatia 
received a total grade of 3.75 for the development of democracy in 2004, which 
indicates a certain improvement in comparison to the previous year, when it had 
achieved a 3.83 average. Progress was achieved in the election process through the 
passing of a new law during the presidential campaign, focusing on the increase of 
transparency in financing the campaign. In comparison to other Balkan countries, 
which Croatia is included in, it holds third place along with Serbia when it comes 
to the development of democracy, following Bulgaria and Romania which are in 
first and second place respectively. 
Prior to the analysis of the acceptance of the chosen human rights and 
freedoms (a total of 16 among the young and elderly in Croatia), the relationship 
of participants toward human rights and freedoms as values, needs to once again 
be mentioned. Namely, in the chapter about political values, it has already been 
stated that the constitutional value ‘respect for human rights’ is considered to be 
of utmost importance by approximately 92% of the youth and 94% of the older 
participants (placing this value in second position, right after ‘freedom’). At the 
same time, about 76% of the young participants and 80% of the older ones, 
believe that the Croatian Government should put most effort into ‘realizing 
human rights and freedoms’ (putting this political priority into fifth place on the 
ranking scale out of 19 political goals). The cited data undoubtedly indicate that 
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human rights and freedoms represent one of the highest values for Croatian 
citizens. Such a stance surely determines the relationship toward specific human 
rights and freedoms, as it influences the estimates on their state in Croatia. 
The acceptance of individual human rights and freedoms (Table 1) has 
been investigated through the answers ‘should always be protected’, ‘depends on 
the situation’ and ‘I do not know’. We have decided to interpret only the 
answers in favor of unquestionable protection of the observed rights and 
freedoms. 
 
Table 1: A comparative outline of the acceptance of certain human rights and 
freedoms (%) 
Croatia 2004 
Human rights and freedoms 
Youth Adults 
Croatian students 
1998/995 
Right to education 95.4 97.1 96.8 
Right to work 94.6 97.4 95.1 
Personal safety 91.6 95.6 94.8 
Right to privacy 89.6 93.7 91.4 
Social protection of the elderly and those at risk 89.6 95.1 94.9 
Equality before the law 89.3 92.2 93.9 
Rights of women 89.3 91.6 90.8 
Right of ownership 85.9 91.5 86.2 
Freedom of speech 80.4 81.4 84.3 
Freedom of information 79.7 85.7 88.3 
Freedom of opinion 76.1 82.2 80.4 
Freedom of media 68.4 77.9 81.6 
Cultural autonomy 66.7 71.2 - 
Freedom of association 60.6 62.2 60.6 
National minorities' rights 60.5 66.7 67.5 
Right to asylum 44.1 52.2 - 
 
It is interesting that in the acceptance of all the rights and freedoms, the 
students6 surveyed five years ago, are considerably closer to the adult partici-
pants today than the younger population. Based on the comparisons of data, it is 
                                                     
5 The research was implemented on a sample of 870 students from the Universities of 
Zagreb and Split. The data has been taken from V. Vujčić (2001: 384). 
6 We are conservative in using the comparison of participants from our sample and those 
from the research implemented in 1998/99, due to the different nature of the samples. 
However, a comparison is useful as an illustration of certain durability in evaluating 
human rights and freedoms. 
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easy to conclude that the unconditional protection of all the investigated rights, 
is most advocated by the adult participants, followed by students surveyed at the 
end of the last decade, and than the young population in our sample. The only 
exceptions are freedom of information, freedom of media and national minori-
ties’ rights, whose protection is advocated by students to a greater degree than 
the adult participants, which we will comment on later. 
The young most of all accept the right to an education, the right to work, 
personal safety, the right to privacy, social protection of the elderly and those in 
need, equality before the law, the rights of women and the right of ownership, 
with answers averaging from 91.6 to 85.9%. Such a high acceptance of the right 
to an education is understandable, because it is the most important channel of 
social promotion, something the participants are obviously highly aware of. 
Aside from that, “in the wider sense, education is simply an aspect of socializa-
tion: it includes the gaining of knowledge and learning of skills. Intentionally or 
unintentionally, education often affects the creation of convictions and moral 
values” (Haralambos, Holborn, 2002: 774). 
The right to work, as a continuation and a part of the right to an education, 
is warranted by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 23: “Everyone 
has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable 
conditions at work and to receive protection from unemployment. Everyone, 
without discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. Everyone who 
works has the right to just and favorable payment, ensuring for himself and his 
family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, 
by other means of social protection. Everyone has the right to form and to join 
trade unions for the protection of their interests.” This right is also guaranteed by 
the Constitution and legal acts of the Republic of Croatia, even though it is 
denied to a large portion of the population, not as much due to reasons that are 
within the limits of power of an individual person (not being ready to work), and 
more due to objective reasons coming from an unfavorable situation within the 
labor market. The process of transition defined as a transition from a planned, to 
a market economy in a global environment, assumes, among other things, the 
transition from a system that guarantees those employed a much higher security 
of employment into a system where the threat of losing a job is an integral part 
of the economic cycle. In Croatia, this has had an impact on the entire working 
population, most of all the young. To be more specific, the highest share of 
unemployment in Croatia (33.8%) includes citizens aged 15 to 24, while the 24 
to 29 age group has a 12.7% unemployment rate (Analitički bilten, 2004). 
The high ranking of personal safety is not surprising, because its 
endangerment brings into question the very existence of a human being. The 
somewhat lower ranking right to privacy is one of the basic human rights, but it 
may not be absolute, especially when public personas are in question. The right 
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to privacy may be defined as an aspect of safety that defines the protection from, 
and the sanctioning of infiltrating the personal rights of individuals by the 
government, different corporations or other individuals. The new legislation on 
privacy requires the protection of data through technical solutions that allow 
individuals to use their right to privacy by insuring quality, confidentiality and 
information safety. 
The social protection of the elderly and those at risk7 is a concept whose 
unconditional respect nine tenths of our participants advocate, and it is interesting 
to find that this right is supported by 6% more adults than young participants. As 
well as that, this is a right whose protection is supported by 5% more students than 
the young in general. This finding probably finds its roots at the higher level of 
awareness about the need for inter-generational solidarity in students and adults, 
who know that the harsh days of retirement are waiting for them or who have 
already retired. The social protection of the elderly and those at risk, built into the 
foundations of our legislation, have lately found more public support and assertion 
When this is the case, it usually has to do with an appeal to the citizens 
conscience, who themselves might at a moment in their lives, find themselves in 
the position of these marginalized groups. The social protection of the elderly, 
those at risk and their social inclusion, is a litmus test of the sensibility of society, 
and an indicator of the progress of civilization. It is expressed through a distancing 
from pure survival and by an increase in the quality of life. 
The argument of equality before the law draws its heritage from history, 
when its original intention was to avoid the arbitrary behavior of rulers in 
treating their subjects. The internalization of the rights to equality is one of the 
bases of socialization of an individual, in line with the principles of democracy. 
When equality before the law is mentioned, it often precedes the principle of 
gender equality. Judging by nine tenths of our participants, the rights of women 
should always be protected. This indicates that the Croatian public is sensitized 
to a satisfactory degree, of the problems towards gender inequality, following 
the trend in developed democratic societies. To be more specific, since the era of 
the suffragettes, there has been a significant shift in the protection and 
promotion of women's rights at international levels. As the most significant shift, 
the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, (CEDAW, 1979) – translated several years ago in Croatia (Šimunović, 
2004). “The First Report of the Republic of Croatia to the Commission on 
Gender Equality, as well as its concluding recommendations, all indicates where 
we were in 1994 when the report was issued, and in 1998 when it was consid-
ered by the Commission. From then to now the progress has been clear. Starting 
                                                     
7 This group of citizens includes both the elderly and disabled persons. 
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with the inclusion of the constitutional principle of gender equality as one of the 
highest values of the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia, the Gender 
Equality Act, the founding of the Office of the Croatian Gender Equality 
Ombudsperson and the Office for Gender Equality, to the Women's Network, a 
legislative and institutional governmental and non-governmental framework for 
the implementation of the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, has been set up” (Šimunović, 2004: 10). 
The right to ownership is another right where the differences between the 
two age groups exceed 5%. The specified difference may be interpreted through 
the lack of knowledge on certain basic economic laws by the young, as well as 
through the situation in which a large number of those younger than 30 in 
Croatia, do not own private property such as, real-estate and thus give that right 
a lesser meaning than their adult counterparts do. In most transitional 
economies, privatization is still the central aspect of reform, which significantly 
influences the social stratification as an opportunity to gain what was once 
exclusively socially/state owned (Arriovich, Carruthers, 2004). The socioeco-
nomic modernization of transitional societies, often carries with it harsh 
consequences for the society and mostly its members, due to its slower dynamic, 
compared to the ‘modernization’ of conscience and the way of life of some of its 
members (those involved in privatization crime). The essential task of an 
economy and policies in transition, is to renew the broken civilization trends (if 
there were any), which should have a positive influence on both the economic 
efficiency and the quality of human life. The tendencies of current economic 
(anti)development, were noticeable in the very beginning of its transition, 
because the government had opted for a mixture of statism and a free market 
economy. ‘Conversion’ or privatization did not achieve the “...three basic social 
goals: a) justice; b) the inflow of fresh capital from the Diaspora and from other 
countries, and c) the technological, ecological, economic and social develop-
ment” (Letica, 1998: 25). Also, Amnesty International Report 2005, states that 
even though the Croatian authorities had claimed that it was going to restitute 
ownership to Serbian refugees, (they avoided doing so during the Homeland war 
until the end of 2004), the pace of return is still slow. Such a breech of the right 
to ownership directed at one part of the Croatian population is one of the greatest 
hurdles Croatia had to pass in the eyes of the international community. 
The next level of rights when it comes to acceptance (from 80.4 to 66.7%) 
is occupied by freedom of speech, freedom of information, freedom of opinion, 
media freedom and cultural autonomy, all of which are advocated by the adult 
participants much more than the youth. When it comes to freedom of informa-
tion and media, students seem to differ quite a lot in accepting their uncondi-
tional protection compared to other observed groups. This has to do with 
specific conditions of the socialization of students, who, due to the sheer number 
Dunja Potočnik 
160 
of social networks they are included in and their urban lifestyle and higher 
exposal to information, are a group, very inclined to freedom of media and 
information. Freedom of speech is often considered an integral element of 
modern democracies, and its key position is strengthened also by protection 
offered by international organizations, in a manner which was, for example, 
expressed in article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The 
implementation of the principles of freedom of speech varies from one country 
to another, it is not without limitations, states can punish (but not ban) certain 
harmful forms of expression. Also, people may hesitate to freely express their 
own opinions, not due to restrictions imposed by authorities, but due to pressures 
from the public. In other words, individuals can, by expressing their opinion, 
become the subjects of attack by their immediate community. To put it simply, 
freedom of speech is one of the fundamental human rights everyone can enjoy 
under the condition that there is a democracy and that human dignity is 
respected. However, it is at the same time, one of the ‘most dangerous’ rights 
(when it comes to the survival of non-democratic regimes), because it quite 
often signifies the wish for changing the existing situation. 
For developed countries, freedom of information means the possibility of 
having access to contents based on free expression in written or some other 
form. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights states that everyone has a 
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the right to free 
expression of opinion without the intervention of other persons/organizations, as 
well as to search, receive and distribute information and ideas through different 
media, regardless of borders. This principle is usually followed by a legislation 
that ensures different levels of freedom of scientific research, publicizing and 
publishing, as well as limitless access to information. Today, the media are a 
democratic arena offering new forms and possibilities of political communica-
tion, so each politically aware citizen, wishing to be acknowledged as a person 
by other individuals and organizations, can use it in everyday life. Freedom of 
information and freedom of media are fully intertwined, and most modern 
outlines of new media forms, assume the possibility that their users may partici-
pate in democratic activity. Thus, the data that 11% of youth, and 8% of adult 
participants are less inclined to freedom of media than to freedom of informa-
tion, is surprising. This discrepancy may be interpreted by the fact that the 
media, as information gateways, often seem to abuse their position in servicing 
information that does not sit well with its citizens, as well as the insufficient 
awareness of citizens about the importance of media in a liberal and democratic 
system. Aside from domestic governmental organizations and state institutions, 
some international organizations have also developed criteria for grading the 
freedom of speech and media. For example, Reporters without Borders state the 
number of journalists that were killed, banished or abused, and the existence of a 
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state monopoly over the media, the existence of self-censorship and the general 
dependence of media, as difficulties today's reporters have to deal with almost 
every day (The 2003 Global Press Freedom World Tour, 2004). Similar studies 
by Freedom House (Freedom in the World 2004 Country Ratings, 2004) 
contribute by giving general indicators of political and economic situations in 
every country, by determining the level of media independence and existence of 
freedom of expression in mind. Thus, the Worldwide Press Freedom index has 
been developed. Each year Reporters without Borders give their estimate of 
media freedom in countries all over the world. The list is based on answers 
given by reporters, scientists, lawyers and human rights' fighters. As countries 
with the highest level of media independence in 2004, the report states Finland, 
Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Ireland, Slovakia and Switzerland. 
On the other hand, countries with the lowest ranking freedom of media are 
Northern Korea, then Cuba, Burma (Myanmar), Turkmenistan, Eritrea, China, 
Vietnam, Nepal, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Croatia does not occupy a very high 
ranking on that list – 54th place. Such a result, when compared to our findings 
about the acceptance of freedom of speech, media and information, does not 
provide any reason for optimism. 
On our scale, freedom of opinion is placed between freedom of information 
and freedom of the media, with a 6% difference between the youth and the 
adults in Croatia. There are two key segments of freedom of opinion as an 
element of civil freedoms: the conscience’s objection to serving in the military 
and the freedom of religious beliefs and performing religious ceremonies. The 
objection of conscience campaign has resulted in the legislative regulation of the 
right to serve in the military as a civilian. The second stated segment of the 
freedom of opinion – religious freedom – may be summed up as follows: no 
religious community may be more privileged than the other, for it would be 
contrary to the constitutional principle of equality, and each one should be 
ensured unlimited and autonomous activity. Hence, the right and freedom of 
ones beliefs (and non-beliefs) are among basic human rights and freedoms, 
springing from the very nature and dignity of each human being as an individual. 
Cultural autonomy also enters into the normative definition of a free 
society. Modern developed countries are multicultural. Each larger French town 
has an Arabian community, each German town a Turkish one, and each town in 
England has Indian or Pakistani communities in it. Today the value of cultural 
activity for the purpose of raising social and economic vitality and sustainable 
development of smaller societies and communities is recognized in the key 
documents of UNESCO and the Council of Europe. Legal studies generally 
define autonomy as the right to local self-government, comprising two types: 
regional autonomy or right to limited sovereignty over a specific territory 
marked with clear borderlines, and cultural autonomy, as a non-territorial type of 
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self-government linked to the reproduction of a group culture. One must have in 
mind, though, that today's relationship between national culture and the globally 
proclaimed multiculturalism, does not spring only from the cultural hegemony 
of the developed, but also from the internal habits created through the tradition 
of cultural statism and conformity. Culture, which was in the function of the 
politics of emancipation and set-up of national states, soon becomes dysfunc-
tional (Cvjetičanin, Katunarić, 1998: 22), by copying the hegemonious treatment 
of minorities from their ‘large’ neighbors. Our young participants seem to 
advocate the right to cultural autonomy a little less. Unfortunately, we do not 
have data on the acceptance of cultural autonomy by students from 1998/1999, 
but we may assume that their results would have been somewhat higher than 
those obtained by the youth in our sample. 
Freedom of association and national minorities' rights are ranked at the 
bottom of our scale, even though they are accepted by most participants. 
Freedom of association relates to both the economic sphere, where it is covered 
by economic rights, and to the freedom of association at civil society level. Civil 
society does not exist as an integral entity within the global society, but as a 
mosaic of forms and elements that may only post-hoc, for purposes of analysis, 
be recognized as a whole. The basic characteristics of civil association are the 
lack of belonging to the sphere of economic life, that is, a non-profit orientation, 
and an autonomous position regarding the state. Freedom of association defined 
in such a way, offers a base for a positive relationship of the state, the economic 
and the civil spheres of society, without which, neither state nor society may be 
considered free. 
Today's political context of the relationship toward minorities may be 
interpreted through the manner in which Croatia left Yugoslavia, followed by a 
rhetoric which was from the very beginning extremely nationalist. The political 
party that before and during the Homeland war expressed most convincingly this 
nationalist rhetoric was the Croatian Democratic Union. The ideology that came 
onto the scene in 1990 (‘thousand-year dreams of a nation’), had very success-
fully replaced the previous one (‘the historic interests of the working class’). At 
the core of the need for such a change laid, among other things, the search for 
national identity. Croatian citizens had then, strongly identified with national 
symbolism, strongly supported by the ‘revolution of symbols’ (Pusić, 1992) that 
was in place at the time. “Modern states are, as a rule, states as representatives of 
a community of citizens (civil states) and at the same time a reflection of 
national identity (national states). The concept of national states often only has 
declaratory value. In democratic countries it gives no special rights to the nation 
whose national identity is expressed in the state” (Caratan, 1998: 22). The 
primary role of patriotism is the integration of citizens into the state. The 
irrational form of patriotism – nationalism – prevents the fulfillment of this role 
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at the very beginning, because it institutes a division among the citizens. The 
state should provide protection to minorities as a collective, because members of 
the minority suffer discrimination precisely because they are members of a 
minority community, so it would be hypocritical to claim that they have the 
same rights as all the other citizens, unless there is a statement in the constitution 
that encompasses the particular minority rights (Caratan, 1998). However, the 
dominance of a nationalist ideology was not an exclusively Croatian charac-
teristic, because the events of the previous decade have shown that this ideology 
is present in most other post-socialist countries whose constitution of a pluralist 
democracy is slow in pace (Pogany, 1995). “In Croatia’s case, a great role in the 
protection of ethnicity and ethnical homogenization belonged to the war 
conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia that Croatia was involved in, 
while waiting for five years to realize its sovereignty of the whole territory. 
Thus, it is, in principle, presumed that the political awareness of the youth was 
formed under the influence of its value framework and the liberal-democratic 
and nationalistic ideology” (Baranović, Ilišin, 2004: 343). This situation has 
reflected on the attitudes of citizens, who advocate the rights of national minori-
ties in two thirds of cases, most of all the students, then the adults, with an 
insignificantly lower result, and finally the young participants with a 7% smaller 
acceptance compared to the student population. Such a trend imposes a conclu-
sion about the necessity for affirmative action and programs for the protection of 
human and minority rights, especially through the education system as one of 
the most important agents of socialization. 
The right to asylum8, by its low level of acceptance, contrasts all the other 
rights: the youth accept it in 44.1% of cases and the adults in 52.2% of cases, 
and it would be interesting to have an insight into the attitudes of students, but 
that right was not included in the 1998/1999 research. These findings could be 
disappointing when it comes to the prognosis of the democratic development of 
Croatian society. At international level, in spite of the differences, the basis of 
refugee treatment is linked to the rule that each state must ensure the possibility 
of seeking asylum, and those seeking it, may not be coerced into returning to 
their country of origin. However, everyday politics offers ample evidence in 
order to state that the rights of those seeking asylum are constantly endangered, 
something that does not discriminate the developed democratic countries from 
the countries that asylum seekers come from. It is not rare to find the practice of 
                                                     
8 International law considers refugees to be persons outside of their state of residence; 
with well founded fear of persecution due to their race, religious belief, nationality, 
membership of certain social groups or political attitudes; and they cannot or will not put 
themselves under protection of the state they had fled from, or return to that state, for 
fear of persecution. Among those demanding refugee status, there are sometimes asylum 
seekers, whose main attribute as refugees is one related to political or religious reasons. 
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retaining asylum seekers in holding centers in some countries, where living 
conditions are not much different from those in prison. Sometimes they are also 
sentenced to prison sentences under criminal charges. Instead of creating a 
supportive environment in which individuals would not feel pressured or threat-
ened, an environment similar to the one those individuals have escaped from is 
often created. However, some alternative approaches have already been tested: 
for example, monitoring if the asylum seeker fits into community life, 
accommodating entire families and temporary forms of asylum. It was shown 
that it is most important to ensure conditions becoming of a human life to 
asylum seekers, with special emphasis on personal freedom (Mollica, Silove, 
Steel, 2001). 
In further analysis we were interested in the structuring of particular human 
rights and freedoms, so they were subjected to factor analysis (Table 2), yielding 
three factors (with a total variance of 52.0%) as well as a variance analysis. 
 
Table 2: The factor structure of certain human rights and freedoms 
Rights and freedoms Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Right to work .782   
Right to an education .712   
Right to privacy .667   
Personal safety .639   
Equality before the law .590   
Social protection of elderly and those at risk .589 .352  
Right to ownership .580   
Rights of women .552   
National minority rights  .785  
Cultural autonomy  .693  
Right to asylum  .692  
Freedom of opinion  .660  
Freedom of speech   .726 
Freedom of media   .694 
Freedom of association   .642 
Freedom of information   .642 
% of common variance 22.4 15.8 13.8 
 
The first factor – individual rights – is constituted by classic values of 
equality and respect for individual rights and freedoms. If the generally high 
acceptance of individual rights and freedoms with the absence of differentiation 
among the youth is observed together, it can be said that there is a high consen-
sus among the youth in accepting most of the basic human rights. 
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The second factor – cultural-political rights – is made up of national 
minority rights, cultural autonomy, right to asylum and freedom of opinion. The 
youth have again proven to be very homogenous, even though not to a degree 
found in the other two factors: the variance analysis has indicated differences in 
this factor only when it comes to the education of participants (F-ratio=6.32). 
Differences are directed in a clear line – participants that have (not) finished 
primary school, as well as those with vocational secondary education, are under-
averagely inclined to this dimension, and other participants are average. This 
finding clearly points to the significant effects of socialization and the 
importance of including human rights into the education system. This interpre-
tation of results may also be considered as an appeal to official institutions in 
order to start a public awareness campaign on the stated rights. Otherwise, 
Croatian society will be very slow in reaching the countries of the Western 
civilization circle that truly cherish the spirit of multiculturalism. For now, only 
the Scandinavian countries really belong to that circle of countries, even though 
multiculturalism is a proclaimed principle in all the significant charters and laws 
in the European space. 
The third factor – labeled freedom of speech, information and association – 
belongs to the domain of civil society development. Through it, the outside 
observers find it easiest to determine the position of a particular society on the 
scale of democratic potential. In this context, we can say that all the groups of 
youth agree when it comes to this dimension of human rights and freedoms. 
3. The perception of respect for human rights in Croatia 
A politically conscious individual who is aware of his/her state and civil 
laws and obligations, takes responsibility for the state and development of the 
community he/she lives in, as well as cares for his/her own existence, taking into 
account the interests of other individuals and the entire community. The 
development of a democratic political culture is especially important for transi-
tional countries, which is accented when it comes to youth that, both as an 
integral part of modern society and as an exponent of the future, take responsi-
bility for a democratic social development (Baranović, Ilišin, 2004: 343). 
Putnam (1993) emphasizes the importance of participation in socio-political 
processes in society in order to ensure the social capital, which will enable the 
development and preservation of the democratic potential of the entire society. 
The sociopolitical context of integrating youth into modern Croatian 
society, is marked by post-war and transitional problems that led to a neglect of 
youth as a specific group, and caused the maintenance and transfer of prejudice, 
discrimination and patterns of violent behavior within it. Even though the 
situation has improved in the last several years, the manifestations of xenopho-
bia, violence, racism and discrimination based on different attributes (religion, 
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nationality, age, gender, sexual orientation and other) are still notable in society. 
This environment inevitably affects the formation of attitudes and values of 
youth. Young people are very often under pressure of latent, and sometimes 
explicit violence, prejudice and stereo-types, that they cannot or do not know 
how to tackle affirmatively or adequately (Bačić and others, 2004: 69). 
In this segment of analysis we will limit ourselves to the assessment of 
youth about the respect towards human rights and freedoms in Croatia in 1999 
and 20004. Graph 1 gives an overview of the distribution of answers of youth to 
the question about the perceived level of respect for human rights in Croatia at 
the two stated points in time. 
 
Graph 1: The comparative overview of the perception of respect for human 
rights and freedoms in Croatia – youth 1999 and 2004 (%) 
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Compared to 1999, in 2004 there is a noticeable difference in all the 
categories of answers, aside from those regarding ‘mostly not respected’ and 
‘completely respected’. The percentage of youth that believes that human rights 
in Croatia are not respected at all, was under 10% in 1999, only to fall under 5% 
in 2004. There is an interesting distribution of answers in the remaining three 
categories. Our neutral category (I do not know/ I cannot estimate) has 
assembled about 7% less participants than in 1999. This is a positive trend, but 
of very limited reach. To be more specific, the percentage of undecided partici-
pants is still close to 20%, indicative of an insufficient knowledge of the youth 
about human rights and/or their lack of interest in the issue. This can be 
illustrated with the data that only 6% of the youth participate in the activities of 
an organization dealing with human rights' protection, which was the subject of 
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a more detailed analysis in the preceding chapter of this study. However, we 
may conclude that a higher level of engagement and a better structuring of 
certain factors of socialization may in an organized manner, contribute to the 
increase in the democratic potential of youth, especially the education system 
that has, for now, shown a minimum preoccupation with education about human 
rights9. According to the assessment of the young participants, school has a 
significant influence on the development of their opinions about humanity and 
society: it holds third position, preceded only by family and friends, and 
followed by the Church and television, that are also considered to be relatively 
influential agents of socialization (Baranović, 2000: 15). Those that believe that 
human rights are mostly respected, have witnessed an increase of 13%, raising 
their percentage to almost 50%. Through an insight into the existing data, we 
notice that the highest increase occurred in the two opposed categories – with 
the participants that consider human rights to be mostly respected and those that 
believe they are mostly not respected. 
Graph 2 contains a comparative outline of the distribution of answers of the 
youth and adult populations regarding the perceived level of respect for human 
rights in 2004. 
 
Graph 2: Perception of respect for human rights and freedoms in Croatia – 
youth 1999 and 2004 (%) 
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9 In Croatian public schools, the human rights program, even though it has been written 
(The National Program of Education for Human Rights, 1999.), is performed only 
experimentally in a part of secondary schools. 
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The first conclusion that arises is the higher level of criticism of youth. 
Specifically, even though the number of youth and adults that are at opposing 
poles of this scale (answers ‘not respected at all’ and ‘completely respected’), as 
well as the inclination to the answer ‘mostly not respected’ is approximately the 
same (the differences range from +/-4%), a higher number of adults believe that 
human rights are respected. However, the influence of age is more noticeable 
with undecided participants: there are approximately 5% more undecided 
participants among the youth that can be ascribed to the higher knowledge of 
legal regulations and the social situation of adult participants. Although, it is 
interesting that this assumed higher competence of adult participants swings in 
favor of the attitude about the prevailing respect for human rights: 9% more 
adults than youth express their agreement with the prevailing respect for human 
rights, that is, the adult participants have already crossed the 50% threshold, 
even though the youth are not significantly far from it. 
In the analysis of respect for human rights and freedoms, we are interested 
in the distribution of responses of youth considering its attributes (Table 3). To 
simplify the interpretation of results we have merged the answers ‘mostly not 
respected’ and ‘not respected at all’, as well as ‘mostly respected’ and 
‘completely respected’. 
Out of the nine independent variables used, only three demonstrate a statis-
tically significant influence on the perception of respect for human rights and 
freedoms. They are gender, regional status and party affiliation. Gender turned 
out to be the least influential variable (χ2=21.543): both genders express a 
similar indecisiveness in their assessment of respect for human rights – more 
than a third of the members of each gender. However, women state that there is 
disrespect for human rights more often, that is, they are more critical than men. 
On the other hand, men are more inclined to assess that there is a prevailing 
respect for human rights, and their total number exceeds 50%. Such gender 
differences may be interpreted by the still existent higher social marginalization 
of women, and a wider spectrum of their rights that are being breeched, which is 
why they, even when their rights are not endangered directly, are more sensitive 
to the violation of human rights. 
Regional status seems to be the most important attribute that discriminates 
against the youth, in the direction of a more positive evaluation in Central 
Croatia and in the City of Zagreb; two thirds of the inhabitants of Central 
Croatia and one half of those from Zagreb, believe that human rights are 
completely or mostly respected. The data range around 40 percent in other 
regions and the lowest percentage can be found in Istria and Primorje. The City 
of Zagreb, Istria and Primorje as well as Central Croatia are interesting regard-
ing another matter – the smallest number of undecided participants ranges from 
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23.8% in Dalmatia to 18.2% in Northern Croatia. This information might serve 
as an indicator of emphasized needs for investment in democratic and human 
rights education, in the counties with the highest percentages of undecided 
participants. As for the inclination toward a more critical evaluation of the 
human rights' condition in Croatia, the most criticism can be found in Istria and 
Primorje with 40%, followed by Northern and Eastern Croatia, the City of 
Zagreb and Dalmatia with approximately 30 percent. While the least participants 
that answered human rights are mostly not respected or not respected at all, live 
in Central Croatia. This direction of influence of regional status to the attitudes 
regarding the level of respect for human rights and freedoms is a reflection of 
developmental tendencies in certain regions, as well as experiences in the 
respect for the observed rights and freedoms. 
 
Table 3: The perception of respect for human rights and freedoms regarding the 
attributes of youth (%) 
Attributes of youth 
Mostly or not 
respected at all 
I cannot estimate 
Mostly or com-
pletely respected 
Gender χ2=21.54 
Female 34.3 21.8 43.9 
Male 32.6 14.8 52.6 
Regional status χ2=36.04 
Northern Croatia 35.4 18.2 46.4 
Central Croatia 22.7 15.1 62.2 
Istria and Primorje 41.2 15.2 43.6 
Eastern Croatia 33.1 20.1 46.9 
Dalmatia 30.9 23.8 45.3 
Zagreb 34.2 13.4 52.4 
Party affiliation χ2=33.78 
HDZ 24.7 21.7 53.5 
HNS 36.0 12.2 51.8 
HSP 27.6 17.9 54.5 
HSS 40.4 12.8 46.8 
SDP 38.1 14.2 47.7 
Undecided 35.1 20.3 44.6 
TOTAL 33.4 18.2 48.4 
 
There is a clear connection between ideology and party preference as one 
of the main determinants of political attitudes and clear indicators of the 
relationship toward human rights. According to our results, party identification 
follows regional status when it comes to the strength of its influence. In our case 
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it means that the most critical, are participants sympathizing with HSS, then 
SDP, HNS and the politically undecided. The least criticism was expressed by 
participants inclined toward HDZ and HSP. One of the possible conclusions is 
that we can compare the declared goals of political parties, to the attitudes of 
their sympathizers. In this context, it would mean that HDZ, as the party in 
power, is less inclined to criticize its own treatment of human rights, while HSP 
is a party that traditionally does not have much space in its program for human 
rights protection, especially regarding cultural autonomy and national minority 
rights. The distribution of participants that are not certain, according to parties, 
provides a wider image, portraying a higher level of uncertainty of participants 
inclined toward HDZ and those who are politically undecided. The least 
uncertain participants are sympathizers of HNS and SDP that are once again 
grouped into a single category. One of the possible reasons for this grouping can 
be found in the civil option the two latter parties advocate, and thus the option 
their sympathizers are inclined to as well. The third option, signifying the 
respect for human rights, is the one mostly chosen by sympathizers of HDZ and 
HSP, and they are joined by participants inclined toward HNS. On the other 
hand, the participants more inclined to HSS, SDP and the undecided opinion, 
respect human rights and freedoms in Croatia somewhat less. 
If we sum up the stated tendencies, we may conclude that the ability of as-
sessment and a higher criticism toward the status of human rights is related to the 
attributes indicative of the female population, the general left-wing ideological-
political orientation, and in the region of Istria and Primorje. On the other side, the 
most benevolent attitude belongs to the inhabitants of Central Croatia and the 
City of Zagreb. The general comparison of the distribution of answers, leads to 
the conclusion, that there has been an improvement in the perception of respect 
for human rights and freedoms among the youth in the five years since the 1999 
research. Compared to the adult participants, the youth in 2004 express a greater 
criticism toward the existing respect for human rights and freedoms, which are 
encouraging findings because youth are the link toward the future respect for 
human rights, and where respect for human rights and freedoms are concerned, 
criticism is never redundant. 
4. Perception of contributions to the protection of human rights 
After investigating the perception of the degree of respect for human rights 
and freedoms, we will focus on the factors of their promotion. This research is 
observed through a prism of both institutional and individual contributions. 
Institutions are represented by members of legislative, executive and judicial 
powers, non-governmental organizations, the Church and the media, while 
individuals are present as distinguished non-political persona. Out of the initial 
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scale consisting of options ‘contributes a lot’ to ‘does not contribute at all’, we 
have portrayed and interpreted the combined answers ‘contributes a lot’ and 
‘mostly contributes’. 
We will first look at the tendencies in perception of the said factors of 
promotion of human rights and freedoms in Croatia, of the population of youth 
in 1999 and 2004 (Graph 3). 
 
Graph 3: The ranking scale of estimated contribution of institutions, associa-
tions and significant individuals to the realization of human rights in Croatia – 
youth 1999 and 2004 (%) 
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For most protagonists, most of the youth estimate that they completely or 
mostly contribute to the realization of human rights in Croatia. Compared to 
1999, there has been an increase in all the observed categories, except for the 
opposition that experienced a decrease, and the Church (religious communities), 
which remained on the same level. We cannot speak of differences regarding the 
media and the judicial system, because there is no data from 1999. 
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The youth, in 2004 ascribed the highest contribution to the protection of 
human rights to the media, the Church (that is, religious communities), the 
Government and the President of the Republic. Following them are the 
Parliament, the distinguished non-political individuals, non-governmental 
organizations and parties in power. It shows that the contribution of the 
opposition and the judiciary is perceived least by the youth. Both categories 
should be, and are defined as, the basis of a ‘healthy’ democratic political 
concept. The proactive role of the opposition is a necessary condition for the 
existence of a democratic and pluralistic political process. To put it simply, the 
opposition should play a role of checks and balances in political life. 
Specifically, decisions and processes may spin out of control without it, 
endangering the rights of minorities, due to the dominance of the majority (the 
party in power). It seems needless to emphasize the role of the judiciary, and the 
perceived low level of its contribution in the preservation of human rights and 
freedoms points to possibly perilous tendencies for the basis of a free society. 
The changes in perception, occurring after five years, point to an improved 
protection of human rights and freedoms in Croatia, or at least to an increased 
number of participants that have the impression that improvement has taken 
place. As was already mentioned, the youth in 1999 have expressed a signifi-
cantly lower level of trust in the abilities of most observed protagonists than in 
2004. The most significant increase occurred with the President of the Republic 
and the parties in power – from the last position they held in 1999, they are now 
close to the top. At first glance, the result that there was an increase in the 
opinion that parties in power contributed to the protection of human rights is 
puzzling, because HDZ was in power both in 1999 and in 2004. We can assume 
that the political convergence of HDZ towards more liberal values, has led to a 
better perception of the contribution of that party to the development of human 
rights. However, it might also be a reflection of the experiences from the time 
when a coalition of a five party coalition was in power (to the end of 2003) when 
there was a significant democratization of social and political life. At the same 
time, an increase in the validation of the contribution of the President of the 
Republic is undoubtedly the consequence of the personal changes at the head of 
state, where the acting president, S. Mesić, is perceived by the youth, to be a 
more devoted protector of human rights and freedoms in Croatia than his 
predecessor, F. Tuñman. On the other hand, the weaker results of the opposition 
are surprising. It would seem that the opposition-position seesaw has 
consequently reduced the significance of the opposition by the transfer of a 
higher contribution to the parties in power. 
After an insight into the assessment of the contribution of institutions, 
associations and significant individuals of the youth population from 1999 and 
2004, we will look at the differences between the youth and the adult 
participants in 2004 (Graph 4). 
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Graph 4: The ranking scale of estimated contribution of institutions, associa-
tions and significant individuals to the realization of human rights in Croatia – 
youth and adults (%) 
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We have already established that adult participants believe, to a higher 
degree, that human rights and freedoms in Croatia are respected, and it is the 
same regarding the perception of the contribution of institutions, associations 
and significant individuals to rights and freedoms. It is apparent that all the 
differences between the youth and the adults are within a +/- 4-10% range, with 
the emphasis being on the differences in the case of the Parliament, the President 
of the Republic, non-governmental organizations and the opposition. These 
generational differences may be the consequence of a higher level of trust that 
adults seem to have toward political institutions, as well as non-governmental 
associations whose activities are also politically colored. 
As we were interested in the possible structuring of youth, according to 
their perception of the contribution of certain institutions and associations to the 
contribution of human rights in Croatia, we have conducted a factor analysis, the 
results of which are portrayed in Table 4. The factor analysis has yielded three 
latent structures (factors) that interpret 66.4% of the total variance, within which 
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the second and third factors have an almost identical variance percentage, while 
the first factor has gathered as much as the previous two have together. 
 
Table 4: The factor structures of the evaluation of contribution by institutions, 
associations and significant individuals to the realization of human rights and 
freedoms in Croatia 
Positive contribution Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Sabor (Parliament) .869   
Government .868   
Parties in power .805   
President of the Republic .663  .328 
Opposition .635  .422 
Church (religious communities)  .753  
The media  .696  
Judiciary/ Croatian legal system .476 .611  
Non-governmental organization   .832 
Distinguished non-political individuals  .326 .773 
% of common variance 33.0 16.8 16.6 
 
The first factor was labeled political institutions due to the nature of the 
institutions it includes. The most saturated items in this factor are the Parliament, 
the Government and parties in power, while the President of the Republic and 
the opposition, have a lower level of saturation. This type of factor structure is a 
reflection of both the basic principles of the way parliamentary democracies 
work, and the day-to-day political situation in Croatia. Specifically, an almost 
equal saturation of the Parliament and the Government springs from the position 
that the legislative and executive powers have in the political process. It is 
equally understandable that the significance of the parties in power follows the 
Parliament and the Government, as well as the ranking of the President of the 
Republic behind those institutions, but preceding the opposition as a protagonist 
that, in Croatian political conditions, still has a limited influence. 
The second factor is quite non-systematic and not so easily interpreted; 
which is why it was labeled sacral, judicial and media institutions. The judiciary 
and the media are clearly corrective institutions of the nomenclature in power, 
but the Church does not fit in at first glance. On the other hand, if we recall that 
the Church is also a sort of corrective institution, due to its referral to 
conscience, especially considering that it, as well as religiousness, are often still 
the light-motives of everyday life and politics, we arrive at a different perspec-
tive that with some limitations, allows for the Church to be put side by side with 
the media and the judicial system. 
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Even though the last factor – civil sector – gathered an almost identical 
percentage of the common variance compared to the previous factor, it differs 
from it both by its homogeneity and simple interpretability. To be more specific, 
the third factor consists only of non-governmental organizations and distin-
guished non-political individuals that are often associated by their very nature. 
Even if distinguished non-political individuals are not directly related to non-
governmental organizations, they do advocate very similar aims in the percep-
tion of an average citizen. 
We were interested in the attributes that differ the youth in its acceptance of 
the three yielded factors, so we conducted a variance analysis, the results of 
which are in Table 5. 
The acceptance of political institutions (factor 1) as those that contribute to the 
protection of human rights varies only in regard to the regional status. Thus, the 
population of Northern Croatia, Istria and Primorje seems to be under-averagely 
inclined to appreciate the contribution of political institutions, while Central Croatia 
and the City of Zagreb note an above-average inclination. Eastern Croatia and 
Dalmatia are positioned in the center of this dimension, with an average inclina-
tion to asses that political institutions are a significant factor in the improvement of 
the state of human rights. The fact that only the variable of regional status 
achieved a statistically significant influence on the political institutions dimension 
is intriguing, while, for example, party preferences ‘failed’ in this case, even 
though they had been confirmed by numerous research studies to be a significant 
indicator of the relationship toward political institutions. We may conclude that 
the youth population is relatively homogenous, aside from the differences in 
regional status as an indicator of developmental-cultural differences, in the case of 
their relationship toward the contribution of political institutions to the realization 
of human rights and freedoms in Croatia. 
Religiousness, regional status, the father's education and party affiliation 
affected the inclination toward sacral, judicial and media institutions (factor 2). 
In line with this dimension's name, religiousness is the strongest predictor, 
which is easily explained due to the saturation of one part of public life with 
religious elements, where the “religious orientation has the strongest influence 
on the choice of party in a Catholic and countries with a mixture of confessions” 
(Vujčić, 2001: 329). Seen in total, this dimension had an above average attrac-
tion to participants whose fathers had not finished their primary education, the 
inhabitants of Eastern Croatia and Dalmatia, religious participants and 
sympathizers of HDZ and HSP. Contemplating the attributes of those that have 
an average inclination to this factor, we reach a profile of youth whose fathers 
have a vocational degree, are inhabitants of Northern or Central Croatia and 
sympathizers of HSS or are politically undecided. On the opposing pole from 
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those with whose advocating this dimension is above average, are the youth, 
whose fathers have an academic education, who live in Istria, Primorje and the 
City of Zagreb, who are religiously undecided or not religious at all, and are 
inclined to HNS and SDP when it comes to political preference. The profile of 
those that are inclined to this factor below average is somewhat distinctive, if we 
take into consideration that the factor also consists of certain sacral elements. 
But difficulties arise when we contemplate the link with the media and the 
judiciary. The lack of trust in the judicial system by the previously described 
participants is easily explained by a number of scandals in that system, as well 
as by its low effectiveness, causing numerous cases to remain unsolved for 
years. However, when it comes to the media as protagonists in the contribution 
to human rights' protection, higher education and non-religiousness should also 
signal a higher democratic potential, linked to trust in the media, which of 
course changes in conditions where the media are not free. We have already 
stated that Croatia was in 54th place in 2004 when it comes to freedom of the 
media (Freedom in the World 2004 Country Ratings, 2004), which does not give 
a great basis for these participants to trust the great contribution of the Croatian 
Media to the protection of human rights and freedoms. 
The third latent dimension (civil sector) influenced by all the observed 
attributes of youth aside from regional status, are in the following order: 
education, age, party preference, religiousness, socio-professional status and 
education of the participant's father. The opinion that the civil sector is an 
important factor in improving the state of human rights and freedoms in Croatia is 
expressed above averagely by older participants (25-29 years of age), students, 
youth whose fathers have a higher or academic degree, and who themselves have 
the same level of education, those undecided when it comes to religion, and voters 
of HNS. All these attributes indicate a higher democratic potential of participants 
inclined toward this factor. The other extreme is occupied by the youngest partici-
pants (15-19 years of age), unemployed, fathers who have some primary 
education, and who have themselves finished primary school or vocational school, 
as well as being sympathizers of HDZ and HSP. Education was once again shown 
as a strong indicator of the relationship toward the civil sector, when it comes to 
the degree of its influence: ascribing merit to the civil sector increases with the 
level of education. Equally, the perception of the effects of the civil sector grows 
with age, belonging to liberal political options, religious non-denomination and 
the father's education. These attributes point to a higher democratic potential of 
participants inclined to perceive the civil sector as a factor contributing to the 
respect of human rights in contemporary Croatia. 
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Table 5: The differences among the youth in the acceptance of the factors of 
contribution by institutions, associations and significant individuals to the 
realization of human rights and freedoms in Croatia 
Attributes of youth Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Age   F-ratio=12.73 
15 – 19 years   – 
20 – 24 years   0 
25 – 29 years   + 
Socio-professional 
status   F-ratio =8.90 
Employed   0 
Unemployed   – 
Pupils   0 
Students   + 
Father's education   F-ratio =5.95 F-ratio =6.17 
Primary school  + – 
Vocational school  0 0 
High school  0 0 
College, university  – + 
Education   F-ratio =14.28 
Primary school   – 
Vocational school   – 
High school   0 
College, university    + 
Regional status F-ratio =10.66 F-ratio =6.65  
Northern Croatia – 0  
Central Croatia + 0  
Istria and Primorje – –  
Eastern Croatia 0 +  
Dalmatia 0 +  
Zagreb + –  
Religiousness   F-ratio =49.46 F-ratio =9.51 
Religious  + 0 
Undecided  – 0 
Not religious  – + 
Party affiliation  F-ratio =5.57 F-ratio =10.62 
HDZ*  + – 
HNS  – + 
HSP  + – 
HSS  0 0 
SDP  – 0 
Undecided  0 0 
Legend: – below common average; 0 within common average; + above common average 
 
The youth are only at the beginning of their life and work cycle when they, 
as individuals, become aware of the necessity of mechanisms systems for the 
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protection of human rights and freedoms. To what degree their political aware-
ness will be realized, depends, not only on the primary agents of socialization, 
but, to a great degree, on the institutions that create and implement everyday 
policies. Adding up all the previously stated findings we conclude that the 
recognizable effectiveness of certain institutions, associations and individuals 
when it comes to improving human rights and freedoms in Croatia, is influenced 
not only by their objective effects, but by the democratic potential of youth – 
that is education – and their inclinations toward specific political options. 
5. Conclusion 
It is possible to efficiently implement the systematic proclamation of 
human rights on a global scale that began in 1948, with the Universal Declara-
tion on Human Rights, and in our times, among other places, expressed by the 
United Nations Millennium Development Goals (United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals by the Year 2015, 2000), only through an orientation of the 
governments of certain states on the areas of education, preservation of health 
and an increase of income levels. Countries must construct partnerships on a 
global level, not to determine political and economic agendas so much, but to 
promote and protect human rights. The polarity between rights-freedoms and 
rights-claims has made relative the “original greatness of human rights, but at 
the same time, it has expanded the area of their types and meanings, and 
increased the social mass of those interested in the rights of life. It has made 
them an instrument of the developmental and social dynamic of the industrial 
society, through an argument of great clashes between democracy and totalitari-
anism, of the developed and undeveloped, etc.” (Kalanj, 1996: 50). These 
tendencies are exacerbated by globalization, even though, seen as an ideal-type, 
globalization is meant to imply an ever widening implementation of the 
hypothesis of human rights, that is, their universality. However, we are unfortu-
nately, witnesses of constant deviations in the process of their protection. 
“Institutions are necessary but not enough. They need to be filled with 
content, used for the improvement of all sectors of human rights. This content 
and this path will lead Croatia toward the European Union and its high standards 
in eliminating discrimination” (Šimunović, 2004: 10). Modern thoughts on the 
development of human rights move in the direction of linking social develop-
ment with increasing the protection of human rights – the emphasis is on 
prevention (instead of late intervention), social participation, activities of self-
organization and self-help, promotion of autonomy and development of social 
skills, and need for greater transparency of public policies. In this context, it is 
very important to work on affirmation, promotion and implementation of values 
and ideas of civil society, of the culture of non-violence and tolerance, human 
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rights, dialogue, cooperation and trust, as well as awareness-raising about the 
opportunities for social change. It is also very important to inform and stimulate 
the youth to get engaged, to question and educate themselves on those values 
and opportunities of work and life based on them, in order to propel them 
forward and contribute to the realization of positive shifts in society. Youth in 
our analysis are perceived as a link, just being formed in a specific social 
system, thus making it one of the most important elements of a positive 
reception and implementation of the basic postulates of human rights. 
The results of the research on validating specific human rights and 
freedoms, indicate that the greatest number of young persons accept the right to 
an education, right to work, personal security, right to privacy, social protection 
of the elderly and those at risk, equality before the law, rights of women and 
ownership rights. The comparison of acceptance of the observed human rights 
and freedoms of the population of youth and adults in Croatia, demonstrates that 
adults accept most rights to a higher degree than the youth, which can be 
interpreted through their better social integration. The analysis has shown that 
the preference of Croatian youth for certain human rights and freedoms is not 
conditioned by their observed socio-demographic and socio-structural attributes, 
aside from education, which points to the significance of the education system as 
an agent in improving the condition of human rights. 
Approximately one third of youth participants, were not satisfied with the 
respect for human rights in Croatia today as well as five years ago, while the 
number of those undecided has decreased, which can probably be attributed to 
the positive effect of public campaigns and some changes occurring during that 
period of time. There has been an increase from 1999 to 2004 in the number of 
youth who believe that human rights in Croatia are mostly or completely 
respected. The youth, compared to adults, express a higher level of criticism 
toward the existing degree of respect for human rights and freedoms. The results 
of analysis according to the social attributes of youth, demonstrate that the 
capability of assessment and higher criticism for the status of human rights in 
Croatia, is related to living in more economically prosperous regions, as well as 
the left-wing ideological-political orientation and female gender. 
Through an insight into the assessment of the contribution of institutions, 
associations and distinguished individuals by the youth population in 1999 and 
2004, we have determined that today's generation of youth perceives to a greater 
degree, the contribution of all institutions, associations and significant individu-
als (except for the opposition) to the protection of human rights and freedoms in 
Croatia. To be more precise, most young people assess that all the protagonists 
completely or partially contribute to the realization of human rights in the 
country. There has been a significant increase regarding the perception of the 
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contribution of the highest institutions of power compared to 1999. The adults 
differ from the youth by emphasizing the contribution of all the observed 
protagonists even more. Regional status, religiousness, the father's education and 
political party affiliation, notably affect the perception of the contribution of the 
observed protagonists of the realization of human rights in Croatia. 
Summarily, our analysis indicates that the youth accept human rights and 
freedoms decidedly, when they are discussed on a level of principles, but that 
there is a certain disharmony where specific rights and practices in Croatia are 
concerned, which can partially be interpreted as their insufficient competence 
regarding certain elements of social and political processes. As human rights and 
freedoms constitute universally accepted international standards and criteria of 
democracy in the modern world and its institutions today, the relationship of 
youth toward them, represents an indication of its social awareness and a 
precondition for its democratic activity. Even though the level of acceptance of 
human rights and freedoms as values seems to be high, there is wavering, 
indicating a need for additional engagement of some agents of socialization, 
especially the education system and the political protagonists. Freedom and 
human rights in Croatia are normatively regulated and are given to the individual 
at birth. However, freedom is not just a right, but a permanent mission, put 
before each young person, making all the difference for those that manage to 
gain entry into the world of active citizens, capable of making good their own, 
and others resources in the best possible way, thus contributing to the develop-
ment of the world we live in. The first step in this ambitious plight is for the 
youth to contribute as much as possible to the democratization of Croatia, which 
would prepare them, as well as the country, for joining the united Europe. 
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Furio Radin 
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD 
EUROPE 
1. Introduction 
This share of the analysis will be dealing with the relationship toward one’s 
nation and certain attitudes toward European integration, as well as differences 
between basic social subgroups of youth in that context. Put in this way, the 
question is apparently simple and gives the impression that the answer might be 
unambiguous, however, as is often the case, such questions present the greatest 
challenge to science by producing the most doubts and almost regularly ending, 
not in answers, but in an entirely new set of questions. 
Actually, the question itself is only apparently simple, because there are no 
theoretically sustainable reasons that would allow us to set a directive hypothesis 
about the affect of ethnocentrism or cosmopolitism on the relationship toward 
European associations. However, it can be assumed that Europeism will have a 
positive correlation with the relationship toward the European Union, but such a 
hypothesis would make no sense, for in this political moment, those two 
concepts are mostly coherent. 
The relation between the national and “supranational” relationship with the 
idea of a united Europe represents one of the basic questions discussed not only 
during the process that precedes a country's integration into the European Union, 
but later on as well, each time there is a conflict of interests between the Union 
and certain states, or social groups within those states (fishermen, farmers, truck 
drivers, etc.). We can assume that a change of balance in such relationships 
occurs due to pressure from specific interests, but, as is the case whenever 
attitudes are in question, the affective component might have a strong influence. 
A set of emotions produced by ethnicity deeply penetrates the irrational dimen-
sion of an individual's personality and the collective perception, so it is often 
very difficult to differentiate between the influence of interests in the first place, 
of tradition in the second, and finally, of subconscious factors in third place, on 
the power of the idea of nation in the social life of an individual or a group. 
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The solemn deeds and crimes undertaken in the name of the nation are 
evidence of the influence of that concept on the life of individuals and the 
functioning of groups, and we can assume that this effect is even stronger when 
it comes to youth. Something similar to that is not possible, at least at this social 
moment, when talking about the affective relationship toward Europe, where 
something we might call soft power is in action, that is the power of inclusion, 
or, in other words, the greater or lesser involvement of individuals in the idea of 
the need for something that is for the most part considered a value. One does not 
die by the sword nor for love of Europe, because the very process of inclusion in 
the European Union is subject to criteria that are pragmatic, and the process of 
integration is democratic. Perhaps the association process represents the greatest 
reason for the aversion of certain political options towards European integration, 
because the lack of coercion in this integration, replaced by acceptance of the 
rules of the game, is something that represents a sort of twist when compared to 
national integrations that were, almost as a rule, infused by romance. And 
perhaps the acceptance of the European idea is understood by some exclusively 
as the relinquishing of national sovereignty, hence, as a subtraction and not 
addition of value, exactly because the concept of the European Union is not 
associated with strong emotion, or at least not as much as is usually dedicated to 
a nation, a region or a city. 
2. Basic concepts 
It is necessary to define several basic concepts, mostly due to the constric-
tions of the research subject. 
Let us, then, return to the subject itself, determining that in this section we 
will be dealing with the relationship between national identity and attitudes 
toward European integration. Since our approach is psycho-social, we shall 
disregard the definitions of concepts related to institutions and concentrate on 
the discussion of phenomena that have to do with individuals or groups. 
The concept of national identity is narrowly correlated to the phenomenon 
of ethnic identity. The central importance of this concept for understanding the 
individual and interpersonal aspects of ethnical affiliation is present in many 
authors. Phinney and Rotheram (1987) define ethnic identity as a feeling of 
belonging to an ethnic group, i.e., as that part of opinions, beliefs, attitudes and 
values in each of us, that is ascribed to such belonging. The authors emphasize 
that ethnic identity is articulated in different components and serves the individ-
ual by self-recognition within his ethnic group, that is, to determine the value 
that the unique culture has for that individual's development and functioning. 
The creation of such an emotion presumes a certain level of interethnic contact. 
Ethnic identity, to be specific, takes on its true meaning only in those contexts 
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that require necessary everyday contact between different cultures, that is, in 
multiethnic environments, especially when dealing with a certain relationship 
between a majority nation and minority groups. In these cases, ethnic identity 
becomes a factor of differentiation. 
Weinrich (1988) thinks that ethnic identity is not an entity, but a process 
through which an individual builds his/her ethnicity, decides and estimates the 
value that culture has for his/her development. Erikson (1974) considers that 
achieving identity is a result of a period of research and experimentation 
during adolescence through different options and in different fields – religious, 
political, interest, etc. Marcia (1980) believes that this process takes place in 
four different ways: without engagement (diffused identity), engagement 
without research, that is, based on inherited values (blockage of identity), 
research without engagement (expectation period) and engagement with 
research (complete identity). 
Phinney (1990) suggests three phases along a continuum that on the one 
hand presumes an unresearched identity, on the other holds a formed identity 
with engagement, while research points are found in the middle. It is interesting 
that minority groups face two additional problems: recognizing the differences 
between their culture and the culture of the ethnic majority, and realizing that 
those differences often presume social disparity, often economic in nature. 
Even though identity is formed during adolescence, there are phases that 
come earlier, even in childhood. Ethnic categorization, that is, the ability to 
understand differences between ethnic groups, is possible in children that are 
only three-four years old, who can sort photographs of individuals into groups 
based on skin color (Rice, Ruiz, Padilla, 1974; Goldstein, Koopman, Goldstein, 
1979). Ethnic identification is the ability of an individual to identify with his/her 
ethnic group. It is possible from the age of five, but is complete in children at the 
age of nine (Laosa, 1984). 
Ethnic stability presumes the consciousness of ethnicity being a man's 
attribute that is consistent in time. The understanding that ethnicity is stable in 
time occurs at the age of seven, and is complete at eight or nine years of age 
(Aboud, Skerry, 1983; Aboud, 1984). Aside from those, there are other charac-
teristics of ethnic identity visible in childhood: knowing and manifesting 
behavior related to identity through socialization in the family (acceptance of 
alimentary styles, religious practices, etc.); the perception of the family's 
involvement in a wider (original) ethnic community, which accentuates the 
differences between the in and out groups (Phinney, Rotheram 1987; Phinney, 
1990). 
The final characteristic of ethnic identity, and at the same time, the most 
interesting for our research, is the ability to develop attitudes about one's own 
and other ethnic groups (Phinney, Rotheram 1987). Ethnic attitudes are the 
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characteristic manner of reacting to one’s own and other ethnic groups. Such 
reactions may be positive or negative and may vary in intensity. 
The inclination to positively value members of one's own ethnic group is 
known as ethnic preference, and in extreme cases, that is, when one's own nation 
is preferred at all times and in spite of everything else, it is called ethnocentrism. 
A negative attitude towards other ethnic groups is called ethnic prejudice 
(Aboud, 1987). 
Ethnic attitudes are characterized by a cognitive component, that is, by 
beliefs about a certain ethnic group, an affective component that relates to 
emotions accompanying such attitudes, and a connative component that relates 
to behaviors and activities we undertake regarding the ethnic identity of an 
individual or a group. 
Two theoretic-methodological approaches have developed in the last three 
decades regarding research of the development of ethnic attitudes. The first is 
socio-cognitive, which studies the development of ethnic attitudes as a result of 
social and cognitive evolutionary changes (Katz, 1976; Phinney, Rotheram 1987; 
Aboud, 1988). The second is based on SIT, or the social identity theory (Tajfel, 
Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner, 1982) and the SCT, that is, the auto-categorization 
theory (Turner and others, 1987). 
The socio-cognitive model sees ethnic attitudes as “an inevitable, but not a 
permanent dimension of development” (Aboud, 1988), and that ethnic prefer-
ence and prejudice reach a maximum of intensity between the ages of five and 
seven, and that their strength decreases between ages seven and nine, later 
developing attitudes of criticism toward one's own ethnicity, that are less 
discriminating toward other ethnicities (Katz, Sohn, Salk, 1975). 
Perhaps the most productive framework, for our needs, is the one set up 
lately by different researchers (Vaughan, 1987; Milner, 1996; Nesdale, 2000), 
studying the development of ethnic attitudes through the integration of the SIT 
and SCT models. 
This approach presumes that ethnic and inter-group attitudes in general are 
the function of social categorization and identification with one's own group 
(Brown, 1995; Powlishta, 1995; Bigler, Jones, Lobliner, 1997). This categoriza-
tion enables the forming of simplified perceptions of the social environment in 
which the differences between social groups are amplified, and those within a 
group disregarded. Identification enables the determination of one's own social, 
in our case ethnic, belonging, by choosing one of the available categories. In 
other words, preferences and prejudices are visible as a consequence of belong-
ing to a certain social group. 
This approach is also important because it does not assume it is possible to 
reduce prejudices and ethnical preferences after a certain age of childhood, but, 
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however, believes that such findings are more a result of the methodology used 
than an expression of phases of development, and that after childhood prejudices, 
including ethnic prejudices, and preferences of in-groups may increase in certain 
social contexts (Rice and others, 1974; Nesdale, 2000). 
Finally, a certain degree of national identity exists in all social groups and is 
considered to be normal, for it is a form of direct cohesion. An almost inevitable 
product of “normal ethnocentrism” is the rejection or non-respect for out-groups, but 
while ethnic groups that exist with mutual contact keep their values and normative 
autonomy, a satisfactory level of tolerance and coexistence may be achieved. 
Conflict, on the other hand, occurs when there is competition based on 
cultural differentiation, focused on achieving certain specific goals (material 
goods, power, prestige, economic security, autonomy, etc.). However, the effect 
of irrational motives, myths and personal frustrations and political manipulations 
cannot be neglected, which may have an important role in creating inter-ethnic 
tensions and conflicts. 
3. Attitudes toward one's own nation 
The relationship toward one's own nation was investigated with the same 
battery of 11 attitudes that was (with the exception of one item, investigating the 
relationship toward Yugoslav ethnicity) used in our first research of youth, a 
long time ago, in 1986 (Flere, 1986; Vrcan, 1988). This instrument was again 
applied in 1999 (Baranović, 2002), giving us the opportunity to compare the 
generations of youth of the past twenty years. 
Special value belongs to data gathered in the last research on the sample of 
adult participants, which for the first time enable the comparison of attitudes of 
the young to those that are typical of older generations, including those that 
coincide with their parents' age. 
The participants reacted to the offered attitudes by using answers at the 
Likert scale consisting of five degrees: from “I completely disagree” (1) to “I 
completely agree” (5). The frequencies of the results were analyzed first and 
compared to those from 1986 and 1999; we accepted as relevant the percentages 
of complete acceptance (grade 5 on the scale), the middle grade (arithmetic 
averages of answer degrees) and the standard deviations (Table 1). A similar 
comparison was done between the young and adult participants in the 2004 
research (Table 4). 
A factor analysis reduced the 11 statements from the scale to the main 
components with the use of the Kaiser-Guttman criterion of extraction with an 
orthogonal rotation (varimax), suitable for additional autonomous factor analysis 
(Table 2). This is why we were able to compute the factor points by the regression 
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method and then, through variance analysis, the significance of differences for 
several socio-demographic “independent” variables: gender, age, regional status, 
socio-professional status, residential status, education, religious self-identification, 
marital status and party preference (Table 3). Since the statistical analysis applied 
is identical to the one used in 1999 and partially to the one from 1986, the results 
are comparable. We have also factorized the results of the answers given by 
adult participants, in order to show if there are any age related differences in the 
latent structures of national identity (Table 5). 
The first conclusion that arises is that extreme identification with a nation 
can be found in the second half of the scale, while the attitudes of moderate 
national identification and openness toward other nations are more represented 
(Table 1). The very well accepted attitudes, that is, those whose strongest form is 
accepted by more than 50% of youth, with an average grade above 4, reflect 
moderate national identification. Those are statements on the need for nurturing 
and renewing national ideals, and on the simultaneous acceptance of national 
and global citizenship. 
 
Table 1: National identity of youth in 1986, 1999 and 2004 
1986 1999 2004 
Attitudes 
(%)* M S.D. (%) M S.D. (%) M S.D. 
Each nation needs to renew and cherish its 
national ideals. (A) 26.4 3.66 1.15 32.5 3.73 1.16 53.0 4.28 0.92 
I feel like a member of my own nation as 
much as a member of the community of the 
human kind. (B) 
46.3 4.15 0.98 42.2 3.95 0.97 52.7 4.20 1.00 
No relevant trait comes out of one's national 
affiliation. (C) 44.2 4.00 1.08 33.1 4.08 1.00 39.7 3.72 1.28 
Every nation needs to be open to the world and 
the influence of other cultures. (D) 40.5 3.95 1.10 40.6 3.26 1.29 38.0 3.89 1.10 
I feel like a member of my nation and that 
feeling has priority.** (E) – – – 18.6 2.23 1.18 30.9 3.62 1.23 
Every member of my nation should always 
and in every way appreciate our nation more 
than others. (F) 
9.5 2.45 1.33 19.4 3.36 1.20 30.7 3.48 1.37 
Humanity is the only real human community 
so every division into nations is harmful of 
meaningless. (G) 
33.8 3.76 1.12 21.7 3.40 1.16 24.8 3.31 1.32 
Even the flaws of one's nation should be loved. 
(H) 16.0 3.00 1.34 17.8 2.44 1.25 23.3 3.24 1.34 
One should always be cautious and restrained 
toward members of other nations, even when 
they are friends. (I) 
6.3 2.27 1.28 7.6 4.10 0.94 8.9 2.40 1.32 
Openness to the world brings every nation 
more harms than benefits. (J) 6.6 2.19 1.23 2.7 2.14 1.09 7.1 2.40 1.22 
Nationally mixed marriages are doomed to 
failure in advance. (K) 3.7 1.90 1.13 4.7 3.19 1.28 5.4 2.00 1.23 
* Complete agreement 
** The content of this item was adjusted in 1986 in order to measure Yugoslav ethnicity. 
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It is also a fact that the orientation toward national ideals is for the first 
time at the head of the hierarchy in this research: in 1986 this attitude was 
accepted by only every fourth young Croat (26.4%), in 1999 every third 
(32.5%), and in 2004 every other (53%). It is evident as well that, in general, 
nationally tinted attitudes are significantly more present in this research 
compared to the previous two. 
The third and fourth attitudes in the rank belong to an open ethnic mindset 
as evidence that some of today's young generation accept the value of tolerance 
and coexistence. Almost 40% of participants believe that the nation is not one of 
the important human personal traits (39.7%, 5% more than in 1999, but also 5% 
less than in 1986); 38% think that we must be open to other cultures. 
The first attitude that signifies a firmly positive attitude toward one's own 
nation, but not necessarily a negative attitude toward others, is in fifth position, 
accepted by almost one third of participants (30.7%). It means a national 
emotion that gives priority to one's own nation. This attitude is the only one that 
was not measured in 1986, but we do know that it was much stronger than in 
1999, when it was accepted by 18.6% of youth (that is, the mean increased from 
2.23 to 3.62, from being under average to slightly above average). 
Similarly, the attitude about the uncritical preference of one's own nation is 
accepted by the same percentage of youth (30.7%), by a third more than in 1999 
(19.4%) and by two thirds more than in 1986. 
Only one quarter of youth accept the typical attitude of cosmopolitism 
(24.8%, with a mean of 3.31), somewhat more than in the late 1990s (21.7%), 
but less than in the 1980s (one third). 
With other ethnocentric attitudes, serious acceptance is present only for the 
statement about the need to love even the shortcomings of one's own nation 
(23.3% with the mean of 3.24). This attitude increased significantly from the 
1980s, when it was accepted by 16% of youth and the 1990s (17.8%). Other 
attitudes of extreme orientation toward one's own nation are at the back of the 
ranking scale, represented by less than 10% of youth. 
The frequency analysis moved us to construct a map of ethnic attitudes 
based on multidimensional scaling before the factor analysis (Graph 1). The map 
is portrayed noting that the complete meaning of the abbreviations used may be 
found in Table 1 (in parentheses behind each respective attitude). 
The map, constructed by using the method of computing of the Euclid 
distance between variables, without additional standardization and with the 
given 2x2 dimensions, produces axes labeled closed-open (horizontal) and 
cosmopolitism-ethnocentrism (vertical). 
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Graph 1: The map of national identification of youth 
 
 
The lower right quadrant signifies an emphasis on openness and 
cosmopolitism. Three attitudes are positioned here: cosmopolitism, insignifi-
cance of a nation for the life of an individual and, on the cusp, openness toward 
other ethnicities. 
The upper right quadrant determines openness and ethnocentrism. One 
attitude is placed here: the need to renew national ideals, while the attitude about 
the connection between the nation and the human community is at the border. 
Between the right and left upper quadrants, that is in the area of ethnocen-
trism and an unspecified, that is diffused open-closed, there are three attitudes: 
the priority of national emotions, the need to appreciate one's own nation more 
than other nations and to love even its shortcomings. 
The lower left quadrant, safely within the "closed" area and diffuse in their 
relationship toward cosmopolitism and ethnocentrism are the final three 
attitudes: about the harmfulness of mixed marriages, about caution toward 
members of other nations and about the harm of opening to the world. Hence, 
these are the least accepted attitudes that might characterize a general pathologic 
relationship toward the environment the individual is living in, rather than a 
formed national identity. 
The multidimensional scaling regularly demonstrates the complexity of the 
relationship between worldviews with many borderline areas that are not 
immediately visible. 
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The classic method defining such complexities is factor analysis. It has 
demonstrated here that the correlation between the answers of all the participants 
and all the attitudes, that measure the relationship toward ethnicity, produce 
three latent dimensions (factors) that explain 55.4% of the total variance. Table 2 
portrays the structures of the three obtained factors. 
 
Table 2: The factor structure of national identity – youth 
Attitudes 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
I feel like a member of my nation and that feeling has 
priority.  .760   
Each nation needs to renew and cherish its national ideals. .719   
Every member of my nation should always and in every 
way appreciate our nation more than others.  .708 .306  
Even the flaws of one's nation should be loved.  .637   
One should always be cautious and restrained toward 
members of other nations, even when they are friends.   .745  
Nationally mixed marriages are doomed to failure in 
advance.   .737  
Openness to the world brings every nation more harms 
than benefits.   .733  
No relevant trait comes out of one's national affiliation.    .722 
Humanity is the only real human community so every 
division into nations is harmful of meaningless.    .720 
Every nation needs to be open to the world and the 
influence of other cultures.   .624 
I feel like a member of my own nation as much as a 
member of the community of the human kind. .331  .600 
% of common variance 20.9 17.8 16.7 
 
The first factor delineates the national identification, that is, the non-extreme 
model of relatedness to the nation that does not a priori exclude consideration of 
other ethnicities and coexistence with them. A mild saturation of this factor with 
the attitude that determines a similar value of national and supranational 
(cosmopolitan) identities proves that this is a dimension that used to be known as 
patriotism. From the similar factor derived in the 1999 research, this factor, aside 
from the reasons mentioned, differs by the lack of one item (the need for caution 
towards other, even “friendly” nations), that contributes to its moderation. 
The second factor can, without a doubt, be labeled ethnocentrism. It is also 
very similar to the identically labeled factor from the previous research, differing 
from it only by the lack of one negatively saturated item (about the need for 
nations to be open to other cultures). 
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The last latent dimension is indisputably cosmopolitism and also differs 
from the similar factor in 1999 due to the lack of, in this case a mildly positively 
saturated item about the need for openness towards others. 
We can, thus, conclude that the results obtained confirm the ability of the 
instrument to discriminate the population based on national identity into three 
models: moderate national identification, radical ethnocentrism and pronounced 
cosmopolitism. 
We will now, using the variance analysis method, test the differences that 
these three models of national identity produce within the basic social groups of 
the young population. 
Table 3 portrays the existing differences among the young in accepting the 
patterns of national identity. Two pluses (++) stand for categories significantly 
above average, one plus (+) stands for those that are above average, 0 means 
those that are within the average of the common results. Analogous to that, two 
minuses (--) signify groups that are significantly below average, and one minus 
(-) stands for below average. As significant differences, those with a level of 
significance lower than 0.01 were analyzed. Such differences were marked with 
symbols (++,+,0,-,--) in Table 3, while the other fields are empty. 
The F-ratio values indicate that the discriminating attributes are religious 
self-identification, regional status and the education of the participants (the latter 
only in relation to ethnocentrism). The weakest differences are produced by 
gender and age. 
The factors of national identification and ethnocentrism are far more 
discriminating than cosmopolitism. 
The pattern of national identification is more present with the young from 
Dalmatia and Central Croatia, with sympathizers of HDZ and HSP, those with a 
lower level of personal and paternal education, and the youngest. The extremely 
low values are accepted by the non-religious and religiously undecided partici-
pants and those coming from Istria and Primorje. 
Ethnocentrism is stronger with the youngest participants, that is, pupils, as 
well as the unemployed, with a lower level of personal and paternal education. 
Also, it is stronger in the rural population, in continental Croatia (with the 
exception of Zagreb) and Dalmatia, and in religious youth and sympathizers of 
HDZ, HSS and HSP. A low level of ethnocentrism is more commonly found in 
youth from Istria, Primorje and Zagreb and in the urban population in general, 
with a higher level of education, both personal and paternal, in non-religious and 
religiously undecided participants and with youth close to HNS and SDP. 
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Table 3: Differences among the young in accepting the factors of national identity 
Attributes of youth National identification Ethnocentrism Cosmopolitism 
Socio-professional status F=6.37; Sign.: 0.00 F=14.64; Sign.: 0.00 F=2.80; Sign.: 0.04 
Employed 0 0  
Unemployed 0 +  
Pupils + +  
Students + – –  
Gender F=0.85; Sign.: 0.36 F=1.22; Sign.: 0.27 F=16.74; Sign.: 0.00 
Female   + 
Male   – 
Age F=5.27; Sign.: 0.01 F=6.56; Sign.: 0.01 F=2.78; Sign.: 0.06 
15 – 19 years + +  
20 – 24 years 0 0  
25 – 29 years 0 0  
Father's education  F=7.31; Sign.: 0.00 F=13.85; Sign.: 0.00 F=1.24; Sign.: 0.29 
Primary school or less + + +  
Vocational school + +  
High school 0 –  
College, university, higher – –  
Participant’s education F=6.44; Sign.: 0.00 F=27.63; Sign.: 0.00 F=2.90; Sign.: 0.03 
Primary school or less + +  
Vocational school + + +  
High school – –  
College, university, higher – –  
Place of habitat F=2.26; Sign.: 0.08 F=13.20; Sign.: 0.00 F=1.40; Sign.: 0.24 
Village  +  
Small town  0  
Major city  – –  
Zagreb  – –  
Regional status F=18.13; Sign.: 0.00 F=12.35; Sign.: 0.00 F=3.98; Sign.: 0.01 
Northern Croatia 0 + – 
Central Croatia + + + 
Istria and Primorje – – – – + 
Eastern Croatia 0 + 0 
Dalmatia + + + – 
Zagreb 0 – – 0 
Religious self-identification F=52.53; Sign.: 0.00 F=25.71; Sign.: 0.00 F=1.46; Sign.: 0.23 
Religious + +  
Undecided – – – –  
Not religious – –  – –  
Party affiliation F=13.75; Sign.: 0.00 F=11.68; Sign.: 0.00 F=4.29; Sign.: 0.01 
HDZ + + + + – 
HNS – – – + 
HSP + + + – – 
HSS + + + + 0 
SDP – – – 0 
Undecided – 0 0 
 
Finally, cosmopolitism, as a separate and autonomous factor, cannot be 
defined only as the opposite of ethnocentrism. It can be a thoughtful value orien-
tation, as well as a consequence of globalization, so it is not surprising that it 
produces a structure of differences that is unlike the ones in the previous two 
factors. The basic segments of youth actually differ poorly regarding the (lack of) 
cosmopolitism, which proves that openness to the world may coexist in (more 
moderate) forms of national identity. In this case, the exception is made by three 
attributes of youth. The first is gender, where women demonstrate a more open 
attitude toward the world than the men. Regarding the regional status we regis-
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tered mild, but significant differences: Istria and Primorje, as well as Central 
Croatia produce a somewhat more pronounced cosmopolitism, while Dalmatia 
and Northern Croatia accept a lower level of cosmopolitism. Sympathizers of HSP 
and HDZ are not cosmopolitan, and those partial to HNS are somewhat more 
inclined toward it. 
Before moving on to the comparison of national and European identity, we 
shall turn our attention to the results achieved from the sample of adult participants 
and their comparison to the previously analyzed data from the sample of youth. 
Table 4 indicates the frequencies of the adult participants' sample along 
with the already portrayed data for the young population. 
 
Table 4: The national identity of youth and adults in 2004 
Youth Adults 
Attitudes Complete 
agreement 
(%) 
M S.D. 
Complete 
agreement 
(%) 
M S.D. 
Each nation needs to renew and cherish its 
national ideals.  53.0 4.28 0.92 61.8 4.37 0.94 
I feel like a member of my own nation as 
much as a member of the community of the 
human kind. 
52.7 4.20 1.00 61.0 4.31 1.04 
No relevant trait comes out of one's national 
affiliation.  39.7 3.72 1.28 44.7 3.80 1.33 
Every nation needs to be open to the world 
and the influence of other cultures. 38.0 3.89 1.10 46.8 4.02 1.14 
I feel like a member of my nation and that 
feeling has priority.  30.9 3.62 1.23 43.9 3.84 1.28 
Every member of my nation should always 
and in every way appreciate our nation more 
than others.  
30.7 3.48 1.37 35.1 3.48 1.45 
Humanity is the only real human community 
so every division into nations is harmful of 
meaningless.  
24.8 3.31 1.32 30.7 3.34 1.42 
Even the flaws of one's nation should be 
loved.  23.3 3.24 1.34 29.7 3.30 1.47 
One should always be cautious and 
restrained toward members of other nations, 
even when they are friends.  
8.9 2.40 1.32 13.7 2.58 1.42 
Openness to the world brings every nation 
more harms than benefits.  7.1 2.40 1.22 7.9 2.37 1.29 
Nationally mixed marriages are doomed to 
failure in advance.  5.4 2.00 1.23 7.2 2.19 1.29 
 
The comparison between the adult and young participants indicates a more 
pronounced level of results by the adults both in percentages of answers, and in 
their mean values. The ranking of the answers is almost identical (except for the 
third and fourth attitudes) and, to summarize, we notice it shows several tenden-
cies. 
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1. Both groups of participants predominantly accept the attitude that signifies 
national identification, but the adults accept it somewhat more often (61.8% 
compared to 53.0%, that is, 4.37 versus 4.28). 
2. Three attitudes that belong to a more tolerant worldview or cosmopolitism 
follow, but they are more strongly accepted by the adults. 
3. After that come the attitudes that signify a pronounced national identifica-
tion and ethnocentrism, and here as well, the adults accept the more 
extreme answers better. 
 
We can conclude with sufficient reliability that both the young and the adult 
participants demonstrate a very similar hierarchy of attitudes related to national 
identity and that all these attitudes are increasingly accentuated with age. 
The results of the factor analysis on the sample of adult participants (Table 
5) indicate that the very structure of orientations of national identity is very 
similar in youth and in the adult age, where three of the yielded factors explain 
55.6% of the total variance. 
 
Table 5: The factor structure of national identity – adults 
Attitudes 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
I feel like a member of my nation and that feeling has 
priority.  .764   
Every member of my nation should always and in every 
way appreciate our nation more than others.  .718 .362  
Each nation needs to renew and cherish its national ideals.  .700   
Even the flaws of one's nation should be loved.  .654   
Nationally mixed marriages are doomed to failure in 
advance.   .762  
One should always be cautious and restrained toward 
members of other nations, even when they are friends.  .323 .707  
Openness to the world brings every nation more harms 
than benefits.   .701  
Humanity is the only real human community so every 
division into nations is harmful of meaningless.    .713 
I feel like a member of my own nation as much as a 
member of the community of the human kind.   .663 
No relevant trait comes out of one's national affiliation.    .659 
Every nation needs to be open to the world and the 
influence of other cultures.   .635 
% of common variance 21.2 17.6 16.8 
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The factors are very similar to those obtained from the sample of young 
participants, both in their structure, and in the interpretation of the total variance. 
A certain difference is noticeable only in the first component, where, unlike 
the structure obtained from the young population, there is an attitude missing – 
the one that determines an equal sense of belonging to one's own nation and the 
human community in general – and instead of it we find, even if it is less 
saturated, a typical ethnocentric claim that members of other nations should be 
doubted, even if they are friends. In other words, this factor outlines a more 
radical pattern of national identity in the adult population compared to the young 
(which is why it can be labeled as “emphasized national identification” ), while 
the remaining two – ethnocentrism and cosmopolitism – stay the same. 
After looking at the new findings gained through the comparison of adult 
and young participants, let us return to the analysis of our basic sample (youth) 
with the intention of determining possible differences and correlations between 
the factors of national identity and attitudes about European integration (Tables 
6 and 7). For this purpose, we will use the most representative attitudes from 
each of the factors (the highest saturated statement for each latent dimension 
summarized into three categories of answers), and by the χ2 test analyze the sig-
nificance of differences in regard to the two attitudes toward the European 
Union: the one signifying a perception of the European Union (“What is your 
general perception of the European Union?” ) and the one measuring the support 
of Croatian accession to the EU (“Do you support the Croatian accession to the 
European Union?” ). The correlation will be tested through regression analysis. 
The item that signifies the factor of national identification is: “I feel like a 
member of my nation and that feeling has priority” (0.76). 
The factor of ethnocentrism is best represented by the attitude: “One should 
always be cautious and restrained toward members of other nations, even when 
they are friends” (0.74). 
Cosmopolitism is best represented by the attitude: “No relevant trait comes 
from one's national affiliation” (0.72). 
With these three attitudes the answers were summarized into three catego-
ries: “I completely or generally disagree” , “I neither agree nor disagree” and “I 
completely or generally agree” . 
The attitude that measures the perception of the EU was also simplified into 
three degrees of answers: “very or mostly negative” perception, “neutral” and 
“very or mostly positive” . 
Finally, the participants' support for Croatia joining the EU was dichoto-
mized into Yes or No. 
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Table 6: The representative attitudes of national identification and the perception 
of European Union (%) 
General perception of EU 
Representative attitudes of national 
identity 
Negative or 
very 
negative 
Neutral 
Positive or 
very positive 
NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION χ2=12.58; s.s.=4; p=.01 
I completely or 
generally disagree 13.6 47.6 38.8 
I neither agree nor 
disagree 10.7 56.6 32.8 
I completely or 
generally agree 15.6 50.1 34.3 
I feel like a 
member of my 
nation and that 
feeling has 
priority.  
Total 13.9 51.4 34.6 
ETHNOCENTRISM χ2=24.26; s.s.=4; p=.001 
I completely or 
generally disagree 12.3 49.2 38.5 
I neither agree nor 
disagree 12.2 57.3 30.6 
I completely or 
generally agree 18.9 51.3 29.7 
One should 
always be 
cautious and 
restrained 
toward 
members of 
other nations, 
even when they 
are friends.  
Total 13.7 51.6 34.7 
COSMOPOLITISM χ2=11.04; s.s.=4; p=.03 
I completely or 
generally disagree 19.2 47.7 33.0 
I neither agree nor 
disagree 14.0 52.1 33.9 
I completely or 
generally agree 12.1 52.4 35.5 
No relevant 
trait comes 
from one's 
national 
affiliation.  
Total 13.8 51.5 34.6 
 
If we apply stricter criteria of significant differences, from 0.01 and less, 
we will conclude that the attitude of national identification and ethnocentrism 
statistically significantly discriminate the participants regarding their perception 
of the EU, while cosmopolitism does not yield any differences. In other words, 
the ethnocentric participants and, to a lesser degree, those with a pronounced 
national identification, have a negative perception about the European Union 
more often than others. The percentages are visible in the Table, and we do not 
insist on them, since they vary too often to be relevant, while the tendencies will 
probably remain the same. 
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This approach is especially important when we consider the attitude toward 
joining the European Union, for it depends on many social and political factors, 
or simply on the estimated amount of time that separates a country from the 
beginning or the end of the EU integration process, and as such are, actually, a 
non-scientific category. The directions and tendencies are, on the other hand, 
permanent, because they rely on the relationship between phenomena. 
Thus, the relationship between attitudes that best represent the national 
identification, ethnocentrism and cosmopolitism and the attitudes toward 
Croatian accession to the EU are portrayed in Table 7. 
Only ethnocentrism statistically significantly differentiates youth regarding 
their support for Croatia's accession to the European Union, where the nationally 
exclusive participants refuse to support that accession more often than others. 
 
Table 7: The representative attitudes of national identity and attitude toward 
Croatia’s accession to the European Union (%) 
Support for Croatia’s 
accession to the EU Representative attitudes of national identity 
Yes No 
NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION χ2=0.79; s.s.=2; p=.06 
I completely or generally 
disagree 87.1 12.9 
I neither agree nor disagree 88.5 11.5 
I completely or generally 
agree 87.0 13.0 
I feel like a 
member of my 
nation and that 
feeling has priority.  
Total 87.47 12.6 
ETHNOCENTRISM χ2=20.47; s.s.=2; p=.001 
I completely or generally 
disagree 89.1 10.9 
I neither agree nor disagree 89.5 10.5 
I completely or generally 
agree 81.0 19.0 
One should always 
be cautious and 
restrained toward 
members of other 
nations, even when 
they are friends.  Total 87.5 12.5 
COSMOPOLITISM χ2=0.73; s.s.=2; p=.70 
I completely or generally 
disagree 86.1 13.9 
I neither agree nor disagree 87.5 12.5 
I completely or generally 
agree 87.8 12.2 
No relevant trait 
comes from one's 
national affiliation.  
Total 87.5 12.5 
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We can, then, conclude that cosmopolitism most probably lacks the predic-
tive value about the attitude of youth toward Croatia's accession into the EU, 
while a strong national identification and especially national exclusiveness 
might contribute to the negative perception of institutionalized Europe and a 
negative attitude toward European associations. 
Finally, it remains to note that, at the moment the research was conducted, 
only one fifth of the more ethnocentric participants expressed a negative attitude 
toward Croatia’s accession to the European Union, which is a far cry from those 
values today. 
4. Attitudes toward other nations 
One of the interesting ways to research the problem of national identity is 
social distance, understood as an active dimension of prejudice, that is, the 
readiness to undertake certain actions toward a specific social object. To be 
more precise, it measures the acceptable degree of intimacy in relationships with 
members of a certain social group. The concept, as is well known, was 
operationalized by Bogardus in 1925, when the famous Bogardus scale of social 
distance was constructed, which was later used in thousands of research projects 
in the original or a modified form. In its original form the instrument measures 
the readiness of the participant to have one or more of the following types of 
relationships with a certain group (not its better or worse members, that he/she is 
personally acquainted with, but with the group in general, that is with its ideal-
type representatives): marriage or being closely related, personal friendship in 
the same circle or club, neighborhood, common work environment, citizen of the 
same country, visiting my country, complete exclusion from my country. 
Our research used a similar instrument, but corrected so that it does not 
have any negative relationships, that is, it does not offer exclusion from the 
country as an answer, but rather different forms of relationships, from the least 
to the most intimate: from marriage or close relation (7), through performing key 
functions in the political life of a country (6), being companions and visiting 
each other (5), being one's superior at work (4), cooperation at work (3), 
neighborhood (2) and permanent life in the same country (1). Social distance 
was measured in regard to Croats and 13 other nationalities (Albanians, 
Americans, Bosnians, Montenegrins, Czechs, French, Italians, Hungarians, 
Macedonians, Germans, Russians, Slovenians and Serbs). 
Even though the list of nationalities is identical to the one in the 1999 
research, the data, unfortunately, are not comparable because in 2004 it was only 
possible to give one answer for each nation, while the number of answers was 
not defined before. The results obtained are portrayed in Table 8. 
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Table 8: The social distance toward the members of certain nations – youth 
Nationality 
Readiness to be closely 
related (%) 
M S.D. 
Croats 64.6 5.71 2.13 
Italians 19.2 3.64 2.23 
Germans 16.6 3.60 2.15 
French 17.9 3.56 2.22 
Americans 15.9 3.43 2.15 
Hungarians 12.8 3.06 2.13 
Czech 12.3 2.93 2.13 
Bosnians 
(Muslims) 11.4 2.92 2.13 
Slovenians 12.5 2.85 2.16 
Russians 11.1 2.84 2.11 
Macedonians 10.8 2.77 2.11 
Montenegrins 9.4 2.51 2.06 
Serbs 9.7 2.44 2.10 
Albanians 8.4 2.38 2.02 
 
At the end of the ranking scale are nations from the former Yugoslav 
federation (except for the Russians) – from Albanians, which are last, with an 
average grade of 2.38 (out of the possible 7) and 8.4% from the young citizens 
of Croatia that would have the most intimate relationships with them (marital or 
close relations), to Bosnians, with an average grade of 2.93 and 11.4% who are 
ready for all forms of personal relationships. The Czechs and Hungarians are in 
the middle of the ranking scale, but still with an under average grade (approxi-
mately 3). Americans are the first nationality that young Croats demonstrate 
something we might call an average social closeness to (average grade 3.4 and 
15.9% of those ready for the most intimate relationships), and in that same 
group, but with somewhat higher grades, are also the French, the Germans and 
(as the most acceptable from all the other nations) the Italians (3.64 and 19.2% 
respectively). The degree of social closeness that young Croats show to other 
Croatian men and women indicate that they are not so kind to their own nation 
either: 5.71 and less than two thirds of participants with an affinity toward the 
most intimate of relationships with, for the most part, their own nation (that is, 
35.4% believe they do not have any!). 
Similar data was obtained from the adult participants, with two relevant 
differences: that they prefer German over Italians (3.21 compared to 3.12, or 
13.9% verus13.3% regarding their readiness for close relations) and that they, on 
average, demonstrate a greater ethnic distance than the young. So, while the 
mean value of answers for Croats is 5.62 as opposed to 5.71, it is indicative that 
no other nation achieved even an average value of ethnic closeness (3.5): 
National Identity and Attitudes toward Europe 
 203
Germans, Italians, the French and Americans reach medium values from 3.06 to 
3.21, while every other nation is below that grade, where Russians, Montene-
grins, Serbs and Albanians share values under 2.5. 
It is our conclusion that, regarding the distance toward members of other 
nationalities, some old prejudices have yet to be overcome in Croatia, especially 
with citizens of middle and older age. Table 9 illustrates these claims. 
 
Table 9: The social distance toward the members of certain nations – adults 
Nationality 
Readiness to be closely 
related (%) 
M S.D. 
Croats 64.0 5.62 2.23 
Italians 13.9 3.21 2.15 
Germans 13.3 3.12 2.15 
French 12.5 3.07 2.1 
Americans 13 3.06 2.17 
Hungarians 11.6 2.83 2.11 
Czech 11.7 2.79 2.11 
Bosnians (Muslims) 10.7 2.6 2.07 
Slovenians 10.9 2.6 2.08 
Russians 9.9 2.57 2.04 
Macedonians 9.7 2.43 2.03 
Montenegrins 9.5 2.33 2.02 
Serbs 10.1 2.31 2.06 
Albanians 9.1 2.16 1.97 
 
Finally, the claim that the participants from older generations are more 
ethnocentric than today's youth is corroborated by the inter-generational differences 
in the assessment of inequality between certain social groups in Croatia, as well as 
the differences in the perception of danger to national identity caused by Croatia's 
accession to the EU. The final two tables (10 and 11) indicate that the participants 
from the adult population believe that national minorities are a privileged group 
somewhat more often than the young, and more often think that Croatia’s accession 
to the European Union is going to endanger the Croatian national identity. 
 
Table 10: The assessment of the position of members of national minorities in 
comparison to Croats – youth and adults (%) 
 Age Worse Same Better 
 Youth 33.3 51.8 14.9 
 Adults 26.6 57.3 16.1 
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Table 11: The attitude that joining the EU endangers the identity of the Croatian 
nation – youth and adults 
 Age Complete agreement (%) M S.D. 
 Youth 16.3 2.26 1.05 
 Adults 21.1 2.37 1.11 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have analyzed the national identity and linked it to the 
attitudes toward European integration. The relationship toward one's own nation 
was investigated with a battery of 11 attitudes that participants reacted to on a 
Likert agreement scale with five degrees. 
The answers indicate that the attitudes most accepted by the young are 
moderate national identification, followed by those that signify openness to the 
world, while ethnocentric statements are the least represented of the obtained 
hierarchy of attitudes. 
The fact is that the attitude that best represents national identification is, for 
the first time in our research projects, at the top of the rank, as is evident that the 
nationally infused attitudes, both moderate and the extreme, are more 
represented in comparison to 1986 and 1999. It would be arbitrary to ascribe this 
increase in national identity in the young to some isolated factor. It can be 
assumed that the growing uncertainty regarding the future, the decreasing trust 
in political leadership, the more and more pronounced existential problems, the 
growing differences between the rich and the poor, and narrowing perspectives 
all result in a search for a safer model of relationship toward others, to the 
society as a whole and to some of its parts. The nation represents the only safe 
haven, such as the family and the Church, and it is understandable that in the 
context of social instability, they gain importance. 
Aside from that, we need to mention that the attitudes of openness to the 
world, that are often complementary and not opposed to attitudes of national 
identification, remain stable and strong. This, at the same time, points to the 
complexity of the problem of national identity and the fact that it does not have 
to be exclusive, but it may coexist along with attitudes that contribute to the 
European association processes. 
Regarding their national identity, of course, the young are not homogenous, 
but rather different subgroups react in different ways. The three obtained factor 
structures of national identity (moderate national identification, radical 
ethnocentrism and pronounced cosmopolitism) produce the strongest differences 
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regarding religious self-identification, regional status and the party preferences 
of the participants. Thus the nationally oriented youth are significantly more 
religious than others; they vote for the conservative parties and live in Dalmatia, 
Central and Eastern Croatia. They are more often than others from rural areas, 
from families in which the father has a lower level of education, they are 
themselves less educated, and within the youth sample, they belong to the 
youngest cohort (15-19 years of age) and the pupil group. A greater national 
identity is also demonstrated by the unemployed, which is in line with the view 
of ethnocentrism as a protective mechanism of an individual's personality. An 
extremely low national identity is expressed by young participants of an Istrian, 
Zagreb and Northern Croatian provenience, by those that are religiously 
undecided or atheists, from an urban area and with a higher level of family and 
personal education. 
On the other hand, the young demonstrate much more homogenous results 
with regard to cosmopolitism. 
The control group of participants (those older than 30) produced a similar 
hierarchy of attitudes related to national identity, with an analogous structure, 
with the specific of almost all the attitudes being more strongly expressed, which 
might have to do with the polarization and, most probably, petrifaction of 
internalized attitudes. The phenomenon of polarization is a necessary by-product 
of an accumulation of experience, while petrifaction on the one hand is a product 
of age and the psycho-physiological changes it brings with it, and on the other, 
channels experience in one direction and enhances its selective accumulation. 
National identity was related with the perception of the European Union 
and the support for Croatia’s accession to the EU. Aware of the mutability of 
such attitudes, that must often be treated primarily as an expression of public 
opinion, we decided to approach them with caution and include only the main 
tendencies. 
Thus, we can conclude with a sufficient amount of reliability that the more 
ethnocentric participants and, to a lesser degree, those with a pronounced 
national identification, have a negative perception of the European Union more 
often than others, while cosmopolitism again fails to produce any statistically 
significant differences. 
In regard of the need for Croatia to enter the EU, only ethnocentrism differ-
entiates the young in a statistically significant manner, where the nationally 
more exclusive participants tend to refuse to support Croatia’s accession to the 
European Union more often than others, while cosmopolitism and (a moderate) 
national identification have no predictive value. 
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Finally, we decided to investigate the social (ethnic) distance toward 
certain nations, both those that Croatia built with the former Yugoslav federa-
tion, as well as Western and Central European nations. 
In general, the nations of the former Yugoslav federation and the Russians 
are at the end of the rank, with low grades, while as somewhat under averagely 
validated, are the members of some Central European nations (Czechs and 
Hungarians), who are in the middle of the ranking scale. The inhabitants of the 
European West and Southwest, especially Italians, who take up the first position 
after the Croats themselves, and Germans, demonstrate satisfactory results just 
by being evaluated with average grades. The degree of social closeness young 
citizens of Croatia feel toward other Croatian men and women, finally, indicates 
a certain dose of self-criticism, because approximately one third of the young 
participants have no personal affinity toward, in the most part, their own nation, 
who they would rather not form more permanent institutionalized intimate 
relationships with. 
Similar data was obtained from the adult participants: the ranking of social 
distance is for the most part identical; however, they on average demonstrate a 
greater social distance than the young. Thus, it is significant that no nationality, 
aside from Croats, reached an average grade of ethnic closeness (3.5). We 
conclude that in regard of the distance toward persons of other nationalities, as 
well as ethnic attitudes toward them in Croatia, some old habits have not yet 
been eliminated, especially in citizens that are of middle or elderly age. 
This more emphasized ethnocentrism in the adult generations would, 
theoretically speaking, corroborate the theory of integration of the SIT and the 
SCT models, versus the socio-cognitive model. The integrated SIT and SCT 
model does not presume it is possible to reduce prejudice and ethnical prefer-
ence after a certain age in childhood, after which prejudice might increase, 
including ethnic prejudice, and preference of the in-groups in certain social 
contexts. It is obvious that we belong to just such a (multi-ethnically burdened) 
social context. 
We must emphasize the fact that, in spite of the intergenerational differences 
in national identity to the benefit of the adult group, we found intergenerational 
differences that focus on the youngest participants in our sample (15-19 years of 
age). Several authors have already noticed this phenomenon and have described it 
with a so-called U-curve, which vividly illustrates the higher national focus of an 
individual in the earlier and later stages of life, as an expression of, respectively, 
an adolescent transitional crisis and a long-term perseverance in perceiving and 
producing (obviously) negative experiences with a certain out-group. 
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Vlasta Ilišin 
Ivona Mendeš 
YOUTH AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
INTEGRATION 
1. Introduction 
European integration is a complex, dynamic and relatively long-lasting 
process. It is common knowledge that ideas and initiatives about integration 
appeared just after World War II, and that the process of unification progressed 
continually in spite of occasional standstills and difficulties (Mintas-Hodak, 
2004; Obradović, 2004). It is also undeniable that the European Union has its 
roots in economic interests, but from the initial economically oriented 
unification of six European countries, this process is gradually extending the 
areas of integration, as the number of European countries joining the Union also 
grows (Davies, 2003). Therefore, the European Union today is a community of 
25 countries, and with the dominating economic aspect, the political, social and 
cultural dimensions of integration have gained in strength. In the half century of 
its existence, the institutions, competences and policies of the European Union 
have been formulated to solve the problems the governments of individual 
countries could not solve themselves, but the discussion on whether these 
institutions, competences and policies solve the existing problems more 
successfully, and what the future will bring in this regard, might be a long one 
(Kraus, 2000; Pinder, 2003). 
The sector and geographic expansion of the European Union causes 
changes in research into the phenomenon of European integration. As S. Hix and 
K. H. Goetz (2000: 2) state, from the beginning of this process, the theoretical 
and empirical efforts were primarily focused on the findings and an analysis of 
the influence of the institutions and protagonists of the member countries on the 
development of the EU, while recently – initiated by the enlargement of EU to 
the less developed European South in the 1980s – greater emphasis is being 
placed on an analysis of the EU’s influence on the pace and scope of changes in 
the member countries. It is certainly possible to add that this shift in the 
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researchers' interest was especially clear after the single biggest enlargement of 
EU in 2004, when eight post-socialist countries were among the 10 new 
members. These countries were as little as 15 ago, in an economic and political 
sense, completely incompatible with the states that created and developed the 
EU, and the transitional processes obviously occurred at such a pace and quality 
to prepare them for full membership. In spite of the admitted readiness, it is 
logical to assume that the EU can and is acting in a number of areas in those 
countries directly, as those that ultimately demand certain adjustments to 
existing European standards and norms, as well as indirectly, as a strengthener 
of existing or new trends and as a catalyst in the creation of new institutional 
forms, all aimed at achieving institutions and their functions more appropriate to 
the Union. 
As for the influence on the member states, the best researched area is 
certainly the influence of integration on public opinion, most of all the 
perception of the EU among the citizens of the countries it includes. This 
research is constantly stimulated by the EU and there is a very logical reason for 
this. Namely, European integration is a project primarily initiated and led by the 
political elite (Hix, Goetz, 2000: 14), but since the key role in its acceptance and 
development belongs to the citizens of member countries, it is necessary to 
monitor their reactions to the events occurring both on the European and the 
national level. Most research of this kind starts with a utilitarian hypothesis, 
suggesting that individuals and groups in the member states evaluate the EU 
from the viewpoint of their real or assumed concrete interests (Eichenberg, 
Dalton, 1993; Gabel, Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998). According to a number of 
authors, the reason for this is the fact that the EU is dominantly perceived among 
the European citizens as an economic community, while the citizens outside 
Europe – for example, the USA – primarily view this Union as a political 
community (Duch, Taylor, 1997; Gabel, Whitten, 1997; Mitev, 1999; Topalova, 
2000). However, when the creation, processes and relationships within the 
European Union are put in the context of game theory, citizens seem to 
understand them more and more as a non-zero-sum game, instead of a game 
with a specified “amount of cake” (Perko-Šeparović, 1975; McLean, 1997) – in 
other words, the winnings of one protagonist (whether it is a national state, the 
European Union itself, a local authority or an individual) brings about an 
increase in the total power and welfare of the system, while the competitive 
conception of the enlargement and deepening process of the EU still exists, but 
emphasized to a much lesser degree. 
The numerous pieces of research of European public opinion have resulted 
in the determination of several basic tendencies. It has been demonstrated that 
the attitudes about the EU change, under the influence of internal and external 
factors (that is, events and processes in individual countries and at the EU level); 
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that the reception of the EU differs from country to country, depending on the 
peculiarities of each country; that different social and interest groups in member 
countries have different expectations from European integration; that the support 
for European integration is predominantly under the influence of the economic 
component, that is, the relationship of national and economic conditions toward 
expected measurable benefits is decisive; that citizens from countries and 
regions thought to have comparative advantages, also expect greater benefits and 
express stronger support for the EU (Eichenberg, Dalton, 1993; Duch, Taylor, 
1997; Gabel, Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998; Green, 1999; Nelsen, Guth, 2003). 
However, it is believed that, aside from these socio-economic elements, the 
positive attitude toward the EU is affected by political and cultural factors, that 
is, the perception of the need for the democratization of certain countries and 
societies, the existence of a larger amount of social capital, especially in the 
dimension of trust (where the trust in national institutions is transferred to the 
EU level), a greater openness toward other cultures and nations (along with a 
positive attitude toward immigrants) and the increase in cultural awareness about 
the European identity that is, incidentally, stronger among the young than among 
the adults (Turner, 1994; Mitev, Riordan, 1996; Žagar, 1998; Green, 1999; Hix, 
Goetz, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Topalova, 2000; Nelsen, Guth, 2003; Adnanes, 
2004, Pinterić, 2005). These tendencies may be summarized in a statement that 
the attitudes of citizens towards the EU are in a very dynamic and permeable 
category that is predominantly under the influence of the specific political, 
socio-cultural, social and especially socio-economic circumstances, both at the 
national and European levels. 
Croatia is a good example of these outlined trends. Some research findings 
have already indicated that the support for the EU and Croatia’s accession 
oscillates (Baranović, 2002; Ilišin, 2002). Thus, at the very start of the 
transitional period, there was the greatest support for accession, but under the 
influence of the war and disappointed expectations about the behavior of the 
international community and the EU, as well as the national homogenization and 
isolation of Croatia in the 1990s, it decreased steadily until 2000 (Sirotić, 1992; 
Ilišin, 2002), while the newest media research of the public opinion note the 
lowest level of support. Most analysts believe that the later plummeting of 
support for the European project is a direct consequence of the postponement of 
negotiations (in March 2005) on Croatia's accession to the EU due to the 
dissatisfaction of the Union with Croatia's cooperation with the Hague Court, 
which among other things, revitalizes the process of national homogenization in 
Croatia. However, this indicates that, where Croatia is concerned, both external 
and internal political conditions are key, the consequence of which is a certain 
neglect of economic, social and cultural components of the process of accession 
to the EU. As for the young in Croatia, five years ago it was stated that most of 
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them, in spite of certain reservations and fears, thought that Europe is an 
“attractive social space, making possible for both Croatia and them personally 
better conditions for development” (Baranović, 2002:152). 
Five years is a relatively long period in terms of research into public 
opinion about a phenomenon, especially regarding something as dynamic as the 
process of European integration. During this period, considerable changes 
occurred in the EU, increasing Croatia's chances for joining, as well as in 
Croatia itself, making possible the acceleration of the accession process. This 
process – for many insufficiently or semi-informed observers – stopped 
suddenly at one moment, and this certainly significantly influenced the attitudes 
of the citizens (including the young). However, one should keep in mind that 
this research was conducted at the beginning of 2004, hence, in the period of 
expectation of the avis that gave Croatia a candidate-country status in April that 
same year, which could have certainly caused an increased expression of 
positive attitudes toward the EU. 
In this analysis we are focusing on the investigation of the relationship of 
youth toward the EU. The goal of this research is to determine the expected 
advantages and disadvantages from Croatia's inclusion in the EU, how the 
potential winners and losers in the process of European integration are 
perceived, what is the perception of Europe and the European Union, and have 
there, and in which direction, been changes in the relationship towards the 
European integration. Within this formulation of the research goal, the 
differentiations among the young are investigated in terms of their different 
socio-demographic, socio-structural and socio-cultural attributes. In an analysis 
conceived in this way, we will try to give an answer to five questions: 1) are the 
young different from adults in their relationship toward the EU; 2) what kind of 
relationship do the young have regarding the dimensions of European integration 
investigated, that is, do they expect more gains or losses from Croatia's 
accession to the EU; 3) has the relationship of the young toward the EU 
changed, and in which direction, in the five-year period observed; 4) is there a 
differentiation among the young regarding their social attributes; 5) do the 
Croatian participants, most of all the young, differ from the young and the 
general population in the European Union. To determine the possible differences 
within the young population, a total of 10 attributes is used: age, gender, socio-
professional status, provenience, domicile, the level of education of the 
participants and their fathers, regional status, religious self-identification and 
party affiliation. Aside from these attributes, some analyses used seven other 
attitudes of the participants to determine possible differences within the young 
population: the perception of the young of the European Union, the perception 
of possible personal gain from Croatia’s accession to the EU, the prediction of 
the year Croatia will join the EU, satisfaction with one's own life, the vision of 
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one's own future and the future of society and the desire to leave the country. A 
comparison based on these, so-called independent variables, should demonstrate 
which of the observed attributes influences the perception of the EU among the 
young the most, at the individual level. Only those differences and correlations 
(obtained by the use of the χ-test and variance analysis) significant at the level of 
.0001 and less will be interpreted. As is visible from the goals of the analysis, 
comparative analysis is used on three levels – the first is a comparison of the 
young and adult participants, the second is a comparison of the research results 
of youth from 1999 and 2004, and the third is a comparison of the research 
conducted in Croatia in 2004 with European research into youth in 1997 and 
2001 and research into the general population in the European Union in 2004 
(after enlargement) and in candidate countries in 2003, before enlargement 
(however, we only have available a relatively limited number of variables for 
these comparisons, except in the case of the comparison between the young and 
the adults). 
2. The advantages and disadvantages of Croatia’s integration 
into the EU 
In this part of the analysis we are dealing with certain issues regarding the 
processes and possible consequences of Croatia's accession to the European 
Union. To be more exact, we are talking about the general perception of the EU, 
the support for Croatia's accession to this community, the estimate of the year 
Croatia might join the EU, and the assessment of the potentially positive and 
negative effects of Croatia's inclusion in this association, as well as the 
circumstances that aggravate the accession process. 
Graph 1 portrays the general image about the EU the participants had at the 
beginning of 2004. Since this is no longer an impression but a firm attitude, and 
since events have taken place in the last three years that will have certainly 
influenced the attitudes about the EU, the results would most likely look 
different today. 
Most young people had a neutral attitude towards the EU, whilst every 
third participant expressed a positive, and every seventh a negative attitude. The 
domination of a neutral relationship toward the EU, gives us the inkling that the 
subsequent events must have reduced the neutrality of the young – mostly in the 
direction of negative attitudes. The young are in this regard almost identical to 
the adults, whose attitudes are somewhat more defined in both directions. 
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Graph 1: The general perception of the European Union – youth and adults (%) 
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The young are quite homogenous in their relationship toward the EU, 
because gender and party affiliation exert the only influence (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: The general perception of the European Union regarding the attributes 
of youth (%) 
Attributes of youth 
Positive 
perception 
Neutral 
perception 
Negative 
perception 
Gender χ2=36.17 
Female 30.1 58.3 11.7 
Male 39.0 44.8 16.3 
Party affiliation χ2=39.53 
HDZ 37.7 50.1 12.2 
HNS 42.0 47.5 12.3 
HSP 26.1 44.8 29.1 
HSS 36.6 53.8 9.7 
SDP 37.5 50.4 12.1 
Undecided 31.4 55.4 13.2 
TOTAL 34.6 51.4 14.0 
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Gender differences clearly indicate that women have an above averagely 
neutral attitude toward the EU, while men state both positive and negative 
attitudes somewhat more. The party-related differentiations are expected: the 
supporters of HNS are dominant in their positive attitudes toward the EU, and 
the sympathizers of HSP in the negative. Such attitudes are convergent with the 
party rhetoric and it is visible that the young have recognized the parties that are 
most convincing in the promotion of their program directions regarding the EU. 
The participants were also asked whether they support Croatia's accession 
to the EU, where short elaborations of potential support were offered (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Reasons for supporting Croatia's accession to the EU – youth and adults (%) 
Support for Croatia's accession into the EU Youth Adults 
Yes, because I believe this will greatly benefit Croatia 21.1 18.3 
Yes, because I believe that inclusion in wider integrations and 
associations is inevitable for the survival of small countries  16.9 20.7 
Yes, although I believe too much is expected from this accession  49.5 46.9 
I do not support it 12.5 14.2 
 
As is visible, at the beginning of 2004 Croatia's accession to the EU was in 
principle supported by almost nine tenths of participants. This is a very high 
percentage, and was probably caused by the increasingly good relationship 
between Croatia and the EU, the crown of which was receiving candidate-
country status. It is also visible that the young and the adults differ amongst each 
other only slightly, where the young support accession only a little more, both as 
Euro-enthusiasts and Euro-skeptics (the first and third attitude), while the adults 
are a bit more inclined to the Euro-realistic (i.e. second) attitude. 
However, the elaboration of support is still more interesting. One fifth of 
the young that expect benefits from accession could be labeled Euro-enthusiasts; 
one sixth that believe that joining wider associations is necessary for the survival 
of small countries, might be qualified as Euro-realists; one half that expresses a 
certain reservation may be described as Euro-skeptics; and the attitudes of an 
eighth that do not support entry into the EU might be called anti-European. The 
most intriguing must certainly be the skeptical participants, not only because 
they are the most common, but also because it is a group that that may be most 
influenced by events in the EU and Croatia – whether under the influence of new 
findings they accept the project of integration as Euro-enthusiasts or Euro-
realists, or whether some of them accepts an anti-European attitude. Observed 
from the viewpoint of the goals and role of political protagonists (especially 
those in power), one may state that almost half of the young population is 
waiting for plausible arguments to be presented on the benefits of joining the 
Union. If some other protagonists on the political scene are more convincing – 
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especially if aided by events that make the initiated accession process more 
difficult than many had hoped – it is logical to expect that some of the skeptical 
participants will have crossed over to the camp of anti-European oriented 
citizens in the meantime. 
The young are noticeably different from one another considering the 
reasons for their support of joining the EU. This is indicated by the aggregated 
data in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Support for Croatia’s accession to the EU in terms of the attributes of 
youth (%) 
Attributes of youth 
Euro-
enthusiasts 
Euro-realists Euro-skeptics 
Anti-European 
attitude 
Gender χ2=18.22 
Female 18.5 16.3 54.1 11.1 
Male 23.6 17.5 45.0 13.6 
Age χ2=33.13 
15 – 19 years 27.7 15.3 45.3 11.7 
20 – 24 years 19.1 15.2 53.5 12.2 
25 – 29 years 16.7 20.3 49.5 13.5 
Socio-professional status χ2=33.13 
Employed 17.2 18.8 51.1 12.9 
Unemployed 26.0 13.5 46.2 14.4 
Pupils 28.6 16.1 45.8 9.5 
Students 14.9 18.1 54.0 13.0 
Education  χ2=63.72 
Primary school or less 28.4 16.7 44.5 10.4 
Vocational school 26.6 9.9 47.9 15.6 
High school 15.9 17.9 53.2 13.1 
College, univ. or more 15.0 24.8 50.0 10.2 
Regional status χ2=53.12 
Northern Croatia 18.7 16.7 50.7 13.9 
Central Croatia 22.5 15.6 52.0 9.8 
Istria and Primorje 14.5 21.5 53.3 10.7 
Eastern Croatia 27.0 14.2 45.4 13.4 
Dalmatia 29.1 14.5 44.6 11.7 
Zagreb 12.8 20.5 53.8 12.8 
TOTAL 21.1 16.9 49.5 12.5 
 
The differentiation of the young is most influenced by the level of 
education achieved: with its increase, Euro-enthusiasm grows weaker, and Euro-
realism prevails. At the same time, young people educated for a blue-collar 
occupation seem to choose the Euro-realistic elaboration the least, and have an 
above average demonstration of an anti-European attitude; the young with a high 
school education are Euro-skeptics above average, and the highly educated are 
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Euro-realists (and, accept the anti-European orientation the least, just like those 
with the lowest levels of education). The regional differences are interesting: 
most Euro-enthusiasts are from Dalmatia and Eastern Croatia, and least from 
Zagreb, Istria and Primorje, where there are most Euro-realists and Euro-
skeptics, while anti-European attitudes are most rarely expressed by the young 
from Central Croatia and Istria and Primorje. The differences based on socio-
professional status are also intriguing: pupils and unemployed youth 
demonstrate the most enthusiasm, and the least Euro-skepticism, however, the 
pupils express the least and the unemployed the most anti-European opinions; 
students are Euro-skeptics above average, and below the average when it comes 
to Euro-enthusiasm. The differences regarding age are partially followed by the 
differences in the socio-professional status and the differences in the level of 
education. It was therefore, demonstrated that with the increase in age, Euro-
enthusiasm decreases and Euro-realism, and somewhat the anti-European 
orientation decrease, while most Euro-skeptics may be found in the middle aged 
cohort of the young. Finally, young women express more Euro-skepticism, and 
young men more Euro-enthusiasm and anti-European attitudes. 
The stated differences observed together indicate that the choice of the 
reason for support of entering the EU is linked to the social competence of youth 
– the more competent the young are (more educated, older and inhabiting more 
developed regions), their Euro-enthusiasm is weaker, and Euro-realism or Euro-
skepticism grow stronger. This tendency opens the question about what the 
expressed attitudes are based on. Namely, one gets the impression that a weaker 
knowledge of the social processes and relationships relevant to the accession 
process results in greater Euro-enthusiasm. Also, there is the issue of whether 
those that are presumably more socially aware (more educated, older) really 
have a better insight into the relevant occurrences, or if their skepticism 
indicates that the manner in which the project of European integration and 
Croatia's place in it is presented to the citizens, is probably not appropriate. 
The estimated year of Croatia's accession into the EU is observed here as 
an indicator of Euro-optimism and Euro-pessimism, where the concrete results 
belong to the group of those that would surely look quite different now than at 
the beginning of 2004. Table 4 portrays the answers to the question about the 
year that the participants believe might be the one Croatia joins the EU. 
In the beginning of 2004, there were two thirds of Euro-optimists among 
the young – if we combine all those expecting Croatia to join the EU by 2010, 
12% were Euro-pessimists, one fifth could not estimate and about 5% of them 
ignored the issue completely. This was a period when the highest political 
spheres disseminated optimism regarding Croatia's accession to the EU along 
with Bulgaria and Romania by 2008, so it is logical that most young people 
decided on closer dates. It is interesting though, that the adults seemed to be 
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greater optimists, and more likely to be able to assess. This generational 
difference suggests that the young might have been somewhat more critical 
toward the preparedness of Croatia for accession, so they were a little more 
reserved regarding the potential accession year. 
 
Table 4: Estimated year of Croatia's accession to the EU – youth and adults (%) 
Estimated year of Croatia's accession to EU Youth Adults 
2007/2008 29.1 35.6 
2010 33.9 34.2 
2015 7.6 5.9 
After 2015. 4.4 3.0 
I do not know 20.2 16.7 
I am not interested at all 4.8 4.6 
 
As for the young, the estimate of the date of entry into the EU varies only 
in terms of the socio-professional status and party affiliation (Table 5)1. 
 
Table 5: Estimated year of Croatia's accession to the EU regarding the attributes 
of youth (%) 
Attributes of youth 2007/2008 2010 
2015 and 
later 
I do not know 
I am not 
interested 
Socioprofessional status χ2=44.26 
Employed 29.8 31.5 11.7 21.9 5.1 
Unemployed 27.9 33.4 10.1 22.8 5.8 
Pupils 35.2 33.4 8.8 17.6 5.1 
Students 22.7 39.0 17.9 17.7 2.6 
Party affiliation χ2=73.46 
HDZ 34.5 32.7 9.0 18.5 5.2 
HNS 26.6 43.2 12.9 13.7 3.6 
HSP 26.9 38.1 17.9 14.2 3.0 
HSS 35.1 20.2 17.0 24.5 3.2 
SDP 30.4 41.9 11.2 15.4 1.2 
Undecided 25.1 30.3 12.3 25.2 7.2 
TOTAL 29.1 33.9 12.0 20.2 4.8 
 
Unlike the reasons for supporting EU accession, the estimate on when this 
is to occur depends on party affiliation. This suggests that this is a politically 
infused attitude. The greatest optimists seem to be the voters of HDZ and HSS, 
                                                     
1 A partial summarization of results was conducted for determining the statistically 
significant differences, that is, the answers “2015” and “after 2015” were combined into 
the answer “2015 and later”. 
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and a somewhat subdued optimism is expressed by the supporters of HNS and 
SDP. On the other hand, the greatest pessimists are the sympathizers of HSP, 
and a similar opinion is shared by voters of HSS, who, aside from that, are the 
ones that cannot assess above averagely. Certainly, the politically undecided 
participants are more often unable to assess or are not interested at all in the year 
of accession (while the sympathizers of SDP seem to express the greatest 
interest). As could have been expected, the pupils are most optimistic, while the 
students are more careful with their optimism and will more often be pessimistic 
in their estimate, and less likely not to be able to estimate. 
To put it briefly, the optimistic estimate of the year Croatia joins the EU at 
the beginning of 2004 was more based on wishes and faith in the rhetoric of the 
ruling political elite, and was less a result of consideration about how much 
Croatia satisfies the set criteria. 
This is exactly what the following analysis will consider. To be more 
specific, Tables 6, 7 and 8 outline how the participants estimate the 
circumstances that aggravate Croatia's accession to the EU, and the positive and 
negative effects they expect from this process. Aside from the comparison 
between the young and the adults, these tables also register the changes in the 
attitudes of youth in the past five years, and the results are ranked based on the 
answers the young gave in 2004. Here, the answers at degrees 4 and 3 were 
summarized (“completely aggravates” and “mostly aggravates”, that is, “I 
completely agree” and “I mostly agree”), for it is our goal to portray the 
dominant direction of the participants’ relationship toward the EU. 
The perception of the circumstances that aggravate Croatia's accession to 
the EU (Table 6) indicates that the participants ascribe the responsibility to 
Croatia and the EU equally2. Even though the economic unpreparedness of 
Croatia is in first place according to the young, the political conditions are 
placed quite high as well. The changes that occurred from 1999 to 2004 among 
the young are especially indicative. The tendency is unambiguous: the emphasis 
on the difficulties the EU is responsible for3 increased, while the accent on the 
                                                     
2 An almost identical ranking scale would have been gained if only the highest degree 
was portrayed, that is, the degree “very aggravating” (decided on by around 40 to 17% 
of the young). Namely, only the first two aggravating circumstances would switch 
positions, while the order in the rest of the scale would remain identical. 
3 The dissatisfaction with the EU due to the inadequate cooperation of Croatia with the 
Hague Court was not suggested as an aggravating circumstance in 1999. Namely, 
Croatia was still too far from accession in order for a greater discussion of any specific 
demand in public, even though there were indications that this problem might escalate. 
Today, it is the second most important aggravating circumstance, which along with the 
perception of overly difficult criteria and conditions unjustly imposed by the EU, must 
stimulate the increase of the negative attitude toward the Union. 
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difficulties Croatia is responsible for decreased. It would seem that the young 
are more satisfied with the situation in Croatia – especially at the political level 
(which might be an indicator of the true achievement of democratization of 
Croatian political and social life) – and that at the same time, they are less 
satisfied with the EU's relationship towards Croatia. The adults in this regard 
have even more pronounced attitudes: they see Croatia as the culprit for the 
aggravated approach less often than the young, while ascribing greater 
responsibility to the EU itself. These attitudes, both of the adults and the young, 
and especially the changes within the young population, indicate that there has 
probably been a change in the perception of the possible advantages and 
disadvantages of Croatia's accession to the EU. 
 
Table 6: A comparative outline of the perception of aggravating circumstances 
for Croatia's accession into the EU (%) 
Youth Adults 
Aggravating circumstances 
1999 2004 2004 
Insufficient economic development of Croatia 83.4 79.5 74.5 
EU's dissatisfaction with Croatia's cooperation with the 
Hague Court  – 76.3 74.4 
Insufficiently democratic social and political system in 
Croatia 83.7 75.4 71.3 
Strict EU criteria set for future members 56.1 69.8 75.1 
Incapability of the government to adapt to EU demands and 
standards  73.1 64.3 60.3 
Unjustly imposed conditions for Croatia's accession into the 
EU 50.6 63.3 70.2 
Insufficient respect for human and minority rights in Croatia  62.6 57.7 54.6 
The interests of some ruling groups in Croatia not joining 
the EU  60.6 50.1 51.2 
 
The data in Table 7 indicate that from two thirds to over four fifths of the 
young believe that in each of the offered areas Croatia will gain some advantage 
by integration into the European Union4. The greatest benefits are expected in an 
individual and socio-cultural sense, then the socio-economic, political and least 
of all the area of military protection. Even though most of the young expect 
                                                     
4 In this case, complete agreement with the potential benefits was expressed by 52 to 
28% of the young. The ranking scale based on just those answers would be different, 
because the middle of the scale would be less shifted in favor of the possibility of 
employment, a higher standard of living and better knowledge of other culures and 
religions. 
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comprehensive positive effects from accession, a comparison with the 1999 data 
indicates that there has been a reduction in the perception of the possible 
advantages in most aspects, and especially regarding the expectation of a higher 
standard of living, faster economic development and accelerated 
democratization and better protection of human rights. It is debatable whether 
these changes indicate disillusionment or whether the young today are somewhat 
more satisfied with the level of socio-economic and democratic development 
achieved in Croatia. If that is the case, the aid of the Union must seem less 
important. Judging by the previous data on the perception of the aggravating 
circumstances, the first assumption seems more probable. On the other hand, the 
expectations on the individual, that is, socio-cultural plain increased. The young 
wish to travel and meet new people, learn about cultures and religions, which 
points to the increase in the acceptance of the value of multiculturalism. 
 
Table 7: A comparative outline of the perception of positive effects of Croatia's 
accession to the EU (%) 
Youth Adults 
Expected positive consequences 
1999 2004 2004 
More opportunities to travel and make friends  79.5 83.7 79.4 
Better quality education 84.5 83.5 77.3 
Better quality and faster economic development 96.0 82.2 79.6 
Better employment opportunities 87.8 80.5 75.7 
Better protection of human and minorities rights 89.8 79.5 75.7 
Higher standards of living  91.5 77.5 72.6 
Faster democratization of the society 89.8 77.2 76.7 
Better knowledge of cultures and religions of other nations 65.2 76.2 75.2 
Better military protection of Croatia 67.5 66.2 62.4 
 
As might have been expected, the adults observe all the potential 
advantages of Croatia's accession to the EU to a smaller degree, even though a 
great majority of them believe that there will be positive changes in all the 
observed aspects. One may say that they expect Croatia to achieve the desired 
benefits to the same degree as they perceive Croatia as responsible for the 
difficulties that are in the path of accession. 
The trends visible in Table 8 are logically linked to the previously 
considered findings. Therefore, where the potentially negative consequences of 
integration are concerned, two thirds of the young are afraid of Croatian 
dependence on the developed European countries, while three fifths believe this 
increases the possibility of economic exploitation. Almost another half of the 
young think that European measures and standards limit Croatia's development, 
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while the least of them (but, still about a third) is concerned about the 
endangerment of national identity and state sovereignty5. 
 
Table 8: A comparative outline of the perception of negative effects of Croatia's 
accession to the EU (%) 
Youth Adults 
Expected negative consequences 
1999 2004 2004 
Makes Croatia dependent on the developed European 
countries (culturally, politically, economically, etc.)  37.9 66.4 70.3 
Increases the possibility for the economic exploitation of 
Croatia  36.9 59.8 66.7 
Limits the economic development of Croatia with economic 
standards and measures  25.3 48.2 50.6 
Endangers the national identity of the Croatian people 20.5 38.4 44.4 
Infringes on the sovereignty of the Croatian state 18.5 34.8 40.2 
 
This hierarchy of possible negative consequences is in line with the 
perception of the aggravating circumstances – to be more specific, if Croatia is 
not developed enough economically, its inferiority and dependence on the help 
of the rich will be even more apparent with the entrance into a far more 
developed environment. Even though, based on the examples of other less 
developed countries, Croatia might count on considerable aid after entering the 
EU, it would seem that the existing experience with the entry of foreign capital 
into Croatia causes the young to fear that similar processes might be continued 
later on. And since it was demonstrated that the young are more inclined to 
ascribe greater responsibility for the difficult process of accession to the 
European Union than to Croatia, without putting great hope in the ability of the 
government to adjust to EU demands (therefore, to adequately negotiate the 
accession), their fear for the socio-economic development of Croatia in the EU 
environment seems understandable. It is more difficult, however, to understand 
why the number of young that to a certain degree perceive all the potentially 
undesirable consequences of integration has almost doubled from 1999 to 2004. 
Namely, even if at the beginning of 2004 certain positive changes in the 
transitional countries that formally became members of the European Union in 
the spring of that year became apparent, it would seem that our young 
                                                     
5 Observing the answers only at the degree of complete agreement, the mentioned fears 
are expressed by 31 to 13% of the young, which indicates that most of those observing 
the potentially negative effects are not completely convinced that matters must end so 
poorly for Croatia. Based on just this degree of agreement, the ranking scale would look 
completely identical. 
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population either did not know about them or observed matters only from the 
viewpoint of the situation in the country and the relationship between Croatia 
and the EU in which even then – in spite of the optimistic atmosphere and the 
impression that this relationship was on the up – there was an inkling of 
significant problems. 
The adults have in this case also demonstrated their consistency: as much 
as they observed the potential advantages, they emphasized the potentially 
negative consequences of accession to a somewhat higher degree. 
The preceding comparative analysis may be summarized in the statement 
that a significant majority of both the young and the adult participants expect 
positive results from joining the EU, as well as that they equally observe the 
aggravating circumstances in the accession process, while both express fears due 
to the potentially negative circumstances to a smaller degree. Here, the young 
are the ones with the higher positive and lower negative expectations, as well as 
those that are somewhat less inclined to observe the EU as the side that 
aggravates Croatia's inclusion into EU. These trends enable us to conclude that 
the young, compared with the adults, have a somewhat more positive attitude 
toward the European Union and the integration process. 
This part will be concluded by a factor analysis of the 22 variables 
observed as an indicator of the relationship toward the European Union. Table 9 
portrays the structure of factors obtained (with total variance of 57.4%), and 
Table 10 portrays the summarized results of the variance analysis. 
The factor analysis produced some very interesting factors, and in the first 
two cases factors with unambiguous tendencies, while the variance analysis 
indicates that there is a limited number of differences among the young. 
The first factor may, without calculation, be labeled as a pro-European 
orientation, and it is especially interesting that it includes all nine of the 
suggested advantages of Croatia's accession to the European Union. This means 
that the young advocating the pro-European orientation above averagely find all 
the dimensions of integration to be equally important – the socio-economic, 
socio-cultural and political. The young are very homogenous in accepting the 
pro-European orientation, and only their party affiliation contributes to 
statistically significant (albeit weak) differences. It is visible in Table 10 that the 
HDZ voters above averagely, and sympathizers of HSP below averagely 
advocate the pro-European orientation. The position of the HSP voters is 
expected, while the attitudes of HDZ's sympathizers might be clearer after an 
examination of other results. 
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Table 9: The factor structure of the difficulties and consequences of Croatia's 
accession to the EU 
Difficulties and consequences of 
Croatia's accession to the EU 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Factor 
5 
Better quality education .754     
Better employment opportunities .739     
Higher standards of living .722     
Better protection of human and minorities’ rights .720     
Better quality and faster economic development .690     
Faster democratization of society .681     
Better knowledge of cultures and religions of other 
nations .648     
Better military protection of Croatia .631     
More opportunities to travel and make friends .618     
Makes Croatia dependent on the developed 
European countries   .779    
Increases the possibility for the economic 
exploitation of Croatia  .764    
Limits the economic development of Croatia   .757    
Infringes on the sovereignty of the Croatian state  .740    
Endangers the national identity of the Croatian 
people  .739    
Integration is aggravated by the insufficiently 
democratic social and political system in Croatia   .742   
Integration is aggravated by the insufficient 
economic development of Croatia   .721   
Integration is aggravated by the EU's 
dissatisfaction with Croatia's cooperation with the 
Hague Court 
  .563   
Integration is aggravated by the strict EU criteria 
set for future members    .820  
Integration is aggravated by the unjustly imposed 
conditions for Croatia's accession into the EU    .803  
Integration is aggravated by the interests of some 
ruling groups in Croatia not joining the EU     .760 
Integration is aggravated by the incapability of the 
government to adapt to EU demands and standards   .466  .561 
Integration is aggravated by the insufficient respect 
for human and minority rights in Croatia   .434  .560 
% of common variance 20.0 14.3 9.0 7.5 6.6 
 
The second factor is also unambiguous in content, and thus labeled the 
anti-European orientation. It includes all five attitudes related to potentially 
negative consequences of Croatia's accession to the EU, which testifies to the 
consistency of the anti-European orientation. In this case as well, party 
identification is what differentiates the youth, joined by their religiousness. To 
be more exact, both the sympathizers of HDZ and HSP express an above 
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average anti-European orientation, as well as the more religious participants. 
The voters of HNS, HSS and SDP and the non-religious and the religiously 
undecided participants are at the opposite end of the spectrum. 
 
Table 10: Differences among the young in accepting the factors of difficulties 
and consequences of Croatia's accession to the EU 
Attributes of 
youth 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Factor 
5 
Place of birth    F-ratio=6.61  
Village    +  
Small town    0  
Major city    –  
Zagreb    –  
Place of habitat     F-ratio=8.36  
Village    +  
Small town    0  
Major city    –  
Zagreb    –  
Regional status    F-ratio=8.72  
Northern Croatia    0  
Central Croatia    +  
Istria and 
Primorje    –  
Eastern Croatia    +  
Dalmatia    0  
Zagreb    –  
Religiousness  F-ratio=9.24 F-ratio=8.88 F-ratio=21.85 F-ratio=9.49 
Religious  + – + - 
Undecided  – + 0 + 
Not religious  – + – + 
Party affiliation F-ratio=4.94 F-ratio=7.62  F-ratio=15.71  
HDZ + +  +  
HNS 0 –  –  
HSP – +  +  
HSS 0 –  +  
SDP 0 –  –  
Undecided 0 0  0  
Legend: – below common average; 0 within common average; + above common average 
 
The three remaining factors were produced by the grouping of the 
perceived circumstances that aggravate Croatia's accession to the EU. The third 
factor was, therefore, labeled as political and economic aggravating 
circumstances, because it is constructed by attitudes ascribing the responsibility 
to Croatia, most of all because of the insufficient democratization of the society, 
economic development and cooperation with The Hague Court. These 
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circumstances are above averagely expressed as aggravating for the desired 
integration by the non-religious and undecided participants (versus the religious 
ones) and the inhabitants of Northern Croatia, Istria and Primorje (contrary to 
the participants from Dalmatia). 
Imposed barriers to integration (the fourth factor) is again unambiguous: it 
consists of attitudes that see the EU as the main culprit for the existence of 
aggravating circumstances in the accession process. This is a latent dimension 
that, in a certain sense, might be seen as close to the anti-European orientation, 
although in this case, the young are less homogenous. As seen in Table 10, the 
responsibility of the EU is emphasized more often by the youth of a rural 
provenience and domicile, those living in Central and Eastern Croatia, the 
religious participants and those more inclined to HDZ, HSP and HSS. At the 
same time, the perception of the EU as the party responsible for the existing 
difficulties in Croatia's accession process is shared far less often by the young 
born and living in larger urban centers and Istria, Primorje and Zagreb. They are 
joined by the non-religious participants and sympathizers of HNS and SDP. 
Finally, the fifth factor – obstruction and lack of preparedness for 
integration – again determines Croatia's responsibility for the existence of 
aggravating circumstances on the way to EU. Here, certain society groups are 
recognized as deliberately acting toward keeping Croatia out of the EU, 
followed by the inability of the government to adjust to EU demands, as well as 
insufficient efforts put into the protection of human rights. The only difference 
was based on religious self-identification – the religious participants attribute 
less responsibility to Croatia, unlike the non-religious or the religiously 
undecided participants. 
After an examination of the trends obtained, the participants' orientation 
according to party identification certainly deserves to be commented on, 
especially since it turned out to be the most influential attribute when it comes to 
the investigated segment of youth toward the EU. The HSP voters (consistently 
anti-European oriented), or the sympathizers of HNS and SDP (as those most 
inclined toward the EU) are not the surprise, however, those supporting HDZ 
invoke some confusion. 
This group of youth is actually noticeably divided into those pro-European 
and anti-European oriented regarding the possible positive and negative 
consequences of Croatia's accession to the EU. Namely, the supporters of HDZ 
are dominant in expressing Euro-enthusiasm (choosing a nearer date for 
Croatia's entrance into the EU with greater perception of potential advantages of 
this act), which might be interpreted as an unreserved acceptance of the new 
policy of the party and government leadership. At the same time, the HDZ 
voters are among those that above averagely demonstrate anti-European 
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attitudes (that is, perceive the potential undesirable consequences of integration 
more and blame the EU for imposing barriers more), which is actually similar to 
the attitudes expressed by the sympathizers of HDZ in 19996, when the party 
leadership also manifested a distance, to say the least, from Europe and 
European values and standards. This division of HDZ's young electorate 
coincides with analytical insights warning that the convergence of attitudes of 
HDZ voters and the party elite is seriously endangered precisely because of their 
relationships toward the EU. It would mean that based on this – especially if 
Croatia's accession to the EU is a lengthy process – one might expect further 
differentiation (and political splits) in HDZ, as well as dispersal of the party 
electorate. Finally, the results of the 2003 parliamentary elections and 2005 local 
elections clearly indicated that the support for HSP (as an advocate of the anti-
European policy) is increasing at HDZ's expense. It is logical to assume that this 
process is not yet finalized and that the portion of HDZ's supporters, harboring 
an anti-European orientation, might redirect their sympathies toward HSP. To 
put it briefly, HDZ's shift toward the right center caused dissatisfaction in their 
right-wing supporters, who then decided in favor of a more appropriate political 
option. 
The second most significant, and interesting, is the influence of religious 
self-identification on the relationship toward the EU. It was clearly shown that 
declared religiousness – which in Croatia can be identified with the Catholic 
denomination – is related with the increased advocating of an anti-European 
orientation, as well as criticism regarding the EU's role in the process of 
Croatia's accession to this association, and at the same time, with a decreased 
acceptance of Croatia's responsibility for slowing down this process. This 
tendency is in line with the change in the population of youth in Europe, 
indicating that among the young Catholics – who have for decades supported the 
European integration process more than the Protestants and atheists – this 
support has been decreasing over the last few years (Nelsen, Guth, 2003: 110). 
Indirectly, this means that certain signals arriving from the top of the Catholic 
Church, were interpreted by believers as a sign of disapproval (for example, the 
dissatisfaction with omitting the Christian tradition from the bases of the 
proposed European Constitution was quite explicitly expressed). However, 
certain specific moments must be at work in Croatia as well, such as the link 
                                                     
6 Five years ago, HDZ supporters, as well as today, accepted the anti-Eurpean 
orientation more than the others, and emphasized the issue of imposed barriers, and 
accepted the responsibility of Croatia for aggravating the integration process much less, 
while they did not differ from the supporters of other parties regarding the pro-European 
orientation (Baranović, 2002: 148). It is worth mentioning in this context that the 
supporters of HSP evolved in the direction of a more consistant advocation of the anti-
European orientation from 1999 to 2004. 
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between the religious and national identity. Therefore, it is possible to assume 
that believers have a stronger national identification as well, which includes 
concern regarding national identity and sovereignty, as well as a certain dose of 
non-criticism toward one's own nation and state. In this constellation, a 
supranational and seemingly bureaucratic and rigid institution, such as the EU, 
causes fear and a certain amount of repulsion as a consequence. 
All the other observed attributes of youth are really sporadically related to 
the analyzed dimensions of the relationship toward the EU, which indicates that 
it is still not rationally founded, that is, it is not a result of a utilitarian 
consideration of the potential consequences of Croatia's accession to the EU. In 
other words, the relationship toward the EU is determined more by the 
ideological than the economic-developmental dimension. One should expect this 
to change once negotiations on a number of concrete solutions commence, 
which will launch socio-economic issues onto the front line, and also offer 
citizens, as well as the young, more information and argumentation for 
constructing a rational relationship toward European integration. 
3. The social and political consequences of Croatia’s integration 
into the EU 
In this section, the objects of analysis are issues linked to certain political, 
social, economic and cultural consequences of Croatia's accession to the 
European Union. These issues include the perception of the potential advantages 
and disadvantages that the construction of Europe and the EU might involve in 
the following decade, then the fears of the participants related to the construction 
of the EU, the mutual negative and positive influence of the member states on 
the EU and vice versa, the areas in which the member states are autonomous or 
share their autonomy with the European Union in making decisions, the 
potential winners and losers of future Croatian membership and, linked with 
this, the citizens that have one of the skills that alleviates their adaptation – the 
knowledge of foreign languages. 
Regarding how the European Union might look in the next 10 years, in 
general, youth has a more positive vision than the adult participants. Table 11 
portrays a ranking scale of answers both by the young and the adults in Croatia 
(the participants were able to choose a maximum of three out of the 11 answers 
offered) and data for the EU youth. 
The ranking scale only indicates that one answer was chosen by most 
participants in Croatia – the claim that the EU will in the future bring its citizens 
easier travel, work, studying and living. However, a significant number of youth 
expect the use of the Euro, a better quality of life and more employment 
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opportunities. In other words, their expectations are largely oriented toward 
improvements in the socio-economic plain. When these expected changes are 
joined by less discrimination towards foreigners and greater gender equality, one 
might say that a large majority of youth expects positive changes in the EU in 
the coming decade. Undesirable changes, such as aggravated decision-making 
and an increase in the number of social problems and unemployment, are 
expected by a significantly lower number of participants. The number of those 
considering that the EU might come to a demise is completely negligible. 
Summing up this data, one can state that the young in Croatia expect that there 
will be changes in the EU in the coming ten years that will bring more benefits 
than difficulties to the citizens of the member countries. These findings are thus 
in accordance with the already established majority expectation that Croatia will 
realize significantly more benefits than difficulties by joining the EU. 
 
Table 11: A comparative outline of expected changes for EU citizens in the next 
ten years (%) 
Youth in EU Croatia 2004 
Changes for EU citizens in the next 10 years  
19977 20018 Youth Adults 
Easier travel, work, study and life in Europe  47.7 45.1 65.5 57.4 
Use of the Euro as the only currency  41.8 48.1 45.0 44.4 
Better quality life  23.3 25.0 43.1 40.2 
More employment opportunities 29.9 28.3 42.4 41.8 
Less discrimination of foreigners  28.8 27.4 17.3 16.0 
Aggravated decision-making process  22.5 21.6 14.9 14.9 
More social problems  17.8 13.3 13.1 17.4 
More gender equality  16.1 16.7 12.3 9.3 
More unemployment  14.6 10.7 7.4 9.7 
Disappearance of the EU - - 1.3 2.2 
Something else - - 1.1 1.7 
 
The young and adults in Croatia mostly do not differ in their expectations 
of possible changes in the EU. The only inter-generational differences are visible 
                                                     
7 The data is taken from the Eurobarometer 47.2 The Young Europeans (1997: 107-108), 
and are related to youth from 15 EU member states (before the May 2004 enlargement), 
aged 15 to 24, so not completely comparable to our findings, but may serve as a rough 
comparison. 
8 The data is taken from the Eurobarometer 55.1 The Young Europeans in 2001 (2001: 
17) and also relate to youth from the 15 EU member states (before the May 2004 
enlargement), aged 15 to 24. 
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in the case of easier travel, work, studying and living in the EU – which is more 
accented by the young, and expecting there will be more social problems – more 
often stated by the adults. 
In comparison with their Croatian peers and their own opinions four years 
before, the young in the EU in 2001 more often emphasized the use of the Euro 
as the only currency. Even though 1997 was the year the Euro was introduced, 
the young then thought that the EU would bring greater opportunities for easier 
travel, work and live anywhere in Europe in ten years. A better quality of life, as 
a possible consequence of the existence of the European Union, is mentioned 
almost twice as often by the participants in Croatia as the youth in the European 
Union. The next attitude, advocated by a significantly smaller number of 
Europeans, regards the expectation of more employment opportunities, which is 
in fourth position for the Croatian youth. The negative consequences that the EU 
might cause in the coming decade, is less often perceived by the youth in Croatia 
than their counterparts in the Union, even though the attitudes of young 
Europeans about these problems became somewhat less pronounced four years 
after the first research. 
Regarding the observed attributes of Croatian youth, the analysis indicated 
that they are quite homogenous in their perception of the EU's future, because 
statistically significant differences consistently occur only when it comes to the 
first item, while they are sporadic in all the other answers. Thus, the attitude that 
the EU will bring easier travel, work, study and life to its citizens in the coming 
10 years is mostly advocated by the participants from Dalmatia, Istria and 
Primorje (χ2=34.13), the young that grew up and live in Split, Rijeka and Osijek 
(χ2=36.50; χ2=27.20), followed by pupils and students (χ2=35.62), the supporters 
of HNS and SDP (χ2=34.55) and those with a positive perception about the 
European Union (χ2=56.82). In contrast to them are the participants from 
Northern Croatia, who were raised and live in the country, are unemployed and 
support HSS. Logically, this group also consists of those that harbor a negative 
image about the EU, but regardless of this, 50% of them believe that the EU 
might signify an improvement in their chances in life in the near future. As for 
the use of the Euro as the only currency, the only difference is that the youth 
aged 20 and 24 consider this turn of events to be more probable (χ2=16.03), 
especially compared to the youngest cohort of participants. A significant 
difference is present regarding the better quality of life, where the participants 
that perceive the EU positively emphasize this outcome more often (χ2=132.33) 
compared to those with a negative image of the Union. Similar differences exist 
with more employment opportunities, more advocated by those with a positive 
perception of the EU (χ2=70.27). On the other hand, those that perceive the 
Union negatively expect a difficult decision-making process (χ2=117.37), more 
social problems (χ2=116.72) and higher unemployment (χ2=60.46). 
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These, of course, are certain fears people feel about a so complex, and 
sometimes unintelligible process such as the construction of a united Europe and 
the European Union. This is why we particularly examined certain fears related 
to this process. Table 12 shows comparative data on the possible negative 
consequences of European integration and the construction of the EU, only on 
the “yes” degree (a three-degree scale consists of answers “yes”, “I do not 
know”, “no”). Data about the perception of the examined fears of the 
participants from the 25 European Union member countries relate to their own 
nations. 
 
Table 12: A comparative outline of the participants' fears related to the 
construction of a unified Europe and the EU (%) 
Croatia 2004 
Fears 
EU 25* 
2004 Youth Adults 
The end of the Croatian Kuna 56 58.9 64.6 
Increased drug trade and international organized crime 65 52.2 65.5 
Increased difficulties for Croatian farmers 65 45.3 56.3 
EU membership will cost Croatia too much money 64 44.6 55.4 
Transfer of employment to countries with lower production costs 74 39.5 47.2 
Loss of power by smaller member countries 46 39.1 49.2 
Richer countries pay more than others - 29.4 34.2 
Less use of the Croatian language 40 20.4 24.3 
Loss of Croatian national identity and culture 42 20.3 25.1 
Loss of social privileges 52 12.8 21.1 
* European Commission, 2005: 141 
 
Observing all the obtained results, one can say that the young participants 
in Croatia are most afraid of the abolition of the national currency and an 
increase in criminal activity, while other fears were expressed by less than a half 
of the participants. Among them, the most pronounced fears are mostly linked to 
the socio-economic area, and they are the aggravated position of agricultural 
workers, the high costs of accession and the loss of employment due to 
differences in production costs. A significant number of youth is also afraid of 
the potentially inferior position of Croatia as a small country, but half as many 
expressed fear regarding the loss of national attributes, such as language and 
culture. It is interesting that the loss of social privileges is feared by only one out 
of ten young persons, possibly because they have yet to face the worst 
consequences of such a loss. 
It is obvious from the data mentioned that there are no major differences 
between the young and adult participants regarding the ranking of the 
consequences they fear, but the differences are obvious in the level of fear 
expressed – the adult participants consistently demonstrate a higher level of fear 
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than the young. This is not surprising, for it is logical that the young, when 
compared to the adult population, have higher reserves of optimism in general, 
and in this case in particular. The most visible difference is again at the bottom 
of the scale, where it is obvious that the adult participants are twice as afraid of 
losing social privileges, because they have already been faced with that situation 
– through the demise of the socialist system and the consequent breakdown of 
the social welfare and protection system. 
Unlike the Croatian participants, and after the “big bang” enlargement of 
May 2004, the European participants expressed the greatest fear when it comes 
to the transfer of employment to other countries, where the production costs are 
lower, and two third were afraid of the increase in crime and the drug trade 
(corresponding with the answers given by Croatian citizens), difficulties for 
farmers and the price of constructing Europe their countries have to pay. 
Compared to the relatively high level of fear in Europeans linked to national 
identity, the use of language and social privileges in the European Union, the 
participants in Croatia are significantly less concerned, and it is quite possible 
that this derives from different experiences. The greatest level of fear of 
different consequences of building Europe, is expressed in the Union by women, 
older participants with a lower level of education and those that know little 
about the EU (European Commission, 2005: 145). 
Since we were not only interested in comparison with European countries 
but also in the possible negative consequences of constructing Europe and the 
EU, the previously analyzed fears underwent a factor analysis and variance 
analysis. Table 13 portrays the three factors obtained (with total variance of 
49.8%). 
 
Table 13: The factor structure of fears from the construction of a unified Europe 
and the EU 
Fears Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Loss of Croatian national identity and culture .841   
Less use of the Croatian language .816   
Loss of social privileges .560   
EU membership will cost Croatia too much money  .740  
Increased difficulties for Croatian farmers  .639  
Increased drug trade and international organized crime  .606  
Richer countries pay more than others   .711 
Transfer of employment to countries with lower production costs   .592 
Loss of power by smaller member countries  .370 .549 
The end of the Croatian Kuna  .325 .485 
% of common variance 27.6 12.0 10.2 
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The loss of national identity is the label of the first factor, for it is primarily 
constituted in the fear of loss of Croatia's uniqueness (identity, culture and 
language), and social privileges. The variance analysis indicated that in 
advocating these attitudes the young differ among each other the most, but with 
relatively low F-ratios (from 39.6 to 6.93). To be more specific, these negative 
consequences of constructing Europe and the EU are above averagely accepted 
by the youngest participants (as opposed to the oldest age cohort), those with a 
primary or secondary school diploma (unlike the highly educated youth), then 
pupils (compared to the employed and students), from Northern and Eastern 
Croatia (versus the participants coming from Central Croatia, Istria, Primorje 
and Zagreb, supporting HDZ, HSP and HSS (opposite the sympathizers of HNS 
and SDP) and religious participants (unlike the non-religious ones), those with a 
negative perception of the European Union (as opposed to those that have a 
positive opinion about it) and young people who believe that Croatia's accession 
to the EU would bring them no personal advantages (unlike those considering 
that they might have personal gains from Croatia joining the EU)9. 
The second factor obtained may be summed up in the common label the 
increase in socio-economic costs and insecurities, because it mostly has to do 
with the influence of the construction of Europe and the European Union on 
certain economic processes, as well as organized crime, and smuggling and sale 
of drugs as a major social problem with unforeseen consequences for society and 
its economy. This factor is above averagely represented by young participants 
living in rural areas (F-ratio=6.06), the religious compared to the non-religious 
participants (F-ratio=12.85), those with a negative perception about the 
European Union (F-ratio=45.62) and participants not certain whether Croatia's 
membership in the European Union would bring them any advantages or not (F-
ratio=56.53) versus those who are certain that this course of events would bring 
them no advantages whatsoever. 
The third factor consists of consequences that may in short be described as 
the increase of inequality between EU member states. It deals, therefore, with 
the differences that might occur between the large and rich countries and the 
small and poorer states entering the Union, which may deepen the gap of 
inequality between them, instead of bridging it. This, of course, is linked to the 
problem of the political power of small countries – a problem even more 
pronounced by the enlargement of the Union and the inability of small countries 
to maintain an equal position in the decision-making process that affects all. The 
variance analysis demonstrated that in the perception of this possible scenario of 
                                                     
9 More detailed information about the results linked with the issue of the perception of 
the personal advantages that the participants might have from Croatia's accession to the 
EU is in Table 25. 
Vlasta Ilišin, Ivona Mendeš 
234 
the European Union, not one observed attribute differentiates the young from 
each other. 
The attitudes examined next deal exactly with the consequences of 
European Union enlargement with new members, including Croatia. Table 14 
portrays the comparative data about the possible consequences of EU 
enlargement when it comes to the degree of answer “yes” (otherwise, a three 
degree scale was used, consisting of the following answers “yes”, “I do not 
know” and “no”) for young and adult participants in Croatia, as well as for 
participants from the 15 countries that were candidates for joining the European 
Union in 2002. 
 
Table 14: A comparative outline of attitudes about EU enlargement (%) 
Croatia 2004 
Meaning of EU enlargement 
CC-15 
2002* 
Youth Adults 
Europe will be culturally richer with more member-states 64 60.5 65.9 
The more member-states the EU has, the more important it will be in the 
world 69 55.9 60.6 
The more member-states the EU has, the more peace and security will be 
guaranteed in Europe 67 51.1 58.3 
My country's membership in the EU would lead to a better quality life 64 49.7 52.6 
My country has much to offer to the EU 53 49.5 60.6 
Membership in the EU would help the national economy 67 49.3 48.6 
My country's membership in the EU is historically and geographically 
natural, justified 64 46.2 58.2 
With enlargement, my country would have its own voice that would be 
heard louder in Europe 62 45.1 50.3 
My country's leadership is doing everything possible to become a 
member of the EU in the near future 54 32.0 42.8 
With enlargement, unemployment in my country would increase  23 14.4 21.1 
* European Commission, 2002: 117 
 
It is visible in Table 14 that all the participants from Croatia emphasize the 
positive consequences of enlargement in the European Union itself, when it 
comes to the increase in cultural wealth, importance, peace and safety in Europe. 
They are followed by positive consequences regarding Croatia, such as the 
higher quality of life, the improvement of the situation in the national economy 
as well as improvement of Croatia's status in Europe. The relatively low 
validation of the efforts the Croatian leadership is investing in Croatia's future 
accession to the EU is interesting: only one third of the young believed that the 
Government of Prime Minister Sanader was doing everything necessary at the 
moment for Croatia to be a member of the EU soon. 
The differences between the young and adult participants in advocating 
certain attitudes were obvious; as in the previously interpreted question, here the 
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adults agree with each attitude more than the young, but there are also certain 
differences in the ranking of these attitudes. The adults believe more often that 
Croatia has much to offer to the European Union, as well as that its membership 
is historically and geographically natural, that is, justified. Also, significant 
differences can be noticed when it comes to the efforts of the Croatian 
authorities to include Croatia in the EU (also 43% of adults believe this is the 
case) and the increase of unemployment in Croatia after enlargement (an attitude 
advocated by every fifth participants of an older age). 
In the case of the participants from countries that five years ago were 
candidates for joining the Union, approximately two thirds believe that seven of 
the stated claims are valid, statements that have to do with improvement of the 
situation in their own countries and in the European Union itself. Somewhat 
more than a half of all the participants believed that their countries' leaderships 
were doing everything in their power to become a part of the Union and that 
they have something to offer to it. Only one quarter of the participants believed 
that the enlargement process might cause an increase in unemployment in their 
countries. The most visible difference from the participants in Croatia is in the 
fact that all these statements were more accepted in the former candidate 
countries. The only statement this does not apply to is the feeling of national 
pride (“my country has much to offer the EU”) – the young participants in 
Croatia gave a similar answer to the participants from the candidate countries, 
while the adults expressed this attitude even more. 
Considering that certain groups of attitudes were already formed when they 
were ranked, it would be interesting to see how these attitudes are really 
structured. This is the reason for applying factor analysis, which resulted in three 
factors of a total variance of 52.2%, portrayed in Table 15, while the results of 
the variance analysis of the obtained factors is in Table 16. 
The first factor obtained was labeled multifaceted benefits from EU 
enlargement because it consists of attitudes linked with the increase in power of 
this association, both internally (when it comes to cultural wealth, peace and 
security), and externally (the global importance of the EU). These attitudes are 
joined by two attitudes linked to Croatia's membership of the Union: the one 
about the justification of that membership and the one about the strengthening of 
Croatia's political power. Explained by the language of game theory: a greater 
power of one player (Croatia) increases the power of the entire system (EU) in 
the so-called non-zero-sum game. This attitude is above averagely accepted only 
by those who also have a positive perception about the European Union (and 
under averagely by those that have a negative image of the EU), while the young 
do not differ from each other in its acceptance regarding the other attributes 
observed. 
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Table 15: The factor structure of attitudes about the meaning of EU enlargement 
Meaning of EU enlargement 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Europe will be culturally richer with more member-states .713   
The more member-states the EU has, the more important 
it will be in the world .687   
Croatia's membership in the EU is historically and 
geographically natural, justified .596   
The more member-states the EU has, the more peace and 
security will be guaranteed in Europe .579   
With enlargement, Croatia will have its own voice that 
would be heard louder in Europe .493 .357  
Membership in the EU would help the national economy  .743  
With enlargement, unemployment in Croatia would 
increase  -.721  
Croatia's membership in the EU would lead to a better 
quality life .401 .673  
The Croatian leadership is doing everything possible to 
become a member of the EU in the near future   .862 
Croatia has much to offer to the EU   .638 
% of common variance 29.9 12.3 10.0 
 
The second factor was labeled the positive influence of enlargement on 
Croatia, for it consists of two attitudes that reflect the possible positive effects of 
Croatia's accession to the EU (the aid to the national economy, a higher quality 
of life – backed by the attitude about the increase of Croatian political power in 
Europe), and the rejection of the attitude that there will be an increase in 
unemployment in Croatia after the accession, indicating a positive relationship 
toward Croatia joining the EU. There are certain differences in accepting this 
latent dimension: it is above averagely accepted by youth born in both small and 
large cities (unlike those born and raised in Zagreb), as well as those with a 
positive perception of the European Union (as opposed to those who harbor a 
generally negative opinion), and under averagely – unlike the sympathizers of 
other parties – it is accepted by HSP's supporters (which is completely in line 
with the proclaimed attitude of this party about entering the Euro-integrative 
processes). 
The justification of Croatia's accession to the EU is the label of the third 
factor, explaining one tenth of the total variance. This factor consists of two 
attitudes often heard on the national public scene when discussing Croatia's 
joining the EU: the Croatian authorities are doing all it takes for Croatia's 
membership in the EU and Croatia has a lot to offer the Union. It is interesting 
that this factor also consists of the attitude regarding the justification of Croatia’s 
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membership, both historically and geographically, which is often associated with 
the previous two. As for the observed attributes of youth, this is the factor that 
yielded the most differences among the young participants. It is most accepted 
by participants born and raised in rural areas and in major cities (unlike those 
from Zagreb), those living in villages (again contrary to the inhabitants of 
Zagreb), that is, Central Croatia and Dalmatia (Zagreb is different here too), the 
religious participants (in contrast to the undecided and the non-religious) and 
finally, the supporters of HDZ, HSP and HSS (all the parties stressing Croatian 
comparative advantages regarding Europe) versus the sympathizers of HNS and 
SDP, who accept this attitude under averagely. 
 
Table 16: Differences among the youth in accepting the factors of the meaning 
of EU enlargement 
Attributes of youth Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Place of birth  F-ratio=6.32 F-ratio=5.47 
Village  0 + 
Small town  + 0 
Major city  + + 
Zagreb  – – 
Place of habitat    F-ratio=8.42 
Village   + 
Small town   0 
Major city   0 
Zagreb   – 
Regional status   F-ratio=7.83 
Northern Croatia   0 
Central Croatia   + 
Istria and Primorje   0 
Eastern Croatia   0 
Dalmatia   + 
Zagreb   – 
Religious self-identification   F-ratio=11.97 
Religious   + 
Undecided   – 
Not religious   – 
Party affiliation  F-ratio=7.46 F-ratio=7.92 
HDZ  + + 
HNS  + – 
HSP  – + 
HSS  + + 
SDP  + – 
Undecided  0 0 
Perception of the EU F-ratio=114.88 F-ratio=161.39  
Negative – –  
Neutral 0 0  
Positive + +  
Legend: – below common average; 0 within common average; + above common average 
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It is certainly important to investigate the citizens' opinions about different 
decision-making areas regarding their own life and its quality. Therefore we 
examined what the participants think about 25 specific issues that have so far 
only been decided upon by the Republic of Croatia. Joining the EU means that 
this practice is certainly going to change, so some issues will require decision-
making by the Union as well, and some will remain in Croatia's exclusive 
competence. Table 17 portrays a comparative outline of the attitudes about the 
examined issues, and only the data for the answer “national government along 
with the EU” are shown (the answer “only national government” was offered as 
well). Regarding the fact that the European Commission researched the same 
question on a sample of the general population in the 25 EU countries, we are 
showing its results as well. 
From the obtained results, the fact is most visible that more than one half of 
all participants believe 20 out of the 25 observed areas should be the subject of 
joint decision-making by the Croatian government and the European Union,. 
Two out of the last five areas also belong within what is known as the classic 
administrative fields – the judiciary and police, which was correctly recognized 
by the participants – however, it is interesting that the first of these fields is what 
the supra-national character of the European Union is based on (the acquis 
communitaire, its common rules), while the police is the second of the three 
pillars the EU rests on, which obviously did not impress the participants very 
much. Agriculture and fisheries are what battles are fought over regarding 
Croatia's accession to the EU, so it is not surprising that this seems to be 
recognized as an issue Croatia should make decisions on autonomously. The 
same goes for cultural policy, which can be understood as a warranty for the 
survival of Croatian culture and diversity in the “great Europe”. It is also 
interesting that both the young and the adults emphasized the acceptance of 
refugees (and the adults added the immigration policy to this), as one of the 
areas Croatia should make its own decisions about. It is presumably the result of 
recent experience with the refugee problem, that additionally wore Croatia out 
economically and socially during and after the war, so it is a problem the 
participants believe should be decided upon by our authorities alone. 
As for the upper portion of the scale, one might conclude that out of the 
first nine areas, five belong to the field of prevention and the fight against 
various evils of modern life: organized crime, adolescent crime, urban violence, 
trade and exploitation of human beings and the drugs trade. It is clear that the 
participants recognized an exceptional need for supranational action in these 
areas, because these criminal activities are not familiar nor do they recognize 
national borders, so taking action according to the sovereignty principle will 
neither repress them nor eradicate them. Two other areas at the top of the list 
also have to do with a fight that is a precondition for success in the previously 
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mentioned areas, albeit a different kind of fight – against poverty and 
unemployment (the basis and even the cause of all forms of crime). Along with 
all this, informing about the EU and scientific and technological research are 
also at the top of the scale, which is not especially difficult to explain. 
Specifically, research has shown that scientific and technological research 
activities demand joint effort, work and financial support, if top results are to be 
achieved. 
 
Table 17: A comparative outline of attitudes about areas in which the national 
government should make decisions along with the EU (%) 
Croatia 2004 
Decision-making areas 
EU-25* 
2004 Youth Adults 
Fighting organized crime 76 89.3 85.8 
Fighting the trade and exploitation of people 81 87.3 83.5 
Fighting drug abuse 73 85.1 83.5 
Information on the EU 71 83.5 79.9 
Fighting poverty 58 81.2 75.4 
Prevention of juvenile crime 39 77.3 74.6 
Scientific and technological research 67 76.4 75.5 
Fighting unemployment 47 75.8 71.7 
Prevention of urban violence 32 68.4 60.9 
Foreign policy toward countries outside of the EU 68 67.7 64.4 
Humanitarian aid 72 67.3 62.7 
Support for regions with economic difficulties 60 64.6 65.9 
Currency 63 59.0 62.9 
Environmental protection 67 58.2 56.3 
Education 33 58.1 52.6 
Defense 57 56.6 54.6 
Basic regulations for electronic media / the press 34 55.1 57.8 
Regulations for political asylum 58 54.5 52.1 
Health and social care 33 52.0 50.5 
Immigration policy 58 50.5 46.6 
Accepting refugees 56 45.7 49.2 
Judiciary 36 44.3 38.6 
Cultural policy 34 37.3 31.7 
Agricultural and fisheries policy 50 37.1 37.6 
Police  30 36.0 31.8 
* European Commission, 2005: 35 
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The middle of the ranking scale consists of heterogeneous areas, three of 
which might be joined under a common denominator. These are areas that 
belong to the classical conception of the modern state: foreign politics, national 
currency and defense. The process of dilution of this conception and the creation 
of new relationships, stimulated by the process of European integration as well 
as globalization, is obvious. Included in these same processes are the issues of 
humanitarian aid, education (with the not so negligible influence of the Bologna 
Declaration on Higher Education, enabling students of any university based on 
this declaration to attend or finish their studies at any other such university) and 
especially environmental protection (the consequences of endangering the 
environment have no regard for state borders, as in the case of crime, so they 
require a joint effort and common standards). It is no accident that the issue of 
support for regions with economic difficulties is among the mentioned areas, for 
it is one of the areas that most funds from the common European budget are 
dedicated to, via the so-called regional/structural/cohesion policy. At the same 
time, this issue is extremely significant for Croatia, where the differences in the 
level of development of different regions are evident (for example, Zagreb and 
the Zagreb County compared to Lika or Eastern Slavonia) and where these 
common funds will mean a great deal where equal development and increasing 
living standards are concerned. Other issues in the middle of the scale have to do 
with certain regulations the Croatian government ought to set up along with the 
European Union: in the field of the electronic media/the press, political asylum, 
immigration policy and health and social care – accepted by every other 
participant. 
The European data regarding subsidiarity, that is, the division of 
competences so that they belong to the lowest possible level of authority which 
may implement them efficiently and effectively, demonstrate certain differences 
compared to the Croatian results. Specifically, the majority of Europeans believe 
that two thirds of the observed functions should be performed by their country in 
cooperation with the EU, while the participants in Croatia share this same 
opinion when it comes to four fifths of these areas. Differences in the ranking of 
certain issues are also evident: the population of the EU support joint decision-
making somewhat less when it comes to the prevention of adolescent crime and 
urban violence, education, basic rules for the media and press, health and social 
care and the fight against unemployment. Issues the Europeans believe might be 
best resolved by joint efforts, unlike the Croatian participants, are environmental 
protection, immigration policy, accepting refugees and, of course, agricultural 
and cultural policy. The cause for this last finding could be in the “panic” certain 
structures of the Croatian society are creating when it comes to Croatian 
agriculture and fisheries in the EU, while the population of the EU has for years, 
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decades even, enjoyed certain rights achieved through the common agricultural 
and fisheries policy, thus being less protective of their fishermen and farmers. 
The cross-analysis of attitudes about the mentioned areas with the observed 
social attributes of youth was only performed for the answer “national 
government along with the EU”, and the obtained results only sporadically 
produce statistically significant differences. Thus, gender differentiates youth 
only regarding information about the European Union (χ2=21.01), where women 
are more in favor of joint decision-making. Regarding regional status, those 
from Istria and Primorje accept joint decisions about the currency more than 
those from Dalmatia (χ2=31.48), while participants from Central Croatia believe 
that the agricultural and fisheries policy should be decided upon together, unlike 
the participants from Dalmatia (χ2=15.72). This is probably the difference 
between the position of farmers (farmers in the EU receive high subsidies from 
agricultural funds) and the position of the fishermen (the participants from 
Dalmatia are probably conveying the fear of Croatian fishermen that the fishing 
resources in the Adriatic will be less protected and more open to the influence of 
fishermen from other countries, such as Italy and Slovenia, once Croatia is in the 
EU). The attribute of the young participants that demonstrated statistically 
significant differences in each of the observed area (except for environmental 
protection and cultural policy) is the perception of the European Union. The 
young with a positive perception of the EU without exception advocate each 
form of cooperation between Croatia and the EU more, while those with a 
negative perception of the Union accept any form of their cooperation 
consistently less (the χ2 ranges from 15.29 to 60.86). 
The question of potential losers and winners from Croatia's membership of 
the European Union was researched separately. Table 18 has the comparative 
data about the specific groups the participants were to estimate whether they 
would be “better off”, “neither better nor worse” or “worse off”. 
The upper third of the Table consists of groups that will presumably fare 
better in the situation appearing with Croatia's accession to the EU, than the rest 
of the population. They are experts, persons that know foreign languages, the 
young, managers and large companies. Both the young and the adult participants 
equally ranked their potential success, that is, benefit. In the middle of the scale 
are those that both the young and the adult participants believe will significantly 
improve their current position with Croatia joining the EU: they are 
entrepreneurs, the unemployed and different minority groups. It can be assumed 
that the participants recognized their momentarily disadvantaged position and its 
potential improvement that, with Croatia's accession to the EU, might be caused 
by the expanding of markets and cultural perspectives. 
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Table 18: The perception of potential winners/losers of Croatia's membership of 
the EU – youth and adults (%) 
Better 
Neither better 
nor worse 
Worse 
Groups of winners/losers 
Youth Adults Youth Adults Youth Adults 
Experts 78.0 81.3 20.1 17.7 1.9 1.0 
Those who know foreign languages 75.4 77.9 23.7 21.5 0.9 0.6 
Young people 67.8 77.1 28.4 25.4 3.8 3.4 
Managers 64.9 66.8 30.5 28.5 4.5 4.7 
Large companies 62.0 56.8 30.5 35.4 7.8 17.2 
Entrepreneurs 48.8 51.3 41.1 38.2 10.1 10.5 
Unemployed 46.4 41.3 39.4 42.2 14.2 16.6 
Members of cultural, religious and other minorities 40.8 36.2 53.8 57.7 5.4 6.2 
Politicians 38.0 34.0 44.8 42.8 17.2 23.3 
Some parts of Croatia more than others 35.3 36.8 54.5 52.2 10.3 11.0 
Workers 33.6 31.0 50.5 48.5 15.9 20.4 
Inhabitants of Zagreb 32.9 32.3 60.3 61.9 6.8 5.8 
All Croatian citizens 32.4 32.7 58.4 57.0 9.2 10.3 
Teachers 32.2 30.1 62.4 64.4 5.3 5.5 
Civil servants 28.7 25.2 63.9 63.7 7.4 11.0 
Farmers 28.0 26.7 41.1 33.9 30.8 39.4 
Retired persons 28.0 26.7 61.5 60.5 12.8 15.1 
 
The remainder of the scale is taken up by groups whose status, the 
participants believe, will remain more or less equal to the existing one – 
teachers, civil servants, retired persons, the population of the capital and 
Croatian citizens in general. However, no great differences between the opinions 
of the young and adult participants exist, except perhaps regarding the farmers, 
that the adults believe will gain or remain in the same position by entering the 
EU, somewhat less than the young. The most interesting part of the table must 
be the one regarding the so-called losers, that both the young and the adult 
participants primarily see as the farmers (almost one third of youth and 40% of 
adults support this attitude), while less than a quarter of the participants believe 
the positions of the other groups will worsen. They are headed up by the 
politicians, perhaps because the participants believe that with Croatia's accession 
to the EU, the accountability system might start functioning, making them 
responsible for the effects of their own (in)action. Along with them, there are 
also groups that are in a less favorable position as it is, such as manual workers, 
the unemployed and the retired, and one out of ten participants are certain that 
this relates to all the citizens of Croatia. 
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Considering the fact that we were interested in the sets of observed groups, 
we conducted a factor analysis and variance analysis. Four factors explaining 
53.9% of the total variance were obtained, and are portrayed in Table 19, while 
the variance analysis results are in Table 20. 
 
Table 19: The factor structure of potential winners/losers of Croatia's 
membership in the EU 
Groups of winners/losers Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Farmers .713    
Teachers .685    
Retired persons .682    
Civil servants .643   .429 
Workers .643    
Unemployed .601    
Entrepreneurs .391   .385 
All Croatian citizens  .745   
Inhabitants of Zagreb  .721   
Some parts of Croatia more than others  .697   
Young people  .560 .445  
Those who know foreign languages   .717  
Experts   .673  
Managers   .520 .403 
Members of cultural, religious and other 
minorities   .389  
Politicians    .748 
Large companies    .586 
% of common variance 29.4 10.2 7.9 6.4 
 
The first factor obtained was labeled potential losers of integration because 
these are groups previously identified as those whose status will not improve 
compared to the rest of the population (headed up by the farmers), and who are 
mostly perceived as groups that are in a disadvantaged social position as it is. 
However, pupils and those with a positive attitude toward the European Union, 
compared to those that perceive it negatively, are the ones that above averagely 
believe these groups will improve their status as well by joining the EU. Along 
with them, this attitude is above averagely represented by youth believing they 
will gain personal advantages from Croatia's accession to the EU (F-
ratio=55.55), unlike those thinking they will gain nothing by it. 
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Table 20: Differences among the youth in accepting the factors of potential 
winners/losers of Croatia's membership of the EU 
Attributes of youth Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Age   F-ratio=12.11  
15 – 19 years   –  
20 – 24 years   0  
25 – 29 years   +  
Socio-profess. status F-ratio=6.14    
Employed –    
Unemployed –    
Pupils +    
Students –    
Education    F-ratio=7.44  
Primary sch. or less   –  
Vocational school   –  
High school   0  
University or more   +  
Regional status  F-ratio=5.40  F-ratio=4.65 
Northern Croatia  –  – 
Central Croatia  +  + 
Istria and Primorje  0  – 
Eastern Croatia  0  + 
Dalmatia  +  0 
Zagreb  0  – 
Religiousness    F-ratio=8.70 
Religious    + 
Undecided    – 
Not religious    – 
Party affiliation   F-ratio=4.86  
HDZ   0  
HNS   +  
HSP   –  
HSS   0  
SDP   +  
Undecided   –  
Perception of the EU F-ratio=47.69 F-ratio=81.37 F-ratio=23.79  
Negative – – –  
Neutral 0 0 0  
Positive + + +  
Legend: – below common average; 0 within common average; + above common average 
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The potential winners of integration is the title of the second factor 
obtained, since it consists of those social groups the participants believe will be 
the winners of Croatia's accession to the European Union. They are the 
inhabitants of the capital and some Croatian regions at the expense of others, 
youth and interestingly, all the citizens of Croatia. Two statistically significant 
differences are obtained by comparing this factor with the observed attributes of 
youth: the population of Central Croatia and Dalmatia accept this factor more 
than others, in contrast to the population of Northern Croatia, who choose it 
under averagely; the young with a positive perception of the European Union are 
more than averagely in favor of this factor, unlike the participants with a 
negative image of the EU. Also, above average acceptance of this factor may be 
found in youth believing they personally will profit from Croatia joining the EU 
(F-ratio=77.17), compared to those thinking nothing will change for the better 
for them because of it. 
The third factor could be labeled sure winners of integration, because it is 
primarily made up of those with specific knowledge and skills that will help 
them cope better with the new situation. Hence, these are persons with foreign 
language skills, experts, managers, and interestingly, different minorities 
(obviously perceived as more capable of adaptation), as well as young people. 
When this factor is compared to the observed attributes of youth, we find that it 
is more than averagely accepted by the oldest participants compared to the 
youngest age group of youth, followed by the highly educated in contrast to 
participants with a primary or vocational school degree, the supporters of HNS 
and SDP, unlike the sympathizers of HSP and the politically undecided 
participants, and finally, those with a positive image of the EU, as opposed to 
the youth whose perception of the EU is negative. Here, there is also a 
statistically significant difference between participants convinced they will have 
some personal gain from Croatia's accession to the EU (F-ratio=27.59), who 
accept this factor more than average, and the young believing that this will not 
bring about any positive shift in their lives. 
The fourth factor is the easiest to explain, and it is least heterogeneous in 
terms of the observed attributes of youth. It may be labeled the political-
economic elite as a winner of integration, for it includes politicians and large 
companies, who are accompanied by civil servants, managers and entrepreneurs. 
Only two attributes of youth differentiate those that accept this factor above the 
average from those choosing it somewhat less often: they are the inhabitants of 
Central and Eastern Croatia compared to the population of all the other Croatian 
regions (with the exception of Dalmatia) and the religious participants, unlike 
those that are non-religious or religiously undecided. 
Considering that persons speaking foreign languages were mentioned 
among those who are the probable winners of Croatia's future membership of the 
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European Union, it is interesting to observe how many such persons there are in 
Croatia and which attributes differentiate them. Table 21 offers a comparative 
portrayal of data about the knowledge of a foreign language on the degree “I 
actively use” (the other answers on the three-level scale are “I passively use” 
and “I do not use”). 
 
Table 21: A comparative outline of the knowledge of foreign languages (%) 
Youth in EU Croatia 2004 
Foreign language 
1997* 2001** Youth Adults 
English 54.0 50.4 44.0 14.7 
German 11.0 13.2 11.0 9.6 
Italian - 3.5 4.7 6.5 
French 20.0 17.5 1.1 1.6 
Other - - 3.0 3.1 
* European Commission, 1997: 40 
** European Commission, 2001: 8 
 
The data about the active knowledge of foreign languages in Croatia are not 
especially flattering, at least regarding the young participants, who know English 
and German more or significantly more than the adult participants, but in the 
case of French, Italian and “other” languages (consisting of Russian, Spanish 
and certain other languages) the situation is reversed. Considering the languages 
most often used in the European Union – English and French – the situation is 
very interesting. The former lingua franca – the language of diplomacy and high 
culture – and today almost exotic, the French language is spoken in Croatia only 
by 1.1% of youth and 1.6% of adults. On the other hand, the language of 
modern, global and globalized communication, English, is actively spoken by 
somewhat fewer than one half of youth in Croatia, while 30% fewer adult 
participants use it with the same level of skill. It is thus, not surprising that those 
who speak it are perceived as the potential winners of European integration. 
Also, a considerable number of young participants, one out of ten, use the 
German language, while the same goes for somewhat less than one tenth of the 
adults. From the data of the European research on the knowledge of foreign 
languages in the young population, one can conclude that the differences are 
significant. Specifically, the active knowledge of the English language among 
the youth in Croatia is 6-10% lower than in the observed European countries, 
while the active knowledge of the French language is very low. 
For comparison according to the social attributes of youth, the original data 
about the knowledge of foreign languages are summarized so that the values for 
active and passive knowledge of foreign languages were added (the total values 
are 82.7% for English, 42.1% for German and 6.0% for French). When the data 
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about Croatian young people’s knowledge of foreign languages are compared 
with the observed attributes of that group, we conclude that the participants are 
most differentiated by their knowledge of English. Therefore, it is more used by 
the young from Zagreb compared to those in Central and Eastern Croatia 
(χ2=143.59), students as opposed to the employed (χ2=199.31), the youngest 
participants unlike the young from the oldest age cohort (χ2=21.59), the young 
living in Zagreb and major cities, unlike the participants from rural areas 
(χ2=178.34), those born and raised in Zagreb or other major cities, compared to 
those born and raised in villages (χ2=190.0), the highly educated in comparison 
to the participants with a vocational school diploma (χ2=192.26), the non-
religious unlike the young that are religiously undecided (χ2=29.16), and finally, 
the supporters of HNS as opposed to the sympathizers of HDZ (χ2=59.48). As 
for German, it is least familiar to the population of Dalmatia, and better known 
by those from Zagreb (χ2=77.05), then the young who are employed compared to 
the students (χ2=51.69), it is less known by men than by women (χ2=15.89), as 
well as participants with three years of high school compared to the highly 
educated youth (χ2=30.27). The knowledge of the Italian language causes 
statistically significant differences in the sense that it is more often spoken by 
youth from Istria and Primorje, and less often by those from Eastern and Central 
Croatia (χ2=515.02), then students compared to the unemployed (χ2=30.44), the 
youth from major cities compared to participants living in the country (χ2=67.61) 
and those born and raised in major cities compared to those born and raised in 
rural areas (χ2=73.32), the highly educated unlike the young with three years of 
high school (χ2=52.98) as well as voters of HNS opposite the supporters of HSS 
(χ2=40.03). When the French language is concerned, it is only spoken more in 
Dalmatia, compared to the youth from Central Croatia (χ2=32.79). The 
knowledge of the other languages researched did not yield any statistically 
significant differences regarding the observed attributes of youth. 
4. Perception of the consequences of Croatia’s integration into 
the EU on a personal level 
In this segment we analyze the answers of the participants linked to the 
perception of the consequences of Croatia's EU membership on them personally. 
This has to do with the general feeling of identity, both Croatian and European, 
with what it means to be “a citizen of the European Union”, with the potential 
personal advantages of Croatia's accession to the EU and with the advantages and 
disadvantages this entails, and finally, with the opinion of the participants about 
going abroad and living and working in one of the European Union countries. 
In order to analyze the data about the perceived personal, positive or 
negative, consequences of Croatia's integration into the EU, first we need to see 
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how the identity of the Croatian citizens is linked to the Republic of Croatia, or 
Europe as a wider geographic concept and the reference civilization circle. The 
question regarding identity was asked similar to other such research in Europe – 
the participants were asked to determine whether they are and how proud they 
are of the fact that they are citizens of Croatia, or Europe. Table 22 offers the 
comparative data for the young and adult participants, summarized in the 
following manner: “yes” (consisting of answers “very proud” and “proud”), 
“no” (consisting of answers “not very proud” and “not proud at all”) and “does 
not feel” for those that do not feel like they belong to the offered identities. 
 
Table 22: A comparative outline of data regarding attachment to national and 
European identity (%) 
Croatia 2004 
Citizen of one's own country 
EU 25* 
2004 Youth Adults 
Yes 86 73.1 75.4 
No  11 24.3 22.9 
Does not feel 2 2.6 1.7 
European    
Yes 68 54.4 50.1 
No  26 31.9 35.1 
Does not feel 7 13.7 14.9 
* European Commission, 2005: 99 
 
It is easily discernible from the portrayed data that approximately three 
quarters of all participants, young and adults, are proud or very proud of the fact 
that they are citizens of Croatia. Here, the young are somewhat less proud, and 
more expressive of a negative attitude toward this identity. The data about the 
lack of Croatian identity are almost negligible. This, however, is not the case 
with the European identity, where 15% of all participants (adults accept this 
attitude somewhat more than the young) do not feel a part of it. Regarding pride 
in their European identity, every other young and adult participant is very proud 
or proud about it, while approximately one third of all the subjects state that they 
are not especially proud or not proud at all. While the adult participants 
demonstrated a stronger attachment to their Croatian identity, it is interesting 
that the young head the positive validation of their European identity. 
It is interesting that both the young and the adult participants in Croatia feel 
less national pride than the inhabitants of EU member countries. The question is 
what caused this, perhaps a greater dissatisfaction with their own life and the 
situation the country is in – which is surprising considering that Croatia 
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mobilized its national pride recently, during the war. The Croatian answers are 
most similar to the participants from Germany, a quarter of whom are not 
especially or not at all proud of their nationality (European Commission, 2005: 
100), while the highest level of pride is expressed by the Irish, the Greek, 
Finnish and Slovenian populations (about 97%). On the other hand, it is 
understandable that the European participants express their pride of being 
European more, for they have had the time and opportunity to experience what it 
really means. However, we should certainly mention that the citizens of the 15 
old member countries are less proud of their Europeism (approximately two 
thirds) than the citizens of the new EU members (78%). Most attached to their 
European identity are the young, the highly educated, those born in the EU and 
those who believe they know very much about the Union (European 
Commission, 2005: 102). 
Comparing this with the observed attributes of youth in Croatia, one can 
integrally say that they cause no statistically significant differences regarding 
their European identity, but the situation is quite different when it comes to their 
Croatian identity. Thus, the men are more proud of being Croat than women 
(χ2=23.14), the inhabitants of Dalmatia are more proud than those from Istria 
and Primorje (χ2=41.64), the religious participants express their pride more often 
than the non-religious (χ2=92.75), and the sympathizers of HDZ and HSP feel 
proud to be Croatian citizens more than HNS supporters (χ2=66.0). 
Aside from the social attributes of youth, the issue of identity is linked to 
some other variables, especially satisfaction with one's own life and the 
perception of one's own future and the future of the society. The data is shown in 
Table 23, and the variable of satisfaction with one's own life is summarized into 
three levels (it consisted of five degrees, from “I am completely satisfied” to “I 
am completely dissatisfied”), as well as variables of the personal and social 
future (the original scale consists of five degrees, starting with “the future will 
be much worse than the present” and ending in “the future will be much better 
than the present”). 
From the stated data one can conclude that those more satisfied with their 
own lives, expecting their own future and the future of society to be better, also 
express a higher level of pride in being citizens of Croatia and the fact that they 
are European. On the other hand, the young feeling dissatisfaction with their 
own lives and a pessimistic view of their future and the future of the society, 
express a lower level of pride, or even completely reject one or other identity 
(this is visible to a greater degree with the European identity, and less with the 
Croatian one). 
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Table23: Attachment to national and European identity regarding certain 
attitudes of youth (%) 
Citizen of Croatia European 
Attitudes of youth 
Yes No Doesn't feel Yes No Doesn't feel 
Satisfaction with one's life χ2=73.83 χ2=50.13 
Satisfied 78.3 19.2 2.5 59.2 28.3 12.6 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 67.1 30.4 2.5 49.8 34.1 16.1 
Dissatisfied 50.0 45.8 4.2 33.5 51.5 15.0 
Perception of one’s own future χ2=20.79 χ2=34.3 
Better 75.5 22.3 2.2 58.8 29.0 12.2 
Same 71.0 25.3 3.8 48.3 36.7 14.9 
Worse 61.8 34.9 3.3 40.5 39.5 20.0 
Perception of society's future χ2=20.06 χ2=36.18 
Better 76.3 21.8 2.0 59.2 29.9 10.9 
Same 72.1 24.7 3.2 51.4 34.0 14.6 
Worse 64.6 31.7 3.7 44.1 34.7 21.2 
TOTAL 73.1 24.3 2.6 54.4 31.9 13.7 
 
In order to explain better and add content to the variable of European 
identity, the participants were offered seven answers, out of which a maximum 
of three could be chosen, about what it means to “be a citizen of the European 
Union”. Table 24 portrays a rank scale of answers for the young and adult 
participants as well as data about the attitudes of youth in the EU. 
 
Table 24: A comparative outline of attitudes about what it means to be a “citizen 
of EU” (%) 
Youth in EU Croatia 2004 
Being a citizen of the European Union means 
1997* 2001** Youth Adults 
The right to work in any country of the European Union 62.4 57.4 70.9 71.8 
The opportunity to study in any country of the European 
Union 45.7 41.9 53.7 42.4 
The right to permanent residence in any country of the 
European Union  51.5 50.8 41.8 33.8 
Access to health and social care anywhere in the European 
Union 34.6 31.7 37.3 48.4 
The right to vote in elections for the European Parliament in 
the member-country of residence 20.3 21.9 12.6 12.2 
The right to vote in national elections in the member-country 
of residence 17.7 17.4 11.5 12.8 
The right to vote in local elections in the member-country of 
residence 19.9 20.8 9.6 10.2 
* European Commission, 1997: 112-115 
** European Commission, 2001: 18 
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The right to work and the opportunity to study in any country of the 
European Union are the only answers accepted by more than a half of the young 
participants, while the mentioned right to work is, understandably, most important 
to the adults, followed by the access to health and social care. A high percentage 
of youth also consider the right to permanent migration to any EU country is an 
important part of the content of “European citizenship”. Both with the young and 
adult participants, the general active suffrage proved to be the least important, 
whether the elections are held for the European Parliament, on a national or local 
level in the country a person has residence in – about every tenth participant 
emphasizes these rights as important for the concept of “citizen of the EU”. 
The right to work, live and study in any EU member country is also the key 
element in the understanding of the “European citizenship” for the young from the 
Union. The ranking of these attitudes has not changed over the years observed, but 
the level of their acceptance has decreased. There is also no great difference be-
tween the young in Croatia and the young in the EU when it comes to access to 
health and social care. However, differences between the counterparts from differ-
ent countries appear regarding the different electoral processes, whose importance 
is rarely recognized by the Croatian participants, while it is especially indicative 
that the European youth value local elections higher than state elections, because 
that is the level where the authorities are elected who will determine the quality of 
life of the population. In Croatia, the situation is reversed, and it is assumedly 
caused by the high level of polarization of local politics and the inability of local 
self-authority units to take care of the basic needs of their inhabitants. 
Considering the comparison of the answers offered with the observed 
attributes of youth, statistically significant differences only occur sporadically 
and with certain answers. Therefore, the socio-professional status of the 
participants influences the emphasis on the right to vote in state elections in such 
a manner that it is less accepted by the pupils and students as opposed to the 
employed and unemployed participants (χ2=18.71), and the opportunity to study 
in any country is stated more by the students and pupils than the employed 
participants (χ2=60.56), which is logical. The opportunity to study in any EU 
country is also more often accepted by youth supporting HNS and SDP in 
contrast to supporters of HSS or HSP (χ2=32.01). Education influences the 
acceptance of the right to vote in the elections for the European Parliament, 
which is accented more by the highly educated participants versus those with a 
primary school diploma (χ2=18.21). The perception participants have of the 
European Union influences the acceptance of the right to work in any EU 
country – those with a positive image of the EU accept this right more often than 
those with a negative perception of the EU (χ2=26.99) – as well as the 
acceptance of access to health and social care anywhere in the EU – the young 
with a positive perception emphasize this attitude more often than those that 
harbor a negative opinion (χ2=17.62). 
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As has been noted several times now, the perception of the participants 
about the personal advantages of Croatia's accession to the European Union 
might bring them, is very important. So, 28% of youth (and only 23.2% of adult 
participants) believe that they will experience personal benefits from Croatia's 
membership of the European Union. On the other hand, an approximately equal 
number of youth (and 43.2% of adults, even) consider that this will bring them 
no advantages at all. 44.4% of youth (and one third of the adults) do not have a 
defined opinion about this issue, that is, they do not know the answer. Regarding 
the statistically significant differences in the acceptance of the mentioned 
attitudes, Table 25 offers an outline of the relevant tendencies among the young. 
 
Table 25: The perception of personal benefits from Croatia's accession to the EU 
regarding the attributes of youth (%) 
Personal benefit 
Attributes of youth 
Yes No I do not know 
Gender χ2=18.17 
Female 23.8 28.1 48.1 
Male 32.0 27.3 40.7 
Socio-professional status χ2=24.51 
Employed 26.9 32.0 41.2 
Unemployed 25.7 30.5 43.9 
Pupils 29.5 19.8 50.7 
Students 30.4 26.0 43.6 
Religious self-identification χ2=25.73 
Religious 25.4 28.7 45.9 
Undecided 36.6 20.5 42.9 
Not religious 32.8 31.3 35.8 
Party affiliation χ2=38.01 
HDZ 29.0 24.3 46.7 
HNS 40.3 20.9 38.8 
HSP 16.5 36.8 46.6 
HSS 27.7 23.4 48.9 
SDP 33.7 29.1 37.2 
Undecided 23.6 29.4 47.0 
Perception of the EU χ2=410.59 
Negative 10.5 63.3 26.2 
Neutral 17.8 26.9 55.3 
Positive 49.7 14.4 35.9 
TOTAL 28.0 27.7 44.4 
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It is evident that the young that accept the attitude that Croatia's accession 
to the European Union will bring them personal gain significantly more, have 
the following attributes: they are male, coming from the student or school 
population, they are religiously undecided and support HNS and have a positive 
perception of the EU. On the other hand, the young believing they will have no 
use from Croatia's membership in the EU are mostly young women, employed, 
unreligious participants who are supporters of HSP and harbor a negative 
perception about the EU. The undecided, when it comes to their future once 
Croatia is in the EU, are usually female, pupils, the religious participants and 
those supporting HSS and, of course, those with a neutral image of the EU. 
Narrowly linked with the issue of potential gains from Croatia's accession 
to the European Union is the question of the personal meaning the EU has for 
the participants. The participants were able to choose a maximum of three 
statements about what the EU means to them personally, out of the ten offered 
answers. Table 26 portrays the ranking scale of answers for both the young and 
adult participants, along with the findings about the attitudes of youth in the EU. 
 
Table 26: A comparative outline of the participants’ attitudes about the meaning 
of EU (%) 
Youth in EU Croatia 2004 
Meaning of European Union 
1997* 2001** Youth Adults 
A way of creating a better future for young people  34.2 28.1 54.5 51.1 
A way of creating employment 29.4 24.4 43.1 34.0 
An opportunity to go anywhere I want within the European 
Union  34.8 39.1 40.5 26.9 
Guaranteed and lasting peace within the European Union 24.1 22.7 23.0 27.8 
A way of improving the economic situation in the European 
Union 34.0 31.1 21.8 27.4 
A way of protecting the citizens' rights 13.1 15.9 19.1 22.7 
A lot of bureaucracy, a waste of time and money 14.4 11.9 12.4 17.7 
Risk of losing cultural diversity 12.0 11.0 10.3 9.7 
European Government 26.2 31.2 9.7 9.4 
Just a dream, a Utopian idea 7.6 5.1 8.8 11.6 
* European Commission, 1997: 103-106 
** European Commission, 2001: 16 
 
The data portrayed suggest that neither the young nor the adult participants 
in Croatia have a homogenous perception of the meaning of the European 
Union. Only one answer occurs in both the investigated population in an above 
average number of cases – the EU as a way of creating a better future for youth. 
More than 40% of youth emphasize that this is also a way to create employment 
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and an opening of opportunities for free movement within the EU. These 
attitudes are significantly less perceived by the adult participants as decisive for 
the meaning of the EU. Each fifth young participant believes that the EU is a 
manner of improving the economic situation and a way to protect the citizens of 
the countries that are its members. On the other hand, the adult participants 
believe more than the young, that the EU is a warranty of economic prosperity, 
but also stress Euro-bureaucracy as an important element of the Union more than 
the youth. One out of ten young people believes that the European Union 
signifies over-bureaucratization, the risk of cultural equalization and just a 
dream. The adults, on the other hand, emphasize the Utopian character of this 
association more often, while neither the young nor the adult participants believe 
that the European Union might mean a “European Government”, superior to the 
national states who are the Union's members. 
Unlike their counterparts in Croatia, the young from the 15 EU member 
states emphasize the freedom of movement within the Union as the most 
important, and the acceptance of this attitude increased from 1997 to 2001. The 
concept of a “European Government”, relatively neglected by the Croatian 
youth, is becoming more pronounced in the attitudes of European youth, while 
the understanding of the EU as a means of improving the economic situation, 
creating a better future for the young and creating new employment, experienced 
a mild decrease. The youth in Croatia and in the European Union are equally 
unafraid of a large bureaucracy, the loss of cultural diversity and the Utopianism 
of the European idea. 
The comparison of the examined attitudes with the observed social 
attributes of youth only resulted sporadically in statistically significant 
differences. The most accepted attitude, the one about a better future for youth, 
is most accepted by pupils, compared to the employed participants (χ2=33.20), 
which is logical, then the participants who have finished primary school in 
comparison with the highly educated youth (χ2=21.05), followed by the young 
from Dalmatia, unlike the participants living in Zagreb and Central Croatia 
(χ2=25.64). The importance of the EU for creating employment is emphasized 
by participants with the lowest level of education compared to the highly 
educated ones (χ2=20.61), and the supporters of HDZ and SDP as opposed to the 
sympathizers of HSP (χ2=25.64), which is difficult to explain. This might be 
attributed to the fact that both HDZ and SDP, at least on a declaratory level, are 
parties that support Croatia's accession to the EU, while HSP voters, in line with 
their previously determined negative perception of the Union, refuse more often 
to admit any positive effects of the Union. The opportunity to go anywhere in 
the Union differentiates the young only by one observed attribute – youth from 
Istria and Primorje are especially accepting of it, unlike the participants from 
Northern Croatia (χ2=25.07). That the European Union will bring about a better 
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economic situation to its members is believed above averagely by the employed 
participants, compared to pupils (χ2=18.57) and by youth with a higher level of 
education, versus the participants who have only primary school education 
(χ2=21.65). The European Union is more often perceived as a mode of protection 
of citizens’ rights by the non-religious participants compared to the religious 
(χ2=18.33), and as a dream, that is, Utopia, it is more often mentioned by HSP's 
supporters, in contrast to HNS or SDP voters (χ2=23.44). 
A somewhat greater heterogeneity among the participants regarding the 
meaning of the EU was caused by their attitudes about the European Union 
itself. So, to improve revision, this data is offered separately in Table 27 (only 
the answer “yes”). 
 
Table 27: The perception of the meaning of the European Union regarding the 
attitudes of youth about the EU (%) 
Attitudes about 
the EU 
Better 
future for 
youth 
Creating 
employm
ent 
Freedom 
of move-
ment 
Better 
economic 
situation 
A lot of 
bureaucr
acy 
Loss of 
cultural 
diversity 
European 
n Gover-
nment 
Dream, 
Utopia 
Perception of EU χ2=184.8 Χ2=38.93  χ2=54.14 χ2=134.99 χ2=70.4  χ2=128.08 
Negative 22.2 25.7  9.8 31.6 22.5  24.4 
Neutral 51.7 44.0  19.3 11.9 10.9  9.3 
Positive 70.0 47.2  30.1 4.5 4.4  1.6 
Year of Croatia's 
accession to EU χ
2=42.35   χ2=36.33    χ2=37.57 
2007/2008 61.3   26.3    5.8 
2010 54.7   24.6    5.9 
2015 or later 44.4   20.0    10.4 
I do not know 49.9   14.1    14.6 
Not interested 36.8   7.4    15.8 
Personal benefit 
from Croatia's 
accession to EU  
χ2=204.08 Χ2=99.52 χ2=25.97 χ2=21.82 χ2=124.34 χ2=45.62 χ2=21.91 χ2=116.19 
Yes 74.4 55.0 47.2 27.3 2.5 5.7 5.7 1.6 
No 31.7 26.1 32.2 15.8 24.3 17.4 13.9 19.2 
I do not know 55.0 45.4 40.5 21.5 11.0 8.6 9.2 6.7 
TOTAL 54.5 43.1 40.5 21.8 12.4 10.3 9.7 8.8 
 
The largest differences regarding the examined attitudes are created by the 
perception of potential personal gains from Croatia's accession to the European 
Union. The participants that believe they will benefit from Croatia's accession 
are more likely to believe that the EU means a better future for the young, 
creating employment, freedom of movement within the Union and a better 
economic situation, while the young who believe Croatia joining the EU will 
bring them no personal advantage will more often think that the EU suffers from 
a high level of bureaucratization, that it is simply a Utopia that will only cause a 
loss of cultural differences and, interestingly, the belief that the European Union 
means a sort of “European Government” – a supranational body making 
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decisions about the lives of its citizens instead of their national governments. 
Along with these attitudes of the participants, influence is also exerted by the 
youth's perception of the European Union, so that all those with a positive 
perception of it are more likely to assume that its existence will improve the 
future of youth, create new employment and improve the economic situation. In 
contrast to them are the participants with a negative image about the EU, so they 
are more likely to emphasize the high level of bureaucratization, its Utopian 
character and the fear of losing cultural diversity. 
Regarding the young who are optimistic about the year Croatia will enter 
the Union, we can conclude that they more often believe it will have an 
influence on the improvement of the future of youth and the economic situation 
of its members, and the number of those thinking the EU is simply a Utopian 
idea is insignificant. In contrast to them are the young participants not interested 
in the year that Croatia will become an EU member. 
Another important indicator of the attitude of Croatian citizens about the 
European Union is precisely the question relating to their readiness to spend a 
part or their entire lives in one of the EU member countries (in the case of adult 
participants the question was related to their readiness to accept such a decision 
made by their children). Table 28 offers a comparative outline of the data for the 
young and adult populations for the positive answer (the participants were able 
to choose answers “yes” and “no” for each offered statement). 
 
Table 28: A ranking scale of attitudes about going to one of the EU countries – 
youth and adults (%) 
Attitudes Youth* Adults** 
Work for a while 71.2 60.6 
Study, train 54.9 68.0 
Start a family with a citizen of that country 23.7 20.9 
Permanent residence 19.0 14.3 
Spend entire working life 17.1 13.3 
 
* The young answered about what they personally would like to do in one of the EU countries. 
** The adults answered about what they would like their children to do in one of the EU countries.  
 
The obtained results indicate that the young in Croatia are relatively ready 
to abandon their own country and search for better employment conditions in 
one of the European Union countries (more than two thirds of young people 
would engage in temporary work in the EU) as well as study (something every 
other young participant is ready for). The values linked with the more permanent 
forms of residence in one of the European countries are considerably lower – 
approximately every one out of five young participants would start a family with 
a citizen of one of the EU member states, as well as become a permanent 
resident or work their entire working lives. Compared to the interpreted data for 
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youth, the adult participants demonstrate a more conservative attitude towards 
their children leaving for one of the Union countries. They are most prepared to 
allow them to study or train (even more so than the young participants), 
somewhat less than them taking temporary employment, and they are 
considerably less prepared to accept marriage between their children and foreign 
citizens, as well as permanent residence or their children spending their entire 
working lives in one of the member countries of the European Union. 
It is certainly interesting to confirm whether there are statistically 
significant differences among the young participants regarding their observed 
attributes. The results obtained in Table 29 relate to the answer “yes”. 
The desire for temporary employment in one of the EU countries is more 
often expressed by the youngest participants (aged 15 to 19), unlike those in the 
oldest age cohort, followed by students and pupils as opposed to the employed 
and unemployed participants, the young that are not married and those that 
would go abroad forever or for a longer period of time anyway, in contrast to the 
participants who would not leave their own country for good. When it comes to 
studying or training, the most significant differences occur between participants 
with different attributes. This opportunity would be used less by men, the 
unemployed (and the most by students), those born and living in the country 
(unlike the young, born and living in Zagreb), youth with a vocational education 
(compared to the highly educated participants), the population of Central Croatia 
compared to those from Istria, Primorje and Zagreb, those already considering 
the possibility of going abroad for a longer period of time or forever, and finally, 
participants who are not proud of being European – in contrast to those who are 
proud or very proud of their European identity (χ2=22.45). Marrying a citizen of 
one of the EU member countries is more preferred by men, the employed 
compared to students, the religiously undecided and the non-religious 
participants, unlike the religious ones, youth with a positive perception of the 
EU versus those with a negative perception, and participants who would like to 
go abroad forever with an adequate opportunity, as well as regardless of 
opportunity, compared to youth who would not leave Croatia either for a long 
period of time or forever. 
The participants who expressed a lesser desire to reside permanently in one 
of the EU countries are those living in major cities (while youth from small 
cities wish to live permanently outside of Croatia the most), then the religious 
participants (in contrast to the non-religious), the young with a positive 
perception about the EU (unlike those that harbor a negative image), the young 
who are satisfied with their life in general (opposite the participants who are 
dissatisfied with their living situation) and participants who believe that, in 
general, they would like to go anywhere abroad (compared to the young who 
would only leave for a short period of time). 
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Table 29: Attitudes about going to one of the EU countries regarding the 
attributes of youth (%) 
Attributes of youth 
Work for a 
while 
Study, train 
Start a family w/ a 
citizen of country 
Permanent 
residence 
Spend entire 
working life 
Gender  χ2=15.37 χ2=26.28   
Female  59.3 18.8   
Male  50.6 28.5   
Age χ2=17.45     
15 – 19 years 74.8     
20 – 24 years 73.5     
25 – 29 years 65.2     
Place of birth  χ2=39.24    
Village  47.2    
Small town  59.9    
Major city  57.6    
Zagreb  64.8    
Place of habitat   χ2=38.0  χ2=22.84  
Village  47.3  15.4  
Small town  59.2  24.3  
Major city  58.4  14.4  
Zagreb  64.3  22.1  
Socio-professional status χ2=26.31 χ2=119.63 χ2=20.10   
Employed 66.1 47.9 19.2   
Unemployed 67.5 39.4 21.4   
Pupils 77.1 64.7 27.7   
Students 77.0 71.7 29.2   
Education   χ2=101.90    
Primary school or less  58.0    
Vocational school  32.0    
High school  58.1    
College, university or more  70.2    
Regional status  χ2=32.69    
Northern Croatia  50.1    
Central Croatia  42.8    
Istria and Primorje  62.6    
Eastern Croatia  53.3    
Dalmatia  54.3    
Zagreb  64.1    
Religious self-identification   χ2=22.89 χ2=36.63 χ2=17.29 
Religious   20.9 16.0 15.1 
Undecided   31.9 26.5 22.2 
Not religious   30.2 30.2 24.3 
Perception of EU   χ2=38.85 χ2=21.35 χ2=18.50 
Negative   14.5 12.0 10.9 
Neutral   21.2 17.5 15.6 
Positive   31.5 24.0 21.5 
Satisfaction with one's life    χ2=32.29 χ2=34.63 
Satisfied    32.5 31.3 
Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied    21.4 19.0 
Dissatisfied    15.4 13.8 
Going abroad χ2=333.23 χ2=113.44 χ2=190.65 χ2=656.17 χ2=500.55 
Not for longer, or forever 41.1 36.9 8.3 1.8 2.9 
Yes, for longer 88.4 63.6 23.3 7.9 8.5 
Yes, forever 76.7 63.6 43.4 57.1 48.8 
I've not thought about it 60.7 42.3 11.2 6.6 3.7 
TOTAL 71.2 54.9 23.7 19.0 17.1 
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Finally, the non-religious participants would rather spend their entire 
working lives in one of the countries of the European Union, which is the oppo-
site attitude of the religious young, the participants with a positive perception 
about the EU, unlike those with a negative attitude toward the European Union, 
as well as those who are, of course, not satisfied with their life in general, 
compared to the satisfied youth, and those who would go abroad forever, 
whether to one of the EU member countries or some other country all together. 
What the distribution of answers regarding going abroad in general (nor 
just linked with the European Union member countries) looks like, is shown in 
Table 30. In this regard, the possible answers made up a five degree scale, 
however, the degree “yes, I would go forever” is a sum of the following answers 
“I would go given an adequate opportunity” and “I would go forever regardless 
of everything”, while all the other degrees are presented in their original form. 
 
Table 30: A comparative outline of the participants' attitudes about going abroad (%) 
Youth Adults 
Attitudes about going abroad 
1999 2004 2004 
I would not go for a long period of time or forever 18.1 22.5 51.4 
I would not go forever, but I would go for a long 
period of time 39.7 39.4 20.2 
I would go forever 21.3 25.9 15.3 
I have not thought about it 21.0 12.2 13.1 
 
As is visible in Table 30, almost 40% of youth would like to live and work 
abroad for a long period of time, and a quarter would like to leave Croatia 
forever. These are high percentages warning of a latently present danger of a 
“brain drain” of the most vital part of the population, which is extremely 
undesirable for small and relatively underdeveloped countries. The young today 
are different from the generation of youth at the end of the previous millennium, 
mostly by being half as likely to claim that they have not even considered going 
abroad. Also, the percentage of those who would go abroad forever, with an 
adequate opportunity or without it, has increased.10 
                                                     
10 Since there are no drastic differences between the expressed desire to go abroad when 
it comes to youth from 1999 and 2004, it is interesting to compare the same data from 
the research conducted in 1986 on the young population. Specifically, it was found that 
there “has been an increase in the degree of readiness to leave the country (…). The 
number of young persons who are resolved to refuse to go abroad decreased 
significantly” in the meantime (Štimac Radin, 2002: 250). The number of young persons 
who would not go abroad either temporarily or forever decreased from 33% to 
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On the other hand, a majority of the adult participants emphasize that they 
would not go abroad either for a long period of time or forever (not surprising, 
because they are probably more linked to Croatia than the young, due to 
business or family reasons), and only somewhat more than 15% believe that the 
idea of leaving the country forever is attractive. 
The young are statistically significantly different regarding the examined 
attitudes in terms of several observed attributes, as is evident in Table 31. 
Youth that is less prepared to leave the country (for a long period of time or 
forever) more often belong to the oldest age cohort, live in the country (compared 
to the young in Zagreb), are employed with a higher or vocational education (and 
both groups are presumably the ones that have managed to find adequate 
employment in Croatia), then those whose fathers are without qualifications, the 
religious participants, and those with a negative perception about the European 
Union and who are proud of being Croatian citizens. The greatest level of 
readiness for temporary residence abroad is expressed by youth from larger urban 
centers, students and pupils (compared to the unemployed) and youth with four 
years of high school (unlike those with a vocational degree), while those least 
prepared are the oldest participants, those whose fathers have no qualifications and 
the young who do not feel like Croatian citizens (which is surprising). The young 
who wish to live abroad forever are above averagely recruited from the ranks of 
the unemployed (least of all the student population) and those with a positive 
perception of the EU (compared to the young with a negative attitude toward the 
EU) and do not feel like citizens of Croatia (opposite those who are proud to be its 
citizens). As for those not even considering going abroad, it was shown that 
thinking about this increases linearly with age, urbanization of the place of 
residence, and the education of both the participants and their fathers. Possible 
emigration from the country is also dwelled upon more often by the students, the 
non-religious participants and those with a negative perception of the EU who are 
not proud of being Croatian citizens. 
The tendency of more favorable circumstances of socialization to stimulate 
the creation of the desire to leave the country for a long period of time is evident 
from these indicators. It is possible that the youth here feel more capable of 
continuing their education abroad (especially visible with the students) or 
building a professional career resulting in adequate material compensation. We 
can, at the same time, assume that the participants are thinking of the developed 
                                                                                                                                   
approximately 18%. An identical trend was noted in other transitonal countries as well 
(Adnanes, 2004), which is seen as a consequence of the political liberalization of the 
former socialist countries and the increased aspirations to attain the material standard of 
the inhabitants of developed European countries. 
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Western countries when considering countries to live in, the majority of which 
are European Union countries, so the correlation between the perception of the 
EU and the desire to go abroad is not surprising. 
 
Table 31: Attitudes about going abroad regarding the attributes of youth (%) 
Going abroad 
Attributes of youth 
Neither for a longer 
time, nor forever 
Yes, for a 
longer time 
Yes, forever 
I have not 
thought about it 
Age χ2=41.01    
15 – 19 years 17.9 42.3 25.0 14.8 
20 – 24 years 19.5 42.3 26.6 11.5 
25 – 29 years 30.2 33.4 26.2 10.3 
Place of habitat  χ2=36.30    
Village 25.6 35.7 23.7 15.0 
Small town 20.5 38.2 29.3 12.0 
Major city 20.3 49.0 23.3 7.4 
Zagreb 19.1 45.4 27.2 8.4 
Socio-professional status χ2=82.32    
Employed 27.2 35.2 25.2 12.3 
Unemployed 25.5 28.4 33.5 12.6 
Pupils 16.0 44.1 24.1 15.8 
Students 18.5 52.5 21.6 7.4 
Education  χ2=52.99    
Primary school or less 19.2 38.6 27.2 14.9 
Vocational school 27.3 28.4 27.8 16.5 
High school 20.5 45.1 24.0 10.4 
College, university or more 30.4 36.1 27.4 6.1 
Father's education χ2=41.08    
Primary school or less 30.7 29.9 24.0 15.5 
Vocational school 19.9 40.9 24.6 14.6 
High school 20.2 42.0 26.6 11.2 
College, university or more 21.9 42.3 28.3 7.6 
Religious self-identification χ2=44.90    
Religious 24.9 39.6 22.6 12.9 
Undecided 14.4 39.5 34.4 11.6 
Not religious 18.4 35.8 37.8 8.0 
Perception of the EU χ2=37.01    
Negative 33.0 38.0 19.2 9.8 
Neutral 21.6 39.6 24.4 14.4 
Positive 19.5 39.5 31.0 10.0 
Croatian citizen χ2=47.43    
Does not feel like a citizen of 
Cro 11.5 23.1 48.1 17.3 
Not proud 17.0 39.5 33.7 9.7 
Proud 24.7 40.0 22.6 12.7 
TOTAL 22.5 39.4 25.9 12.2 
 
It is also not surprising that the unemployed youth have the greatest desire 
to leave forever, because this step must seem to them the only way left to make a 
living. The finding that the highly educated youth head up those that do not wish 
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to live abroad either for a long period of time or forever is certainly an important 
finding. When these trends are adjusted according to the data that students are 
most willing to leave for a long period of time (but not forever), it might be 
suggested that providing adequate work and training opportunities for young 
experts in Croatia might be an efficient way of reducing the danger of a “brain 
drain”. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The citizens' relationship toward the European integration process and the 
European Union is a dynamic category, varying from country to country and 
from time to time. The changes in attitudes are affected by occurrences at the 
EU level, as well as processes taking place in each individual country. However, 
in spite of the differences and changes, there are tendencies of a more permanent 
character, which explain the relationship of citizens toward the processes and 
institutions of the united Europe. Therefore the data collected on the sample of 
youth and adults in Croatia at the beginning of 2004 give an insight, not only 
into the attitudes of that moment, which are more or less susceptible to changes, 
but into trends that enable us to gain scientific insights about the subject of our 
research. 
In this analysis the relationship of the participants towards European 
integration and the EU was investigated through numerous indicators, with 
emphasis on the perception of the consequences of Croatia's accession to the 
European Union. However, other aspects of the relationship toward Europe and 
the EU, which represent a wider context for the understanding of the perception 
of consequences of entering Europe, were also investigated. 
The results obtained demonstrate that most young and adult participants in 
Croatia actually had a neutral perception of the EU – even though there are more 
of those with a positive than a negative image – and it is logical to assume that this 
neutrality might be relatively easily changed under the influence of different 
factors. Nine out of ten participants even supported Croatia's integration into the 
European Union at the beginning of 2004. Among them, most were Euro-skeptics, 
that is, those who believe that too much is expected from accession. At the same 
time, the Euro-enthusiasts (expecting comprehensive benefits from accession) and 
Euro-realists (believing that integration is inevitable for the survival of small 
countries) were considerably less numerous. The domination of Euro-skeptics 
again warns of the instability of the relationship towards the EU, which can be 
influenced by different events both in the EU and in Croatia. However, in spite of 
the expressed skepticism, two thirds of participants expected that Croatia will be 
an equal member of the Union by 2010 at the latest. 
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The experiences of other transitional countries also demonstrated that there 
are numerous obstacles on the road to a united Europe. Our participants ascribed 
these obstacles equally to Croatia and the EU, however, the number of young 
participants emphasizing the EU's responsibility increased from 1999 to 2004, 
while the number of those stressing Croatia's responsibility decreased. Also, to 
determine the relationship towards European integration and Croatia's accession 
to the Union, the findings about the expected positive and negative 
consequences, once Croatia is integrated into the EU, are most important. Again, 
both the young and the adults expect more advantages than undesirable 
consequences. However, there was a mild decrease in the expectance of positive, 
and an increase in the expectance of negative consequences in the five year 
period between the two pieces of research. In spite of all these tendencies, the 
expectations of youth are more positive than those of the adults. The greatest 
positive expectations were registered on an individual and socio-cultural level, 
while socio-economic enthusiasm waned. Indeed, it is because of the socio-
economic unpreparedness of Croatia for joining a developed European 
environment, that most negative consequences are expected. 
An insight into the perception of the social and political consequences of 
Croatia’s integration into the European Union was gained with the aid of a 
number of indicators. Thus, research into the expected development of the EU in 
the coming ten years demonstrated that only the opportunity for easier travel, 
work, study and life in Europe is something most participants expect, where this 
opinion is accepted by two out of three young participants. However, they are 
quite afraid of the costs of integration for Croatia and the worsening of the 
farmers' position. The adult participants expect more social problems than the 
young, including a higher level of unemployment. The negative consequences 
for their own countries are also less perceived by the young in Croatia than was 
the case with their counterparts in the Union. Related to the fears from the 
building of a united Europe and European Union, we determined that the young 
in Croatia are most afraid of the abolition of the Croatian currency and an 
increase in crime, and least afraid of the potential loss of social privileges. The 
adult participants, on the other hand, are consistent in demonstrating a higher 
level of fear in all the examined elements. The fears of the participants from the 
enlarged EU are somewhat different – the greatest fear is that of employment 
transferring to other countries, as well as an increase in crime and the drug trade, 
difficulties for farmers and the price their country will have to pay due to the 
construction of the EU. Both the young and the adult participants in Croatia are 
less worried about losing their national identity, language and social privileges 
than the Europeans. 
One of the most important components of the construction of Europe and 
the EU is the enlargement process, although the current crisis that the European 
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integration process is going through, may result in an intermission in its tempo 
and scope. All our participants emphasize the multifaceted benefits from EU 
enlargement, followed by the positive influence of that enlargement on Croatia, 
while the efforts the Croatian authorities are putting into joining the Union were 
evaluated quite poorly. The adults accept all these attitudes more than the young, 
as well as valuing Croatia qualities more. Almost two thirds of the participants 
from the EU candidate countries, on the other hand, gave high marks in 2002 to 
all the potentially positive consequences of EU enlargement, but one quarter also 
demonstrated a fear of the possible increase in unemployment in their countries. 
The potential accession of Croatia to the European Union will also signify a 
change in the way decisions are made, in the sense that some will be made at the 
national level, and some along with the EU. Our participants have in this regard 
turned out to be very prepared for integration, for most of them believe that four 
fifths of all the observed areas should be the subject of joint decision-making by 
Croatia and the EU. The only areas in which, according to the opinion of the 
young participants, Croatia should decide autonomously, are the acceptance of 
refugees, the judiciary, culture, agriculture and fisheries and the police. The 
European share a different opinion on this issue, and believe two thirds of the 
stated areas should be decided upon by their country along with the EU, while it 
should be autonomous in the fields of preventing juvenile crime, urban violence, 
then education, basic rules regarding the media, health and social care, as well as 
unemployment. 
The perception of the potential winners and losers of Croatia's membership 
in the EU is especially indicative. Different social groups were, based on the 
perception of the young participants, structured into the potential losers from 
integration (e.g. farmers, retired persons, manual workers, the unemployed), 
potential winners of integration (such as the inhabitants of the capital and some 
regions, youth and all Croatian citizens), and sure winners of integration, who 
are also best prepared for Croatia's accession to the EU (experts, those who 
speak foreign languages, the political elite, managers and large companies). 
Indeed, it was demonstrated that the young believe the greatest winners from EU 
integration are those that are today in a relatively better position in Croatian 
terms, and those whose existing position is not invidious and who most need a 
better future, were seen as potentially the weakest winners. It is encouraging that 
the young put themselves in the group of potential winners, meaning they 
believe that the existing capabilities and potentials of their generation only need 
optimal circumstances to be fully expressed. Since people that speak foreign 
languages are perceived as certain winners of joining the Union, we have 
particularly examined this aspect of readiness for accession. The data about the 
knowledge of foreign languages is less than thrilling, especially compared to the 
knowledge of foreign languages of the young in the EU. The first position, of 
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course, belongs to the English language. However, unlike the European results, 
where the knowledge of French is next in line, in Croatia the second most 
common foreign language is German. The young speak both these languages 
more than the adult participants, while they are in a worse position regarding 
other foreign languages researched (Italian, French, and Russian). 
In this research, we also determined that approximately three quarters of 
our participants are proud of the fact that they are Croatian citizens, while 
somewhat more than half of the young and slightly fewer adults are proud to be 
European. The young are those with a slightly more critical attitude towards 
their national identity and are especially avid in the positive validation of their 
Europeism. However, the most interesting finding is that all the Croatian 
participants feel less national pride than the population of the European Union, 
while it is understandable that the EU participants emphasize their pride in being 
European more often. The answers of the participants regarding the content of 
the “citizen of the European Union” indicate that neither the young nor the 
adults have a coherent conception of citizenship in the EU. Still, the right to 
work, live and study in any EU member country is the key element of 
understanding this citizenship, with the young in Croatia, as well as youth in the 
Union itself. Also, both the young and the adult participants in Croatia chose as 
the least important the general active suffrage, regardless of elections being held 
for the European Parliament, the national or the local representative bodies. 
Only one out of four participants from Croatia believes they will have some 
personal benefits from Croatia's membership in the EU, while almost half of the 
young and a third of the adult participants have no defined opinion on this issue. 
This feeling is clearly very much linked to the issue of the personal meaning the 
European Union has for the participants, where neither the young nor the adults 
have a homogenous perception. Only one answer occurs in the majority of cases 
– the EU is a way of creating a better future for the young, while little support 
was given to the claim that the EU signifies a “European Government”, superior 
to the national states who are the Union's members. Unlike the youth in Croatia, 
those from the Union countries mostly emphasize the freedom of movement, 
while in time the concept of the “European Government” grew more pronounced 
in their attitudes. Like the Croatian youth, the young in the EU have an equal 
fear of Euro-bureaucracy, the loss of cultural diversity and the Utopianism of the 
European idea. 
Intrigued by the often publicly expressed concern about the emigration of 
young, especially highly educated people, to other country, we deemed it 
necessary to explore the readiness of our participants to spend a certain period of 
time or their whole life abroad. According to our data, two fifths of young 
people would like to spend a long period of time (working and studying) abroad, 
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while a quarter of Croatian youth would leave forever. The desire of youth to 
gain certain knowledge, material wealth and experience in other countries is not 
in question, especially if it is taken into consideration that the young are also the 
most mobile and flexible segment of society. However, the information that a 
quarter of youth wishes to abandon this country forever (while not all of them 
will do so), is worrisome, seen from the point of view of human capital, which is 
extremely important for the survival and optimal development of a small country 
such as Croatia. Also, it is important to mention that the percentage of youth that 
would go abroad forever, with or without an adequate opportunity, increased 
over the five year period, which is an indicator of the unfavorable trends in the 
social development of Croatia. The adult participants, on the other hand, 
demonstrate a more conservative attitude toward the possible emigration of their 
children to one of the Union countries, but are still prepared to accept their 
studying and training in the EU, and only 14% of them would like their children 
to reside permanently or during their working life in one of the European Union 
member countries. 
The analysis of the differentiation of youth regarding European integration 
and the EU indicated the limited influence of the social attributes used. In other 
words, the young are relatively homogenous in their perception of a unified 
Europe as well as expectations from Croatia's accession to the European Union. 
However, there are certain differences, and they are mostly caused by party 
identification, socio-professional status, regional status and religiousness. The 
conclusion is that the most influence is exerted on the attitudes toward the 
European integration process by ideological-political orientations and existing 
social status as well as the specifics of the wider environment. It was, hence, 
shown that the supporters of the left of center parties, the pupils and students, the 
inhabitants of more developed regions and the non-religious participants are 
more inclined to the EU and the integration process, and emphasize the positive 
consequences and potential gains from Croatia's accession to the Union more 
than they express their fears from the negative consequences. This also applies, 
although to a lesser degree, to young men, the academically educated youth, 
with an urban background and/or domicile, while the age related differences 
within the young population are inconsistent. Therefore, we can say in short that 
the higher social competence of youth is reflected in the formation of a stable 
and consistent pro-European orientation. Since this group still consists of a 
minority of youth, it is obvious that a great effort on the part of the advocates of 
integration is necessary, especially the political protagonists, to attract the 
majority of youth that are vacillating and, thus, susceptible to influences often 
opposite in nature. 
Finally, two most important tendencies may be stressed, which are the 
result of the research data about the relationship of youth towards the European 
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integration process. The first indicates that the young generation in Croatia is 
recognized – both by themselves and by the adults – as one of the potentially 
greatest winners of the European integration process and, in that context, of 
Croatia's accession to the European Union. The second trend demonstrates that 
the young, in relation to the adults, consistently demonstrate a more definite pro-
European orientation. Both these tendencies suggest that the potentials of youth 
are a resource to be taken into serious consideration on Croatia's path to the EU, 
and then in its adequate development in the new circumstances that will arise. 
Hence, along with all the other damage, which would occur by stopping the EU 
enlargement process, one of the undesirable consequences would also be the 
weakening of the motivation and Euro-optimism of youth in Croatia. This 
would, therefore, additionally aggravate the negative consequences, because 
they might be used as one of the more important motors for the development of 
this country, which does not seem to be going in the right direction, in more 
favorable circumstances – which the assured accession of Croatia to the EU 
would contribute to. 
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Ivona Mendeš 
KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION ABOUT THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
1. Introduction 
A world without the media in todays networked and intertwined society is 
almost impossible to imagine. Their expansion is unstoppable and they have, 
almost inconspicuously, become a part of everyone's life. Along with the recent 
appearance of new forms of communication, the news, Internet and mobile 
communications seem to be gaining momentum and spreading the influence of a 
process that marks all that is happening in the contemporary world, whether it is 
for or against this process – the process of globalization. 
Some simple premises that need to be given thought when discussing the 
media have to do with the right of citizens to complete and objective 
information, that is, their right to receive clear and objective information 
regarding political, economic and social issues pertinent to their everyday lives. 
It is obvious, of course, that these “purely informative” media do not exist 
separately, in a sort of vacuum, but have other functions as well – such as 
education, entertainment, etc. Aside from that, the ever stronger intertwining and 
integration of different types of media is the consequence of the globalization 
process and of the opening of markets in different countries to outside 
influences, so we are constantly witnesses of identical or equal contents around 
the globe (Ilišin, 1988; 2002; Kevin and others, 2004). 
The media are also factories of their own products that have a specific effect 
in society, both in a cultural and political sense. The media create the content of 
the so-called mass culture, which would be “a culture created according to mass 
norms of industrial production, expanded by technical means of mass diffusion 
(...), addressing (...) a giant agglomeration of entities, brought together 
independently of the internal structures of the society” (E. Morin, according to: 
Ilišin, Marinović Bobinac, Radin, 2001: 16). This “opium for masses” causes the 
stripping of cultural values from most contents or, on the other hand, the neglect of 
those values in favor of simplification and fine packaging of what is being listened 
to, watched, read, that is, consumed. Due to the reasons mentioned, it is unrealistic 
to expect that there is a media system in which complete and objective information 
is always accessible regardless of the issue at hand. 
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As for media and democracy, they provide information to a system aiming 
to be democratic about political life, about the creation and implementation of 
public policies and about decision making. Here, the assumption is that the 
system is transparent and it allows for access to information. Aside from that, 
the media are expected to provide citizens with an entire spectrum of opinions 
and analysis regarding politics and society, along with argumentation for 
discussion about those issues. The media have, therefore, been dubbed by some 
authors “the fourth power” in the state (along with legislative, executive and 
judicial), because they have the role of guard dogs in the name of the public 
when it comes to the behavior of political institutions and protagonists (Inglis, 
1997; Peruško Čulek, 1999; Kevin, 2004). 
The public perception of the role and activity of the media plays an 
important role because it can demonstrate how much and what kind of influence 
they have on “the average” viewer, what he/she is interested in, in a sea of 
information and how that fact affects his/her opinion about a number of different 
issues and problems of the social life. Here, the so-called proximity law, 
claiming that all equal phenomena, things and events have fewer repercussions 
the further away they are from a specific viewpoint, should be taken into account 
– an individual is interested in his/her everyday life, an event that is “close”. 
Factors that affect the assessment of closeness are, certainly, personal interests, 
geographic proximity, the time of the event, psycho-social factors (for example, 
life, health, security and so on), and political-ideological (people are interested 
in beliefs close to their own), socio-professional, socio-cultural and generational 
factors (Bobić, 1987:15). 
A special group of the population in terms of information are precisely young 
people. In trying to perceive how youth are informed and why, it would be useful 
to note that many authors believe that “mass” is wrongly identified with “passive”. 
To be more specific, a central part of interest of the uses and gratifications theory 
relates to the activity of the individual receiving information, in this case, youth. In 
other words, the media are used for gratifying some special human needs, firstly, 
the need for information, and then, education, confirmation of one's own identity, 
entertainment, escape from reality and so on (Ilišin, 2001). This is why it is 
understandable that youth, a population whose identity is still not fully formed, 
that is to a large degree they are still at some level of acquiring education, that 
place a lot of importance on entertainment and show business, and that, finally, 
faces the causes and consequences of social marginalization, use the media for all 
the purposes mentioned (Ilišin, 1988; 1999; 2002). 
All of the above is true for countries in transition, such as Croatia, that face 
an additional challenge of incorporating the acquis communautaire of the 
European Union into its own legal, political and social system. In this context, it 
can be said that the media have, as the main source of information for citizens, 
undergone rapid changes in the way they gather and provide that information. 
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New or reestablished national states are at the same time caught in a dilemma 
between issues regarding “national interest” and issues of “public, that is, 
general interest”, which directly affects the role of the media as “builders of the 
nation”, as those that develop or stimulate the development of national identity 
and the role of the media as guardians of everything that has to do with the 
public good (Kevin, 2004). 
The existing results regarding information about the European Union, its 
policies and institutions, state that television and the daily press are the main 
sources of information about those issues, while the radio lags behind, even 
though trust in the information heard on the radio is the highest (European 
Commission, 2003c). Besides, the level of use of those media was similar in 
countries that were, in May 2004, candidates for accession to the EU (European 
Commission, 2003a). In spite of any skepticism that might exist regarding the 
media, it could be claimed that European citizens clearly rely on the media to 
obtain information from political, social, cultural and other realms of life. The 
use of new technologies for gathering information, that is, the use of the internet, 
is constantly increasing in this context, but only 12-15% of citizens state that this 
mass media is a source of information about the EU for them. The situation 
regarding youth and the European Union indicates a higher use of the internet, 
especially in countries that were or still are in the accession process (European 
Commission, 2003b). Findings by the World Internet Project also indicate that 
internet users believe it to be a very important source of information. However, 
the reliability and truthfulness of the information distributed by this medium is 
an issue for debate and causes concern for experienced internet users in almost 
every country (Kevin, 2004). 
In this analysis we focused on investigating the general relationship of 
youth toward information on social and political issues, as well as their specific 
attitude toward information about the European Union, its public policies, 
institutions and processes related to it. The goal of this research is to establish 
the level of knowledge and information youth have about the European Union 
and the European integration process. In this context we analyzed the use of 
specific media, the following of specific content in the media, the information 
about the European Union and Croatia’s accession process to this association as 
well as real knowledge related to the process of Croatian accession to the Union, 
which issues related to the EU arouse greater or lesser interest, which sources of 
information play a role in this and how well known some institutions of the 
European Union are. Within the operationalization of the research goal, the 
differentiation of youth in regard to the adults, as well as youth among 
themselves are also analyzed, in terms of their differing socio-demographic, 
socio-structural and socio-cultural attributes. The analysis constructed in this 
way is intended to answer four questions: 1) whether the young differ from 
adults in their level of information in general as well as in terms of information 
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related to the EU, specifically; 2) how much the young are interested in certain 
issues from political and social life and issues regarding the EU; 3) whether the 
young are differentiated regarding their different social attributes; 4) wherever a 
comparison is possible, whether the Croatian participants, specifically the 
young, differ from participants in former EU candidate countries and in the 
European Union itself. A total of 10 attributes is used for determining the 
possible differences within the young population: age, sex, socio-professional 
status, provenience, domicile, level of education of the participants and their 
fathers, regional status, religious self-identification and party affiliation. Aside 
from the stated attributes, certain analysis used the following attitudes of the 
participants: the perception of participant about the European Union, the 
perception of potential personal gain from Croatian accession to the EU, 
following the news on television, radio and in daily newspapers as well as the 
internet, following of issues related to the EU, NATO and Euro-Atlantic 
organizations in the media, an assessment of the participant's own knowledge 
about the European Union, events related to it and the process of Croatian 
accession to the EU, support for Croatian accession to the Union and ownership 
of a personal computer. A comparison based on these variables is intended to 
indicate which of the observed attributes influence the knowledge and level of 
information about the European Union and the integration process the most, at 
the individual level. Differences and correlations significant on a level of .0001 
and less (yielded from the implementation of the χ2- test and variance analysis), 
will be interpreted. A comparative analysis is used on two levels – the first is a 
comparison of youth and adults, and the other compares the research conducted 
in Croatia in 2004 to some European research conducted in 2002 on a sample of 
the population older than 15 in 13 European Union candidate countries 
(including the countries that have just entered the European Union: Bulgaria and 
Romania, and one that has not yet become a member: Turkey), as well as to 
research conducted of the general population of the European Union in 2004 
after enlargement (it should be noted that there is a relatively limited number of 
variables at our disposal for the latter comparative analysis). 
2. Youth and information 
In this section we seek to determine the basic data about information and 
gaining information of youth in Croatia. In this sense, the approach will be 
analyzed of the participants to the media in general, and following the news on 
television, radio, daily press and on the internet specifically, along with the 
frequency of tracking specific subjects from social and political life,. 
In any research regarding informing, it might be most important to examine 
the general position of the media in the lives of the participants, that is, if they 
come in contact with the media and how often. This is why we have tried to 
Knowledge and Information about the European Union 
 275
determine the reach of the most common media the participants might have 
encountered, and we have measured the frequency of following the news in 
those media with a five-degree scale (“every day ”, “several times a week ”, 
“once or twice a week”, “rarely” and “never”). In order to handle and interpret 
the data more easily and simply, the first two degrees were merged into a single 
answer “often”, and the last two into the answer “rarely or never”. The 
comparative data for young and adult participants in Croatia 2004 and for 
participants from the 13 countries that were candidates for membership in the 
European Union at the end of 2002 are portrayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: A comparative outline of the frequency of using the media (%) 
Often Sometimes Rarely or never 
CRO 2004 CRO 2004 CRO 2004 Media CC 13 
2002* 
Youth Adults 
CC 13 
2002 Youth Adults 
CC 13 
2002 Youth Adults 
Television 84 70.9 87.9 7 14.6 5.7 9 14.6 6.4 
Daily press 41 48.5 50.5 17 21.6 16.6 43 29.9 32.9 
Radio  48 47.2 59.6 9 14.0 12.0 42 38.8 28.4 
Internet – 24.0 9.8 – 13.6 5.5 – 62.3 84.7 
* European Commission, 2002: 34-35 
 
From the portrayed data it is simple to notice that the dominant position in 
the frequency of using the media for getting news is occupied by television as 
the most accessible media, but also the one demanding the least amount of 
engagement by its audience. The percentage of regular readers of daily 
newspapers and listeners to radio information broadcasts should not be neglected 
either, and the internet, as a new media whose accessibility is, for different 
reasons (more financial resources are needed, as well as knowledge) smaller, 
records a significantly smaller percentage of regular users. 
Perhaps the most interesting results portrayed in this table have to do with 
the somewhat drastic differences in the use of certain media between the young 
participants and those older than 30. The first difference regards the frequent use 
of television news – almost 20% more adults claim to follow informative shows 
on television compared to the young. Even though the difference is not that 
marked, it is still present in the use of radio for gaining information; specifically, 
three fifths of adults and somewhat less than half of the young participants state 
that they often listen to news on the radio. The differences in using the internet 
as a news following media are more visible when the answer “rarely or never” is 
observed – there are 20% more adults than youth that do not use the internet to 
keep informed, while almost one quarter of youth use this new media frequently 
(compared to only a tenth of adults). 
Regarding the data from those countries that were EU candidate countries 
in late 2002, in other words, countries that were approximately in the same 
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situation that Croatia is in today when it comes to accession to the European 
Union, it is interesting to observe that our participants (this especially relates to 
the adult population) are much more frequent viewers, readers and listeners of 
different media and information sources. 
In order to check for the existence of certain statistically significant 
differences within the young population in Croatia in the frequency of use of the 
stated media, only the data presented in the previous table regarding the positive 
answers of the participants, were compared to the observed attributes of youth. 
The results of the analysis are portrayed in Table 2. 
It is visible from the portrayed data that gathering information through 
certain media causes significant differences among the young. This is primarily 
true when it comes to reading daily newspapers and frequent use of the internet 
for news. Since television sets are an integral part of 92.8% of households in 
Croatia (Basic characteristics..., 2003), it is to be expected that most of the 
young population uses that medium as a source of information without many 
exceptions. The only two attributes that differentiate between the young are age 
(those in the oldest age cohort make up a greater part of the regular television 
audience unlike the youngest participants) and education (the least frequent or 
no use of television for news is indicated by the young with a vocational 
diploma, while the highly educated youth frequently watch informative content 
on the TV in four out of five cases). Radio news shows also do not discriminate 
youth that much when it comes to the observed attributes. There too the young 
participants differ by age – again, the older participants are often those that listen 
to the news on the radio, while almost every other young participant avoids the 
radio as a source of information; then by education: there is an even greater 
difference than in the case of television news shows between the most educated 
participants and, in this case, the young that only have primary education; and 
finally, by socio-professional status – the listeners of radio news are mostly 
employed participants, and in line with the previous data related to education, 
the least attention to radio news is paid by school pupils. 
Most of the differences have to do with keeping informed through daily 
newspapers. It may be said that their faithful reader has the following 
characteristics: he is a man, born, raised and living in Zagreb, Split, Rijeka or 
Osijek (participants with rural origin are on the opposing end), studying or 
working (unlike the pupils and unemployed participants), has a tertiary 
education degree (unlike those with the lowest qualifications), living in the most 
developed regions in Croatia – Istria and Primorje, or Zagreb (on the other end 
there are participants from Eastern Croatia), votes for HNS or SDP (while those 
supporting HDZ are among the least regular readers of daily newspapers) and 
own a personal computer. 
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Table 2: Using certain media regarding the attributes of youth (%) 
Attributes of youth Television  Daily press Radio Internet 
Gender  χ2=33.89   
Female  42.3   
Male  54.3   
Age χ2=24.23  χ2=42.97  
15 – 19 years 66.4  39.4  
20 – 24 years 68.5  46.4  
25 – 29 years 77.7  55.9  
Place of birth  χ2=48.96  χ2=59.38 
Village  43.4  17.7 
Small town  45.9  24.4 
Major city  60.4  33.8 
Zagreb  58.5  33.7 
Place of habitat   χ2=53.84  χ2=51.37 
Village  42.2  18.3 
Small town  47.2  24.8 
Major city  58.9  29.7 
Zagreb  59.8  33.4 
Socio-professional status  χ2=50.94 χ2=42.94 χ2=102.16 
Employed  52.1 52.8 19.06 
Unemployed  40.1 50.2 15.6 
Pupils  42.2 35.4 28.9 
Students  57.3 47.7 34.4 
Education  χ2=43.94 χ2=63.39 χ2=38.39 χ2=97.72 
Primary school or less 65.7 38.5 38.9 24.1 
Vocational school 64.7 44.9 49.0 11.3 
High school 73.1 53.3 47.9 25.4 
College, university or more 83.9 59.0 61.1 37.6 
Regional status  χ2=94.97  χ2=36.58 
Northern Croatia  43.2  19.1 
Central Croatia  41.9  20.9 
Istria and Primorje  62.1  26.7 
Eastern Croatia  34.7  20.9 
Dalmatia  51.9  23.6 
Zagreb  60.1  33.6 
Religious self-identification    χ2=28.35 
Religious    22.5 
Undecided    25.5 
Not religious    32.7 
Party affiliation  χ2=38.57   
HDZ  44.4   
HNS  56.8   
HSP  53.0   
HSS  46.8   
SDP  57.5   
Undecided  45.9   
Owning a PC  χ2=48.38  χ2=377.55 
No  39.9  6.8 
Yes  55.1  37.6 
TOTAL 70.9 48.5 47.2 24.0 
 
It may be roughly claimed that the most common internet “surfers” are very 
much like the daily newspaper readers in their attributes, except in this case the 
most regular visitors to the world's widest network are students and pupils 
(while the unemployed and employed participants, those in the world of labor, 
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obviously seem to have less opportunity to use new technologies to keep 
themselves informed), then the most educated participants (compared to the 
young that have graduated from a three-year vocational school), those from 
Zagreb (versus the young from Eastern, Northern and Central Croatia) and non-
religious participants (where the young that state a high level of religious belief 
rarely if ever use the internet as a tool for keeping informed). 
In order to deepen the insight into the manner of keeping informed, the 
participants were supposed to answer questions on the most common issues 
from social and political life that they follow in the media. The comparative data 
for youth and adult participant from our research and for participants from the 
13 candidate countries before the enlargement of the European Union are 
portrayed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: A comparative outline of the issues from social and political life 
followed by the participants (%) 
Often Sometimes Never 
CRO 2004 CRO 2004 CRO 2004 Issues CC 
13 
2002* Youth Adults 
CC 
13 
2002 Youth Adults 
CC 
13 
2002 Youth Adults 
Entertainment and show business - 64.3 34.5 - 30.4 52.0 - 5.3 13.5 
Sports 34 48.8 35.3 34 36.4 39.9 33 14.8 24.8 
Science and education - 31.2 29.3 - 51.4 54.5 - 17.4 16.2 
Daily chronicles - 30.9 28.3 - 48.2 50.7 - 20.9 21.0 
Culture and art 38 20.0 23.3 45 53.6 55.2 17 26.4 21.5 
Economy 45 19.5 44.7 41 52.1 46.0 14 28.4 9.2 
Social problems 61 18.4 44.0 31 58.6 46.6 8 23.0 9.3 
Environment 38 18.3 26.2 46 58.5 56.9 19 23.2 16.9 
Foreign policy 32 13.2 25.1 44 48.5 53.2 23 38.3 21.7 
Local politics 37 12.8 28.7 44 48.8 52.2 19 38.4 19.1 
Party and political life 48 11.4 32.6 39 52.2 50.2 14 36.4 17.2 
The work of the Government, Parliament 
and President - 10.9 33.4 - 47.0 49.6 - 42.1 17.0 
European Union 37 10.8 19.8 45 57.6 59.0 18 31.5 21.2 
NATO, other Euro-Atlantic organizations - 5.8 10.0 - 44.8 51.1 - 49.4 38.9 
* European Commission, 2002: 112 
 
At first sight we can state that the young follow issues regarding some 
questions and problems from social life much more often than is the case with 
the political issues. The only issue that gains more than 50% of the attention of 
the young population has to do with news in the field of entertainment and show 
business. The adult participants do not pay that much attention to any of these 
issues, but their interests are much more equally distributed between different 
issues, and they follow issues from the political sphere more than twice (in the 
cases of the work of the Government, the Parliament and the President this goes 
up to three times) as much as the young. The subject that occasionally attracts 
the attention of about three fifths of all participants is the European Union, but 
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other Euro-Atlantic organizations and NATO (that are also the least interesting 
subjects for both the young and the adult participants) do so somewhat less. 
As for the data from countries that were candidates for accession to the EU in 
2002, it can roughly be said that the participants from those 13 countries were 
more often consumers and much more interested in all comparable issues, aside 
from sports, which is followed by young people in Croatia far more, and the 
economy, where the level of attention given by the adult participants and 
participants from the candidate countries is identical. The demographic data 
analysis from Central and Eastern Europe has indicated that men pay more 
attention to news about the European Union (87% compared to 77% of women). 
The youngest and the oldest participants pay less attention to any type of 
information compared to the population in EU member countries at the time. 
Also, the most educated follow all types of issues (91%) far more, in contrast to 
those who left the education system before the age of sixteen (74%) (European 
Commission, 2002: 113). 
As we were interested in the structuring of the observed issues, factor analy-
sis and variance analysis were conducted according to the observed attributes of 
the young population. The factors yielded (total variance of 55.3%) are portrayed 
in Table 4, and the results of the variance analysis may be found in Table 5. 
 
Table 4: Structure of factors of issues from the social and political life in the media 
Issues Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Foreign policy/international relations .788   
European Union .758   
Party and political life .755 -.327  
The work of the Government, Parliament and 
President .703  
 
Economy .682   
Social problems .677   
NATO and other Euro-Atlantic organizations .669   
Local politics .660   
Science and education .559 .446  
Environment .526 .522  
Entertainment and show business  .634 .394 
Culture and art .479 .515 -.410 
Daily chronicles   .631 
Sports   .438 
% common variance 35.6 11.4 8.3 
 
 
Ivona Mendeš 
280 
Table 5: Differences among the young in accepting the factors of issues from 
social and political life in the media 
Attributes of youth Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Age F-ratio=63.601  F- ratio=13.636 
15 – 19 years –  + 
20 – 24 years 0  0 
25 – 29 years +  – 
Place of habitat  F- ratio=8.907   
Village –   
Small town –   
Major city –   
Zagreb +   
Socio-professional status F- ratio=32.146 F- ratio=12.402  
Employed 0 –  
Unemployed – –  
Pupils – 0  
Students + +  
Education  F- ratio=36.641 F- ratio=24.713 F- ratio=6.942 
Primary school or less – – + 
Vocational school 0 – + 
High school + 0 0 
College, university or more + + – 
Regional status F- ratio=9.423  F- ratio=5.133 
Northern Croatia 0  – 
Central Croatia +  – 
Istria and Primorje –  0 
Eastern Croatia –  – 
Dalmatia –  + 
Zagreb +  – 
Religious self-identification   F- ratio=7.780 
Religious   + 
Undecided   0 
Not religious   – 
Party affiliation F- ratio=10.819   
HDZ 0   
HNS +   
HSP +   
HSS –   
SDP 0   
Undecided –   
Perception of the EU F- ratio=12.388   
Negative +   
Neutral –   
Positive +   
News on TV F- ratio=131.861  F- ratio=11.393 
Rarely or never –  – 
Sometimes 0  0 
Often +  + 
News in daily newspapers F- ratio=65.211 F- ratio=7.871 F- ratio=31.40 
Rarely or never – – – 
Sometimes 0 0 0 
Often + + + 
News on the radio F- ratio=37.443 F- ratio=9.514  
Rarely or never – –  
Sometimes 0 +  
Often + +  
News on the internet F- ratio=16.822 F- ratio=36.458  
Rarely or never – –  
Sometimes + 0  
Often + +  
Legend: – below common average; 0 within common average; + above common average 
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The first factor yielded is labeled interest in socio-political issues, and it is 
a factor containing most subjects already determined to be rarely followed by the 
young, related to different forms of political activity (foreign policy, EU, 
NATO, political party life, the Government, the Parliament, the President of the 
Republic, local politics) or to controversial issues in social life, which are an 
integral part of the political sphere (the economy, social problems, science and 
education, the environment). 
The young that pay an above-average amount of attention to socio-political 
issues are within the oldest age cohort, live in Zagreb, study, have a high school 
or university education, are from the Zagreb or Central Croatia regions, vote for 
HNS and HSP (their political body seems to be the most politically infused), 
have either a positive or a negative image about the European Union (both 
“extreme” attitudes obviously cause a greater interest in political issues, 
corresponding to the previous finding related to party identification), frequently 
watch the news on television, listen to it on the radio or read it in the newspapers 
and on the internet, while even occasional informing through this latter media 
causes an above-average interest in socio-political issues. In contrast to youth 
with these characteristics we have the youngest participants who live in rural 
areas, towns and cities, the unemployed and pupils, then the young with a 
primary school diploma, coming from Istria and Primorje, Dalmatia and Eastern 
Croatia, the non-religious youth, sympathizers of HSS or politically undecided, 
participants with a neutral perception of the EU, and of course, all those that 
rarely or never use one of the observed media. 
Interest in issues from cultural life and entertainment is the label of the 
second factor, because it consists of just these areas of interest, with the addition 
of science, environmental issues and lack of interest in political and party 
spheres. This factor yields the least statistically significant differences according 
to the observed attributes and is above-averagely represented by students (com-
pared to participants that are part of the working population), then participants 
with higher levels of education (unlike the youth with only primary or vocational 
school degrees), as well as youth that frequently read news in daily newspapers 
and on-line and those that occasionally or very frequently listen to radio news 
(compared to participants that rarely or never use those media to keep informed). 
The final, third factor was labeled interest in sports and daily chronicles, 
and has to do with topics the young pay most attention to (with the addition of 
entertainment and show business and the lack of interest in topics regarding 
culture and arts), that demand the least amount of engagement when it comes to 
understanding and attitude creation. The characteristics of the young are quite 
discriminating when it comes to accepting this factor. It is above-averagely 
accepted by the youngest that have a primary or vocational level of education, 
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those that live in Dalmatia, the religious and frequent newspaper readers. On the 
opposing end there are highly educated participants from the oldest age cohort, 
from all other parts of Croatia (with the exception of Istria and Primorje), the 
non-religious and participants that rarely or never reach for daily newspapers. 
3. Information about the European Union 
Considering the fact that main topic of our research is the relationship of 
youth toward the EU and the European integration processes, it is logical that we 
were interested in how far the participants are informed about the European 
Union. This is why the results yielded by the following questions are portrayed 
and analyzed here: the general level of information of the participants regarding 
the EU and events pertaining to it, the more specific issue of Croatian accession 
to the Union, subjects linked to the policies and institutions of the European 
Union and the ways of gaining information regarding these topics. 
Table 6 consists of a comparative portrayal of the subjective assessment 
given by the participants about how well informed they are about the European 
Union and events pertaining to it. The original answers to the question were 
constructed as a five-degree scale (“very good”, “mediocre”, “very little”, “not 
informed at all” and “I am not interested in this issue”) that was summarized in 
such a way that the first two original degrees now form the answer “well 
informed”, the third and fourth are now “poorly informed”, and the fifth kept its 
original form. 
 
Table 6: A comparative outline of the self-assessed level of information about 
the EU and events pertaining to it (%) 
Croatia 2004 
Level of information about the EU 
EU 25* 
2004 Youth Adults 
Well informed 25 54.2 63.5 
Poorly informed 73 37.9 30.5 
Not interested in the EU 21 7.9 6.0 
* European Commission, 2005: 37 
 
Two significant things are immediately obvious: somewhat more than one 
half of the young participants stated that they are well informed about the 
European Union and events pertaining to it, compared to two thirds of the adults, 
thinking they are well informed. In order to put the level of information about 
                                                     
1 This answer in the research of the European Commission does not pertain to “I am not 
interested” but to “I do not know”. 
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the issue in a wider context, it suffices to note the data on the population of the 
25 European Union member countries, which would be expected to dispose of a 
better level of knowledge about the system they live in, and see that 73% of 
believe themselves to be poorly informed about this topic. In fact, participants in 
Croatia older than 30 claim that they are far more informed about the European 
Union, than the European population older than 15. As for the percentage of 
young and adult participants in Croatia stating that this topic does not interest 
them at all, it is relatively small, but unfortunately, we have no identical, that is, 
comparable data for participants from the European Union in order to 
contextualize it. 
According to the data on the participants from 25 European Union 
countries, a lower level of information about the Union itself is indicated by 
women, older participants (it is assumed that the young come in contact with 
information regarding the EU during their education, while Croatia has a 
completely different situation, because the young have no education about the 
structure and processes in the EU) and the less educated participants (European 
Commission, 2005: 38). It will be interesting to observe if some statistically 
significant differences appear with the Croatian young population, according to 
the observed attributes, when it comes to information regarding the European 
Union. The results of the analysis may be found in Table 7. 
Up to eight investigated characteristics of youth demonstrate differences 
regarding their level of information about the European Union. It can, thus, be 
seen that the well informed young are male from the oldest age cohort, then 
students (compared to the unemployed), those that have, like their fathers 
achieved a high degree in education, the young with a positive perception of the 
EU, and participants that often follow issues related to the European Union, the 
Euro-Atlantic organizations and NATO in the media, while, on the other side, 
those poorly informed are women and the youngest participants, the 
unemployed, and participants with a primary school education, like their fathers, 
participants with a neutral image about the European Union and those that never 
follow subjects related to the EU, NATO and other such integrations. 
Participants that claim that the issues related to the European Union do not 
interest them at all share the following characteristics: they are female, still 
teenagers and go to secondary school, or have, as their fathers, finished only the 
primary level of education, they have a negative image about the EU and they 
never follow subjects related to it in the media. 
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Table 7: The self-assessed level of information about the EU regarding the 
attributes of youth and events pertaining to it (%) 
Attributes of youth Well informed Poorly informed Not interested 
Gender χ2=22.50 
Female 48.5 42.6 9.0 
Male 59.7 33.4 6.9 
Age χ2=22.86 
15 – 19 years 49.2 39.9 10.9 
20 – 24 years 53.5 39.6 6.9 
25 – 29 years 60.1 34.1 5.8 
Socio-professional status χ2=49.60 
Employed 56.6 37.3 6.1 
Unemployed 44.4 46.5 9.1 
Pupils 50.5 37.4 12.1 
Students 64.2 31.0 4.8 
Father's education χ2=36.29 
Primary school or less 43.5 47.2 9.3 
Vocational school 51.4 40.7 8.0 
High school 58.0 33.7 8.3 
College, university or more 62.6 31.8 5.7 
Education  χ2=60.65 
Primary school or less 48.6 39.0 12.4 
Vocational school 43.3 47.3 9.3 
High school 58.7 35.6 5.7 
College, university or more 67.0 29.6 3.5 
Perception of the EU χ2=101.77 
Negative 63.3 24.0 12.7 
Neutral 44.7 46.0 9.3 
Positive 65.1 31.3 3.7 
Following the EU in the media χ2=352.37 
Never 28.4 53.2 18.4 
Sometimes 61.7 35.0 3.3 
Often 88.8 10.7 0.5 
Following NATO in the media χ2=252.37 
Never 37.5 49.1 13.3 
Sometimes 67.7 29.7 2.6 
Often 88.8 9.5 1.7 
TOTAL 13.6 77.7 8.7 
 
Are there participants that might not be especially interested in the 
European Union itself and do not wish to keep informed, but consider 
themselves to be well informed about the process of Croatian accession into the 
European Union? In order to find out the answer to this question, we have 
collected data portrayed in Table 8. 
The participants were able to choose between four answers (“well informed”, 
“sufficiently informed”, “insufficiently informed” and “completely uninformed”), 
here summarized into two degrees “sufficiently informed” and “insufficiently 
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informed”. The same relates to the date gathered at the general population older 
than 15 in 2002 in countries that were candidates for joining the EU. 2 
 
Table 8: A comparative outline of the self-assessed level of information about 
the process of accession of the participant's country to the EU (%) 
Croatia 2004 Level of information about the accession 
process to the EU 
CC 13* 
2002 Youth Adults 
Sufficiently informed 28 44.0 48.9 
Insufficiently informed 70 56.0 51.0 
* European Commission, 2002: 126 
 
The results of young and adult participants when it comes to this question 
indicate somewhat different trends than the results on the level of information 
regarding the European Union itself, where the self-assessment of the level of 
information was much higher. Even in this case the young are somewhat less 
informed than the adult participants, where satisfaction with their level of 
information was expressed by 44% of the young participants. 
In comparison, almost a half of the adult participants are satisfied with their 
level of information about the process of Croatian accession to the EU. 
However, we believe that this result is not very good and that the institutions in 
charge of providing information to the public about the European Union, its 
institutions and policies as well as Croatia’s accession process, might need to 
devote more attention to just these issues, because it is obvious that the Croatian 
population, especially the young, is in need of such information. 
By comparing the data on participants in Croatia and the former EU 
candidate countries, it is easy to conclude that the participants from our research 
assess their level of information as much higher than the population of the 
candidate countries in 2002. Specifically, only one quarter of them believed they 
were well informed about the accession process of their countries to the 
European Union. The demographic analysis of their results indicated that one 
third of the men were confident enough to claim to be well informed, unlike 
only one fifth of women. Also, the level of information in candidate countries 
increased dramatically with the increase in the participants' education level. 
(European Commission, 2002: 127). 
We were again interested in whether there were significant differences 
related to the level of information about the process of Croatia’s accession to the 
                                                     
2 Note: the European Commission data relate to the accession processes of each of the 
countries that were candidates for joining the European Union in 2002. 
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European Union regarding the observed characteristics of the young population. 
The results obtained may be seen in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: The self-assessed level of information about Croatia’s accession to the 
EU regarding the attributes of youth (%) 
Attributes of youth Sufficiently informed Insufficiently informed 
Gender χ2=32.19 
Female 37.6 62.4 
Male 50.2 49.8 
Place of birth χ2=19.94 
Village 40.3 59.7 
Small town 44.2 55.8 
Major city 57.0 43.0 
Zagreb 44.8 55.2 
Place of habitat χ2=22.92 
Village 40.5 59.5 
Small town 42.5 57.5 
Major city 58.2 41.8 
Zagreb 47.3 52.7 
Socio-professional status χ2=19.28 
Employed 44.0 56.0 
Unemployed 37.6 62.4 
Pupils 42.3 57.7 
Students 52.4 47.6 
Education χ2=30.70 
Primary school or less 40.3 59.7 
Vocational school 35.4 64.6 
High school 46.4 53.6 
College, university or more 56.8 43.2 
Perception of the EU χ2=52.88 
Negative 47.5 52.5 
Neutral 36.4 63.6 
Positive 54.0 46.0 
TOTAL 56.0 44.0 
 
In the case of the level of information the young have about Croatia’s 
accession to the EU, those that think they are well informed are mostly male 
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born, raised and living in a large city, students or highly educated, and have a 
positive image about the European Union. 
Unlike them, the young stating they are insufficiently informed about 
Croatia’s accession to the Union share the following attributes: they are female, 
born, raised and currently living in rural areas, they are unemployed with a voca-
tion qualification, and they have a neutral perception about the European Union. 
Considering our belief that it is necessary to determine individually the 
areas, problems and issues related to the European Union that the participants 
want to know more about, we asked a question about those issues where 
participants could choose a maximum of three items that interest them the most. 
Table 10 holds the results obtained for the young and adult populations in 
Croatia, as well as data for participants from countries that were candidates for 
entrance into the European Union in 2002. 
 
Table 10: A comparative outline of the issues related to EU, that the participants 
want more information about (%) 
Croatia 2004 
Issues related to EU 
CC 13* 
2002 Youth Adults 
Youth policy 61 56.0 28.7 
Education policy 57 24.9 17.2 
EU economy in general 53 24.4 47.0 
Social policy 52 21.8 39.2 
Environment 47 17.6 11.9 
Consumer protection 47 17.5 20.8 
Euro 54 16.8 10.8 
Common European market 46 13.5 12.7 
European citizenship 54 12.0 6.3 
Agriculture – 12.0 21.6 
EU enlargement 47 9.5 7.6 
Cultural policy 48 8.6 6.1 
EU international relations – 8.4 8.2 
Common foreign and security policy 46 7.2 10.9 
Regional policy 53 6.7 9.5 
European budget – 5.6 4.7 
* European Commission, 2002: 114 
 
The finding that Croatian youth is most interested in European policies 
directed toward the young is not surprising, because most of them are still of an 
age when they might hope these particular policies might include them, under 
Ivona Mendeš 
288 
the assumption that Croatia joins the European Union within a reasonable 
number of years (five to ten). However, unlike this, the area mentioned most 
often, all other issues offered enticed a relatively small amount of attention from 
the young participants. One quarter of them wish to find out more about 
education policies (again, a finding that is not surprising) and about the 
European economy in general. Aside from social policies, all other issues spark 
the interest of less than one fifth of the young participants. 
Opposed to this, the adult participants are much more interested in the 
economy of the European Union, then in social policy (this interest is also 
stimulated by the specific situation the adults are in – the need for better 
employment, quality of life, retirement, health and social care, and so on), 
followed by the interest in youth policies (it might be assumed that this is 
important to all that have children). Aside from this, one of five adult 
participants indicates an interest in consumer protection, agricultural problems 
and education policy. The least interest of the adult participants is shown in the 
issues of European citizenship, cultural policy and the European budget. 
Considering that the way the question was asked in the research conducted 
in the candidate countries in 2002 is not identical to the manner we used in our 
research, a direct comparison of the data is not possible, but they can be 
generally analyzed to some extent. The first four issues are, thus, identical to the 
order we had seen with the young participants in Croatia, indicating that the 
opinions of the Croatian youth is in line with some general European trends. 
With the exclusion of this finding, the participants from the former candidate 
countries gave a higher position to issues related to the euro, European 
citizenship and regional policies, all of which vary from our research. We did 
not have data on the issues of agriculture, European Union international relations 
and the European budget, so any comparison in those areas is impossible. 
The analysis of the obtained data considering the observed attributes of the 
young population indicates that in some cases the statistically significant 
differences are randomly distributed. Thus, youth policies more often interest the 
youngest participants (χ2=63.77), pupils (χ2=45.26), those with a primary school 
or vocational degree diploma (χ2=36.36), and all those that never follow news 
related to party and political life (χ2=18.05), social policy (χ2=16.00), economy 
(χ2=39.78), foreign policy and international relations (χ2=15.31), local politics 
(χ2=23.76), the work of the Government, the Parliament and the President 
(χ2=26.88), and often follow news related to entertainment and celebrity lives 
(χ2=31.72). Knowing more about the education policy in the European Union is 
a wish expressed by young women (χ2=52.23), pupils and students (χ2=37.75), 
participants with primary or higher levels of education – obviously interested in 
continuing or supplementing their existing education (χ2=27.71), all those that 
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often follow news from the world of science and education (χ2=113.97), culture 
(χ2=50.30), social policy (χ2=22.03) and news about the European Union 
(χ2=16.71). The economy of the European Union is interesting to the oldest age 
cohort of youth (χ2=44.36), the employed (χ2=34.60), the young that often 
follow news from party and political life (χ2=63.91), social policy (χ2=28.31), 
economy (χ2=174.42), foreign policy and international relations (χ2=55.22), local 
politics (χ2=40.62), European Union (χ2=39.86), the work of the Government, 
the Parliament and the President of the Republic (χ2=54.50) as well as NATO 
and other Euro-Atlantic organizations (χ2=30.84). Interest in the social politics 
of the EU is shown more often by youth from the oldest age cohort (χ2=15.48), 
and those living in Zagreb or some other big city (χ2=19.81) and, of course those 
that are usually more interested in issues related to social policy in the media 
(χ2=77.64). The youngest participants (χ2=22.16) and pupils (χ2=22.72) – 
probably because those issues are usually tackled in school – and those that have 
finished primary school (χ2=24.32) and, logically, young that usually follow the 
environmental issues in the media (χ2=58.16), would all like to know more about 
issues related to the European Union and the environment. Issues regarding the 
euro is more interesting to men (χ2=24.17) from Dalmatia (χ2=22.34). The 
problems of agriculture in the European Union is something that the oldest 
cohort of youth wants to know more about (χ2=15.47), as well as those born, 
raised (χ2=66.69) and living in rural areas (χ2=50.72), with a vocational school 
diploma (χ2=19.65) and HSS supporters (χ2=59.99) and youth that often follow 
issues related to economy in the media (χ2=49.05). 
The following part is focused on sources of information through which 
Croatian citizens gather information on the European Union, its policies and 
institutions. Table 11 consists of five answers offered to the participants and one 
(answer “other”) consisting of answers “specialized information offices of the 
state government”, “contact with members of Parliament”, “political 
gatherings”, “state institutions”, “labor unions”, “professional associations” and 
“something else” – thus, all the sources of information that young people use 
less than 5% of the time. Along with that, the percentages for answer “yes” were 
given for participants from the enlarged European Union, however the answer 
“nongovernmental organizations” was not offered to them, and the answer 
“other” is a summary of the following answers that were offered: “other press”, 
“meetings” and “something else”. 
Certainly, regarding the previous results, it is not a surprise that most 
participants both in the countries of the European Union and in Croatia receive 
information about the EU through the electronic media and the press. Here, the 
adult participants in Croatia use that very source of information to in a high 
percentage. Second place is taken by discussions and conversations with 
relatives, friends and colleagues both with the adult and the young participants, 
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as the mode through which they find out new information related to EU policies 
and institutions. Even here the young use the Internet more than twice as often 
as the adult participants in order to find out information about the European 
Union. Books, brochures and flyers are used by one out of five young and 15% 
of adult participants – this being the most common way of giving information 
about some of the more complex issues related to the EU used by the former 
Ministry for European Integration, that is by the existing Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and European Integration. Considering we do not have information about 
the level of data dissemination that the Ministry wants to achieve through its 
publications for citizens, we cannot claim to know if their proclaimed goal has 
or has not been achieved. Finally, the only remaining answer chosen by more 
than 5% of all participants relates to gathering information through civil society 
activities, that is, the actions of nongovernmental organizations. Considering this 
sector is relatively new in Croatian society, the percentage of effectiveness it has 
achieved, at least regarding the issues related to policies and institutions of the 
European Union, is by no means insignificant. 
 
Table 11: A comparative outline of the sources of information about the EU, its 
policies and institutions (%) 
Croatia 2004 
Sources of information about the EU 
EU 25* 
2004 
Youth Adults 
The media (press, television, radio) 77 91.7 95.0 
Discussions with relatives, friends and colleagues 23 50.0 48.0 
Internet, World Wide Web 21 29.1 13.1 
Books, brochures, informative flyers 16 18.8 15.5 
Non-governmental organizations – 7.3 6.5 
Other 9 20.6 28.4 
* European Commission, 2005: 51 
 
A comparison with participants older than 15 years from EU member 
countries indicates that Croatian citizens are more likely to use all the sources of 
information offered than the European population. This might be explained by 
the fact that Croatia is currently “bombarded” by a variety of information related 
to the EU due to its membership aspirations, while countries in the EU do not 
find this a number one political priority. Along side this, citizens of the 
European Union who use these sources more are mostly men (except for 
discussions with family and friends), adult participants are more regular users of 
the electronic media and the press, while the young tend to rely more on 
conversation, and especially the internet as the source of information. The highly 
educated use more of all these sources compared to participants with a lower 
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level of education, and finally, participants that claim to know a lot or enough 
about the European Union use every source mentioned more than the 
participants claiming to know little or nothing (European Commission, 2005: 
52). 
We wished to determine if there are some statistically significant 
differences in the manner of gaining information about the European Union, its 
policies and institutions, regarding the observed attributes of the young 
population in Croatia. The results of this analysis may be found in table 12, and 
it needs to be mentioned that the category “other” was omitted here, as a 
summary of the answers offered that were too heterogeneous to allow analysis. 
The results obtained through this analysis do not differ from the data available 
on the citizens of the European Union. Indeed, it is interesting that gaining 
informed through the electronic media and the press causes differences only 
regarding the general perception about the EU (the young with a positive general 
image of the EU follow the offered sources more than those with a negative 
perception), about following EU related issues in the media, which is logical 
(those that are informed about such subjects will more often use this source of 
information as well), and about the general estimate of one's own level of 
information about the Union (the well informed, as is the case in the European 
Union research as well, use this source of information more often than those not 
interested in the subject matter). Regarding discussions and conversations with 
those who are nearest and dearest, it is obvious that this mode of gathering 
information is used more often by participants born, raised and living in Zagreb 
(compared to the young from rural areas), students (unlike the unemployed and 
the pupils), young people with four years of high school or university education, 
those sympathizing with HSP, versus the HSS voters, participants that do not 
harbor a neutral image of the EU and, just like with the previous source, the 
young that believe themselves to be well informed and usually follow issues 
related the EU in the media. 
The use of the internet for gathering information about the Union causes 
the most significant differences regarding the observed attributes of youth. 
Hence, it is most commonly used by men, who were born, raised and live in 
large cities (unlike the participants from rural areas), students compared to the 
unemployed, the highly educated versus those with a vocational degree, the 
young from the Zagreb region, unlike those from Central Croatia, participants 
that usually watch news related to the EU in the media, and those considering 
themselves to be well informed about the subject at hand. Books, brochures and 
flyers are generally more commonly used by women, students or persons with a 
higher level of education, the well informed participants and those that often 
follow issues related to the EU in the media. 
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Table 12: sources of information about the EU, its policies and institutions s 
regarding the attributes of youth (%) 
Attributes of youth Media 
Relatives 
and friends 
Internet, 
www 
Books, 
brochures 
NGOs 
Gender   χ2=16.40 χ2=12.53  
Female   24.9 21.9  
Male   33.1 15.7  
Place of birth  χ2=26.85 χ2=27.48   
Village  44.9 23.5   
Small town  50.0 30.6   
Major city  54.0 36.9   
Zagreb  61.7 36.2   
Place of habitat   χ2=21.17 χ2=30.75   
Village  44.8 23.5   
Small town  50.9 29.8   
Major city  54.2 38.6   
Zagreb  58.6 36.3   
Socio-professional status  χ2=38.76 χ2=62.01 χ2=30.96  
Employed  50.6 26.7 16.5  
Unemployed  43.6 16.9 12.7  
Pupils  43.6 33.8 20.4  
Students  62.1 40.2 26.9  
Education   χ2=25.99 χ2=74.96 χ2=35.34 χ2=21.45 
Primary school or less  43.0 28.1 18.6 4.5 
Vocational school  44.9 12.8 8.5 4.5 
High school  55.7 32.4 21.1 8.8 
College, university or more  52.2 44.1 26.1 12.2 
Regional status   χ2=22.34   
Northern Croatia   29.6   
Central Croatia   20.6   
Istria and Primorje   34.0   
Eastern Croatia   24.9   
Dalmatia   26.8   
Zagreb   36.5   
Religious self-identification     χ2=19.73 
Religious     6.0 
Undecided     8.4 
Not religious     14.4 
Party affiliation  χ2=27.51    
HDZ*  49.8    
HNS  57.6    
HSP  58.2    
HSS  36.2    
SDP  57.5    
Undecided  44.7    
Perception of the EU χ2=27.29 χ2=21.36    
Negative 87.7 55.4    
Neutral 89.8 44.8    
Positive 96.0 55.1    
Following the EU in the media χ2=105.06 χ2=115.75 χ2=118.92 χ2=96.77 χ2=58.91 
Never 82.3 34.5 14.7 9.9 2.9 
Sometimes 95.8 54.8 33.0 19.6 7.7 
Often 97.2 72.9 50.7 40.2 18.7 
Level of information about EU χ2=155.93 χ2=95.88 χ2=101.72 χ2=50.47 χ2=32.52 
Well informed 97.4 59.3 38.3 24.1 10.2 
Poorly informed 88.1 41.8 19.8 13.8 4.5 
Not interested 70.1 25.3 10.8 5.7 0.6 
TOTAL 91.7 50.0 29.1 18.8 7.3 
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And, finally, non-governmental organizations are sources of information 
about the European Union for the young that are highly educated, non-religious, 
and also relatively avid as an audience when it comes to EU related issues in the 
media, and consider themselves to be well informed about that subject. Based on 
the stated findings, we might only conclude that there are no large differences 
regarding the young participants in Croatia and the citizens of the European 
Union when it comes to the form of gathering information about policies and 
institutions of the EU. 
4. Knowledge about the European Union 
We determined previously what the participants' level of information looks 
like regarding Croatian accession to the European Union based on a personal 
estimate. In other words, this was a subjective measurement of the level of 
information a participant has about the process of Croatian accession to the EU. 
Table 13, on the other hand, portrays a comparative outline of their objective 
knowledge, based on specific questions regarding Croatia’s accession process to 
the European Union. Specifically, this research was conducted in early 2004, 
before Croatia became a candidate for accession to the European Union. After 
the primary analysis of the results obtained, data in the form of a three level 
scale will be used further on in this text: “correct answer”, “incorrect answer” 
and “I do not know”. 
 
Table 13: Knowledge about Croatia’s accession to the EU – youth and adults (%) 
Participants' knowledge Youth Adults 
Correct answer 
Croatia submitted an application for full EU 
membership 32.6 35.6 
Croatia is an EU membership candidate 22.4 20.3 
Croatia is negotiating its membership in the EU 25.6 28.0 
Incorrect 
answer 
Croatia is a member of the EU 1.0 1.1 
I do not know  18.4 15.0 
 
Observing the obtained results, the level of knowledge, or lack of it, 
regarding this initial aspect related to Croatia’s relationship with the European 
Union, is somewhat cumbersome. This is especially the case given that the 
research was conducted at the peak of strong media coverage of this issue, since 
Croatia had just submitted the avis to the European Commission, whose 
response was then awaited for several months. Namely, the general conclusion 
might be that about one third of the young and somewhat more of the adult 
participants knew the answer to the question, while two out of three participants 
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did not. It would be interesting to question the citizens again to determine if their 
level of knowledge has increased in the meantime. 
In order to determine the attributes of the young that knew, were wrong or 
did not know the correct answer, an analysis regarding the observed 
characteristics of the young population was conducted, and the collective data is 
portrayed in Table 14. 
Based on this analysis, it might be claimed that the young that offered a 
correct answer to the question about Croatia’s accession to the EU had the 
following common attributes: they were male, living in Zagreb (compared to 
participants from rural parts of Croatia), are studying (versus the young that are 
still pupils) or have already obtained a higher education degree (in comparison 
to youth with a three-year vocational degree), are from the Zagreb region (unlike 
the young from Eastern Croatia), follow the news on television, in daily papers 
and on the internet, often use all the media to gain information about European 
Union related issues, have a positive image about the EU, believe themselves to 
be well informed about Croatia’s accession to the Union, and support Croatia in 
joining the Union, because they believe it to be inevitable. 
On the opposite side are the participants that answered our question 
incorrectly. They are more often men living in one of the three large cities, they 
are also pupils or are employed, with three years of high school education, living 
in Central and Eastern Croatia, often watching news on television, and 
occasionally reading it in a daily newspaper and on the internet, all the while 
supporting the process of Croatian accession to the EU because they believe 
Croatia will greatly benefit from it. In terms of all the other observed attributes, 
these participants do not differ from the young that answered the question 
correctly. As well as this, there are differences regarding those immediately 
claiming they do not know the correct answer. They are young women, living in 
rural areas, unemployed or pupils, they are also persons with a vocational 
education degree, from Northern and Eastern Croatia, persons that rarely or 
never watch the news on television, the daily newspapers or the internet, so their 
level of common knowledge is relatively low, the young that neither have a 
positive nor a negative perception about the EU, participants that never follow 
issues related to the EU, NATO or the Euro-Atlantic organizations in the media, 
the young stating that they are otherwise insufficiently informed about the 
process of Croatian accession to the European Union and, finally, the 
participants that do not support Croatia in joining the Union. 
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Table 14: Knowledge about Croatia’s accession to the EU regarding the 
attributes of youth (%) 
Attributes of youth Correct answer Incorrect answer I do not know 
Gender χ2=22.72 
Female 46.0 31.4 22.6 
Male 51.7 33.9 14.4 
Place of habitat  χ2=46.67 
Village 49.1 27.5 23.4 
Small town 49.3 33.2 17.5 
Major city 50.8 35.7 13.6 
Zagreb 46.6 43.1 10.3 
Socio-professional status χ2=33.87 
Employed 49.5 33.1 17.4 
Unemployed 47.6 29.0 23.4 
Pupils 49.9 27.6 22.5 
Students 48.2 41.0 10.8 
Education  χ2=61.21 
Primary school or less 48.4 27.4 24.2 
Vocational school 51.0 23.6 25.4 
High school 49.3 36.7 14.1 
College, university or more 45.6 43.4 11.0 
Regional status χ2=52.81 
Northern Croatia 47.1 29.7 23.1 
Central Croatia 56.6 25.4 17.9 
Istria and Primorje 47.5 34.7 17.8 
Eastern Croatia 52.5 24.5 23.0 
Dalmatia 47.1 36.6 16.4 
Zagreb 46.7 43.0 10.3 
News on TV χ2=74.58 
Rarely or never 44.1 24.1 31.7 
Sometimes 45.4 26.8 27.8 
Often 50.6 35.6 13.8 
News in daily newspapers χ2=111.12 
Rarely or never 47.3 22.9 29.8 
Sometimes 51.5 28.5 20.0 
Often 48.8 40.4 10.8 
News on the internet χ2=37.77 
Rarely or never 47.4 30.1 22.4 
Sometimes 52.8 34.1 13.1 
Often 50.7 38.2 11.1 
Perception of the EU χ2=49.95 
Negative 48.7 32.0 19.3 
Neutral 45.9 30.4 23.7 
Positive 53.6 36.3 10.1 
Following the EU in the media χ2=126.62 
Never 44.1 24.4 31.6 
Sometimes 50.0 35.8 14.2 
Often 56.5 41.1 2.3 
Level of information about Croatian 
accession to the EU χ
2=125.05 
Sufficiently informed 52.5 39.8 7.8 
Insufficiently informed 46.1 27.1 26.8 
Support for Croatian accession to EU χ2=30.06 
Yes, high benefits 51.9 31.4 16.7 
Yes, inevitable 51.0 38.6 10.4 
Yes, but expectations are too high 48.1 32.1 19.9 
No 44.1 29.1 26.7 
TOTAL 49.0 32.6 18.4 
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Along with the previous question regarding the participants' knowledge 
about Croatia’s accession process to the European Union, we have researched 
whether participants were familiar with the existence of some of the main 
institutions of the EU. The offered answers were dichotomous: “yes” and “no”. 
Comparative data for young and adult participants from our research and for 
participants from the 25 EU member countries, for the answer “yes, are available 
in Table 15. 
 
Table 15: A comparative outline of the familiarity of some EU institutions (%) 
Croatia 2004 
Institutions 
EU 25* 
2004 Youth Adults 
European Parliament 92 84.7 87.3 
European Commission 82 65.9 72.8 
Council of Ministers of the European Union 66 64.3 74.4 
European Central Bank 71 52.7 63.0 
Court of Justice of European Communities 75 30.2 43.0 
European Union Board of Regions 28 18.5 25.7 
* European Commission, 2005: 106 
 
As in Europe, the best known institution in Croatia, regardless of the 
participants' age, is the one whose function is to protect the citizens from the so-
called democratic deficit of the European Union – the European Parliament. The 
second best known institution, but probably the first when it comes to the scope 
of different issues regarding the European Union, the European Commission, 
caused a reaction with two thirds of the young, and somewhat more of the adult 
participants, while in Europe four out of five participants are familiar with this 
institution. The Council of Ministers is similarly familiar to the Croatian young 
population and to the participants from the EU, while the adult participants seem 
to recognize this institution a little more often. The European Central Bank is the 
last of the stated institutions whose familiarity with the young, as well as with 
the adult participants in Croatia, is more than 50%, with almost two out of three 
adult participants claiming they are familiar with this institution. The greatest 
discrepancy appears between the researched population of young and adult 
citizens in Croatia, and participants from the EU, regarding familiarity with the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities. The cause could most probably 
be found in the more frequent number of encounters with the decisions of that 
court by the citizens of the European Union. The Board of Regions is relatively 
poorly known to all three of the investigated populations, even though, with its 
contribution to the structural, cohesion policy of the European Union, it is a very 
influential and important institution. 
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In order to determine if there are differences regarding the characteristics of 
the young claiming to know of these institutions, we analyzed their answers 
according to the observed attributes, and the findings may be found in Table 16. 
 
Table 16: Familiarity of some EU institutions regarding the attributes of youth (%) 
Attributes of youth 
EU Par-
liament 
EU Com-
mission 
Council of 
Ministers 
Central 
Bank 
Court of 
Justice 
Board of 
Regions 
Gender  χ2=14.72   χ2=12.57  
Female  61.8   26.5  
Male  69.9   33.8  
Age  χ2=55.63 χ2=19.40 χ2=25.01   
15 – 19 years  57.0 59.7 45.4   
20 – 24 years  64.5 62.4 53.8   
25 – 29 years  76.3 70.8 59.0   
Socio-professional status χ2=20.71 χ2=23.21  χ2=29.82   
Employed 86.4 67.8  56.9   
Unemployed 80.5 66.1  47.8   
Pupils 81.1 57.2  44.4   
Students 89.9 71.9  59.7   
Education  χ2=26.58 χ2=37.05 χ2=19.65 χ2=24.73   
Primary school or less 79.9 57.8 58.4 44.7   
Vocational school 80.7 62.8 60.6 51.6   
High school 87.8 68.9 67.4 56.0   
College, university or more 90.7 78.5 71.9 61.4   
Regional status  χ2=22.92  χ2=29.38  χ2=29.34 
Northern Croatia  66.2  50.9  17.6 
Central Croatia  63.0  57.6  19.7 
Istria and Primorje  72.4  65.8  29.2 
Eastern Croatia  60.7  44.5  15.5 
Dalmatia  61.1  52.5  20.2 
Zagreb  73.5  52.9  12.9 
Perception of the EU   χ2=26.81    
Negative   65.8    
Neutral   59.4    
Positive   71.6    
Following the EU in the media χ2=49.66 χ2=62.53 χ2=46.06 χ2=45.99 χ2=30.21 χ2=26.95 
Never 76.7 55.7 55.9 43.1 23.5 14.0 
Sometimes 87.8 68.5 66.1 54.9 31.6 18.8 
Often 92.5 83.6 80.8 68.2 42.7 29.9 
Following NATO in the media χ2=27.21 χ2=54.70 χ2=50.41 χ2=39.66 χ2=30.74 χ2=18.26 
Never 80.7 59.2 58.0 46.2 24.9 15.3 
Sometimes 88.7 70.6 68.6 57.4 34.3 20.6 
Often 91.4 88.7 87.1 70.7 44.3 29.3 
TOTAL 84.7 65.9 64.3 52.7 30.2 18.5 
 
Familiarity with the European Commission and the European Central Bank 
cause most of the statistically significant differences. On the other hand, the 
European Parliament is most familiar to the students (compared to pupils and the 
unemployed), that is the highly educated participants (as opposed to young with 
a basic primary school education) and the young that often watch EU, as well as 
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NATO and Euro-Atlantic organization-related issues in the media, (χ2=27.21). In 
their better recognition of the European Commission as an EU institution, the 
young with the following attributes are distinguished: men from the oldest age 
cohort, students (compared to pupils) and the highly educated participants 
(unlike those with a primary school diploma), the young from Zagreb, Istria and 
Primorje (as opposed to those from Dalmatia and Eastern Croatia) and, finally, 
the young that often follow issues related to the EU, NATO and other similar 
integrations in the media (χ2=54.70). The Council of Ministers of the European 
Union was recognized the most by the oldest participants with a higher 
education institution diploma, those with a positive image of the EU (in 
comparison to participants with a neutral perception of it) and the young that 
often follow issues related to the EU, NATO and other such organizations 
(χ2=50.41). The European Central Bank was most familiar to the oldest 
participants, the students and the highly educated youth from Istria and Primorje 
(compared to youth from Eastern Croatia) and the young that, as was the case 
with previously mentioned institutions, follow related issues in the media 
(χ2=39.66). The young that have more often than others heard of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities are mostly male, showing an above 
average interest in these subjects in the media (χ2=30.74). The Board of Regions 
of the European Union, as the least well known institution out of the six used in 
the research, was most often recognized by youth in Istria and Primorje (not 
surprising, given that Istria is one of the European regions in Croatia), and least 
often in Zagreb (a surprising piece of data, that is difficult to interpret), and, of 
course, all the participants that follow EU, NATO and Euro-Atlantic 
organization-related issues in the media more often (χ2=18.26). To summarize, 
the young at a higher socio-professional, socio-economic and educational levels 
seem to be the ones with a greater knowledge about the institutions of the 
European Union. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The level of information of citizens about important social, cultural and 
political issues is important for any society, including Croatia. In our case, it is 
specifically linked to the problem of being informed about the European Union, 
its structure and processes and Croatia's position in that context. Since joining 
the European Union was set as Croatia’s political priority, achieving an almost 
complete consensus of all the relevant political protagonists on the Croatian 
social scene, it is not irrelevant to see how well Croatian citizens are informed 
about important facts and how they assess their interest in these issues. 
When it comes to gaining information and being informed, the results from 
the Croatian youth indicate that they often follows news in every media, but lag 
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behind both the adult participants and participants from the former EU candidate 
countries. This finding does not apply to the use of the internet as a source of 
information, where the young are far ahead of the adult population, and given 
the data from the introduction, ahead of the inhabitants of the European Union 
today. However, the young differ among each other mostly in their use of 
internet and their reading of daily newspapers, with the socially more qualified 
young people (more educated, coming from an urban background and richer 
regions, and older on average) being the ones to use both these media to keep 
informed. 
Regarding the content the participants follow in the media, it is visible that 
the young are much more interested in events from social and cultural life, and a 
lot less interested in subjects with political connotations. The adult participants 
follow almost equally all subjects from social, political and cultural life, and are 
much more interested in those with a political character. A comparison with 
participants from 13 EU candidate countries indicates that they are far more 
interested in all the issues in question (aside from sports) than the Croatian 
participants. A deeper analysis of following the content offered, yielded three 
factors labeled interest in socio-political issues, interest in issues from culture 
and entertainment and interest in sports and daily chronicles. The young 
following issues comprising the first factor, are mostly among the socially and 
culturally more competent ones, the second group of subjects is followed by 
about the same profile of youth (with less pronounced differences regarding the 
observed attributes), and the third group of contents is what interests the young 
with a lower level of education that are religious and live in Dalmatia. 
The second group of subjects this analysis deals with is information and 
interests related to the European Union. In the case of the personal estimate 
about the level of information about the EU, somewhat more than a half of youth 
claims that they are well informed about the European Union and events 
regarding it, in comparison to two third of adult participants who believe they 
are well informed. On the other hand, the results from both the young and the 
adult participants are surprisingly high compared to data about the level of 
information of the population in the 25 countries of the European Union, where 
73% participants claim to be poorly informed about the issue. As for differences 
among the young, the most informed, in their own opinion, are men, from the 
oldest age cohort, students and highly educated participants, the young with a 
positive perception of the European Union, and those that usually follow issues 
related to it. 
A narrowly linked question to the one about the level of information about 
the European Union, was a question about the general level of information about 
Croatia’s accession to that association. The results indicate a somewhat different 
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trend than the previous results. In this case, 44% of the young, unlike almost half 
of the adult population, believe they are well informed about the process. It is 
surprising, though, that the identically gathered information from the former EU 
candidate countries revealed a much lower assessment when it comes to the 
level of information about this issue. The young in Croatia that believe 
themselves to be well informed are mostly male, coming from large cities, 
studying for or have received a higher education degree, and have a positive 
perception about the EU. 
Regarding issues and problems related to the EU the participants wish to 
know more about, the results indicate that both the young in Croatia and the 
participants from the former candidate countries find the issues related to youth 
and education policies of the EU to be the most interesting, followed by 
economy and social policies. On the other hand, the adult participants seem to be 
far more interested in the last two subjects. Along with that, the issues related to 
EU enlargement, cultural policy, international relations, regional policy and the 
EU budget are the least interesting to the young population. The differences 
among them are mostly randomly distributed regarding all these subjects linked 
to the EU. 
The ways of gathering information about the European Union and the 
previously mentioned contents primarily consist of the mass media (the press, 
television and radio), followed by other forms of gathering information such as 
discussions with friends and family, surfing the internet, specialized books and 
other published materials, as well as the activities of non-governmental 
organizations. Use of these sources shows no great differences between the 
young and the adult participants, except in the case of internet use, as was 
determined previously. Regarding the participants from the 25 EU member 
countries, they state all the mentioned sources as a way of keeping informed 
about the European Union, its policies and institutions, to a smaller degree. 
The final part of this text consists of some control questions, linked to the 
objective knowledge of the participants about specific issues related to the 
European Union. Thus, the question about where Croatia was in its accession 
process to the EU at the moment the research was conducted, actually 
demonstrated some disappointing results: the correct answer was given by 
approximately one third of the young and adult participants. The second 
question asked had to do with the familiarity of certain institutions of the 
European Union. The young and adult participants are not that different in their 
knowledge about this issue: both find the European Parliament to be the most 
familiar institution, followed by the European Commission, then the Council of 
Ministers of the EU, and the European Central Bank, while other institutions 
were recognized by less than 40% of Croatian participants. The participants 
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from the European Union are more familiar with each of the mentioned 
institutions, which is not surprising, given they have had more opportunities to 
deal with them in everyday situations. However, the ignorance of the Croatian 
participants about the accession process of their own country casts a shadow of 
doubt over their assessment related to their level of information about the EU 
and its institutions. It is realistic to assume that this level of information is lower 
than might be concluded just from their statements, and this assumption is 
supported by the finding that participants from European Union member 
countries estimated their level of information to be poorer than the Croatian 
participants. It is difficult to understand where such a non-critical opinion about 
the Croatian participants' level of information derives from. One of the possible 
explanations might be, since they realize the subject of the European Union is so 
important for Croatia at the moment, that they refused to admit in the research 
that they are actually not adequately informed, and the other explanation could 
be that the participants mistook the fact that the media increasingly cover the 
subjects of European integration and Croatia’s relationship with the EU, with 
their own knowledge and coverage of those issues. 
The social characteristics of youth in Croatia that cause the greatest 
differences in acceptance of the observed attitudes and perceptions, are primarily 
those that relate to the level of socio-cultural qualifications (the socio-
professional status and education of participants), followed by gender, 
provenience, regional status and finally, the participants' age. The lowest effects 
on the differences among the young population come from the fathers' 
education, then religiosity and domicile, followed by party identification. The 
highest level of information and knowledge is shown by men from the oldest age 
cohort of the young participants, those born and living in large cities (including 
Zagreb), inhabitants of the most developed regions (Zagreb, Istria and Primorje), 
students and the employed and those that have a higher level of education, the 
non-religious and sympathizers of liberal and left-wing oriented parties (HNS 
and SDP), sometimes accompanied by young supporters of HSP, due to the fact 
that this is the party that builds a part of its image on its loud opposition to 
Croatia associating with the European Union. Along with all that, it is important 
to mention that better knowledge and a higher level of information about the 
European Union, its policies, institutions and enlargement process, is linked with 
the positive attitudes about the different aspects of the European Union (its 
image, following of EU related issues in the media, support for Croatian 
accession to the Union, etc.), which, most probably, means that they are 
mutually conditioned. 
As a conclusion, we can state that the participants' answers demonstrate 
that Croatian citizens – both young and adult – are not as interested in the 
European Union as its presence in the media and the political agenda might 
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imply, while their knowledge about the relationship between Croatia and the EU 
is at an even lower level. Hence, there needs to be a stronger and more 
comprehensive public campaign focused on the increasing the level of 
information and level of knowledge the citizens have about the European Union 
and what it represents, so the Croatian population might make an informed 
decision about their county joining this community of European countries, when 
that moment arrives. Such a campaign is even more in line as the newest events 
regarding the European Constitution demonstrate that the EU citizens have 
problems with a deficit of knowledge and information when it comes to matters 
related to the Union, that they are supposed to decide on. A lesson about the 
much greater effort that the European elite needs to make, to include citizens in 
this very important political project – the construction of a united Europe – is a 
useful alarm to the domestic political elite that needs to animate its citizens for 
Croatian inclusion in the process of European integration. Since the young are 
the natural winners of Croatian accession to the EU, who are to start the most 
productive part of their lives in this new environment, it is especially important 
to create an information campaign that is close and convincing to the young 
generation. 
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SUMMARY 
The subject of this study – The Youth in Croatia and the European 
Integration – is the relationship of youth toward the European integration 
process, including the Croatian accession to the European Union, as well as their 
sociopolitical readiness for integration into a united Europe. The analysis is 
based on a section of data gathered in early 2004, on the entire Croatian 
territory, and conducted within the scientific and research project Youth and the 
European Integration Process. The basic sample of youth, aged 15 to 29, 
consisted of 2000 examinees, and the control sample of persons older than 30 
consisted of 1000 examinees. The obtained findings on youth have been 
systematically compared to results from the previous research project, The Value 
System of Youth and Social Changes in Croatia, conducted in early 1999, on an 
identically structured sample of 1700 young examinees. Data on Croatian youth 
has also been compared to the corresponding findings of several European 
researches. 
European integration is a dynamic and multidimensional process, and in 
this research, the accent was on the political and normative dimensions of 
integration. The genesis of the political development of European Union has 
indicated that, in spite of the oscillations in the process of integration, there is a 
recognizable progress toward the construction of a Europe of values, where all 
the included countries meet with equally high democratic demands. The existing 
research into the European integration process has undoubtedly shown that the 
relationship of citizens toward the EU varies as a function of time, and depends 
on the specific situation in certain countries or societies. Croatia is a transitional 
country that has stepped into the process of democratic consolidation, and after 
the year 2000, it had also stepped out of a certain kind of international isolation. 
Today, Croatia is a country trying to join the united Europe, which has managed 
to obtain the status of a candidate country for accession into the EU, albeit with 
an uncertain date for accession negotiations. Even though the main obstacle for 
the start of negotiations is supposedly the lack of satisfaction of the EU with the 
Croatian cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, the existing tendencies and 
events in the country indicate that Croatia is not adequately prepared to join the 
Union: not at the political, nor the social, and especially not at the economic 
plain. The indicated findings are also the starting points in the research of the 
relationship of Croatian youth toward the European integration process. 
A valid analysis of this relationship demands a previous insight into some 
aspects of the political readiness of youth for European integration of Croatia. 
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With that in mind, special attention was dedicated to political values, attitudes 
and participation of youth, whose longitudinal monitoring enables a detection of 
changes that took place during the past five years. The data comparison showed 
that during the observed period of time, the young people’s otherwise relatively 
high acceptance of almost all the constitutional values, as well as the 
harmonious perception of politics and institutional trust have increased, while 
the lack of hard work, discipline and responsibility are now perceived as a social 
problem to a greater extent than before. The recent data also indicates that 
today’s youth perceive the existence of educational, gender and age inequalities 
in the Croatian society to a larger degree, as well as the worsening of political 
representation of all marginal groups. On the other hand, the understanding of 
conflicts and democratic rules (especially the role of the opposition) has 
weakened, the perception of crime in ownership conversion and privatization as 
a problem has decreased, there is also a weaker perception of the existence of 
social and religious inequalities, the social activism and political participation 
have decreased, and the attitude about inclusion into youth organizations of 
political parties and the establishment of independent youth parties as forms of 
activities that might contribute to a more active participation of youth in the 
society has decreased. From hence comes the conclusion that certain changes 
tend to lead to further social, most of all political, (self)passivization and 
marginalization of young people. 
The continuity of tendencies established in the previous research projects, 
confirm the finding that the young are not a monolithic group when it comes to 
acceptance of political values, expression of political attitudes and the level of 
political participation. The greatest differentiation is present regarding the not so 
present tolerance toward most observed social phenomena and groups, the 
perception of unemployment as the most important social problem and the cause 
of existing difficulties, the perception of existence of political inequalities and 
the stated interest in politics, as well as the perception of the role of the 
“diaspora” in the Croatian political life. When these results are observed 
integrally, it is obvious that the young are mostly differentiated by the level of 
obtained knowledge and their socio-professional status, then party identification, 
social origin and the phase of maturity. All the mentioned differentiations of 
youth can simply be summarized by outlining two large, relatively polarized 
groups: one consists of socially more competent youth, inclined to the 
ideological and political options of the left center, and the other consists of a 
socially inferior youth, inclined toward the right pole of the ideological-political 
spectrum. The socially more competent youth is more liberal, more critical 
toward the social reality and the political actors, they manifest a greater respect 
for democratic institutions and procedures, which is an indicator of the 
importance of favorable circumstances in the process of political socialization. 
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The recent data enabled us to establish the existence of inter-generational 
differences, which are not enormous but are significant. The comparative 
analysis of the attitudes of both the young and the older examinees, 
demonstrated that the young state a higher degree of trust in the media than the 
older examinees, that they are more tolerant toward a number of social 
phenomena and groups, which cause dispute both in the Croatian and the 
European public opinion arena, as well as more sensitive regarding ethnic 
inequalities. The young perceive war as the main cause of current difficulties to 
a greater extent than the elders, they have considerably more trust in their own 
generation as a social force that could initiate positive trends, they express a 
greater readiness for inclusion in different civil society activities, and believe 
more that television and youth organizations could mobilize them into active 
participation in social affairs. At the same time, the young are slower than the 
older examinees to accept the value of a democratic order, however, they are 
also less prone to have a harmonious understanding of politics, they are less 
socially sensitive, they express less trust in the institutions of power, the 
socioeconomic goals and the preservation of tradition are less often among their 
political priorities, they less often think immorality and criminal activities in the 
privatization process are the cause of current problems, they perceive a smaller 
level of corruption in all areas of social life (aside from education), they believe 
less in the positive contribution of experts and entrepreneurs to overcoming the 
trends of crisis, they are less interested in politics and participate less in political 
parties, and they have a smaller level of faith in the mobilization role of 
education for democracy, volunteer work, political parties and non-
governmental organizations, as well as the contribution of the family and 
education system in the stimulation of the young people’s social engagement. 
The established inter-generational differentiation can be explained through the 
life cycle theory, meaning the mentioned differences are mostly the effect of 
differing social statuses and the complete experiences of the young and the older 
examinees. That means that most young people have not assumed some of the 
permanent social roles, and that their immediate experiences are limited only to 
some social areas among which politics do not have a prominent place. The 
existing inter-generational differences are also the result of the fact that most 
older examinees draw on their experience gained in a different social and 
political regime, which to a certain measure forms their existing system of 
political values that is, in certain elements, especially those related to the social 
dimension, different than the youth’s system of political values. On the other 
hand, the congruence of the young and older examinees is contributed to by a 
common experience of an era, that is, life in a specific socio-historic period. The 
absence of deep inter-generational ambiguities also indicates that, in spite of the 
radical changes that have appeared through the decomposition of the old and the 
set-up of a new social and political order, the mechanism for transposing 
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political values from the older generations to the young ones, functions to a 
considerable degree, along with the transfer of the shortcomings that exist in the 
structured political awareness of the older generation. 
Even though it was established that the youth in Croatia accept the 
traditional values to a smaller degree compared to the elders, the young are at 
the same time somewhat more conservative in certain areas than their European 
counterparts. Pointing to this finding is the greater orientation of the Croatian 
youth toward the family and a smaller extent of tolerance of certain phenomena 
and groups in the contemporary society. At that, the social participation of the 
Croatian young generation is at a lower level than the participation of their 
European peers. 
The attitude toward human rights is also one of the indicators of political 
preparedness of Croatian youth for integration into a democratic Europe, which 
promotes high standards in the protection of human rights and freedoms. The 
research results about the evaluation of individual human rights and freedoms, 
show that the youth accept the right to an education, the right to work and 
personal security, the right to privacy, the social protection of the elderly and 
those in other precarious situations, the equality before the law, the rights of 
women and the right to ownership the most. The analysis has shown that the 
preference of individual human rights and freedoms is not caused by the 
observed socio-demographic and socio-structural characteristics of the young, 
aside from education, which points to the significance of the education system as 
an agent of improvement of the state of human rights. Approximately a third of 
the young examinees were not satisfied with the respect for human rights in 
Croatia today nor were they satisfied five years ago, the percentage of the 
undecided has decreased in that period of time, and the number of those that 
think human rights in Croatia are mostly or completely respected has increased. 
The results of the analysis of social attributes of youth indicate that the ability of 
assessment and a higher degree of criticism toward the status of human rights in 
Croatia is related to life in economically more prosperous regions, a left 
ideological-political orientation as well as the female gender. The comparison of 
the evaluation of the contribution of institutions, organizations and significant 
individuals in the population of youth in 1999 and in 2004, established that the 
generation of youth today perceives a higher level of contribution of all observed 
participants (except for the opposition) to the protection of human rights and 
freedoms in Croatia. More precisely, most of the young assess that all the 
participants, completely or mostly, contribute to the realization of human rights 
in Croatia, which especially refers to the perception of the contribution of the 
highest institutions of power. The perception of the status of human rights in 
Croatia and the contribution of the observed actors to the realization of those 
rights, are considerably highly influenced by regional affiliation and party 
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identification, followed by their social background, their gender and the 
religious self-identification of the young. 
The comparison of acceptance of the observed human rights and freedoms 
of the populations of young and older examinees in Croatia, indicates that the 
elders accept most individual human rights and freedoms more than the young, 
and that they also express less criticism toward today’s respect for those rights 
and freedoms in Croatia, while validating the contribution of all the observed 
actors to a higher degree. 
To summarize, the analysis has shown that the young accept human rights 
and freedoms very highly at the level of principle, but that there is a certain 
disagreement when it comes to concrete rights and practices in Croatia. Even 
though the degree of acceptance of the value of human rights and freedoms is 
high among the young, there are also deviations indicating an increased need for 
additional engagement of certain agents of socialization, especially the education 
system and the political actors. 
The national affiliation of youth is another indicator relevant to its 
relationship toward the European integration. The research has shown that the 
attitude most represented with the youth is one of moderate national 
identification, then the ones signifying an openness toward the world, while 
ethno-centric statements are at the back of the obtained hierarchy. The attitude 
that had demonstrated the highest representation of national identification is for 
the first time at the top of the rank in all our research projects, just as it is 
evident that nationally tinted attitudes, both moderate and extreme, are more 
represented now than in 1986 or in 1999. Such an increase of the national 
affiliation of the young can be interpreted by the fact that there is more emphasis 
on existential problems and that there is a higher uncertainty regarding the 
future, then the increase of differences between the rich and the poor, as well as 
a smaller degree of trust in the political leadership. The immediate confrontation 
with this type of social instability, results in a search for safer modes of 
relationships with other people, the society as a whole and some of its parts, 
where the nation represents one of the safe havens, much like family and church. 
However, it is necessary to emphasize that the attitudes of openness toward the 
world are quite stabile, and that they are often complementary instead of being 
opposite to attitudes of national identification. At the same time, this points to 
the complexity of the problem of national affiliation and the fact that it does not 
have to be exclusive, but can actually coexist with attitudes that enhance the 
process of European association. 
Regarding their national affiliation the young are, of course, not 
homogenous. The results of the analysis have shown that the nationally oriented 
youth is significantly more religious than the others, they prefer the conservative 
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parties, live in Dalmatia, Central and Eastern Croatia, they originate more often 
from rural areas and families, where the father has a lower degree of education, 
they personally have a lower level of education and, within the youth sample, 
they belong to the youngest age cohort (age 15 to 19), and the groups of pupils 
and the unemployed. On the other hand, a significantly lower national affiliation 
is expressed by youth coming from the Istrian, Zagreb and Northern Croatia 
provenience, those indecisive about religion or atheists, youth of urban 
background and a higher family and personal education status. However, 
regarding cosmopolitism, the young demonstrate significantly more 
homogenous results. 
It is especially indicative that the more ethno-centric examinees and, to a 
smaller degree, those with a pronounced national identification, more often have 
a negative perception of the European Union, while the nationally more 
exclusive examinees refuse to even support the accession of Croatia into the 
European Union. 
The examination of the social (ethnic) distance toward certain nations has 
demonstrated that the young have put members of the former Yugoslav 
federation and Russians at the back of the scale, while, with an under-average 
evaluation, the center of the scale is occupied by members of certain Central and 
Eastern European nations (the Czech and the Hungarian). Inhabitants of the 
European Western and Southwestern territories, especially the Italians, which 
occupy the first position after form the Croats, and the Germans, demonstrate 
satisfactory results just by being evaluated by average grades. However, the 
degree of social closeness that the young citizens of Croatia feel toward other 
Croatian men and women, indicates a certain dose of self-criticism, because 
approximately one third of the young do not feel an especially high level of 
affinity toward, for the most part, their own nationals. 
The older examinees differ from the young in that they more pronouncedly 
represent attitudes at the center of the national affiliation scale, as well as 
indicate a higher ethnical distance on average. However, the fact is that, in spite 
of the existence of inter-generational differences when it comes to national 
affiliation where the older examinees dominate, there are also inter-generational 
differences that indicate a better position of the youngest examinees in our 
sample (aged 15 to 19). This phenomenon has already been described in 
literature by the so-called U-curve, which vividly illustrates a higher national 
affiliation of individuals at their earlier and later periods of life. Thus, the greater 
national affiliation, on the one hand, seems to appear as an expression of an 
adolescent transitional crisis, and on the other, as a consequence of a long-term 
perseverance of the perception and production of (most probably) negative 
experiences with a specific out-group. 
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The relationship of the examinees toward the European integration and the 
European Union has been investigated via numerous indicators, where the 
emphasis was on the perception of the possible consequences of Croatian 
accession to the EU. However, other aspects of the relationship toward Europe 
and the EU have been the object of research, presenting a wider context for 
understanding the perception of consequences of joining the Union. The 
obtained results demonstrated that most of the young and of the older examinees 
in Croatia actually had a neutral image of the EU, even though those with a 
positive image exceed those that perceive the EU negatively. Actually, nine 
tenths of the examinees have in the beginning of 2004, supported the Croatian 
integration into the Union, but among those examinees, there is a highest 
number of euro-skeptics, that is, those that believe that too much is expected 
from the accession. At the same time, there were considerably less euro-
enthusiasts (those that expect all-around benefits from the integration) and euro-
realists (who believe that integration is inevitable for the survival of small 
countries). As for the difficulties standing in the way of the Croatian road to a 
united Europe, the examinees had equally addressed them to both Croatia and 
the European Union, however, the number of young emphasizing the 
accountability of the EU has increased from 1999 to 2004, and the number of 
those accenting Croatia’s responsibility has, in the same period of time, 
decreased. The finding that the young expect significantly more positive than 
negative consequences after the Croatian accession into the European Union, is 
especially important. However, in this regard, there has been a mild decrease in 
the expectation of the positive, and an increase of the negative consequences 
among the young during the last five years. The highest positive expectations 
have been registered at the individual and the socio-cultural planes, while the 
optimism regarding the socio-economic progress has decreased. Indeed, the lack 
of socio-economic preparedness of Croatia for the entrance into the developed 
European surrounding is expected to yield the most negative consequences. 
The research of the expected development of the EU in the coming ten years, 
has shown that only the possibility of easier travel, work, study and life in Europe 
is expected by most of the examinees, especially the young ones. The young are 
quite fearful of the costs Croatia might have from the integration and of the 
worsening position of the agricultural population. The negative conesquences 
expecting their own country are, however, less perceived by the youth in Croatia, 
than by their counterparts in Europe. Related to the fears from the construction of 
a united Europe and European Union, we have established that the youth in 
Croatia is most afraid of the abolition of the Croatian currency and the increase of 
crime, and its smallest fear has to do with the potential loss of social privileges. 
The fears of examinees in the enlarged Europe are somewhat different – the most 
expressed fear is that of labor transfer into other countries, the increase of crime 
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and drug trade, the difficulties expecting the farmers and the price their country 
has to pay due to the development of the EU. Both the young and the old 
examinees in Croatia are less worried about the loss of national identity, language 
and their social privileges than the European examinees. 
All our examinees emphasize the multiple benefits of the EU enlargement, 
followed by the positive effects of that enlargement for Croatia, while the efforts 
of the Croatian government, regarding the accession to the Union, are valued 
quite poorly. The potential accession of Croatia into the European Union shall 
also signify a change in the decision-making process, meaning that some of 
those decisions will be reached at the national level, and some jointly with the 
EU. Our examinees have, in this regard, demonstrated a high level of readiness 
for integration, because more than half of them believes that four fifths of the 
observed areas should be the object of joint decision-making by the EU and 
Croatia. The only areas in which, in the opinion of the young examinees, Croatia 
should decide autonomously are the acceptance of refugees, the judiciary, 
culture, agriculture, fisheries and the police. The Europeans differ in their 
opinions on these issues from the Croats, and believe two thirds of the observed 
affairs should be decided on jointly by their country and the EU, while their 
country should be autonomous in deciding about education, basic rules about the 
media, health and social care and unemployment. 
Different social groups have, based on the perception of youth, been 
grouped into potential losers of the integration (farmers, the retired, workers, the 
unemployed), potential winners of the integration process (such as the 
inhabitants of the capital and certain regions, the young, as well as the Croatian 
population as a whole), and certain winners of the process of integration, which 
are also the best prepared for Croatian accession into the EU (experts, foreign 
language speakers, the political elite, managers, large companies). Actually, it 
was shown that the young consider the social groups which are in a relatively 
better position in the Croatian society today to be the greatest winners of EU 
integration, and those whose current status is unenviable, who are in the greatest 
need of a better future, were perceived as those that will potentially gain the 
least. The only encouraging fact is that the young are seeing themselves as the 
potential winners, meaning they believe the existing abilities and potentials of 
the young generation only need optimal circumstances in order to reach their 
peak. However, the data about the knowledge of foreign languages in Croatia are 
not very exhilarating, especially compared to the knowledge of foreign 
languages of the youth in the European Union countries. 
Within this research, we have also found that approximately three quarters 
of our examinees are proud of being Croatian citizens, while around half of the 
young, and somewhat less of the elders are proud to be European. The young are 
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the ones to be more critical toward their national identity, and at the same time 
they lead in the positive validation of their European identity. However, the most 
interesting finding concerns the fact that all the Croatian examinees feel less 
national pride than the inhabitants of the European Union, while it is 
understandable that the examinees in the EU emphasize their pride of being 
European more. The answers of the examinees regarding the question about the 
contents of the concept “being a citizen of the European Union” indicate that 
neither the young, nor the older examinees posses a coherent understanding of 
the EU citizenship. Still, the right to work, live and study in any EU member, 
represents the key element for the understanding of EU citizenship, both with 
the young people in Croatia and with the youth in the Union. The young and the 
older Croatian examinees believe that active suffrage is the least important, 
regardless of whether the elections in question include the European Parliament, 
the national or the local representative bodies. 
Only one out of four Croatian examinees believes the Croatian membership 
in the EU might benefit them personally, while almost half of all the young and 
a third of the older examinees do not posses a defined opinion on this issue. It is 
clear that this feeling is closely related to the question of the personal meaning 
the European Union holds for the examinees, where neither the young nor the 
elders have a homogenous perception of the meaning of the EU. A single 
response appeared in an above-average number of cases – the EU is a way of 
creating a better future for the young – while the claim that the EU signifies a 
sort of “European government”, superimposed to the national states which are 
members of the Union, received a small level of support. Unlike that, the young 
from the Union countries emphasize the freedom of movement most often, while 
in time, the very concept of “European government” became more pronounced 
in the attitudes of the European youth. The young people in Croatia, as well as in 
the EU, express an equally small level of fear of the euro-bureaucracy, the loss 
of cultural diversity and the utopian idea of Europe. 
Considering the readiness of the young to live outside of Croatian borders, 
we have found that almost two fifths of them would like to live (and work and 
study) abroad for a while, while a quarter of the Croatian youth would like to 
leave the country forever. The older examinees, on the other hand, demonstrate a 
higher level of conservativeness toward the possible departure of their children 
into one of the countries of the Union, but they are, however, ready to accept 
their possible studying and training in the EU, while only one out of seven 
examinees would like his/her children to permanently live or spend their entire 
working life in one of the countries, which are members of the European Union. 
The analysis of the differentiation of the young in their relationship toward 
the European integration and the EU, has indicated that the used social 
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characteristics have a limited influence. In other words, the young are relatively 
homogenous in their perception of a united Europe and the expectations from the 
Croatian accession to the European Union. However, certain differences do 
exist, and they are mostly caused by party identification, socio-professional 
status, regional affiliation and religious self-identification. This means that the 
most influential attributes, when it comes to attitudes toward the European 
integration process, are the ones consisting of ideological-political attitudes and 
the current social status along with the specifics of the wider environment. Thus, 
we have found that the sympathizers of parties that belong to the left center, then 
pupils and students, the inhabitants of the more developed regions and the non-
religious examinees are more inclined toward the EU and the integration 
process, and at that, they emphasize the positive consequences and the potential 
gains from the Croatian accession into the Union, more than they express their 
concerns with the negative consequences. Hence, the concise conclusion would 
be that the greater social competence of the young is reflected in the establish-
ment of a stable and more consistent pro-European orientation. Otherwise, the 
young differ from their older counterparts in their higher expectance of positive 
effects from the Croatian integration into the EU and, at the same time, in the 
lower perception of expected problems and undesirable consequences. 
Considering information sources and the level of information of the young 
in Croatia, the results show that the young follow the news in all the media 
outlets relatively often, but that they do lag behind the older examinees, and the 
examinees coming from the former EU candidate countries. This finding does 
not apply only to the use of the Internet as a source of information, where the 
young people are far superior to the older examinees. With that in mind, it is 
interesting that the young differ the most among each other, in the use of 
Internet and the reading of daily newspapers, where the socially more qualified 
young examinees (the more educated, coming from an urban environment and 
richer regions and averagely older ones) are the ones that use both media for 
obtaining information more often. As for the contents the examinees look for in 
the media, it is visible that the young are much more interested in events from 
the social and cultural life, and much less in issues related to politics. A 
comparison with the examinees from 13 countries that were EU candidates, 
demonstrated that they are far more interested in all the contents (aside from 
sports) than the Croatian examinees. 
Regarding the assessment of their own level of information about the EU, 
somewhat more than half of the young have stated that they are well informed 
about the European Union and events in it, compared to two thirds of the older 
examinees believing they are well informed. On the other hand, the results of 
both the young and the older examinees are surprisingly high, compared to the 
data on the level of information of the inhabitants in the 25 countries of the 
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European Union, where three quarters of the examinees thought they were 
poorly informed about the issue. Closely related to the question of the level of 
information about the European Union itself, is the question about the general 
level of information about the Croatian accession to that association. The results 
demonstrate a somewhat different trend than the previous finding. In this case, 
less than half of the young consider themselves to be well informed about the 
process. It is interesting that the identically gathered data on this issue, from the 
former EU candidate countries, yielded a much lower evaluation by the 
examinees on their own level of information. Regarding issues and problems 
related to the EU that the examinees would like more information on, we have 
established that both the youth in Croatia and the examinees from the former EU 
candidate countries, find issues related to the Union’s policy on youth and 
education to be the most interesting, followed by the economy and social policy. 
Along with that, the issues regarding the enlargement of the EU, the cultural 
policy, the international relations, the regional policy and the EU budget are the 
ones the young find to be the least interesting. The manner in which the 
examinees gather information on the European Union mostly include the mass 
media outlets (the press, the television and the radio), and only then other forms 
of information gathering, such as discussions with their families and friends, 
surfing the Internet, specialized books and other published material, and the 
activities of non-governmental organizations. There are no significant 
differences in the use of the stated sources of information between the young 
and the older examinees, except in the case of the Internet. Considering the 
examinees from the 25 EU member countries, they use all of the observed 
sources as a way of getting information about the European Union, its policies 
and institutions, in a smaller amount. 
The examination of the objective knowledge of the examinees on specific 
issues related to the European Union has yielded devastating results. Thus, when 
asked about the phase Croatia was in, regarding the accession process into the 
EU, at the moment the research was being conducted, the correct answer was 
given by only a third of both the young and the older examinees. The second 
question asked, dealt with the familiarity of certain institutions of the European 
Union. The young and the older examinees do not differ very much from each 
other regarding their knowledge of this issue: the most familiar institution to 
both of them is the European Parliament, followed by the European 
Commission, then the EU Council of Ministers, then the European Central Bank, 
while all the other institutions were familiar to less than two fifths of the 
Croatian examinees. The examined citizens of the European Union are, 
understandably, more familiar with each of the observed institutions. 
The social attributes of the young, causing the greatest differences 
regarding their level of information, are mostly the ones connected to their level 
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of socio-cultural qualifications (the socio-professional status and the level of 
education), followed by gender, and then provenience, regional affiliation and 
the age of the examinees. The highest level of information and knowledge 
belongs to men from the oldest age cohort of youth, those born and living in 
large cities, the inhabitants of the most developed regions, students and the 
employed examinees, as well as those with a higher education degree, the non-
religious and examinees preferring liberal and left-wing parties. Along with all 
that, it is important to stress that a better level of knowledge and information 
about the European Union, its policies, institutions and enlargement process, 
correlates to positive attitudes about the different aspects of the European Union 
(the image of the EU, the following of issues related to it, the support for the 
Croatian accession to the Union, and so on), which, most probably, means that 
they are mutually determined. The inter-generational comparison has, on the 
other hand, indicated that the older examinees are more interested in most issues 
appearing in the media, especially politics, and that they assess their level of 
information to be better than do the young examinees. 
To put it shortly, the results of the research on the information level and 
knowledge of the Croatian citizens – both young and old – about the European 
Union, have indicated that they are not that interested in the European Union 
issues, as much as their level of presence in the media and the political agenda 
might imply, and the examinee’s knowledge about the relationship of Croatia 
and the EU is at an even lower level. Henceforth, it is necessary to conduct a 
strong and comprehensive public campaign directed precisely at the increase of 
the level of information and knowledge of the citizens about the European Union 
and what it represents, so that when the issue comes to the agenda, the Croatian 
inhabitants might make an educated decision about their country’s accession to 
that community of European states. 
The research results presented above may be summarized into a number of 
tendencies and statements of a wider nature. 
The political culture of the young testifies, in a number of aspects, to an 
approximation to the desirable democratic standards – especially regarding the 
acceptance of basic liberal-democratic values and the readiness for social 
engagement, at lease in principle – however, their social power and social capital 
are at a low level. At that, the young are aware of their own social and political 
marginalization, and recognize an entire plethora of measures that might help 
them gain a certain measure of power and become active citizens, as is desirable 
in a democratic society, but they do not use sufficiently the channels of social 
and political promotion, which are at their disposal. 
Today’s generation of youth expresses a lower level of social sensitivity 
and is more oriented toward individual efforts and family resources in the 
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realization of life goals. At that, it seems that the young are not aware of the fact 
that an unequal access to existing social resources of the young generation today 
will have generated an unequal social status when they come of age. Hence, we 
can expect a widening and deepening of the process of social decomposition, 
that should be corrected through mechanisms that are supposed to ensure the 
highest possible equality of chances in the access to social resources (most of all, 
education). What we mean to say is that human capital is what Croatia, as a 
small and an insufficiently developed country, should deal with very 
thoughtfully. This, at the same time, signifies a maximum of investment into the 
development of human potentials, where the young generation certainly comes 
first. 
The inter-generational differences regarding the readiness of Croatia for 
accession into the European Union, and the relationship toward the European 
integration, are not of such a type and scale that there could be any mention of a 
generational gap, however, they are indicative. The most visible fact is that the 
young have demonstrated a more liberal, tolerant and flexible disposition, that 
they have a higher belief in the potentials of their own generation, and that they 
are consistent in their pro-European orientation, where they see their own 
generation as one of the certain winners of the Croatian accession into a united 
Europe. These trends suggest that the potentials of the young are a resource to be 
seriously reckoned with on the Croatian road into the EU. 
The process of the Croatian accession into the European Union is linked to 
different difficulties that affect the attitudes of citizens about the importance of 
Croatian entrance into the EU. Through this research, we have clearly detected 
that, unlike the Croatian political elite, both the young and the older citizens do 
not consider the Croatian integration into EU, to be the most important political 
goal. The political priorities of the citizens seem to be quite different, and their 
support to the project of European integration is weakening. It is, then, realistic 
to expect this trend to continue if the problematic events in the European Union 
persist, just as the difficulties in the relationship of Croatia and the EU, as well 
as the unfavorable economic and social trends in Croatia itself. This is why there 
are two equally important political tasks facing the ruling political elite: the 
initiation of the development of Croatia and an well-argumented explanation to 
the Croatian citizens why the country’s integration in the united Europe is 
purposeful. 
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